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PREFACE 
We have had deve lopment mode ls . But the theo ry o f d e v e l o p -
ment i s no t the same t h i n g as theo ry o f p o v e r t y . K model o f 
deve lopment i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a model o f e l i m i n a t i n g p o v e r t y . 
I nd ian e x p e r i e n c e i n combat ing p o v e r t y b r i n g s out the inad -
equacy o f model o f growth t h a t n e g l e c t s the parameters o f d i s t -
r i b u t i o n . I n c r e a s i n g c a p i t a l accumulat ion alone may w e l l 
improve growth r a t e s but s i g n a l l y f a i l s t o secure an e q u i t a b l e 
sha r ing o f the f r u i t s o f g rowth . P o v e r t y i n I n d i a i s i n f a c t 
s t r u c t u r a l l y determined and r e q u i r e s the n e c e s s i t y o f r e d i s t -
r i b u t i o n o f p r o d u c t i v e a s s e t s as a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the success 
o f a n t i - p o v e r t y programmes. I n f a c t p o v e r t y i s not on l y a 
problem o f economics o f p r oduc t i on but o f s o c i o l o g y o f d i s t r i -
b u t i o n as w e l l . 
Both the anatomy and the phys io l ogy ' o f p o v e r t y i n I n d i a have 
t o be s tud i ed in a w id e r frame o f r e f e r e n c e which would be more 
e m p i r i c a l and l e s s a b s t r a c t , more m i c r o - s o c i o l o g i c a l and micro-
economic and l e s s m a c r o - s o c i o l o g i c a l and macro-economic . I t is 
now q u i t e obv i ous t h a t p o v e r t y i s a case o f p l u r a l i t y o f causes 
and he te reogeneous i n t e r m i x t u r e o f e f f e c t s . W o should no t o n l y 
i d e n t i f y the causes o f Ind ian p o v e r t y but a l s o grasp how these 
I 
ca\3ses uct and r e o c t on one ano ther . Vlhot vje rcqv i i re i s i d e n -
t i f i c a t i o n o f the hard and s o f t p o i n t s o f ag ra r i an s o c i a l , 
economic and p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . Thanks t o the e f f o r t s o f I 
f i e I d - o r i e n t e d s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s t h a t newly emerging p i c t u r e 
o f Ind ian s o c i e t y i s in c l o s e p r o x i m i t l y w i th s o c i a l r e a l i t y . 
We have t o p robe i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l - s t r u c t u r a l s p h c r c - c u l t u r c 
I 
o f p o v e r t y a c o l o u r f u l range o f s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l arrcngenicnts 
and i n s t i t u t i o n a l c omp l exes . . One o f the myths pe rpe tua t ed by 
the pov/er e l i t e i s t h a t the problem o f p o v e r t y and the problem 
o f deve lopment cnnnot bn s o l v ed t o g o t h p r . 
In t h i s s tudy, p o v e r t y f ocusscd r u r a l deve lopment has been 
examined and a c r i t i qu i e o f f e r e d . The IRDP i s , i n f a c t , grounded 
i n the r h e t o r i c o f r a d i c a l change; i t i s no t o r i e n t e d tov/ards 
r a d i c a l o r s t r u c t u r a l change . I t i s a r e f o r m i s t v e r s i o n o f the 
t 
c o n v e n t i o n a l parad igm. Here we have examined the ' t r i c k l e down' 
approach . Growth, d i s t r i b u t i o n , p o v e r t y and i n e q u a l i t y have 
been analysed p a r t i c u l a r l y in the c o n t e x t o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i -
c a t i o n a l f a c t o r s - c a s t e , c l a s s and power . I t i s a f a l l a c y that 
t h e ' t r i c k l e down' does occur w i th t ime , t h a t a ch i e v ing h i gh 
g rowth r a t e s i s an e s s e n t i a l p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r h o l i s t i c d e v e l o p -
ment and t h a t i n e q u a l i t y may i n c r e a s e i n i t i a l l y but d e c r ea s e s 
as growth and deve lopment p r o c e e d . 
The problem o f p o v e r t y i s a t t r i b u t e d no t o n l y t o economic 
b u t t o s o c i o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s . The c o n v e n t i o n a l theo ry seeks t o 
r e d i r e c t inves tments towards t a r g e t groups t o i n c r ea s e t h e i r 
purchas ing power and the reby r e s u l t i n g s t r u c t u r a l change i , e , 
a change i n the compos i t i on o f demand, p r oduc t i on and employ-
ment r a t h e r than a p r i o r r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f a s s e t s t o e f f e c t 
b a s i s s t r u c t u r a l change and c r e a t e c o d i t i o n s o f e q u i t a b l e access , 
but the s t r a t e g y under I I ^ P accords d e f e r e n c e t o existing 
pov.'er s t r u c t u r e , preempts the p o s s i b i l i t y o f i t s success in 
p o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n and s t r u c t u r a l change. The pr imary e f f o r t 
under t h i s ax^proach i s towards more e f f e c t i v e n e u t r a l i n t e r -I 
v e n t i o n and economic man ipu la t i on . The SUCCCGS o f p r o j e c t s 
i s rneosured in terms o£ Qmounts d i sbursed cind oroas and the 
a n g r e g a t e nuriber o f p oo r f a m i l i e s c o v e r e d . Thus the t a r g e t s 
Qppeored to hove been snrpo^sed even v ; i thout f u l l y r each ing 
the ' t a r g e t grou] .1'. The cruG<;tion v/ho r c a ] 3 v b e n e f i t s , how 
he b e n e f i t s and whv he b e n e f i t s i s seldom i n v e s t i g a t e d v i t h 
any thoroughness . Th i s i s the v e r y c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h i s s tudy. 
Poverty i n Ind ian e x p e r i e n c e seems t o be a consequence o f 
power r.l iiK'-l u r o , tlio i n c g a l i t n r i o n oconomlc and s o c i a l s t r u c -
t u r e de t e rmined p r i m a r i l y by the land h o l d i n g p a t t e r n . E f f o r t s 
a r e made t o s h i f t the power s t r u c t u r e v ; i thout s h i f t i n g the 
power s t r u c t u r e . Th i s s e t o f f a c t o r s p r e v e n t s the p e r c o l a t i o n 
o f b e n e f i t s and the access o f weaker s e c t i o n s . Wi thout a l t e r -
a t i o n o f these f a c t o r s and v ; i thout the o r g a n i s a t i o n and p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n o f the r u r a l p o o r , the b e n e f i t s f rom deve lopment 
schemes w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be dravm by the b e t t e r o f f d e s p i t e 
p r j e c t s l i k e IRDP. 
The n e t impact o f the new p o l i c i e s i s t o i n t e g r a t e the 
p o o r i n t o t o e x i s t i n g o r d e r r a t h e r than seek t o change the 
.structure Lhai.^j 'roduccs p o v e r t y . Tho proncnt s t r a t e g y i s 
r e t r o a c t i v e r.^thc^r Lhan p ioact iv t - ; cukI Conr.t ( lucmtly r e f o r m i s t 
and increrT 'cntol ist o f s t a t u s - q u o o r i e n t e d - u n l i k o l y t o succced 
e f f e c t i v e l y in e r 3 d i c a t j , n g the problem o f p o v e r t y . ' Na tu ra l l y , 
t h e impact o f the p o l i c y has been f e e b l e . 
The approach under IRDP i s no t capab l e o f a l l e v i a t i n g 
p o v e r t y and o f b r i n g about s t r u c t u r a l change . I t s success 
w i l l depend on the a b i l i t y t o d e a l w i th the pov.'er s t r u c t u r e 
and the f o r c e s a c t i n g t o r e t a i n and f u r t h e r e x i s t i n g pov;er 
s t r u c t u r e . Un l ess the s t r u c t u r e i s c ons i d e r ed as p r o b l e m a t i c 
and measures taken towards p romot ing p a r t i c i p a t i v e c u l t u r e o f 
Llio i ^oorc r r j c c L i o u s in doLermin in^ I I hc^  co i i r - .e o f dev f^ lopment 
s t r a t e g i e s the e x i s t i n g approach w i l l remain at the l e v e l o f 
r h e t o r i c and v j i l l s e r ve t o s t r eng then the e x i s t i n g imba lances . 
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CHAPTER 
I N ' T R O D U C T I O N 
Economic factors determining growth are shaped and 
effected by formal social, political organisations as 
well as by customs, values, modes of thought, attitudes 
motivations and power dynamics. Realisation of this led 
development economists to emphasize that key economic 
functions used in analyzing advancec^ economies may take 
quite different forms in less-developed countries. This 
is for reasons that are largely political, social and 
institutional,^ Equally it has led to the recognition i' 
that the 'unity of social life* and its inseparable conn-
ection between its elements rules out any dissection of 
concrete reality into political, cultural, social, ethical 
and economic parts. Moreover, as the whole is something 
greatr-r than the sum of its parts, any attempt to reality 
2 by atomism would be misleading and even dangerous. 
Ther is a tendency on the part of econists to take 
these institutions and values as unchanging given and, as 
such, theories formulated on the basis of such assumption 
cannot l«y claim to universality of application^ This is 
why classical and other Western economic theories are 
utterly inadequate to explain problems facing contemporary 
u licit.-r<l«'ve loped couiitrLe.M wh- re i n;j 1.11 u Liona and v a l u e s are 
markedly different f rom those found in Western societies. 
With regard to the stand of the classical economists, 
it may be pointed out, with Hicks,that since policy is 
a reconciliation between political, social, cultural, soci-
ological and economic considerations, any attempt to recom-
n 
mend policy without due consideration of 'non-ecomomic• 
factors will be singularly misleading. As for modern 
economists, it will suffice to say that the relevance 
of economic is, after all, with social and cultural reality. 
Working on the assumptions thdt human motivations and 
the social and cultural environment of economic activity 
are relatively rigid, they attempted to relate purely eco-
nomic variables to one,another to the complete disregard 
of the political and social changes that were the concom-
.itants of the process of economic development. They do not 
seem to recognise that-there is a need to relate economic 
development to cultural change. And because of the magni-
tude of the problem and the number of variables involved, 
very few attempts have been made to treat changes in these 
Institutional and attitudinal aspects of a society as dynamic 
independent variables in the growth proress. This has led 
an economist like Boulding to express his disenchantment 
with the efficacy of applied economics in dealing with con-
crete problem. He said, 
•I have been gradually coming under the conviction 
distubing for a professional theorist, that there is 
no such thing as economics - there is only social 
science applied to economc problems^* 
Confronted with the problem, modern economists have, 
asserted that economic development is surely not equivalent 
to the total development of a society, but only a part of it.^  
13 
They conceive social development to be much broader than 
i' 
more economic development, Kindleberger, notes that 
socio-cultural and economic factors interact on an onging 
process in which it is unlikely that one always dominates 
the other,'' 
Since Marx's time, the importance of social structure 
in influencing the pattern of economic change has been 
underlined by ecpnomc historians over and over again, 
Sombart's analysis of the 'sprit of capitalism* as a moving 
I 
force in the rise of Western industry, Tawney's study of 
the impect upon economic growth of the Protestant ethic, and 
recent investigations into the role of social structure in 
explaining differences in rates of economic growth in the 
nineteenth century furnish examples of the concern of social 
8 scientists with social factors in the growth process. 
IDENTIFICATION OF NON-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The relationship of the individual to society has been 
9 10 
stressed by Parson. and Levy as critical in the transf-
ormation process, for, in their opinion, economic development 
presupposses the existence of ^.^tionality in cognition unive-
rsalism in membership and specificity in relationship. 
While emphasising the relevance of social and institut-
ional factors, we must remember l:hat economic growth is 
influenced indirectly, on the whole, rather than directly 
by a society's social structure and its apparatus of state.^^ 
Though in his analysis Spengler distinguishes the influ-
ence of the state on the social structure, he emphasizes that 
t 
the two influences overlap. He ar^es that many of the 
elements composing the sucial structure are included also I 
among the elements giving shape to the apparatus of state. 
So he considers the state apparatus as a part of the social 
structure. That is why the nature and the capacity of the 
state undergo modification when other components of the 
social system change. 
He rightly points out that the state, being a variable 
collectivity of variable elements and constituting a major 
component of the all-inclusive societal system, may be looked I 
upon as an association which performs a variety of functions 
assigned to it and in the possession of which is an appara-
tus of widely varying capacity to affect the course of evsnts, 
( 
As such, he holds (i) that the role of the state varies dire-
ctly with the nature of the reghant society; (ii) that the S 
goal-accomplishing power of the' state is a function of factors 
that reflect the stage of the society's and the economy's 
advanc4.m£nt as embodied in the quality of the bureaucracy 
and the technical apparatus employed by the state; and (iii) 
that the degree of compatibility of goals set by the state 
before itself with those subscribed to by the population or 
its most powerful subgroups determines the state's capacity 
to accomplish these goals,^^ 
c.; ti 
Economic policy generally refers to the princip-
les of Exonomics that govern action directed towards 
given ends. It is a conscious intervention to later 
the existing condition of society. TTie study of Econ-
mic Policy therefore should concern with three things, 
what we want (the ends) , how we get it (the means) and 
who are 'we* that is, what is the nature of the organi-
14 sation or group concerned. 
Economic Policy does not function in a vacuum. 
It operated in a definite social system. It influences 
the structure and function of society. At the same time 
I 
the social structural - functional factors influence the 
functioning of economic policy. Regarding the close 
connection between economics and other social sciences I 
Boulding says " I have been coming under the coviction 
disturbing for a professional theorist that there is no 
s 
such thing as economics - thci;« ir> only social science 
applied to economic problems How economics to depe-
nding on other social .sciences is obvious from Hicks' 
view that " since policy is a reconciliation between 
political, social, cultural, sociological and economic 
considerations, and attempt to recommend ^jolicy without 
duo consideration of non-r»conomc fnrtc^ rr; will bo r.lnrpil-
arly misieading, AS far modern economists, it will 
suffice to say that the relevance of economic is, after 
all, with social and cultural realitv,^^ 
13 
' Economics by its quantitative approach can answer the 
question "who" gets "what". But it fails to answer the 
querry "How" and "Why" one gets and the other doesn't. The 
answers to How and Why fall in the domain of sociology. 
Hence the relevance and rationale of socilogy of economic 
policy. 
POVERTY IN INDIA: 
Poverty in India is basically a rural problem. And 
in rural areas, it is landless agricultural labourers and 
rural artisans, in general, and the Scheduled Castes and 
the Scheduled Tribes, in particular, who constitute the 
I 
hard core of the poor. Any strategy for the alleviation 
of poverty should, therefore, be examined with particular 
reference to these sections. The rrain components of the 
« 
strategy adopted so far have been the rate of growth and 
the generation of additional employment opportunities, 
distributions of assets to the'rural poor, investment in 
human capital through education and tralnino, area specific 
schemes and target group oriented programres such as the 
SFDA, NREP, RLEGP, assistance for handlooms, handicrafts, 
khadi and village industries (through education and training), 
programmes for the Scheduled Castes and the Sch'^duled Tribes 
and the Minimum Meeds Programinos. 
The e a r l i e r f i v e yoor plcjn'. hof1 g e n e r a l l y procoedcd 
on the assumption that the norrnr-l prograrripies of development 
particularly those undertaken in rural areas, like those in 
13 
agriculture. Irrigation, int^untries, electrification, 
transport and communications, would produce a multiplier 
effect and thereby generate employment and raise the liv-
ing conditions of the poor. The corrmunity Development 
programmes (CDP-19^2) , the intensive Agricultural District 
programme (lADP-1960-61), the Intensive Agricultural Area 
Programme (lAAP - 1964) and high yielding varieties prog-
rammes (HYVP - 1966-67) belong to this category. Hence 
not much direct attention came to -.be focussed on the prob-
lems of poverty and unemployxjient. There were, no doubt, 
some programmes like expansion of Khadi and village indus-
tries, on the one hand, and education, training and job 
reservations for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes, on the other. 
Thus we see that the poverty alleviation and employ-
ment generation programiiies have maturfd from their general 
character to a more specific target group and area based 
programmes with the main thrust being on the eradication 
of poverty and unemployment in rural areas on a national 
scale, Inspite of many multi-faceted poverty alleviation 
programmes, progress in this regard, has not been upto 
the mark, 
{ 
What has been tho imprct of nearly three decades of 
"planned development"on rural poverty? Throughout the 
period, the average growth rate has been around 3,5 per 
cent per annum, arfd the per capita income has increased 
8 
at an average of 1.5, per cent per annum. The stucies on 
poverty trends indicate two releated phenomena: an inte-
nsification of inequality, with the higher income groups 
obtaining an increase in the percf^ntage share of income 
distribution while the percentage share of the poverty 
groups shows a decline; and an increase in overall inci-
dence of poverty computed on the ba:is of income levels 
for basic caloric requirements. The highest 5 per ceJnt 
income-earners receive 22 per cent of the national income, 
while the bottom 40 per cent receive less than 16 per cent. 
The Gini index has shown a rise indicating a deepening of 
inequalities; the index for hoVseholds incomes, for example, 
17 went up from 4.8 in 1955-56 to 5.13 in 1968-69. 
Despite measures such as progressive taxation and 
/ , 
other limitations to prevent the rich from becoming dispro-
portionately richer, the share of the top 20 per cent has 
increased, A similar trend is visible in consumption expe-
nditures; the upper groups showed an increase in the capita 
consumption expenditure, the lo\4er groups remained stagnant, 
18 
while the bottom 5 per cent showed a decline. The implic-
ations of such findings are often played down or underesti-
mated on grounds of being too aggregativ€=, ignoring public 
works and infrestructural deveiopmpnt, nnr' not nccotinting 
Lor qeneral progress an<l welJQr<-'. Typical is the coii.uent 
of Milton Friedman that money income differences cannot be 
cnii;ha»i2ed "just when broad social chonges arc greatly enha-
ncing the importance of differences not directly measurable 
in money, ^ ^ 
Several studies on the incidence of poverty in India 
have been made during the past decade. Most of the esti-
mates are based on the National Sample Survey data on 
consumption expenditure. The findings vary considerably, 
depending on the norms adopted for me^asurinq the minimum 
level such as the amount of caloric intake, the price 
indices used to estimate the cost of minimum consurr.ption 
at constant prices, the types of sampling procedures, and 
and so on . The studies by Ojha^® and by Dandekar and RATH^^ 
are based on an average caloric intake of 2,250 per capita i' 
per day. By computing the cost of the necessary foodgrains, 
Ojha estimates an increase from 184.2 million people (51,8 
per cent) below the poverty line in 1960-61, to a staggering 
289 million, or 70 per cent of the population in 1967-68, 
Dandekar and Rath also conclude that poverty has increased 
during this period, but their estimate of the minimum income 
22 
leads to a much lower increase. Using Rr, 18 as the 
minimum of 225 calories, Bardhan suggest a very large incr-
I 
ease from 38 per cent of the population in 1960-61 to 54 
per cent in 1968-69, indicating that additional 100 rr,illion 
people sli ped belov; tho poverty line in the- brief space of t eight years. The price index used in Bardhan's study has 
led to an overestimation of the rise of cost of living and 
S. 
hence the inflated figure of people bolow the poverty line in 
the latter years. 
Even the Sixth Plan, relatively more prone towards 
highlighting the achievements of planning, has admitted a 
10 
"limited success in redistributing assets", a lo\^r pace 
of generation of employment opportunities and inability 
of large segments o5' the population to share the benefits 
of progress or participate in the process of development. 
It admits that the poor have "by and large remained unto-
?3 uchcd by deve lopment progranmies so t a r " . 
Overall, there seems to be a consensus on two aspects; 
one, the percentage of population below the poverty line has 
not decreased despite three decades of planning on the prin-
ciples of social justice, and two, the absolute number of 
people below the povejrty line has certainly increased by 
large number during this period. This has been sumrriarized 
by the Planning Commission in the Sixth Plan 1978-83, 
"Attempts have been made to measurf=> the oxtent of pov-
erty in India, and depending on the norms used, 40-60 per 
cent of the population fall beipw the minimum acceptable 
standard, ACCORDING to a recent estimate using norms of 
caloric consumption, the percentage of population below the 
poverty line in 1977-7P may he projected at 48 per cent in 
rural areas and 41 per cent in urban areas. The total number 
of the poor, so defined, would be about 290 million....Though 
these estimates are d e b a t a b l e i t cannot of living for the 
large number of the poor and the d e s t i t u t e . . . .The prevalence 
of poverty and inequality has remained virtually unchanged 
over the years Tends in the distribution of income and 
wealth are difficult to discern, but the evidence of persis-
tence of gross inequalities in clear,.......The Distribution 
i i 
of assets for rural households shoxvs that 20 per cent 
of the households, each having less than R:. 1,000 of assets, 
account for less than 1 per cent of all rural of assets, 
while 4 per cent with asset value of Rs, 50,000 or more 
,'24 own over 30 per cent. 
This raises a basic question: where have we gone wrong 
in our efforts? Have we gone wrong in the diagnosis of 
rural poverty, in policy formulation or in implementation? 
The present study attempts to answer these questions by 
e amining the performance of one major ;rural development 
strategy namely. Integrated Rural Development Programmes 
strategy. The main reason for selecting this strategy is 
I 
that it is a major strategy of our planners aiming at erad-
ication of rural poverty. 
DIAGNOSIS OF RURAL POVERTY A M THE EMERGENCE OF THE INTEG-
RATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY. 
A large number of studiesVin the developing economies 
during late sixties and early seventies revealed that eco-
nomic growth in these did not have any significant impact 
on reducing poverty of the population. 
The economic growth had. a selective impact v/hich bene-
fitted relatively developed areas and relatively better off 
prople, but which left out backward areoa <ind hhe> poorer 
sectors of the economy almost completely. 
The question that bothered economists was what had 
gone wrong with the development strategies that created such 
a mess, Mehbub-Ul-Haq answered these questions extremely 
i2. 
well when he talked about the seven sins of developirent 
planners. The seven sins were Uv^ir fascination with 
numbers which created empty economic lx)xes with little 
policy and project content, vfcheir too much faith in eco-
nomic controls, in high rates of inventjrient (Irrespective 
25 
of their contents) and in development fashions, the 
divorce between planning and implementation, and the neg-
lect of human resources. The other studies also pointed 
out many of these weaknesses of the planning efforts of 
the developing economes. Gradually, new perspectives in 
development were evolved and a number of new ideas came 
to be established as a part of new development thinking. 
These could be described as follows: 
(1) An increase in GNP or in per capita income is not 
l i k e l y to reach the poor. A direct attack on poverty 
is needed to eradicate poverty. A micro-level appr-
, oach would be effective in this respect. 
(2) Basic human needs should be identified and production 
strategies should take them into account. Instead of 
following the.existing pattern of market-demand, the 
planning strategies should emphasize the production 
of minimum needs partly bu public expenditure, but 
largely by influencing the income distribution and 
the pattern of market deniand. 
(3) Investment in human resources should be emphasized, 
and not just the rate and amount of investment. Eff-
orts should be made to improve the productivity of 
the poor. « 
ii' 
(4) Full employment of the poor should get a high priority 
in planning strategies. Income distribution and empl-
oyment policies must be integral parts of production 
planes, 
(5) All this may need a drast'^ .c restructuring of political 
and economic power relationship if development has to 
spread to the vast majority of population. 
Indian development planners also scom to have accepted 
these ideas in principle, A number of studies on the green 
revolution in India showed that the agricultural growth 
in rural areas was selective in the sense that it affected 
26 
mainly selected areas and selected classf^s of farmers. 
Other studies showed that new technology of growth opportu-
nitits could not reach the poor because the institutions and 
structures built up in the past would not let it percolate 
to the poor. 
An important feature of our anti-poverty strategy was 
therefore a direct attack on poverty at the micro level. This 
emphasized efforts to create special facilities for the poor 
in the area of minimum needs and in the area of income/employ-
ment generation. The former was covered systematically in 
the minimum needs programme of the Five Year Plans, and the 
latter was incorporated in the special programrres for the 
target groups and for backward a r rn r ; . I t war. assumed that 
if special efforts are made to provide tho necessary inputs/ 
technology/credit etc. to the poor, it w i l l enab le them to 
e n t e r tho irini nntronm oE tho oconDiny. The VonkntHpiiih Connnittf^o 
l i 
which recominendecl the setting up of Small Farmers Develop-
ment Agency, proposed a set of institutions which could 
27 provide these facilities to the poor. Thus, in the words 
t 
of Raj Krishna, the economic philosophy behind the special 
programmes was simply that special preferential treatment 
was necessary to enable the poor to participate in the 
28 
economic development. Such a treatment attacked poverty 
directly and helped in increasing employment/incomes of the 
poor by creating special employment opportunities for them 29 and by increasing their productivity. 
The policy mechanism of the special progromrres strategy, 
which translated the philosophy into practice, can be desc-
ribed as follows: 
(1) Identification of the weaker sections of the target 
groups on the basis of assets (land) , income and caste 
(for the scheduled castes/tribes) in a precise manner. 
(2) Investigation of their economic problems and formulation 
of programmes to raise their income and employment in 
the present as well as in new occupations. It is 
necessary that the programmes are suitable and accep-
table to the tai-get groups. 
(3) t r o v i a i o n o t ap<cidl ux Lt-iKiioii L c i c i i i L i e s so Llidt the 
poor are not only informed about tVie exestice of the 
progranimes, but are also helped in participating in 
them. The extension services should also provide for 
proper followup to help the poor in running the schemes. 
(4) Providing credit (if it is not a public works programine) , 
for undertaking the scheme in such a way that A it is 
25 
easily available, B it mrets all the types of credit 
needs of the scheme, C it is available at a lower 
than the market rate of interest, D and is to be 
1 
repaid in easy instalments. The loan also will be 
subsidised so as to reduco the burden of the debt of 
of the beneficiary, 
(5) Providing a complete package of infrasturctural faci-
lities to the poor to run the scheme successfully. Over 
and above credit, the other facilities would be regular 
supplies of inputs, marketing of output, training faci-
lities, technical help whenever needed, insurance to 
cover the rist of failure etc. etc.. This should be 
done by evolving adequate financial and adm.inistrativ 
arrangements for implementing the programmes and by 
promoting common facilities for production, processing, 
storage and marketing, 
(6) Evaluation of the programmes from time to time and 
,monitoring them effectivly so as to assure efficient 
performance of the prograrrmes. 
It was expected that all these special arrangements 
will en^le the poor,- to participate successfully in the 
process of economic development. Once a poor person takes 
up an asset based income/emplovnicnt qenor f i t inq ncboinc, he 
would bt; working at u h i g h e r It 1 o!. l e chno l ogy which w i l l 
generate additional income not only for the repayment of 
the loan that he has taken, but it will also provide him 
a surplus which will be an incentive to run the scheme. 
l i 
After the repayment of the loan, he will be the owner of 
I 
the asset which will enable him to v/iden his asset-base 
gradually. And after a few years (the number of years 
will depend on the scheme that he has taken up and on his t 
initial level of income) the beneficiary will reach an income 
level vhich will assure him a minimum living standard. 
PERFORMW]CE_ OF TOE IRDP; 
One would ejq^ect that these special programmes would 
have raised the consumption levels of the lowest AO'A of rural 
population substantially. Unfortunately, the evaluation 
studies of these progran'mes do not show such results,^^ 
contrary, the clearly show that the participation rate of the 
poor in asset based income/emplo^iinent generating programmes 
has been very low,^^ and that those who have been benefitted 
by these programmes are mostly better off among the poor, which 
32 
many times included the non-poor. In other words, the eval-
uation studies suggest that the special programmes have proved 
selective in their Impact which has once again left the real 
needy poor outside the purview of developrrent efforts. The 
( 
studies have also shown that the beneficiaries have not bene-
fitted enough in terms of increase of income, employirient, asset 33 
formation etc. in a significant way. This would imply that 
the programmes have not helped the beneficiaries substantially 
in terms of the eradication of their poverty. 
This once again raises the same fundamental question 
which was raised in tte early sevrnties; What has gone wrong 
with our new development strategy that it has still not cont-
ributed substantially in terms of eradication of poverty ? Why 
i i 
has the IRD Prograrra^ies s t r a t e g y , which i s based on d i r e c t 
nt trick on po.vorV.Y nol^  bi un niuTv s r . f n l l y ? VJh' re li ivi • \o 
gone wrong ? . 
The e v a l u a t i o n s t u d i e s o f the t a r g e t group s p e c i a l 
prograiTiiues have attempted t o S/rovide ensv/ers t o Lhe cruest-
i o n s r a i s e d above . Acco rd ing t o these s t u d i e s the n-ajor 
f a c t o r s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the l i m i t e d success o f the s p e c i a l 
programmes are r e l a t e d t o the per fo rmance o f the implemen-
t a t i o n machinery o f the deve lopment programmes, 
A . DEVELOPMENT /JDMINI3TRATI0!I: The e v a l u a t i o n s t u d i e s 
p o i n t ou t t h a t the pe r f o rmance o f the deve lopment adminis -
t r a t i o n , which had the ma jo r I ' o sponr . i b i l i t y o f implement ing 
t h e programmes, was no t s a t i s f a c t o r y . F i r s t o f a l l , the 
e f f i c i e n c y o f the s t a f f was lov; as ( a ) i t v;as i n d i f f e r e n t 
t o the problems o f the poor and i t Inckcrl undors tnnr ing as 
wess as invo l v ement v/ith the s u f f e r i n g s o f the p o o r , (b) 
iiu-iny hitiicr. the r.t.-ifT f o l ] in 1 i ni > v/il"li I lie nuMl i ir-h 
i g n o r e d the p o o r . 
13 
S e c o n d l y , the p r o c e d u r a l r eau i r emcnts in t e rms o f 
p r e s e n t i n g documents, g e t t i n g s i g n a t u r e o f c e r t a i n 
o f f i c i a l s on them the c l e a r a n c e o f the a p p l i c a t i o n by 
a number o f a u t h o r i t i e s b e f o r e the f i n a l s a n c t i o n i s 
g r a n t e d e t c , were no t s imple o p e r a t i o n f o r the r u r a l 
p o o r . Even the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p rocedure was found t o o 
c o m p l i c a t e d f o r the i l l i t e r a t e p o o r . Consequen t l y , many 
o f the p o o r c o u l d no t app ly f o r the programmes. Those 
who nppl ioH nlr.o lind ho V;,TI'I Tot ItMiq p c r i o f l f o r I he-
f i n a l s a n c t i o n , 
{ Tliirdly, accorclinq to MK- i^l.IN, MK- H'M i II i L M I ivc 
s t a f f was t o be appo in ted a t v a r i o u s l e v e l s t o c o o r d i n a t e 
and s u p e r v i s e the ^ func t i on ing o f the IllD progrorr'nies, Hov;-
e v o r , such a m o n i t o r i n g mach inery vjas e i t h e r n o n - e x i s t i n g 
21 
o r d i d no t f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y . Moreove r , t h e r e ^^as a l s o 
a l a ck o f c o o r d i n a t i o n among the a g e n c i e s work ing f o r the 
proqrr!rr)nicr> nt tho lo\;cr If v 1 . 
L a s t l y , the b c n c f i c i a r i c s o f the i^ro.irnr:ii'Cs d id not ^et 
p r o p e r f o l l o w - u p a t t e n t i o n v. 'hilc running the schcnes . The 
l a p s e s i n t i m e l y t e c h n i c a l , f i n n n c i a l anr" manage r i a l h e l p 
I F' D in 11 lo poor FI met" 1 < M J i I > | I > I I IJ' proMi 
IS 
Implementation is' a serious problem. The slip between 
ambition and accomplishment, legislation i^nd execution* promise 
and performance, is plain for all to 'i his becomes a more 
important issue, when, without chanqing the power structure, a 
programme is introduced for the least powerful groups of the 
society for promoting equity. Ass^ionalde and Ingle point out, 
"once a prolect is begun, it tends to acquire a life of its own 
and this life is larqely guided by the organizational influences 
36 
in its environnent.. "'his poses n problem - Stronger organiza-
tion can co-opt and redirect the project. Similarly John Vtoodward 
Thomas cpIIo'I the co-optation and recUcoction pcocoss 'V^ ogi^ anune 
37 
mutation". Thomas pointed out, "There are several important 
decisions at which pressure for mutation can be appliec/t^e choice 
of project, the choice of technology, the choice of project imple-
mentation agent, the establishment of wage rates, or the sele-
ction of emoloyees. Over some period of time, these pressures 
may succeed in altering programmes since the rural poor usually 
provide an indequate political counterforce in defence of their 
' 38 own interest." 
The existing studies on equity-oriented IRDP have mainly 
focussed either on the administrative aspect, or the clientele 
39 
aspect. However, for a 'fuller understanding of the inplemen-
tation of the equity-oriented integrated rural development 
proqramme, it is desirable thnt onn tnkr-R inl-o rons 1 :V>rnt-,lon 
the cllentelo and the ncJialn LstCdL Iv.; .liiix-cLu LoijeLher. This 
will also help in answering 'how* and 'why* benef i ts from poverty 
al]ovintion procirnmmen hr»V(» boon d i nVr ibutoii in .1 [x.i L Icul .>r way. 
The fact that many social factors play a role in ^ 
determining benefit distribution has not been considered ''''''' 
in t'ne existing studies^ A more adequate knowledge of how 
benefits have been distributed can be had, if the role of 
various social and economic factors in influencing the 
nature of benefit distribution is examined. A comparative 
analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of the bene-
ficiaries and eligible non-ben«ficiaries will not only 
provide a more exact knowledge of 'who' have been benefitted 
by the anti-poverty-programme, it will also help in under-
standing •how* and 'why» they have benefitted from them. 
THE NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUMCTTONING : 
In a parliamentary democracy policies are taken by 
legislature which are then carried out by the execttive. 
Here the question arises , what is the nature of administra-
tive functioning. 
Karl Marx and Frederick Enqels said that the repre-
sentative government provides no more than a vehicle for 
the reinforcement of the powers of the bourgeoisie. Jheir 
I 
view has been summarised in the following form in the commu-
( 
nist Manifesto: "The executive of the modern state is but 
a Committee for managing the comnon affairs of the whole 
40. 
bourgeoisie!." In their, 'Origin of Family, private property 
and State' Marx and Engle wrote, "State is an organisation 
of the possessing class The highest form of the state, 
<1r>rTiorr.-i( Ic ropublic oTl i<-i.i]ly Icnow.-i iv>ihiiKi .my 
more of property distribuLion. H- is W<--<ilLh LIUIL 
41 its power indirectly, but all the more sur j. . ' 
2i 
Max Weber, who ha4 very little in common with Marx 
and Engels has this to say about the role of bureaucracyi 
"The consequences of bureaucracy depend upon the direction 
which the power using apparatus give to it. And very often 
42 
a cryptoplutcrattc distribution of power has been a resale". 
R. Milliband in his "State in Capitalist Society" 
argues that " Civil servants tend to have value lying 
within an ideologically 'safe* spfsctnom, that civil secvice 
neutrality must involve an implicit commitment to the status 
quo and that as the operators of the bureaucratic machine, 
civil servants will become intrinsically suspicious of inno-
43 
vation." Thus, their neutral role sustains status quo. Hence, 
in a society characterised by poverty & inequality the execu-
tive functions in such a manner as to maintain the status quo. 
Bottomore argues that recruits to the higher branches 
of civil services are largely drawn from the upper middle 
classes and educational background that suggests that they 
44 will identify themselves closely with bourgeoisie interest. 
45 Such a trend is evident in the Indian Administrative Service. 
46 
According to the findings of Lipset and Selzinick* 
"A progressive programme is modified in the course of implc:aen-
tation by qoal displacement" 
A study by Cohan <(n(.i Edgec on povvjrty procjtcunrni-'s su ( j j -
ests that the condition of bureauccc'cy itself can inhibit 
47 
social change and contribute to t h e d e f e c t o f refor-n prograrn.r>e. 
48 
R. Micneles in his study "Political Parties" agrues J> 9 
that "radical and socialist politic^.ans tend to become conser-•V 
vative compromised by the bourgeoisie comfort of their own 
positions. They enjoy a situation in which they are at least 
partially accepted by the established order which they elected 
to challenge and inevitably many of them identify with one 
49 
time "class enemies" rather than with their ov/n mass supporters. 
In such cases* they are ill equipped to offer an effective 
challenge to civil servants who do not share their political 
commitments." Micheles calls this the 'iron law of oligarchy'. 
The oligarchy here refers to a group in power. 
On the basis of these studies, one can conclude that 
when equity oriented poverty allevation is adopted in 'class 
societies' there is a tendency in the bureaucracy to misippli-
ment it to. the advantage of the better off sections of the 
society. From these experiences the folldwing two generali-
sations can be made, 
(1) In class societies, the policies or the programmes 
of the government are executed in such a fashion as 
not to alter the existing unequal & poverty-ridden 
structure of the society. 
(2) Even when a government adopts a policy or programme 
which specifically aims at reducing the existing 
inequality and poverty of the society, in general 
those policies or programmes are implemented in 
favour of the compar ativol Y bfjtter of^ nectlons. 
> 
B^ Supporting Institutions: The studies also pointed out 
that the performance of the supporting institutions that provided 
facilities like credit, marketing, and other infrastructural 
facilities also was far from satisfactory. 
As cooperative credit societies cared more for the non-
poor ( they are not meant exclusively for the poor ) and as 
Land Devlopment Bank was mainly involved in lonq term credit 
in a lomited way, commercial banks were expectrd to provide 
liberal credit for the various bankable schemes formulated under 
the special programmes. A number of studies however, revealed 
that the banks were not providing enough credit to the poor for 
various reasons. Marketing of finished goods at reasonable 
prices as well as providing input regularly were almost always 
the weak points of the implementation,^^ This also upset the 
working of many programmes. 
C. Planning Peficiences: The evaluation studies consider 
planning deficiencies also as an important factor responsible 
for the poor performance of special programmes. First of all, 
as it was pointed out, the definition of the poor who were 
entitled for the benfits' of various programmes included a 
wide range of households all of whom were - not equally poor. 
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The l i f i i t e d funds o f the prograrr.T.os v^ere snatchad 3v-ly 
by the r e l a t i v e l y bet ter o f f poor an-j the real needy er e 
l e f t v.lth almost nothing. Even in the case o^ Antyodaya 
v.hich was meant .for the poorest of the poor, the i i ~ n t i f i -
cat ion of r e l a t i v e l y be t ter o f f fa-ni l ios a--, 'he poorest 
\.a3 not found uncomTian The dec in i t ion oC i:he roor s 
also loose in the s^nse t lut i t coul '. not ke?p av.ay the non-
poor taking advantage pf the pronr nrr.T.o n. Secondly, rr.ost of 
these special progrjmrr.es uere formulated at the macro 
or at the cent re . They were no^alwoyo suitable in the sane 
form when impleT.entad at the micro l e v e l . Consequently, 
many times the schemes performed miserably at the micro-
l e v e l . For example, the amount o f loan f ixed up for purcha-
sing a part icu lar asset was not alv.ays enouoh. Or the 
schemes, (for example, the m.ilch animal scheme) v.hich v.ere 
O'liphasiscd at the macro I'-^vel WORE not 3 U I tab"! O in T JNY 
micro s i tuat ions . The types o f small .ind rottToo i n l u - t r i ? s 
to be set up at micro l e v e l many times did not take l oca l 
f a c t o r s in to account. The net resul t vios that the type of 
the schemes and the designs of the schemes v.ere not ilv.ays 
v.orkable when implemented. 
To sum up, ther( jror?, tho -v.iluaMon '-tu 11 • , 
that the major caus'io foc the linited ouccj-^.s of th j^ c I j I 
programme strategy i r e r e l a t i n o to the " io f ic ionci in their 
planning and im.pl oTion t ^ tion . Xdmlni tr iti ve vind oun nnizJti-
onol pro-bl om 5 soom to bo rruci il in th --i r jn '-n -n t . Tn 
o r -
Other v<ordi5, the stu.iies se-m to sugoG<;t that th^re i s nothing 
1 
bas ica l l y v\rong either vdth our diagnosis of rural poverty 
or with the formulation of the rural developT,?nt sti"3t;gy 
underlying the I D ProgcamT.es. 
However, WG think that tho ibove explanations :io not 
ansvver some basic questions regacJinn the per F'lr'n.mc o of the 
special progra^imes : (a) ^^ ihy have a l a rge number of poor-
spec ia l ly the real needy* ones reT.ained almost outsi ' l3 the 
purview of the special progranmes in spite o f the spscial 
e f f o r t s made to cover them ? and (b) .Ihy are not the b ene f i -
c i a r i e s ben e f i tted enougVi^ why are not the schemes working 
properly - even when complete infrastcuc tural f a c i l i t i e s are 
made ava i lab le to them ? 
.ie think that tho answers to th(?so -.uostions c lOiot 
be given in terms of admini strat ive/ocganization il problems 
olonu'. '.;e think so becauyj the s'?l'3ctive impact of tho s; -^cial 
programmes c l ea r l y suggests that tho strr.itegy h^s f j i l ^ j to 
re--.ch the r C-J1 poor. I t has f a i l ed to i l j n t i f y and aUack ths 
constraints of the poor that come in the way of thsir c a r t i -
c ipat ion and in their way of running the schemes success fu l ly . 
In oth?r v.ords som'^thinn -^'-^ ms to w ^ '.ro-m y^  h', f-i, ^ 
of r ur i.ov-jrty an-- t!i" i .ol icy frj-aiul I; "O bn!>rlv' ln- t'n^ 
t3Cg^;t group oriented ss^ocial t r t^ c'.VT, .. os. Tli . " in i t - j ly 
a need to take a fresh look at the .-coblc^.3 
-0 f, 
'je think th'Jt the mjjor l im i ta t i ons of the itcZiligy 
are l i k e l y to be in three j reas : ( I ) T I I G strateoy H A S not 
S. 
i d e n t i f i e d and attacked the real 'problaT.s of the poor. 
That iSf i t lacks a proper understJndiog of ttie naturo of 
poverty. (2) The strategy shows a lack of ^rop'jr un : .rr.tjn-
dinq of the ro l e of the exp lo i t . j t i ve structure of our rur^l 
economy in in f luencing the functioning of rural davolopment 
prograT.T.es. (3) The pol icy frame of the strategy i s par t ia l 
in the sense that i t attempts to eradicate poverty only by 
attacking a part of the problems. That i s , i t Joes not 
r e a l i s e that the rural poverty i s a consequenca of the 
overa l l funct ioning of the rural economy and i t can br; sradi-
catcd only by a total approach that modif ies the functioning 
of the ixonoT.y. Let us ela'nor.jte, 
^i ) Trji OF PQVc^l'IY : Javelopment planner 's prrcept-
ion of rural poverty assumes a numb or of thing'-., ( l ) The 
planners assume that the poor always have pos i t i v e a3 : i ra -
t ions and that they al\\ays have a des ire to come u:,, C2) the 
I 
i.o.rizon of the poor i s long in the sense that the poor are 
used to thinking of long term future , and (3) incomV2'!•Fioy-
•u.;rit gotior.jting a c t i v i t i e s have tiio highest [ c i o r i t i j s in the 
eyes of t'ne poor. The special pcogr anvi'.es strategy tb : rerot3 , 
expects that the poor are eager to take up income/a:.cl sym en t 
generating schemes as thay v.an t to inc reas j t lu i r l i v i n g 
Stan jar ds. I t also assumes that v/nit the ;; oor n s i s 
special arrangements that provide them the required inputs. 
on 
Once these arrangements are made tha poor w i l l par t i c ipa te 
in a b ig way. 
I s t h i s percept ion of poverty cor root ? Jo th-j poor 
really think in this way ? ..e think that the plannc-rs' 
; crception of rural poverty i s l i k e l y to . e biaoed or lin-.ited 
f o r a number of reasons* ' F i rst of d l l j the rurdl s tu j i e s on i' 
which the perception i s based, ace l i k e l y to have a nunber of 
b iases as they are normally of near-urban v i l l a g e s or of the 
v i l l a g e s on highways and rare ly of remote v i l l a g e s . The 
studies also generally reveal the views of the rural e l i t e 
as th3 real poor are the l a s t to come up and the lust to 
speak up. And as the r e s ea r che r s ace alv^ays in a hur ry , they 
hardly have enough time to get the r ight response from tha 
52 
poor. I t i s poss ib le , there fore , that oomo of th- . 5 ^ unption s 
I 
of the plut^ners regarding th 3 perception of poverty are not 
c o r r e c t , we do not have enough evidence to check on t h i s as 
53 
l imi ted work has been done in this a r j i . ' ut the l i ' . . l teJ work 
4 
that has bean done suggests that pjrh.jp:i the ;-oor do not jlv-ays 
have pos i t i v e aspirat ions or that t'n Jo not thin i: in t 'r-.s 
of long time horizons. Galbraith, for exar,[,ly, that 
the assumption of pos i t i v e aspirat ions of the poor i s an 
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unreal is t ic a ssuaiption. .according to lii-.r;, the mass poverty 
of the developing economies i s bas i ca l l y Juo to th:^  of 
aspirat ions of the poor. 
The assumption of long timG horizons and of the 
highest p r i o r i t y o f the poor to incoT,e/eTiploytri.3n t g an era t ing 
a c t i v i t i e s also could be unrea l i s t i c . The poor who are 
su f f e r ing from fo rx idab l e probleTis of survival and fi:or, the ir 
he lp less dependence on the non-poor, may not think of long 
term future or long tetT. plans. 
In short, the nature of poverty as under stoo I by 
plann r s needs some better undec stan iin-!. jtudi -! ; n i th is 
area are t'necefota nece'ssaty, 
^ 2 ) T H E £ > ^ ' L 0 I T . A N / 3 ST^UCTUL^H O F T H ^ . U I U L .Y : 
number of studies in cural India hdve shov.n th : t t'na^ . i s a 
concen trati-jn of =conoT.ic, social and i - o l i t i c a l ov, .r in a 
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few h jn i3 . The rural r i ch enjoy larg:5 po. cc s v.hich th^^ y use 
in strengthing their posi t ion furthar . The rural a l i t a , 
there fo re , are not l i k e l y to 0nc^.'uc.jge any l o l i c y r.-.a :ure 
that improves the condition's of the f-oor . In f a c t , J'.i .. ^-ould 
expect that they v»i l l try thoir b )ot to oao t in t th. , 3or io 
not take advantage of such po l i cy '..easucas. 
In othar v\ot:ds, i t i s n -^cessacy to jxa'r.in i th -.;tcjnath 
of the special programmes strategy in the context of the expl-
o i t a t i v e pov,er structure of our cural soci ?ty in orriar to 
under stjnd the causes of th3 l imi ted success of this t - i g e t 
group oci.-nted s t rategy . 
-J 
(3) .^P : The ihird T.-.jor l i - n i t . t i t of the 
special progCdTiT.e strategy seJT.s to 'n j i t s [ . j c t i^ l o i i c y froT.e. 
The strategy attacks only a part of thi pro'il —.5 of the 
poor v.hen i t provides them cred i t to buy an incoiie n-ncc a ting 
asset along with other in sti tution J1 anj c^ ganizatlo"! J1 help. 
Though such a measuce atteT.pts to incr "id'j} th 3 inco'u „ of the 
poor and uiden their asset-b.ise, i t l e j v i s out C3rt j in -^o^ic 
problems of rural poverty. This T. jy f rustrate the functioning 
o f the special prograT/r.:s. 
The poor need credit for CNSUT.ption '^rxially in the 
slack season, Flicy also n eJ M.ON^ 'y IM felcbf-itc , C J J I fu-Tct-
r 1-i on s. Roth tho^ j n m^  i r ur q. m 1 t- n • l , > 1 1 on in 1 1 tut n 1 11 
credit is available for the'n. Th > 'cial |c0qcji'. .tr itegy 
pays no attention to these n3.d5. Con 33 u^en tlv, it i: possible 
that the incoT.es of the assets of the sp.ci^l i cooc : 5 oce 
used in meeting these needs rather than in r^iayin-I IOJOS. 
The poor T,ight even sell off the assets to ^Jet ti - ^j^Js. 
This T.ay U[L set the v-or kin g of the itonrj '^ e n^ ^  ul 1 .ly T.ay 
l.>nd the poor in a pool of debts. I t v-oulJ be us i ' v l ro 
inves t i ga t e the impact of this pi^rtial a^.,.roach on i ca j i ca t i on 
of poverty. That i s , i t w i l l be uasful to j>,jT.ino tiio 
functioning of the sp jc ia l ;.cooCa'i,i str^t 'oy in th i l i - 'ht 
of i t s par t i a l approach., 
HYPOTHESES: 
1, Sconoroic Policy for poverty alleviation under IRDP 
has not been effective in raising the target groups 
J 
above the poverty line because of organisation^ ins-
titutional and structural factors, 
2, There is differential distribution of developinent 
i' 
benefits among the agrarian classes, 
3, Stratificational factors i.e. caste, class & power 
influence the distribution of development benefits, i.e. 
3 (i) CASTE is positively correlated with the perco-
lation of development benefits, 
3 (ii) CLASS is positively correlated with the perco-
lation of development benefits, 
3 (iii) POWER is positively correlated with the 
percolation of development benefitn, 
4, Class is the most significant stratificational factor 
influencing the percolation of development benefits, 
t 
5, there is positive correlation among caste, class and 
power hierarchies, 
MATHEMATICAL TECHI^QUES: 
1, Mean, Median, percentage. Index Numbers, 
2, Chi-Square Test, 
3, Analysis of Variance i.s, Test, 'T' Test, 'Z' Tesi 
4, Gamma 
5, Partial and Multiple Correlation, 
6, Gini Coefficient, 
7, Sen's Poverty Index, 
3j 
OBJECTIVES OF STUDY; 
1, To study the nature of agrarian social structures of 
Study Villages. 
2, To study the inequalities of land, income and assets 
distribution. (Gini Coefficient) 
3, To study the mode of implementation of integrated Rural 
Development Programmes. 
I 
4, To study the pattern of participation. 
5 , To study the na tu re and quantxjm o f l ca )<ages . 
5. To study the reaf=x>ns of non-participation of the poor 
in thr' Integrated Rural Development Proqrfirrmer.. 
7. To study the levels of living of agrarian classes. 
To study the poverty Line ( Sen's Poverty Index ) 
9. To study the socio-econon i^ ^ characteristics of participant 
Sc non-participant households. 
10. To Study the p r o c e s s & p r o g r e s s o f IRD Programn.es in the 
study v i l l a g e s . 
11. To study the percolation of de^Eelopmcnt benefits among 
various agrarian classes in the study villaoes. 
12. To study the corrcJation among st i aLi ficational factors 
i .n. cnste, c1 o- r. & powe r. 
13. To study the influence of stratificational factors, 
individual as well as cumulative, on the percolation 
of development benefits. 
14. To draw policy implications for an egalitarian agrarian 
social structure. 
r, Q 
PLAN OF CHAPTERIZATION : "" 
As it is obvious, 4.t is an inter-regional, inter-discrip-
linary and a PERIOD-OF-TIME STUDY. It has been presented in 
nine chapters. In the first ohap|:er, we have discussed the 
•i 
nature of administrative functioning, the assumptions under-
lying the poverty alleviation programmes and then formulated 
the PROBLEM OF STUDY. 
In Chapter 2, v;e have dealt v/ith the measurement of 
poverty, the magnitude and trend in thu incitl(3nce of poverty 
and the data base of the available studies on rural poverty 
in India. This is done with a clear purpose of providing a 
ready reference and the nature of the research conducted so 
far as well as help provide direction for our empirical 
enquiry. 
In Chapter 3» v/e have described rt^search methodology 
t 
giving detailed account of this study, its time dimension, 
tools and techniques used, operationalisation of the concepts 
of caste, class, power, composite and supplementary develop-
ment benefits ; estimation of consumption pattern and poverty 
line, the scores of levels of living of the agrarian classes 
in the study villages. 
In Chapter 4, we have provided a profile of the study 
villages which serve as a context for grasping the findings of 
the study. In this chapter, we have discussed the social. 
economic and political aspects of agrarian social structures 
of study villages the nature and magnitude of rural poverty 
(Sen's Poverty Index) and inequalities of land, income and 
assets (Gini Coefficient), the technological development of 
agriculture, cropping pattern and the intensity of cropping in 
/ 
the study villages. 
In Chapter 5» we have discussed the consumption pattern 
and levels of living of agrarian classes. 
In Chapter,6, v/e have analysed the evolution of economic 
policy for poverty alleviation, the principal objectives of 
policy planning under the Five Year Plans, and the change in 
thinking from growth with aocial justice to distributive justice 
from raising minimum level of living to minimum needs package. 
We have presented the IRDP in India, particularly in the study 
villages of the Distric,ts of Aligarh and Karnal which provides 
a broader framework of the rural development programmes. This 
helps us in understanding the findings of this study. 
In Chapter 7, we have expounded how social stratifications 
factors i.e. Caste, Class and Pov;er exercise influence on the 
process of percolation of development benefits, the correlation 
between caste, class and pov/er hierarchies and development 
benefits, the share of below-the-poverty-line households in 
development gains. Here we have made an attempt to examine 
whether the three stmtLflcotionnl f.iclor.M int'luonco (,ho 
percolation process, independent of each other, and whether 
34 
these factors, if combined, exjolainod greater variations in 
the distribution of development benefits, the perception of 
the respondents ,about the differential distribution of 
development benefits. 
Chapter 8 is in continuation with Chapter 7. In this 
Chapter, we have examined the mode of implementation of 
development programmes, the character of rural development 
administration, the rural bureaucracy, the role of middleman, 
pattern of participation, factors promoting participation and 
causing non-participation, the process of percolation of 
development benefits, spcio-economic characteristics of parti-
cipating and non-participating households and the nature and 
quantum of leakage. 
In the last Chapter, findings are summarized, conclusions 
are drawn and their policy implications discussed, ilere we 
have exposed the structural - functional theory of poverty. 
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C H A P T E R - 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION ; 
Of lato theoretical and empirical expiorntions in development 
studios have focussed attention on Poverty -^ nd dist^i^1J t j onil nsnrcts 
of econoiio srov/th. This is sought to be understood in terras of the 
interre lat ionship between econoniic growth , incore inequal i ty , poverty 
and wel fare obtaining atrong the various regions ind the ccio-econo"iic 
groups therein nt national and international leve ls J Trad i t ion i l l y 
"development" has been associated with high rates of growth in agrrregate 
and per capita incomes. As such in the ea r l i e r approaches to develop-
ment problems, during the duciflcr, of 50s nnd 60.'), '^xclnaive onpViaaia 
was l a i d on ra i s ing the aggregate rates of growth of domectic product. 
This tendency was reinforced by international aid agencioa which set 
growth targets and devised 'perforraance' indicators on the basis of 
which assistance was a l located . This on afr^iregate growth rates 
was prompted by the be l ie f that rapid industr ia l i zat ion and structural 
transformation would spread the benef its of growth throughout the i' 
various s t r a t a of society eventually by ' t r i ck l e down' process.^ 
I t was assumed that "reduction of poverty could only be tackled 
a f t e r a certain leve l of GNP had been reached; f i r s t the cike 
had to be produced and made bigger before i t could be 
equally d i s t r i bu ted , " ^ . once high 
4; 
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INCOME LEVELS were attained distribution would exert its leve-
lling effect with greater c^se through rapid percolation. Hence 
greater inequality in earlier stages was postulated as a nece-
ssary precondition for rapid growth 1*51 the various influential 
growth models,^ This initial trade 6ff between the objectives 
of growth and distribution was viewed as a transitional cost of 
successful development before their eventual complementarity 
was securely established. 
But the development experience of a number of tanderdeve-
loped countries during ^he past quarter of a century did not 
uphold this expectation. Accumulated experience has cast doubt 
on the proposition that a skewed distribution of income would 
encourage saving and investment and therefore more rapid economic 
advance.^ Though growth rates did accelerate in many post-colonial 
countries it soon become apparent that they provided no guarantee 
of a secular rise in the material well-being of the masses. On the 
t 
other hand many countries of the third world experienced a widening 
of inequalities among the regions and socio-economic groups and a 
worsening in the levels of living of the people, sometimes absoulute, 
at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid^ Even In growing 
economies large number of people have failed to share the benefits 
of growth and only served "to absorb the political economic and 7 political costs 4f change and growth". 
The gradual realization that a large percentage of population 
in developing countries has been by-passer3 by economic growth led to 
the awareness that growth in average GNP is not a reliable indicator 
53 
of Improvements In eccfnomlc well-being. Further the growth of 
9 
massive xineroployment observed In these countries in the face 
of rapid population growth andthe resulting erosion in the levels 
of living and participation in economic activity led development 
analysts to question the erstwhile strategies of growth. It 
became evident t'lat economic growt-> to be meaningful, roust be 
attended by increasing participation of masses as it is the only 
meaningful way of transfo^ng purchasing power and raising the 
general level of well b e i n g , T h i s led to a search for develo-
pment paths that would result in growth with equity and elimina-
tion of poverty.^^ As a consequence emphasis on studies of Income 
distribution, employment and growth has come to be increasingly i' laid in the current studies. 
SCHEME OF PRESENTATION; 
The presentation of the content under review is organised 
on the following lines. Section I focusses briefly on the studies 
and generalizations drawn from the international experience bearing 
on the behaviour of inequality with economic development. This is 
followed by a survey of studies (Section II) on income and expen-
diture inequalities in India. The third section summarizes inequ-
alities In India. The third section summarizes the evidence reve-
aled by various 
last section (IV) sets out the problem under study in its Regional 
context commenting on the relevance of such explorations. 
Section I: Distribution and Envelopment - International Experience: 
Systematic work on the distribution of Income by size at 
different stages of development Is of very recent origin. The woCks 
13 
of Kuznets,^^ Kravis,^^ Nicholson,^^ Soltow,^® Stark,Weisskoff. 
18 
and Pishlow focus on the trends in Income inequalities in a 
number of countries. In fact our early insights into tv.e relat-
ionship between economic' development and income distribution were 19 provided by Kuznets, 
Kuznets clarified a number of conceptual issues involved 
in interspatial and intertemporal comparisons of income distri-
bution and provided tentative answers to the question of changes 
in income distribution in the process of develop-^ent. In a 
classic discussion of historical trends in income distribution 
he pointed out that a maj^ked feature of economic growth was a 
shift from the agricultural sector to the bon-agricultural 
sector to be accompanied by an increase in inequality. He examin-
ed the shift in terms of .inter-sectoral differences, in average 
incomes, distribution of income within each sector and the 
migration of work force from agri(\>lture to the non-agricultur 
sector to be accompanied by an increase in inequality. He exam-
ined the shift in terms of inter-J«itoral differences, in average 
incomes, distribution of income within each sector and the migr-
ation of work force from agriculture to the non-agricultural 
sector. The tendency for income distribution to worsen in the 
earlier phases of development is accounted for by two reasons. 
The higher percapita incomes in the non-agricultural sector 
grow faster than in the agricultural sector and the inequality 
of incomes in the former is greater than in the latter and may 
grow faster. He pointed out the various factors instrumental 
in widening the inequalities and argued that the greater prop-
ortional accumulation of assets by the rich than by the poor 
the urbanization associated with development tend to 
concentrate distribution over time with reversal coming 
20 only later as low income groups gain political influence. 
He concluded that there probably was "a long swing in the 
inequality characterizing the secular Income structure 
widening in the early pleases of growth when the transition 
from the pre-industrial to the Industrial civilization was 
rapid, becoming stablli^.ed for a while, and then narrowing 
21 
in the latter phases. Kuznets did not assort that this 
period of Increasing inequality, ^ lasting some fifty to 
seventy years, must be repeated by the developing countries. 
But he pointed out that the underdeveloped countries might 
have a degree of inequality greater than the advanced 
countries have now, and that many of them were much poorer 
thean the advanced countries were when they embarked on 
industrialization. So if the less developed countries 
experience the same growth in inequality during industriali-
zation, the hardships the poor may have to undergo are likely 
22 to be severe. 
Kuznets hypothesis sparked many empirical explorations 
into the relationship between economic growth andinequality. 
23 
Kravls made an early attempt to compare Income inequality 
cross nationally and to search for reasons why income 
Inequality generally appeared greater in less developed 
countries than in developed ones and confirmed Kuznets* 
hypothesis of greater Ijiequality in developing countries. 
56 
Kravls computed four measures of inequality for Pretax 
income among consumer units for ten developed and developing 
countries in the early 1950s; taking the United States as 
the basis of comparison, he found that in three countries 
there was less inequality (Denmark, Netherlands and Israel), 
in three other countries there was about the same degree of 
inequality (Great Britain, Japan and Canada) and in four 
countries inequality was considerably greater (Italy, Puerto 
Rico, El Salvador and Srilanka). He concluded that the 
degree o£ equality tends to be positively correlated with the 
level of percapita income byt that the correlation was not 
a simple one. Kravis was able to confirm Kuznets' statement 
that the share of the lowest income groups tends to be 
higher in the poor countries than in the developed ones. 
The explanation of the greater inequality in developing 
countrues was therefore to be sought in the greater dispeision 
25 in the upper part of the distribution scale, 
26 
Harry T. Oshima*", joined the debate with a fourfold 
classification of the stages of development - undeveloped, 
underdeveloped, semi-developed and fully developed - and 
suggested that inequality was generally low at the underdev-
eloped stage and that the dispersion of income grows as 
countries advance to the next stage. He further suggested 
that inequality Increases during the semi-developed stage, 
but reaches its peak there and declines during the fourth 
stage. The main contribution of Oshima's article was that 
it laid the blame for income inequality on the shoulders 
of dualism. In his worSs, "the major determinant of the 
despersion of qutntile ^hares between count r i e s i s the weicjht 
13 
of farm or rural sector in the total economy" as well as the 
extent to which the agricultural and urban areas are economi-
cally integrated. Secondly, he found that within the rural 
and urbfin sectors the stand«rd deviation of quintile shares 
was largely influenced by the dispersion of land holdings 
within the rural sector and the dispersion of capital" per 
worker in the ludo rural sector and tiie dispersion of capital 
per worker in the urban sector. In an attempt to compare 
income distributions cross-nationally, Kuznets reentered the 
discussion in 1963 by generating usable data on sixteen 
countries, nine of them devloping. Classifying pretax family 
\ 
income in these countries by quintiles he made the following 
27 observations. 
(a) The share of the upper income groups was distinctly 
larger in the xinderdeveloped than in the developed 
countries. This finding was very clear In the case 
of the top 5 per cent of the families which typically 
accounted for 30 per cent of the total income or more 
in developing countries and for only 20 or 25 per cent 
in developing countries, andit still held good even if 
the top 10 per cent or indeed the top 20 per cent of 
families was taken^ into account. 
(b) The income share of the lowest quintiles is about the 
same in developed and developing countries. The 
poorest 60 per cent of families in developed countries 
received about 29-33 per cent of Income, while in less 
developed countries they received 25-32 per cent. 
o ^ ? 
Prom these two findings followed a third one, namely 
that with greater concentration of income in the top 
group in the developing than in t e developed countries 
and with the share of the lowest group being about the 
same in both, the share of the middle group was lower 
in the developing than in the developed countries and that, 
generally, in the developing countries income distribution 
was more equal below the level of the top 5 or 20 per cent 
( 
of families. 
A nxunber of studies comparing income distribution in 
countries at different levels of economic development 
28 
followed. Paukert examined data on income distribution 
in fiftysix countries and found a sharp increase in 
inequality (as revealed by <2ini indices) as one moved from 
the lowest per capita GDP countries upto those in the 
$ 300-$500 per capita range. (The $300 - RsSOO range represents 
those countries with the most extreme inequality)• As 
higher per capita income levels were approached, inequality 
became progressively legs. He pointed out that one should 
not generalize from the simple fact that the share of the 
poorest 20 per cent of families in countries below $ 500 
per capita falls as income increases. Subsistence certainly 
sets a floor to family incpme; and, in each of these 
countries. If the poorest 20 per ^ent are at subsistence 
level, their share of total income must fall as income 
increases. 
It has also been observed that countries experiencing 
the most rapid rates of economic growth suffer from 
2Q 30 increasing inequality; Adelman and* Morris Pishlow 
and Wells^^ point to the increasing inequality accompanying 
32 
rapid growth in Brazil in the late 60s and Amdt finds 
similar trends in Indonesia• Trends towards inequality 
along with economic growth have been witnessed by Chenery 
et.al.^^ in mahy countries, 
34 
Adelman and Morris examined data for fortythree 
developing countries, searching for relationships between 
patterns of Income distribution and thirty one indices of 
economic, political and social forces which could be 
expected to influence it. Their findings confirm the 
hypothesis that, at the lowest levels of development, 
growth tends to increase inequality. Broadly speaking, 
in the poorest coiintrles, growth works against the poorer 
segments of the populatioh. The allocation of income to 
the poorest 60 per cent of the population is best 'explained' 
by the extent of socio-economic modernization and the expa-
nsion of edueational services. Of the variables found 
important In the Adelman and Morris study. Improvement of 
u 
human resorces and direct government economic involwement 
seem to offer the most promise for greater equity in income 
distribution, 
Ahliiwalla's study,^^ a surtmarised version of the recent 
work by the World Bank, gave some weak evidence that increasing 
inequality did not necessarily accompany economic growth. He 
compared the growth in income of the poorest 40 per cent income 
n o t> J 
recipients with the GDP growth rate in ISdeveloping count-
I 
ries and found no clear pattern. It is of Interest that 
the World Bank study turned up two variables relatied to 
u the quantity and quality of hximan resorces as being most 
A 
closely related to relative income shares. The level 
and availabilit/ of education was positively related to 
the income shares of the poorest 80 per cent. Primary -
School enrolment rates most significantly explained the 
share of the poorest 40 per cent, and the rates of enrol-
/ 
ment in secondary schools played a similar role for the 
middle 40 per cent of income recipients. In a study of 
36 inequality in Asian countries, Oshima found that changes 
I 
in income distribution are not a result of economic growth 
perse in explaining changing income distribution. His main 
\ 
conclusion vas that undue policy emphasis on industriali-
zation can lead to unemployment, excessive urbanization, r 
•m* 
regional imbalance and widening inequality. Thus he laid 
the blame for inequalit/ squarely in the lap of dualistic 
development. 
Them selves only to consumer expenditure while others 
have tried to derive size distribution of personal income 
by incorporating simple hypothesies about saving behaviour. 
38 
The Reserve Bank of India study by Ojha and Bhatt 
is the first of its kind in building a meoningful pattern 
from unrelated data from different sources. It relied on 
integrating income tax data with the consumer expenditure 
data from NSS in its method of estimation. Analysing the 39 income structure in terms *bsluc±lrakdbH»d3t of three groups 
and comparing the p a t t e r n o f incorne d i i sL r i bu t i on in In^^ia 
t 
with some of the developed as v;ell as underdcvloped count-
ries ill terms of the concentry,)I ion r.itio, the ntudy indi-
cated that "contrary to general impression^ the degree 
of inequality in income distribution in India does not 
AO seem to be higher than in some of the advanced covintries. 
The National Council of Applied Economic Research 
conducted two comprehensive studies, one on the urban 
income and saving and the other on rural income and saving. 
'rho Loriiicr way iindcrLukcn t.oi Lbc- yc.ir l"'(»l) .md Lhc J.iLLer 
for 1962, Subsequently the two were put together and the 
sijie distribution of income for the country as a whole was 
wstimated. The results of the two studies briefly, are as 
t 
follows:'^^ 
Among the rural household the top 10 per cent of the 
i' 
populotion had a share of 22 yjcr cent oE the total house-
t^ old income not very much different from the share of the 
bottom 50 per cent which had 22.7 per cent to its credit: 
to put it another way, the top 1 per cent of the rural 
households had a per capita income v/hich was 12 times the 
5?. 
per capita income of the poorest 5 per cent of the house-
holds. 
In the urban areas also the results showed a sirr.ilar 
situation. While the top 10 per cont of the urban house-
holds had a share of more than 40 per cent of the total 
I 
household income the share of the bottom 50 per cent v;as 
of the order of 17,5 per cent 
Another study by NCAER in 1964 provided data on income 
distribution for both rural and urban areas. If these data 
are compared with the data for 1962 it would appear that 
the inequality in income in the rural areas has somewhat 
declined. In the urban areas, on the other hand, there seem.ed 
to be no definite indication of a change. The board conclu-
sion from this data would be that while there is some trend 
towards reduction in inequality in rural areas, this is not 
true in the case of urban sector. But for the country as 
a v;hole the changes are so small that no definite conclusion I 
can be drawn. 
In an elaborate study focur is ing on the t rends in income 
13 
distribution, (1953-54 to 1959-60) Ranadlve Indicated two 
42 broad conclusions. 
"1. The income structure in Indi a is comparable to that 
in other underdeveloped countries. The contention that 
Kuznets' hypothesis of greater income inequality in the 
underdevloped countries than in the developed countries 
is not borne out in tfie case of India does not seem to be 
valid. 
2. Ten years of plapning have not had an y impact on the 
income structure in the direction of narro-wing the disper-
sal, It needs to be borne in maind that our estimates rel-
ate to the size distribution of money income and makes no 
allowance for the possibility of differential increases 
in the cost of living. Given the generally held belief 
that the impact of rising cost of living has been more serere 
on the low income groups, the fact that during the period 
covered in the study, the richest 2 per cent have improved 
their relative position would therefore merit further scru-
tiny". 
This has been followed up by another study where she 
estimated various measures of inequality for income and 
consumption expenditure separately for all India with rural 
43 urban breakup, 
I 
In another study Ahmed and Bhattacharya esti-mated the 
personal income distribution in India for three different 
periods 1956-57, 1960-61 and 1963-64 by integrating the size 
2i 
distribution of consumer expenditure obtained from NS3 with.. 
the size distribution of income before tax obtained from 
44 
income tax data on certain simplifying assumptions. Their 
estimated distributions of percapita personal income ( at 
current prices ) indicated a decline in disparities between 
1956-57 and 1963-64. 
In a cross section study focussing on Inequalities In 
45 
personal income distribution in India, Sarma found higher 
income disparities in the urban households sector than in the 
rural. He looked into the income concentration among various 
socio-economic groups also. Furthor, in an inter country com-V 
parislon of income distributions/*^ found the deqref=> of concen-
tration of Income in Inriia highf^r than in the economically 
advanced countries, a finding in conformity with Kuznets earlier 
results. Examining the changes in income distribution among 
rural households In India during 1968-69 to 1970-71, Sarma^® 
found a decline in inequality over tin«. His Gini concentration 
ratios are 0.43 for 1968-69, 0.39 for 1969-70 and 0.38 for f 1970-71. 
Focussing on the consumer expenditure distribution we 
A. 7 
may begin with the study of Swamy. He examined the trend in 
the household consumer expenditure Inequal-ities over the first 
decade of planning when theee was price stability and the 
economy registered considerable growth. He concluded that the 
size distribution of income or consumer expenr^iture widened 
over the fifties. The size distribution "stretched" at least 
at its end points, indicating a poesible widening of inequality 
J 
in the all India size distribution... The Lorenz ratio has 
/ 
shifted away from the line of equality, the index rose from 
0.37 in the plan I to 0.39 in the Iplan II. He attributed 
85 per cent of this increase in the size distribution of 
consumer expenditure to structural changes and the rest to 
intersectoral changes. 
In an extensive study ^^dhakrishna and Atul Sarma 
estimated the disparities in consumer expenditure over a 
long period for 17 different years (1952-53 to 1968-69), 
adopting quintile shares and Gini concemtration ratio for 
Aft 
both rural and urban India separately. The inequality 
measures have been computed for total expenditure at current 
prices as well as at constant prices; adjustmentr^s were also 
made for differential price impact across factile classes. 
They concluded that "differential price effects have started 
operating against the bottom decile classes at a progressively 
higher pace down the rung ever since 1963-64. As against this 
trend differentials, while the average per capita expenditure 
of all classes at current prices has been increasing both for 
rural and urban India, the real per capita expenditure in 
urban areas has fallen and that in rural areas has increased 
marginally. Inequalities in the level of living considered 
in torma of current prices have narrowed down whereas those 
measured at constant prises (Base: 1952-53) taking into acc-
ount price differentials have widened in the period beginning 
from 1963-64. With no appreciable improvement in real per 
capita expenditure on the one hand and widening disparities 
J l" 
on the other, the level of living of the people in the 
49 bottom decile classes has fallen in absolute terms, 
SECTION III: EVIDENCE ON POVERTY IN INDIA 
Poverty is not a recent phenomenon in I n d i a , T h e 
debate on India poverty in the last century vividly brought 
out the socio-economic conditions of the time and the merc-
enary impact of the British rule in deepening the poverty of 
the m a s s e s A f t e r the advent of independence sustained 
attempts have been made at planned development and the elim-
f 
inati6n of structural imbalances and constraints in improving 
the levels of living of the masses. Also evaluations of the 
policies of development have been undertaken from time to 
time.^^ 
In the recent past various empirical studies bearing 
on the measurement of poverty in India relied on 'absolute 
poverty* as the frame of reference and adopted an objective 
boundary poverty line,^^ defined in terms of per capita 
household consumer expenditure ^^ (See Table 1.4), In 1962, 
a distinguished study group^^ recommended that a per capita 
consximption of Rs, 20 per month at 1960-61 prices (excluding 
expenditure on health and education, both of which "are 
expected to be provided by the state according to the cons-
titution nndin the light of its other commitments") should 
be deemed as the nationally desirable minimum level of 
consumer expenditure,^^ This pe^ capita consumption oi. 
20 per month has been adopted as the poverty line and 
the proportion of people below this standard has been 
r.n J ; 
investigated in various studies. Sometimes the lines have 
been slightly redravm say at Rs.lSO/- or Rs,200/- per capita 
per year at 60-6f prices, making a rural and urban distin-
ction also. 
Adopting the national averages of per capita consump-
57 
tion at 60-61 prices worked out by Tiwari and applying 
the NSS ratio of rural of urban consumption,^® Minhas^^ 
estimated the per capita overall consumption n rural India 
in 60-61 prices. Using the NSS estimates of percentage shares 
of different fractile groups of ^he population in total 
consumer expenditure, he derived the average per capita consu-
mption (60-61 prices) of each fractile group of population 
year by year. His estimates of the number and percentage 
of persons in rural India consuming less than Rs, 240 as well 
as Rs, 200 per annum at 60-61 prices are presented below.®® 
The number of people below the poverty line (RS.240) 
did not change much while the proportion of such people below 
the poverty lines declined steadily. This decline is 
largely explained by the growth in the average per capita 
consumption in real terms rather than by the slight fall 
I 
in the concentration index of consumer expenditure (NSS), 
Minhas' estimates of poverty have been seriously contested. 
Ojha's®^ estimates showed a rise in the proportion of 
poor people. Adopting a calorie norm of 2250 per capita per 
day for an average Indian, he assigned that 66 per cent of 
this must be obtained from food grains, cereals and pulses, 
in urban areas; 80 per cent was the corresponding figures 
58 
for the rural sector. These percentages worked out to 518 
gra, and 432 gm, per person per day in rural and urban areas 
62 
respectively. OJha adopted these standards for studying 
the incidence of poverty and found that nearly 5254 of all 
;persons in rural areas (184 Million) and 8% in urban areas 
(6 Million) fell below the poverty line. For the year 67-68 
he conclude^ that 70% of the rural poi)ulation were below the 
minimum level of foodgrains consumption. 
Dandekar and Rath^^ based their estimation of poverty 
on a method similar to OJha with two differences. They use 
the NSS estimates of consumption of foodgrains (and substit-
utes) without any correction; secondly they assumed a yield 
of 200 calories per capita per day from other items of food. 
They found that for rural areas, in 1960-61, an annual per 
capita consumer expenditure of Rs,170/- was needed to ens\ire 
a diet adequate at least of 2250 calories per capita per day. 
The equivalent annual per capita expenditure was Rs. 271/- for 
urban areas, about 60 per cent higher than the corresponding 
figure for rural households. It was accordingly estimated that 
in 60-61, about one third (33.12) of the rural population and 
nearly half (48.64) the urban population lived on diets inade-
quate even in respect of calories. 
I 
In difference to the annual minimum of Rs.240/- per person 
suggested by the study group (D.R.Gadgil et.al), Dandekar and 
Rath revised their rural minimxim, slightly upwards to Rs.180/-
per annum and the urban minimum to Rs.270/- per person per year. 
59 
It was found ±hen that about 40 per cent of the rural 
population lived below the poverty line, the desirable min-
imum in 1960-61, The current price data into 1960-61 prices 
is open to objection. 
Bardhan's®* time series profile of the rural poor 
showed a sharp rise in the incidence of poverty over time. 
< 
He worked out the proportion of the rural people below an 
annual per capita expenditure of Rs.180 at 60-61 prices. 
His estimates are* 
Year Percentage of 
poor in rural, 
population 
Consumer price Index 
Current value of 
goods worth Us, 15 
(per month) at 
'60-61 price 
(Rs.) 
1960-61 38 100 15.0 
1964-65 45 144 21.6 
1967-68 53 200 30.0 
1968-69 54 196 29.4 
Source: P. K. Bardhan (1970). 
In the absence of consumer price index number Cor the 
rural poor, Bardhan^^ used the official agricultural labour 
consumer price index for deflating the consumption of the 
rural poor and the official working class consumer price 
in;3ex for deflating that of the urban poor. The former is 
constructed on the basis of NSS rural retail prices and 
the weighing diagrams worked out by the second agricultural 
labour enquiry. In absolute numbers, Bardhan found a 
•staggering* rise in the number of rural poor from about 
135 million to 230 million between 60-61 and 68-69, The 
high incidence for the 67-68 was understandable in view 
of the prece« ding exceptionally bad crop years; but the 
consumer price indices must have been partly responsible 
I 
for the high percentage of 68-69, Bardhan defended these 
indices by computing several alternative more appropriate 
than the national income deflator implicitly used by Minhas.®^ 
t 
When Bardhan computed the cost of minimum diet reco-
mmended for an adult In mo^rate activity by the Central 
Government employees pay commission (57-59) with flight 
modification,^^ its cost (at current prices) in rural 
areas worked out to Rs, 9,61 in 60,-61. This approach too 
led to a similar conclusion regarding the Incidence of 
poverty; the percentage of rural poor below the alternative 
minimum went up from spme^h«tt less than 38% in 60-61 to 
about 54% in 68-69, 
Vaidyanathan®^ worked out the proportion of t e 
rural population with per capita consumption below Rs.20 
per month at 60-61 prices. His estimates^^ are: 
\ 
POVERTY ESTIMATES; RURAL ARSAS 
YS.\R NSS OFFICIAL SERIES 
1960-61 59,5 58,8 
1964-65 60,4 56.9 
1967-68 67.8 57.8 
Source: A. Vaidyanathan U974). 
61 The estimates based on wholly NSS data showed a consi-
derable rise during the sixties though the degree of Inequality 
In distribution declined. The second column based on a com bl-
natlon of official estimates of per capita consumption and the 
pattern of inequalities revealed by the NSS showed a mild fall 
in the proportion of rural population below the poverty line 
cited earlier. The price Indices were computed for each fractlle 
group by using official wholesale price relatives for ten 
commodity groups and combining them by NSS based weights. We 
( 
may note that for 67-68 the price index (base: 60-61) was about 
190 for the first five or six decile groups. 
Basing on NSS 13th .round (September 57 - May 58) consumption 
go 
data for rural India, Chatterjee et,al found about 53 per cent 
of the population to fall below the norm of 2400 calories per 
capita per day. The estimation was based on fairly detailed 
calculations. 
Basing on the NCAER distribution data (study of the 
effectiveness of employment in rural India) for 1968-69 
70 Bhatty found that about 70 per cent of the population in 
rural India were below the poverty income level of Rs, 30 per 
71 
capita per month In that year. He adopted both Sen's poverty 
Index and the traditional head count in quantifying the incidence 
of poverty among the various rural occupational groups and found 
the incidence to be maximum among the agricultural labourers (83%) 
followed by non-agricultural workers (70%) and cultivators (62%), 
72 
Vyas found a decline in the incidence of rural poverty 
dtiring 1950s and traced this to the combined impact of major 
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institutional changes and considerable agricultural growth 0 % 
during the period. The proportion of rural poor below the 
poverty line (Rs,240 per capita and annum) fell from 45% in 
1954-55 to 38?6 in 1960-61. The period after 60-61 witnessed 
neither agricaltural growth nor institutional change but an 
increase in poverty. 
73 
In a recent study Ahluwalia examined trends in the 
incidence of rural poverty for fourteen different years spanning 
the period 1956-57 to 1973-74 for India as a whole (Table 1.4) 
as well as for the individual states. The time series showed 
fluctuations in the incidence of poverty in response to variations 
in real agricultural output per head though no significant- time 
trend was discernible. He found a statistically significant 
inverse relationship between rural poverty and agricultural 
performance for India as a whole. This relationship was also 
observed in several statetf but there was also evidence of other 
factors at work which tended to increase the incidence of poverty 
independently of variatiohs in agricultural output per head. 
74 
MuHherjee prepared a map of India delineating clusters 
of regions relatively hom^eneous in respect of level of living and 
the incidence of poverty. He looked at the serial distribution 
of poverty over 50 regions. Ranking persons by per capita 
expenditure he formed a group comprising the poorest 10 per cent 
of India's rural population and then examined how many of these 
poor fell in different regions. Judging both the rural and urban 
segments of the states as a whole on the criteria of density of 
the poor, density of the rich and per capita expenditure, he found 
Orissa, Kerala, Bihar, Mysore and Andhra Pradesh among the poorer 
states in 1963-64. 6 J 
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In a wide ranging study, the Centre for Development 
Studies focussed on 'economic evaluation of selected measures 
against poverty and unemployment and their implication for 76 development policies' with reference to Kerala. It examined 
the incidence of poverty and food intake ( from the food balance 
sheets covering a period 1960-61 to 1970-71) and found from a 
cross section analysis across states in India that the average per 
capita calorie intake for the urban population was directly 
related to the percapita .income anil per capita output of food grains 
in the state; on the other hand the percapita calorie intake of 
the rural population was not explained by the per capita income 
but was directly related to per capita food production in the 
state and inversely related to the level of inequality in ownership 
holdings. This was attributed to "the limited power of relatively 
poor rtd scattered rural communities to attract supplies of food 
grains from a distance after covering the marketing costs and 
77 distributive margins'?. Hence it found th at raising the level 
t 
of income in rural areas through public works programmes was by 
itaelf unlikely to bring about significant reduction in poverty in 
the absence of both growth of production and of reduction in 
78 inequalities in rural areas. 
In a regional study of changes\in rural poverty and inequality 
79 
over the decade of sixties Indira Rajaraman found a deterioratioi 
in the absolute levels of living and a rise in the incidence of 
poverty. She measured poverty by the percentage of population 
below the poverty line worked out specifically for the region using 
n 
linear programming techniques. She concluded that "there was a 
significant deterioration over the ten year period not merely 
in terms of the relative distribution of comsumption, but more 
seriously, in the absolute consumption levels of the poorest 25 
per cent of the population. The finding assumes an added signi-
ficance when it is seen to have occurred during a period of growth 
80 and a generally rising mean consumption level", 
81 Deepaklal found a decline in the incidence of poverty 
82 
among rural labour households in five states between 1956-57 
and 1970-71. He adopted three alternative estimates of the stete 
level poverty lines of Dandekar and Rath and Bard'ian and utilised 
1 
the rural labour enquiries of the NSS for 1956-57 and 1970-71. 
He noticed a significant negative correlation between the percentage 
change in the proportion of sample households below the poverty 
line and the percentage change in the average household income for 
the sameple group as a whole,; further the former was also 
correlated (though at a fairly low level of significance) with the 
percentage change in the cereal output of the period. 
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Parthasarady ex^ined the economic conditions of 
rural labour and fotind 80 per cent of the labour households 
below the poverty line of Rs, 450 per capita annual income at 
1972-73 prices. The proportion varied between landless and 
landed labour households; it was 86 per cent among the former 
vghile the corresponding percentage ^ong the lan<}ed was 63. 84 
In another study Sarveswara Rao highlighted the higher inci-
dence of poverty and inequality in a more developed rural region. 
In a study of poverty and rural development focussing on 
U' c 
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the population in abject poverty. Finally, Radhakrishna et.al. 
in an elaborate cose study of urlmn poverty an^ ^ slurs found the 
incidence to be ramrpant among the urban vulnerable social groups. 
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CHAPTER-3 
R E S E A R C H M E T H O D O L O G Y 
I 
The present study is a macro study of certain micro units. 
It is an empirical, evaluative and intensive study of the different 
socio-economic aspects of,agrarian reality as observed in the 
selected villages of the lADP Districts of Aligarh & Karnal. 
The sociology of economic pc^licy implies the sociologi-
cal forces that influence certain instruments of economic policy 
and their implementation process in the attainment of specified 
objectives. It is the structure and function of rural society 
that determines the operational direction of such forces. 
It is an inter-discriplinary study encompassing the 
domains of economic and sociology. It is a synthetic study of 
economic aspects of social structure and sociological aspects of 
economic structure of the selected villages. 
The villages of Aligarh and Kamal were selected because 
they have been lADP Districts, Many other development and poverty 
alleviation programmes have been inplemented in these districts. 
Under the Sixth and Seventh Five Year Plans IRDP is being vigor-
oursly impilemented as an anti-poverty programme. These districts 
have well developed infrastructural facilities. They have been 
the hinterland of Green Revolution, Our objective of selecting 
these villages was to observe the extent of poverty and inequality 
among the agrarian classes in the d i . ' j tr icts. We wanted to examine 
how the stratificational factors of class, caste and power, and th< 
attitudinal and behavioural factors of rurcl bureaucracy, the 
middleman and the rural elite influence the process of perco-
lation of development benefits among the agrarian classes of 
the villages. Our objective was to examine how inspite of 
well developed infrastructural facilities and Groen Revolution 
in the districts and a vigorous anti-poverty programme, a major 
segment of rural society has failed to rise ^ove the poverty line. 
All the selected four villages are ecologically similar. 
The fertility of the land is -similar, intensity of irrigation 
is high and institutional support is substantial. However, inspite 
of all these positive features, there mass poverty and inequality. 
It is mainly because of structural-functional factors which have 
been sidestacked by the planners. 
In this study an attempt has been made to study (1) the 
pattern of agrarian structure in relation of poverty, inequality 
and distribution of development benefits (2) The association of 
inequalities in the distribution of development benefits with str-
atificational factors i.e. caste, class and power (3) The corre-
lation among stratificational factors and (4) Th« role of rural 
bureaucracy in the distribution of development benefits. 
THE SMPLEt 
VJe studied the agro-economic features of the two districts 
of Aligarh and Karnal and with the help of the project authorities, 
listed the blpcks in the two districts, where the lADP, lAAP, Il<DP, 
NREP, MNP etc, were launched and where the work has continued since 
they were launched, CXit of the two separate lists of blocks in the 
two districts, the blocks which seemed to be unique or distinctive i' 
in agricultural features from the norms were rcinovfd. 
on 
I From the blocks in the lists, one block was selected randomly^ 
in each of the districts. Two lists of all villages of the two 
blocks were prepared. Out of these lists after discur.sion with 
the block authorities villages where some unusal features weire 
noticed were left out. Again, very srnall villages having less 
than 150 households and very big villages having over 350 house-
holds were also eliminated from the lint. 
Thus Adaun and Imlani villages from Dhanipur Block and 
Berthal and Sikri villages from Nilokheri Block respectively in 
the Districts of Aligarh and Karnal were selected. 
The study of four villages wes considered adequate in 
view of Lhc relative homogeneity of the bloclCG. Go the sample 
of four villages is fairly representative of the chief charact-
eristics of the agrarian social structures prevalent in the two 
districts. The villages are conposed of multi caste groups with 
a sizeable number of scheduled caste population. Almost all the 
major occupational groups - farmers, agricultural labourers, 
f 
artisans, traders and money lenders are represented therein. The 
agrarian structures in all the four villages present a skewed 
distribution of landholdings, where, inspite of certain institu-
tional reforms, land is coricentrated in a few hands of dominant 
castes. In the villages of Berthal (K) and Adaun (A) there is 
one caste dominance, whereas in Sikri (K) and Imlani (A) there 
is dominance of two castes. There were 1140, cultivating as well 
as non-cultivating, households in these villages. All of them 
have been studied intensively,^ In this regard, village and 
household schedules were prepared for eliciting relevant inform-
ation. 
0 0 Cd 
VILLA3E SCHEDUIE; 
It was designed to accommodate information in a detailed 
way ^out the village primary statistics, development, schemes, 
population, land utilisatiop, cropping pattern, crop rotation, 
irrigation, credit and marketing, panchayats - their structure 
and function, sources of income and ^ cittern of e-xpenditaxe, caste 
cortposition, occupational groups, amenities and infrastructural 
facilities available in the villages. 
HOUSEHOID SCHEDULE: 
It constituted the nucleus of the study. In contained 
information like family composition, asset structure, details 
of houdings, land utilisation, intensity of cropping, intensity 
of irrigation, cropping pattern, cost of cultivation, extent of 
adoption of inproved practices of farming, details of marketing 
and capital expenditure, credit needs, levels of debts, borrowing 
and cost of credit and membership of village institutions, caste, 
class and power position of the family etc. The information thus 
collected forms the raw material for all the economic and socio-
logical analysis found in the study. The working heads of the 
f 
households were interviewed for the purpose assuming that they 
might be better informed ^out the development benefits received 
by the respective households owing to their involvement in the 
decision-making processes. 
Besides, all rural bureaucrats concerned with the rural 
development programmes, more particularly I IUJP, were interviewed 
for the purpose. 
About 10 to 12 weeks were devoted to collecting data in 
each village?. The realities of agrarian structures and the process 
of implementation of development programmes (IRDP) have been observec 
face to face in the real context. Such observations bear great 
I 
value tor pto^JOR uruJoraLAUD LMJ ot HIT; J.ULCI1 O O C N E , 
TADULATION: 
The entire data was tabulated on a master sheet and summary 
tables were prepared out of it. For aasessing the caste, class, 
power, status of the family multi-stage stratified purposive random 
sampling techniques were used in the study. Data for the study 
again 
was collected during September 1978 - August 1979 and/October 1983 
September 1984. in all cases^ the date was collected personally 
by the researcher at the place of work or at the residence of the 
informants. Certain operational difficulties were overcome with 
the help of local residents and influential jsersons from the vill-
ages and outside. 
Our major emphasis was on discussion. The problem under 
Study was a highly complex one which could not be studied properly 
by filling in formal questionnaires. It needed an indepth under-
standing of the village economy and its social structure as its 
major objective was to build up an understanding regarding the 
inequitous power structure with all its socio-politico-economic 
( ramifications in the villages. It was necessary to have a clear 
knowledge of the attitudes of the panchayat members, village 
leaders, administrative functionaries etc. It was also essential 
i' 
to gain perception of the nature and extent of economic disparities 
and the resultant problems, fears, hopes, expectations of the 
exploited and the neglected segments of the rural society. 
8?" 
The crux of the research is to substantiate the thesis 
that poverty i,s not only a problem _ql^ r<3das,tion,,,e.cpnoini9$ b^t; 
of .sociology. pX_disArib\ition _as„wen , .Oociologicol fnctors, 
i.e. Caste, class and Power, rural bureaucracy, the middleman, 
t 
the rural elite tend to influence the pattern of Income distri-
bution and development benefits and in consequence the levels 
S 
of living of different agrarian classes. The flambuoyant models 
of economic development formulated by developments economists 
for the betterment of rural masses are meaningless unless due 
attention is paid to the structure and function of rural economy, 
TOOI^ AND TECHNIQUES; 
Interview schedule was employed in this study to obtain 
information from the respondents. Based upon the study of 
relevant literature, discui:=sion wiUi the Dlock change agents, 
interview with the villagers and the researchers own experience 
in the field, two draft schedules w«re edited, modified and 
finalised. The first appendix contained questions basically 
concerned with the agricultural aspects of rural life. It was 
concerned with question on Crops, Cropping Pattern, intensity 
f 
of Cropping, fattern of consumption, ^ intensity of Irrigation, 
distribution of land & income, poverty line etc. The second 
Appendix contained questions on respondents' caste, class and 
power position, amount o'f development benefits receive'^, perce-
ption aboxjt the rlliitribu tion clfvelopin'-nt be:ne£lLs an<l the levels 
of living of agrarian classes, the characteristics of households 
below the poverty line etc. 
0 0 Li 
A separate interview schedule was used to obtain infor-
mation from .-the Block extension staff on the problems. It 
consisted of three parts (1) identification (2) perception 
I 
of groups benefitted and (3) identification of beneficiaries. 
All the agencies at the village, block, district and state 
levels possessing relevant information on the problems were 
approached and i^ he data connected with the block and the 
sample villages was collected from i he records for the refer-
ence period,^ The information given by the respondents was 
suitably supplemented and edited through personal observation 
and cross checks. The help of the B.D.O., A.B.D.O,, officers 
of I.A.D,P., I.R.D.P., V.L.W. Lckh.Pals, Gram Pardhanas and 
other village leaders was sought, 
OPERATIONALISATION OF COlvlCEPTS: 
CASTE: In order to study caste hierarchy, a large number of 
judges representing different caste groups were selected in 
each village. They were asked to rank the status of all the 
castes of their respective villages in the four hierarchical 
4 groups. These were given scores 1 through 4,1 for the lowest 
« 
and 4 for the highest castes. Bnsed upon median and quartile 
values of ranking of each caste, all the caste groups were I 
divided into 4 hierarchical stratum i.e. highest, high, low 
and lowest, 
CLASS: We have s tud i ed cl3r,r> hier^irchy by us ing compos i te 
t 
index based on land ownership, income and occupation. As a 
first step, respondents' ranking of each of the thirre measures 
was obtained as followsr 
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i) LAND gONERSHIP: As shown in the revenue records^ total 
land ovmed by all the members of the household was taken into 
account. The total variation betv/een the highest and the 
lowest amount of land owned by the respondents in each village 
was divided into 10 equidistant categories. These were assigned 
scores 1 to 10; 1 for the lowest and 10 for the highest land 
size category. 
ii) INCOMlt The total net income earned during the previous 
year from various sources by allvthe earning members of the 
households was taken into consideration for the purpose.^ It 
consisted of (i) farm income and (ii) Non-farm income. The 
farm output minus the cost of all materials and paid out labour. 
The non-farm income consisted of the value of salary, rent, 
profit, interest, wages etc. the income received by a household 
in the year was rounded to the nearest multiple of R:. 500/-. 
The total variation in the household income in each village 
was divided into 10 equidistant categories. These were assigned 
scores 1 through 10, 1 for the lowest and 10 for the highest 
income category, 
iii) In order to obtain ranking of occupation^ a large group 
of villagers belonging to different occupations and caste groups 
were selected in each village. They v/ere asked to rank all the 
occupations followed in their respective villages into 6 hiera-
rchical orders. These were assigned to rank all the occupations 
into 6 hierarchical orders. These were assigned scores 1 
through 6, 1 for the lowest and 6 for the highest ranked occu-
pations, Based upon the total values of ranking, all the 
occupations wera divided into 10 equidistant categories scores 
1 through 10 VTere assigned to them: 1 for the lowest and 10 for 
the highest ranked occupations. If the members of a household 
follow more than one occupation, the scores of all such occup-
ations were averaged to 9btain occupational scores of that house-
hold. 
The single index approach makes use of only a single variable 
as a sole indicator of one's class position. In view of the 
problem of status-inconsistency and absence of universally eff-
ective single determinant of clas^^, single index was not used 
for study. Also classes based on land are not exclusive to 
each other and occupation, inspite of its simplicity, has not 
been considered suitable as its various aspects are not always 
correlated. Social researchers have resolved these problems by 
having a composite view of one's statuses based on two or more 
status giving variables. This provides an overall view of one's 
class position. 
Using the economic conception, two approaches to study class 
have been noted: (1) single index, and (2) composite index. We 
have employed composite index for the study of class hierarchy 
« 
and three variables i.e. land, income and occupation were taken 
as indicators of one's class position assurr.ing that they are 
relatively more stable. Such an approach has made it possible 
to have a picture of class structure independent of the subje-
ctive view of caste. 
CO^^POSITIE CLASS I^ JDEX: -
I I ! • . • • • • , , • • • ! >.1 • I — f 
As a second step, scores received by each respondent on three 
measures were totalled to obtain his composite class score. The 
Q U 0 J 
maximum scores that one'could obtain on the three measures 
were 30, Based upon the total scores obtained by the resp-
ondents in each village, median and quartile values were 
computed. Accordingly, ' all the respondents were categorised 
into highest, high, low and lo%-jest classes. Their broad cate-
gorisations were households aboveVpoverty line and below poverty 
line. 
PWERt 
V7e have used the positional approach in the study of power. 
In all, 7 formal institutions entrusted with power and autho-
rity were considered for the purpose. They were village pan-
chayats, panchayat samiti, standing comrittees of the zilla 
7 
parisheds, cooperative societies and political party. The 
inclusion of political party was based on the assumption that 
a man can possibly acquire a certain measure of power by value 
of his position in the party hierarchy, irrespective of his 
caste of class. Hunter has shown how political parties patro-
nise local influentials which ultimately results in strengthe-
ning the latter's position, economic or otherwise Recognising 
that individual's power varies with the nature and numbet of 
positions he holds, OEfice bearership, membership and non-
membership of each insljitution were assigned scores 2,1 & 0 
respectively, like caste, and class positions, power positions 
of I not only the respondent alonge but of all the members of 9 
his family were t^en into consideration. The scores, thus, 
received by a respondent were totalled. Using median and quar-
tile valued, all the respondents were divided into highest, 
high, low and lowest po\>?er groups. These were grouped into 
90 
higher and lower power groups wherever it was considered 
necessary to do so for statistical analysis. In fact, one's 
power position depends not only upon his own position but also 
upon the positions held by his family members and accordingly 
the family tends to exercise the power of its members in secu-
ring development benefits, 
DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS: 
The. term "Development Benefits" used to denote a composite 
meooure comrising of two primary components: {i) Adoption of 
improved technology and (ii) Material assistance. As a first 
step, respondents' benefit scores on each of these two measures 
were obtained as follows: 
(ii) Adoption of Impypved Technology: 
The Prime objective of economic policy is to diversify agri-
cultural economy and raise its productivity levels in order to 
imporve the guality of rural life. In this regard, 12 practices 
which have been strongly advocated by the extension agents cove-
ring agricultural and agro-industrial areas were taken into accou-
nt for the study of adof)tion of improved trchnology. The respon-
dents* adoption index was defined as the percentage of the reco-
mmended practices adopted by him during the last one year to the 9 
total number of practices applicable to his situation. For inst-
ance, of the 12 practices, 8 are applicable to the respondents 
and if he adopts six out of thene B pr':icticpn, his adoption score 
. 6 
^ ^ ^ 8 * - scores thus received by the responde-
nts were rounded to the nearest multiple of 10 and 1 score point 
was contributed by each unit of 10 tov;ards composite development 
benefit scores, 
MATERIAL ASSISTANCE: The^ amount of loans ard grants, in cash or 
kind, subsidy v/as U3«~d as an indicator of matrrial assistance. 
Of the two, grandi and subsidy were conceived as a better meassure 
of development benefit as the loans borrowed by a 
respondent are repayable.. Accordingly, a unit of grant was roughl 
9i 
10 
treated as three units of loan. The material assistance, 
S. 
thus received by a respondent was rounded off to the nearest 
multiple of Rs,500/- and I score point was assigned to each 
unit of Rs«500/*« The total variation between the lowest and 
the highest material assistance scores obtained by the respo-
ndent in each village was divided into 10 equidistant catego-
ries. These were assigned score 1 through 10? 1 for the lowest 
and 10 tor the highest material assistance category. 
COMPOSITE . DliVELOPMENT BENEFIT INDEX 
As a second 8tep# the scores obtained by a respondent 
on the above two measures were sumned up. The maximum scores 
that a respondent could obtain on two measures were 20. Thus 
the respondent's composite development benefit index was 
defined as the percentage of the scores he actually obtained 
to the maximum possible scores of 20. For example, if the 
respondent obtained 8 scores, out of the maximum scores of 
Q 
20, his composite development index would be * " 
per cent. Based upon the scores thus obtained by all the 
respondents in each village, median was conputed and the 
respondents were accordingly classified into high and low 
development benefit categories. 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT MEASURES 
In order to further our hypothesis, two 
supplementary measures of development benefits, namely, 
11 
increase in assets and benefits from social amenities were 
also used. To have an estimate of the increase in the value 
0?. 
of assets during the reference period, we have considered 
agricultural as well as non-agricultural assets. Besides^ 
respondent's own estimates of his assets, key persons were 
also consulted in assessing the value of assets in order to 
avoid discrepency, if any. The actual value of assets was 
rounded off to the nearest multiple of Rs.500/- and I score 
point was assigned to each such units. (It is likely that 
the adoption of Improved technology combined with material 
assistance might have helped in- Increasing the income and 
thereby the assets of the household, the increase in assets, 
therefore, provides some evidence of the increase in income). 
There has been a considerable emphasis on developing 
social amenities in the villages for the benefit of the 
rommunity nn a whole.i' These include .qnch proorf«rm»ea as 
schools, street lights training,health services etc. 
The benefits received from such programmes were measured 
as the percentage of the programme for which the respondent 
reported b«iefits to the total number of such programmes 
applicable to his village. Based upon the scores obtained 
by all the respondents in each village, the median was 
computed. Accordingly, the respondents were divided into 
high and low benefit categories. 
PQWKR T Two conceptions of pover can be noted in social 
science research i (1) generalised and (2) restricted. 
J 
As a generalised concept, power is conceived as a pheno-
menon of ine<|ualitles in several "political resources" 
such as wealth, income, education, esteem etc. Inherent 
qualities of men were also added to such a list of 
resources* 
In a restricted sense, power has been approached in 
three wayst (1) reputational, (2) aecisional or historical 
or event analysis, and (3) positional. As the prestige 
dimension has already been considered in the study of caste, 
we followed positional approach. The positional power which 
is often formally structured and legitimatised is refered as 
autho^city. It is this approach of power with which we are 
concerned in the present study. 
METHOD OF KSTIMATION OF CONSUlgFTION PATTERNS 
We have used consumption expenditure data rather //via,^  
income data in our analysis of consumption mainly because 
the estimates of consumption expenditure are likely to be 
more accurate than the income estimates in rural areas* 
we used different reference periods tor different 
sets of consun^tion items so that recall would not create 
any serious problem in estimation. For example, the 
\ 
•Of 
preceding weelc was the reference period for the Items of 
dally/weekly purchase such as milk, fruits, vegetables, 
fish, meat, tea, coffee, oil, ghee, sugar etc. The prec-
eding month was the reference period for items like 
cereals and pules, coal and other fuel, etc. etc. The 
preceding year was the reference period for expenditure on 
health, education, social functions, house rent, travel 
etc. and on consumer durables like utensils, clothing, 
furniture, radio, bicycle, fans, etc. etc. 
Consumption of each it«n was divided into two parts. 
Consuirption of homegrown quantity and consumption of purcha-
sed gtjantlty. The homegrown quanltitles were converted irito 
value terms by using the prevailing retail prices of the 
items in the local market and the figure of the total value 
of consumption was arrived at by adding the values of 
i' 
homegrown and purchased quantities of items. 
NOTES AND REFERENCES: 
1, Using as many cards as there were villages in each zone, 
the name of each village wasVentered on a separate card. 
These cards, which were uniforin in all rcspects, were 
thoroughly shuffled and a child was asked to draw one 
card from each such lot, 
2, The decision to include all the households in the study 
was ;guided by two main reasons: (1) to obtain a complete 
picture of stratification system of the village as a whole, 
and (2) to avoid any chance of exclusion of beneficiaries 
or non-beneficiaries so as to permit thorough investigation 
of the problem, 
3. The agencies approached for securing secondary information 
included Village Panchayats, VLWs, local Patwaries, school 
teachers and balwadi teachers at the village level; Panch-
ayat samiti office and branch office of the Central Coope-
rative Bank, Karnal at the block level: Gramin Bank and 
Canara Bank, Aligarh: lADP Office, ICDP Office branch office 
of land Development Bank, State Bank of India, PubjdD Nati-
onal Bank, E"arTners 'Training Centre, National Dairy Research 
Institute, Karnal and the District Offices of the Economic 
and Statistical Organizations Census Operations Govts of 
Mary ana and U.P,, 
4, Such an approach was preferred assuming that the hierarchy 
of individual castes provides ambiguous tentative and 
arguable picture. Moreover, the position of each caste, 
particularly the one statistically insignificant, is misl-
eading for our purpose. 
5. The facts incapable of being verified from the revenue 
records or Patwari were verified by the presidents of 
Panchayat and the cooperative society of the concerned 
village. This is a general practice followed in advan-
cing loans on the basis of landownership. 
6. The concept of incdme has been used here in a restricted 
sense. This consisted of (1) farm income and (2) non-farm 
income. The farm income was viewed as the total value of 
farm output minus the cost of all material and paidout 
labour. The non-farm income consisted of the value of 0 p salary, rent, profit, interest and wages etc, 
I 
7, The inclusion of political party was based on the assump-
tion that a man can possibly acquire a certain measure of 
power by virtue of his position in the party hierarchy 
irrespective of his c^ste or class (Beteille, 1969) , Hunter 
(1969) has shown how political parties patronise local inf-
luentials which ultirr.ately results in strengthening the 
latter's position, economic or otherwise, Aslo see Rao 
(1963 : 10) 
8, In fact, one's power depends not only upon his own position 
but also upon the positions held by his family members and 
accordingly the family tends to exercise the power of its 
member in securing development benefits, 
9, This procedure is based upon the method employed by Desgupta 
(1965) and Sengupta (1967), Freeman (1961) and Bose and 
Desgupta (1962) have also studied adoption by simply coun-
ting the number of improved practices adopted by a respon-
dent at a given point of time. Scholars have added to it 
a few other aspects such as potentiality, time, amount of 
difficulties, etc, to measure adoption level, 
( 
10, There were two main reasons for doing so: (i) the respon-
dent pays a lower rate of interest on the developmental 
loan borrowed by him from the institutional agencies and 
thus, he saves a heavy amount of interest which he has to 
pay to the private 'money lenders, and (J.i) the larger 
amount of loan enable the respondent to make higher inves-
tment which is likely to give more yield and income, 
11, It is likely that the adoption of improved technology 
combined with material assisLance might have helped in 
increasing the income and thereby the assets of the house-
hold, The increase in assets, therefore, provides some 
evidence of the increase in income. 
C H A P T E R - 4 3 
A3RARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE; POVSRY AND INEQUALITY 
The concept of agrarian social structure inplies the 
combination of statuses and accompanying roles in an agrarian 
system of social relationship. Status is a position in a 
social system occupied by individuals. It is simply a coll-
ecion of rights and duties. Role is the behavioural enacting 
of the patterned esqpectations attributed to position. It 
represents the dynamic aspect of status. Role and status are 
quite inseparable concepts in so far as there are no roles 
without statuses and no statuses without roles. 
An important feature of the agrarian social structure is 
that, in the agrarian setting, interaction is selective, regu-
larised, and regulated by various social controls. These basic 
concepts of social control are particularly important. First, 
values legitimise the existence and importance of specific social 
structure's and the kinds of behaviour that transpire in a given 
social structure. Second, norms are standards of conduct which 
regulate interaction among individuals in social structures. 
They are more specific than values in their control of interaction, 
Finally, sanctions including both rewards and deprivations, invo-
lve the use of various social resources to control the behaviour 
of individuals in social structures. 
Institutionalisation unifies the elements of social struc-
ture including roles, statuses, values, norms and sanctions. 
When we spf^ ak of the institutionalisoticn of the social system 
in the rural area of a given region of a country, we are referring 
to the more or less enduring pattern of roles and statuses 
which exist (the landowners, tenants and sharecroppers, lab-
ourers, and artisans, and the respective rights anc^  c^uties 
which accompany each of the?e generalised roles) ; the values 
which underlie that system, those elements of the existing 
V 
system of beliefs which in flue nee ' the broad framework of beha-
viour; the norms which govern conduct such as \i:ritten laws of 
contract or property of informal customary rules of work relatio-
nships; and the sanctions which are available to reinforce comp-
liance such as control over the payment of wages and settling 
their amount, the withholding of services - whether l^our on 
the part of the landless or credit on the part of the moneyle-
nding landowner. 
Let us begin our empirical analysis with an examination 
of the agrarian social structures of study villages. This will 
throw light on the process of percolation of gains of develop-
ment to various segments of the agrarian society and on the 
genesis of rural poverty. 
t 
THS VILLAGE ECONOMIES: 
The four selected villages are Berthal and Sikri in 
Nilokheri block of Karnal District and Adaun and Imlani in 
Dhanipur block of Aligarh District. The IRD Programmes as 
a part of poverty alleviation measures were introduced in 
1978-79 in both the districts. 
Among the four study villages, Imlani is the smallest 
one, Ita populalien is R5P and aren 364 ncron. It is at 
a distance of 2 kilometres from the main read and 6 kilometres 
from Aligarh railway station. Its climate is arid and annual 
«. 
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TABLE 4.6 
CONCENTRATIOM OF LANDHOLDING AMONG CASTE, 
CLASS AND POWER GROUPS 
/"N - 1140_7 
GROUPS N % Percentage of total landowned 
Higher castes 
1 
660 58.20 97.02 
Lower Castes 480 41.80 2.98 
Higher class 492 43.29 95.56 
Lower class 648 56.71 4.44 
Higher power 264 23.36 48.10 
Lower Power 896 76.64 51.90 
The pattern o f land d is t r ibut ion i s highly sXewed. Higher 
I 
caste households nimiber about 58.20% (666) but they 97.20% 
of land v/hile lower caste households are 41.80% but they hold 
only 2.98% of land. Higher c l a r r households beina (492) 
t o t a l h6viseholds but they hold 9 5.56% of land while lower c lass 
households mostly being BFL householcs hold onlv o^ l?nd 
\ 
As roqairdG hLnlv c y^ o^ •:er c r^ou s, hey are 23.36% of rural house-
holds in the 5tud^; v i l l a g e s but i lioy own 4 : . 10% of l.ind ivhile 
lower pov;er group being as high as "76.64% of rural household 
ovm only 51.90% of land. (Table - 4.G) 
TABLE 4 .7 
ASSTRR CONCENTRATION 
IU J 
Village Agricultural 
Machinery & 
inplements 
Gini-coeffi-
cient. 
Live-stock 
wealth 
Gini-coeffl-cient. 
Financial 
assets 
Gini-coeffi. cient. 
1. BERTHAL (K) '0.531 
2. AUAUN (A) 0*5702 
0.373 
0.356 
0.8009 
0.594 
3. SIKRI (K) 
4. IMLAMI (A) 
0.528 
0.430 
0.304 
0.206 
0.657 
0.817 
i I- -.5 
rainfall is 325-450 (MM). Its soil is loam, sandy^ soft loam 
and sandy clay. It is a multicaste village. The Thakurs and 
The Brahmins dominate the rural scene. There is inequitable 
distribution of land in this village. 
Agriculture in this village is fairly developsd,. The mean 
income of this village is Rs. 945.93, Its productivity per acre 
is R£, 4692.11, The mean income of the people below the poverty 
f 
line is Rs. 645.1 (Table 4.1) and Sen's Poverty Index is 0-146 
Table (4.5) . 
The intensity of cropping is 1,48 and the percentage of 
i' 
net area under irrgation if 48,60. The percentage of holdings 
irrigated is 70, Eighty percent of Uie holdings use HYV seeds 
and 75.27% of them use chemical fertilisers (Table - 4,2) 
^ong all the four study villages the use of tractors 
is the least in this village. Only 35,6% of holdings use 
tractors and tractor hours per acre are 12,66 (Table -4,2) 
ADAUN; 
It is a well developed village^ It is 2 kilometres away 
I 
from the main road and 14 kilometres from Aligarh railway 
station. Its population is 1630 and area 742 acres. 
Its climate is semi-arid ant^i annual rainfall is 300-500 
(MM) . Its soil is loam and silty loam and intensity of irrig-
ation is 68, 
\ 
The mean income of. the village is R;, 1171.86 and produc-
tivity per acre is Rs, 7267,03 per acre. The mean income of 
the population below the; poverty line is n. 563,58 (Table4,l) 
and Sen's Poverty Index is 0.232 (Table-4.6) It means that 
there is more poverty in Adaun than in Imlani, Agriculturally, 
w i -
Adaun is more developed than Imlani, The Intensity of cropping 
is 1.7. It is the highest in all the four study villages. It 
has got the highest percentage of gross cropped area devoted to 
cash crdps. It is 41.3% as against 23.64% in Imlani. The 
percentage of gross cropped area devoted to cereals, mixed crops 
and other crops is 40.4, 7.15 and 11,15 in Adaun as against 
41.51, 24.97 and 9.98 r.espectively in Imlani. In Adaun, the 
technological development of agriculture is the highest in all 
four study villages. (Table 4.2) . The Thakurs are the dominant 
caste in the village. 
The percentage of net area under irrigation is 80% as 
against 60% in Imlani. About 89% of holdings are irrigated 
as against 57.25% in Imlani and Ninety Six percent of holdings 
use HYV seeds as against 80% in Inilani, The percentage of 
holdings using chemicalrfertilisers is 80.4 as against 75,?7 
in Imlani. In, the same way, 65.23% of holdings use tractors 
and tractor hours per acre are 40.66 as against 35,60 and 12,6 
respectively in Imlani -{Table 4.2) . 
BERTHALt 
licrl.hnl 1B hhe lorgenU oC '^ N^ r. MMMIY VILLTTJF'N, Its 
population is 1734 and area 1150 acres. It is at a distance 
of 3 kilometres from the main road and 12 kilometres from 
^7ilokheri railway station. Its climate is dry sub-humid and 
annual rainfall is 950-1000 (MK), Its soil is silty loam, 
loam and silty clay. It is also a multicaste village and 
the Jats are the dominant caste here. 
Berthai has got a highly developed, commercialized and 
diversified aqrlculturr . itn croppinn. .i.ntonr,lty Is 1,6 
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(Table 4.3) , The percentage of cropped area . . cash crops, 
cereals, mixed crops is 40.89, 32.30, 13,72 and 13.09 respec-
tively, The percentage of net area under Irrigation is 75 
while the percentage of holdings irrigated is 82.46. Hundred 
percent holdings use HYV seeds and 85% of them use chemical 
fertilisers. The percentage of holdings using tractors is 
62.76 and tractor hours per acre are 27.75 (Table 4.2) . 
SIKRI; 
It is our second ptudy village in Karnal District. It 
is a developed village. It is a multi-caste village. However 
The Jats and The Muslims near about equally dominate the village 
socio-economic strxicture. It is about 2 kilometres from the 
main road and 26 kilometres from Nilokheri railway station. Its 
population is 1780 and area is 712 acres; 
The climate of Sikri is semi-arid and annual rainfall is 
975-1125 (MM), Its soil is silty clay and intensity of irri-
gation is 65, ^ 
Agriculture is fairly advanced here. The mean income of 
the village is Rs, 1112.27 and productivity per acre is Rj.4891.03. 
The mean income of the population below the poverty line is 
Rs.623.12 (Table 4,1) and Sen's Poverty Index is 0.156. So there 
is less poverty in Sikri than in Berthal (Table 4.'-') . 
\ 
The intensity of cropping is 1,58, The percentage of gross 
cropped area under cash crops, cereals, mixed crops and other 
crops is 21,79, 43,40, 24,97 and 9,64 respectively (Table 4,3), 
The use of technological inputs and the rate of intensity 
of adoption of modern technology is fairly high. The percentage 
of net area under irrigaMon is 65. Seventy percent of holdings 
CASTE COMPOSITION OP THE STUDY VILLAGE 
•IW 
Caste ALIGARH KARNAL 
IMLANI ADAUN BERTHAL SIKRI 
BRAHMINS, 16 20 4 16 
(9.75) 6.66) (1.17) 4.16) 
j«rs 4 - 192 96 
(2.43) (56.47) (28.57) 
THAKUR 61 
(37.19) 
.196 
(65.33) 
— -
YADAV 13 
(7.92) 
16 
(5.33) 
— — 
HARUAN 45 40 104 48 
(27.43) (13.33) (30.58) (14.28) 
MUSLIM 12 8 8 120 
(7.31) (2.66) (2.35) (35.71) 
OTHERS 13 20 32 56 
{1.91) ,(6.66) (9.41) (16.60) 
164 
(100) 
300 
(100) 340 noo) 
336 
(100) 
TABLE NO. 4. 10 A f i. 1 
CASTE TOTAL KjF SF OF AL NAL AH RA SER 
VICE 
BUS I 
NESS 
^ E % OF 
^ ^ LAND 
HOIFLSRS 
BRAHMINS 20 4 4 12 2 ,3 
JATS 
THAKURS 196 60 64 40 8 4 88 ,6 
YADAV 16 4 
( 
4 2 8 4 1 .7 
HARIJAN 40 12 4 20 4 3 . 1 
MUSLIMS 20 4 4 10 .5 
OTHERS 20 4 4 8 
1 
4 8 3 , 8 
TOTAL 300 80 80 44 40 4 28 8 8 100 
'ADAUN* (ALIGARH) 
There is single caste - the Thakur - dominance in this village. 
The Thakurs constitute 65,33% of total population but they own about 
88.6% of land. The Harijans are 13,33% of population but they own only 
3,1% of land. Each of the Brahmins, the Muslims constitutes about 6,66% 
f 
of population but thoy hold only 2,3%, 3,1% of lond respectively. The 
Yadavs are 5.3% of population but they hold only 1,7% of land. These 
figurca show a highly inegalitarian agrarian structure. The Gini 
t 
Coefficient of land distribution is 0,316. 
The dominant caste is a cultivating caste - 164 (63,67%) house-
\ 
holds are connected with agriculture, while 8 households are in service 
and 4 householris fo business. Most of the agricultural labourers are 
the Muslims and other low costemen. 
TABLE NO. 4. 11 
CASTE TOTAL MF SF OF AL NAL AH RA m M S • 
HOIDERJ 
BRAHMIN 16 4 8 29% 
JAT 4 4 .5% 
THAKUR 60 8 16 24 4 4 60.5 
YADAV -12 8 4 1 1.5 
HARIJAN 48 4 4 32 8 5.3 
MUSLIM 
f 
12 4 4 2 4 1.4 
OTHERS 12 4 1 8 1.8 
TOTAL 164 28 36 2'8 36 16 8 8 4 100 
* IMLANI * (AL IGARH) 
In this village there is relatively less skewed land distri-
bution. The Brahmins constitute only 9.75% of population but they 
own about 29% of land. The Thakurs are 36,58% of population but 
they hold 60,5% of land. On the other hand, the Harijans are 29.26% 
of population but they own only 5.3% of land . In the same way the 
Yadav, the Muslims and others constitute about 21.95% of population 
but they own only 4.7% of land. The Brahmins and the Thakurs are 
the dominant castes in this'villages. 
The Gini Coefficient of land distribiition is 0.285, 
numerically, the Hari jans constlLuLc: Llic sccond largest caste 
I 
group, but economically they are wenk nnd rlerx^ndent, Kost of thorn 
work as agricultural labourers anrl no agricultural labourer belongs 
to the upper or middle castes. 
TAB IE. NO; 4. 12 i i n i 
CASTE MAIN, OCCUPATION AI3D LAND g.JNERSHIP IN 'SIKRI' (KARKAL) 
CASTE TOTAL MF SF OF AL NAL AH RA SERV 
ICE 
BL^I 
NESS 
OTH % OP 
ERS LAND 
HOLDERS 
BRAHMINS 8 
( 
4 4 2,2 
JATS 104 8 40 24 4 12 4 12 38,75 
JHIMAR 32 4 4 20 4 2,18 
HARIJAN 48 8 4 ^ 32 4 2,17 
MUSLIM 120 20 36 20 16 4 12 4 4 4 54,7 
TOTAL 336 44 84 48 68 4 4 16 20 8 16 100 
SIKRI (KARNAL) 
It is multi Cciste village. It has got two caste dominance. The Jets 
and the Musllme constitute about 31,54% and'35,71% of population 
respectively and they hold 38,75% and 54,7% of land. The Harijans 
are 14,28% of population but'they own only 2,17% of land. The Jhimars 
are 8,5% of population but they own only 2,18% of land. The Gini 
Coefficient of land distribution is 0,303. 
TABLE NO. 4. 13 Jt ji ' 1 
CASTE TOTAL MF SF OF AL NAL AH RA SERV BUSI 
ICE NESS 
OTH 
ERS 
% OF LAND 
HOLDERS 
BRAHMINS 4 4 2.1 
JAT 192 48 49 40 4 20 8 4 90,6 
JHIMAR 48 16 8 16 4 4 1.2 
HARIJAN 64 12 4 36 4 4 4 2,9 
MUSLIM 4 4 .3 
OTHERS 28 12 8 4 24 2.9 
TOTAL 340 88 68 48 76 12 8 24 8 8 100 
'BERTHAL' (KARNAL) 
It is a multi caste villages with a single caste^ the Jat, dominance 
who are at the helm of agrarian social atrucutre. The Jats constitue 
56.47% o£ population but they own 90.6% of land. The Jhimars are 14.11% 
of population but they own only 1,2% of land. The Harijans are 18.82% 
of population but they own only 2.9% of land. Others are about 8.25% 
of population but they hold only 2.9% of land. The Gini Coefficient 
of land distribution is 0,521, The data shows a highly skewed and 
inegalitarian agrarian structure. Most of the agricultural labourers 
arc the Jhijuars and the Harijans, No hou^hold of upper and middle 
castes in engaged in dirty of 'Poor' occuptiaons. 
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are irrigated and B5% of them use HY7 seeds and 72,75% use 
chemical fertilisers. The p^A'ontnqe of holdings using 
tractors is 45,75 and tractor hours per acre are 18,75 
(Table 4.2) , 
THE SOCIAL STRATIFICATION; 
So far as the social hierarchical order is concerned, there 
definitely seems to be a close association between caste and 
class in the sense that high<rr castes ovm larger areas of land 
and vice versa. That is, over and above land, caste will be 
an additional factor diverting the benefits of growth to a 
selcctCfT Ecw, Whether this hnr-ipens in rc.-ility or not depends 
on (1) the caste, class relationships and (2) the caste soli-
darity, Let us exanine this phenomenon in the context of our 
study villages, 
Thereare different percentages of high .and low castes 
high and low classes and high c.rd low power groups . In Aliqarh 
villages, the percentage of highest castes, high castes, low 
castes and lowest castes is 11,25, 45,05%, 18,10, and 25,86 
respectively as against 8,87%, 48,52%, 13,60% and 28,99% in 
Karnal villages. Whereas the whole percentage is 10,24, 47,61, 
15,45 and 26,80 percentage (Table 4,/^) . Again the percentages 
of highest classes, high classes, low classes and lov;est clar.ses 
are 10.B2.%, 2S,0%, 2^,01, nnd 30,17 In Mln-irh vino j. .13 
against 22,4C, 19,52, 30.76, and 27,21 in Karnal villages wher-
eas the whole percentage is 21.78, 21.86, 28.14 and 28,22% 
respectively (Table 4*/5') , So far as pov^er groups are conce-
rned, in Aligorh villages, the highest, high, low and lov/est 
power groups comprise of 14,65%, 20.68%, 37.93% and 37.06% of 
households. On the other hand, 10.65%, 11.33%, 13.17% and 
47.33%of households belong to highest, high, lov/ and lov;est 
power groups (Table 4./^ ) . These data show that higher per-
centage of households in Karnal share power than those in 
Aligarh signifying grf.ater d i f f u G i o n o f pov.'er i n K o r n a l village 
than in Aligarh villages. 
A l l the v i l l a g e s are m u l t i c a s t s v i l l a g e s . There a re 
a t l e a s t t h r e e n u m e r i c a l l y impor t an t c a s t e s in each c f the 
V i l l a g e s , The v i l l a g e s a r e thur n o c i o l o q i c n 11 v t > ron<- noo\i-
vinltn (Tnh lo 4 .0 ) 
The Thakurs a re n u m e r i c a l l y impo r ton t i n Adaun (65,33% ^ ^ 
and I in lani (37%) , However , the h i g h c a s t e s and the uppe r 
t 
middle castes (mainly The Thakurs/The Jats) together constitute 
more than half of the population of Imlani and more than 60% of 
the population of Adaun (71%), Berthal (62%) and Sikri (66%). 
The Muslims in Sikri enjoy a high status as most of them are 
land owners in the villages (Table 4,6) , 
The low castes are numerically important in Berthal and 
Imlani, where they constitute 33% to 38% of the total population 
respectively. However, their share is low in Sikri (14%) and 
Adaun (16%), The rest of the population of the villages belongs 
to the middle and lower middle castes (Table 4.6) . 
CASTE AND OCCUPATIONJ 
JA^oxu^ middle castes and lower castes are numerically 
important in these villages, it is only the high castes thet 
enjoy higher "occupational status. 
First of all, the families belonging to the highest and 
upper middle castes namely The Brahmins, The Jats and The Thakurs 
have the smallest percentage of families belonging to low occup-
ations. Secondly, a major share of agricultural labourers come 
from the low caste of which The Harijans are predominant. For 
example 75% of agricultural labour families in Inilani, 60% in 
Sikri, 73% in Adaun and 88% in Berthal belong to low castes. 
The share of The Brahmins, The Jats and The Thakurs is nil among 
agricultural laboures (Tables 4,/O'to 4.l3) , 
The service sector occupies a very small place in the 
economies of these villages. 
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OFFICE BEARERS OF F3S, F/ZS AMD OF TIIE GRAM PANCHAYAT'S; 
Table 4,l7 gives information cibout the office bearers of 
important organisations in the villages. It reveals that 
I 
these organisations, which hold the pov;er of making almost 
all economic decisions in the village are managed exclusively 
by the higher castes of the villa^'e. In Berthal, for exarriple, 
the Chairmanship and Secretaryship of both FSS, FC3 arc held 
by tV»e Jats, The Sarpanch is also o Jnt no ic; the Deputy 
Sarpanch though the Jats constitute only (56.47%) of the popu-
lation. In Imlani, the Thakurs are holding the Secretaryship 
of MCS and Chairmanship and Secretaryship of the FSS, The 
Chairmanship of j^CS is held by a Brahmin v/hich is the second 
caste in the hierarchy of castes in the village. The Deputy 
Sarpanch also belongs to this caste. In Adaun, all these 
posts are held by the Thakurs, though they constitute hardly 
(65,33%) of the village population. In Sikri, the Muslims 
enjoy a high social status. Consequently the Muslims as well 
as the Jats occupy all the major posts in the villages (Table 
4,14) ' 
THE RURAL STRUCTURE AND TFIE FlTtCTIOMlNG OF THE VlLLK^E ECONOHIES! 
The objective of this section is to study the patterns of 
stratifications o£ the 'population of the selected villages and 
examine how they influence the process of percolation of bene-
fits of grov/th to different sections of the society. It a 
society is a homogeneous society, the percolation process is 
likely to be simple, (as gradually all will get the benefits). 
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but when it is heterogeneous, that is, when it is divided into 
different strata based on class, caste and political power, 
the process becomes complicated. To understand this process, 
one has to examine the nature of heteroneneity of the society. I 
THE FRAMEWORK OF AI^ IALYSIS 
Tv/o major framevrorks used for understanding the rural soci-
ety in India relate to the caste and the class. When v/e add the 
third type of stratification which is based on power (i.e. infl-
uence on decision making) , the pic\uro ol stratification will be 
conip] cto . 
Class relates to the sources of income, and in an agrarian 
society, it can be related to land. As Myrdal puts it, in the 
South Asian rural setting, inequality in iact is mainly a quest-
ion of land ownership. The economic classes in rural areas are 
therefore as follows; 
Marginal, small, medium and big farmers and agricultural 
labourers in the agricultural sector and rural artisans, the 
people in service and traders in the non-agricultural sector. 
The king pin in this structure is land, rather the size-distr-
ibution of land (Table 4.18) . Our analysis of economic stratifica-
tion v/ili therefore start vdth an analysis of the size distributic 
< 9 { 4 ^^ 
holdings, and then proceed to examine its impact on access-
ibility to credit, to new technology and to agricultural 
growth and on the pattern of distribution of consumption 
levels of different classes of the villages. 
The caste system which is a social hierarchical system 
seems to have a significant impact on the accessibility of 
different groups to various economic activities and progr-
ammes as this system is not merely an arrangement of groups 
which are ranked high and low. It is also a system of values 
in which the idea of hierarchy- occupies an important position. 
For example, a person botn in a high caste enjoys some privi-
leges by the right of his birth. He enjoys a high social 
status which means that he is treated as socially superior 
to others which perh^s implies that his accessibility to new 
information, activities etc. is relatively high. 
There is also a feeling of cSste solidarity, which is 
based on kinship relations, rules of purity, pollutione tc. 
and which is strengthened by common residential areas. Caste 
solidarity tends to make the percolation of information, prog-
raiTjnes etc. caste-oriented. It may take a longer time to reach 
other castes or it may not reach other caste at all. 
The caste-class relationship-that high castes own bigger 
lands-strengthens the position of those who belong to high castes. 
Though studies have shown that many changes are taking place in 
this relationship, it is still accepted that caste is an import-
ant stratification of our rural society. (Table - 4,6) 
Power is essentially the influence on decision making. 
CXir analysis of power therefore will study the functioning of 
125 
decision making organizations working at the village level. 
They are the village Panchayat, the FSS, cooperative socie-
J ^ 
ties etc. 
The iinplenientation of democratic decentralisation 
through Panchayat Raj Institutions was meant to give an opp-
ortunity for local initiative and participation in development 
activities. In fact, the Balwantrai Mehta Committee was formed 
because of the fact that the community development programmes 
could not be implemented as they were under the direct control 
of the government. It was thought that a linkage between local 
leadership enjoying confidence of local people and the State 
Government had to be established to translate the policies of 
the government into action. 
The Panchayat Raj fetructure which was introduced in our 
rural areas is a three/four tier structure. The gram Pancha-
yat or the village Panchayat, v;hich is at the lowest level, has 
large pov/ers to influence the percolation of economic gains into 
the rural society. 
\ 
SIZE - DISTRIBOTION OF HOLDINGS 
The villages under study have inherited an uneven land-
distribution, In the post-independence p e r i o r l , e nuir.ber o f 
land reforms such as abolition of tenancy, land to land tillers, 
ceilings on land holdings (agricultural) etc. v/ere introduced. 
However, these reforms have not changed the picutre radically. 
Table 4.14 gives information about the size-distribution 
of land holdings in the four villages. It shows that all the 
four villages have highly unequal land distribution. The Gini 
C#efficientdistrlbution is 0,521, 0,316, 0,303, 0,285 in Berthal, 
Adaun, Sikri and Imlani respectively. 
i (yi -J 
5 
S OQ < 
(0 ^  EH 
» i 
S8§ 
ac 2 0 5 
01 H 
U 
s a: 
6(1 
Sgg 
U S Oi 
W ^ fe o 
§ •J 
o o OI CO o • in 00 in o • • • o VO in 00 f-4 GO 
M" CO in o . O r- o 
• • • • in c ro o\ 
00 r- CO 00 
m T-J o n 00 
• • • • CM VO CM ro in CM CO 
00 <H CM CM CO CM VO «H 
• • • * rH 00 r-rM CM r-l fH 
I H 
g S H H 
CQ to 
• • f-4 CM 
< ^ 
< § 
ro 
127 
The main reasons fot this seems to be the larger share 
of agricultural labourers as well as of small and marginal 
farmers in the irrigated villages. What could be the reasons 
for the large share of these classes ?. the likely reasons are 
(a) inmigration of labourers from outside (b) demographic pre-
ssure of the population, (c) rural artisans etc. have taken 
up agricultural labour work (d) small and marginal farmers have 
sold their lands and joined the army of agricultural l^ourers. 
All tho thrco f DC tors ar^cm lo/jpon.'Dlblc for awcllhvj U)e 
number of agricultural labourers and of small and marginal 
farmers in the study villages. 
What is striking however is the increasing proportion of 
land mortgaging and land sales in these villages. The Patwaris 
of all these villages stated that the land sales were on the 
increase in the villages, (Table 4,191 , They also said that 
many times the land sales were not recorded as they were not 
legal, 
(1) Majority of land mortgages and land sales are of 
small land holders. However a few big land holders also have 
mortaged their lands in Berthal and Sikri, 
(2) The proportion of land mortgaging is highest in 
Berthal, followed by Sikri, Imlani and Adaun, Our investiga-
tion showed that the main reasons for land mortgaging are 
rising cost of agriculture .; -.^ r increasing cost of living, 
or as compared to the income of ag^ricultural labour work and 
social functions such a marriages, deaths etc. In Berthal 
village, where the Jats are in majority, mortgaging for marr-
iages is a common practice. 
^ o ? i (U ^  
(3) It seems that many times land mortgaging is the 
first step towards land sales. Once the whole holding is 
mortgaged, the family starts selling the land to meet its 
needs. The total sales o^ land, including the illegal ones, 
are quite high in the irrigated villages. On an average, 
10-15small holders sell parts of their lands per year in the 
irrigated villages. It seems that if this nattern continues 
(and as the patwaris said the number of sales are on the incr-
ease) a large number of non-viable small and marginal farmers 
will be forced to leave their lands gradually. 
To sum up, therefore, immigration, and land sales, both 
are important reasons for the larger share of agricultural 
labourers in the irrigated villages. 
The size-distribution of landholdings in a village is 
likely to have far reaching consequences in terms of distri-
bution of benefits of growth. First of all, it influences -
if not determines, the accessibility of a family to the credit 
facilities. Secondly, it influences the ownership pattern of 
assets (which includes irrigation facilities, such as well/ 
tubewell, tractors, other agricultural implements etc.) and their 
use. Thirdly, big farmers tend to influence the working of FSS, 
MCS, Panchayats cooperative societies etc. by occupying impor-
tant positions in these organizations, which again, improves 
their accessibility to the supplies of new inputs, new technology 
etc. etc. Let us examine the case of the selected villages. 
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Use of Irrigation and Ownership of Irrigation Facilities; 
The accessibility pattern to the credit market is natu-
rally reflected in the use pattern of irrigation facilities. 
It is clear that this pattern will be different in canal 
irrigated and wellirrigated villages, (Table -4,7) givei 
information about the use of irrigation and ownership of 
irrigation facilities Cwells) by different land-holdings, 
I 
Imlani and Adaun are irrigated by wells. Though well 
irrigation is expensive as compared to canal irrigation hiring 
of well water is a coirainon practice in Adaun and to some extent 
in Imlani also. This has made it possible for some small far-
mers t^use irrigation in cultivation. Well is accessible only 
to big farmers in both the villages. It shows that for large 
investments (like in a well) bigger land holdings are in a 
favourable condition, 
I 
As regards hiring of well water a number of complaints 
were made by the small and marginal farmers in both the villages 
A number of them reported that (a) they were not happy with the 
< 
time and the quantity of water supplied and the crops suffered 
because of this factor, (b) the charges were not streamlined, an< 
(c) there was a limited choice as to from whom to borrow as the 
nearby wells were the convenient r.ovirccs. In short, though the 
hiring of well water allowed small and marginal farmers to use 
modern technology etc. it also increased their dependenc® on 
big farmers. 
1 -J J 
III DECISION MAKING AT TUC VILI,AGE LEVEL: 
FUICTIONING OF THE VILLAGE PANCHAYATS 
The Panchayati Raj Institutions were introduced vith 
romantic and idealistic overtones. The Panchayats were 
entrusted with such functions as construction, repair, 
maintenance, cleansing and lighting of public streets, 
medical relief such as maternity and child welfare, sani-
tation arrangments for re> reational facilities such as 
library and radio sets, establishment and maintenance of 
Primary Schools, construction of public wells, tanks and 
ponds, registration of births & deaths and marriages and 
protection and upkeep of buildings blonging to Gaon Sabha, 
Development functions: The development factions of 
Panchayats included framing the village production plan and 
budget of requirements for supply and finance, acting as a 
channel for distributing loans, organizing voluntary labour 
or community work, improving the b^ced of animals, helping 
in the development of cooperatives, and developing village 
industries, pisciculture, .commerce, and so on. All the 
village Panchayats in the circle had framed programmes of 
production, had helped the villagers in getting seeds from 
seed stores, and had organized labour for community projects. 
Land reforms and land management: Land reform functions incl-
uded the determination of land toy^ be allotted to ov;ners and 
tenants, the determination of surplus lands on application 
of ceiling of holdings, and distribution of surplus land. The 
management functions included regulation of the use of common 
land, adoption of standards of goods manngemont, and mainte-
nance of land records. A functionary of the Revenue about 
141 
Department, a Lekhpal, keeps these records, 
FINANCE; 
Income. The sources of income for the Panchayats were taxes, 
grants, income from village property, fees, and so forth. The 
main source of income has been grants from the government, but 
that too,was not regular, 
A Gaon Sabha can levy the following taxes and fees: (a) 
a tax on land not exceeding one anna (six paise) in the rupee 
on the aroount of land revenue payable thereon; (b) a profess-
ional tax on a person engaged in a trade or vocation; (c) a 
tax on animals or vehicles for hire; (d) fees on persons exposing 
goods for sale in markets, such as weekly bazaars and fairs; 
(e) fees on registration of animals sold in melas; (f) fees for 
the use of slaughter houses; and (g) a tax on buildings owned 
by persons vAio do not pay any of the aforesaid taxes. The 
Panchayats generally imposed taxes on land, but land taxes, 
as well as other taxes, were seldom realized, 
I 
The Panches made no effort either to realize the taxes 
already imposed or to levy new ones. Two reasons were; (1) 
that in some cases they themselves were the defaulters; {2) 
% 
that some Panches did not allow the Secrctory to ask the 
villagers to pay the taxes for fefir of losing their seats. 
Thus, the Panchayats have to depend mainly on grants, which, 
as already stated, are too meagre and not always available. 
Expenditures: The major income of Panchayats was spent on the 
construction and repair of roads, school buildings, panchayat 
ghar, and so forth. Some income was also spent on purchasing 
iiiii I <r 1 iil.M lor <j«iiM«'3, t<i<llc) .'ifLu, l<(Mjk;j lui ih< .llljinry, I'liul mo 
forth. The expenditure on various activities is low, but 
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expenditure cannot exceed income. Actually, the funds avai-
lable are very small and inadequate; therefore, unless the 
Panchayats develop their resources, performance cannot be good. 
Under the Panchayat Act the Sarpanch is directly elected by 
the voters of the village, while the deputy Sarpanch is elected 
by the elected Panchayat membe-rs. Obviously the main functions 
of the Gram Panchayat are related to general welfare and 
development of the village. It is expected that, the Panchayats 
function according to local needs and interests of the people 
and work for the welfare and development of the respective 
villages, 
ELECTION OR SEIECTION ? 
Though the members of the Panchayat are expected to be 
elected, the four villages have not undergone any election 
for a majority of seats of the Panchayats, 
Table 4*JHfO. shows this clearly: 
Imlani (A) and Sikri (K) so far have not had any election 
for the post of the Sarpanch, The Sarpanch of Imlani (A) , is 
holding this office for the last 10 years. He belongs to the 
Thakur caste and is a big farmer, Abdul Hakim is the Sarpanch 
of Sikri (K) and this is his second term. He is a muslim and 
a big farmer. 
The Sarpanch is always from among the big farmers of the I 
dominant caste of the village. There is either a unanimous 
choice for the post or a contest between the members of the 
same group (which is mainly because of their rivalry) . The 
contest is in no way a class conflict between the rich and the 
poor. 
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Both the reserved seats of women members of the Panchayat 
are filled In by unanimous choice in all the villages. As 
Llic T a b i c shows, a l l o f Lhr^ ni o r e e i t h e r r e l a t i v e s o f 
% 
the Sarpanch or are relatives of other members of the Pan-
chayat, It seems that their selection is done by the Sar-
S, 
panch and the persons belonging to his group. There does 
not seem to be any specific critericnof selection - except 
that they are relatives of influential persons. 
The reserved seats of SC/ST also are unanimously filled 
up, Candidates from the SC categories are not elected in any 
of the four villages. Once again the selection has been done 
by the Sarpanch apd other leaders of the village. Their 
personal relationship with the Sarpanch or other leaders seems 
to be an important consideration for this selection. The 
members are either the labourers working on the farms of 
these leaders or they have long personal relationship with 
the families of the leaders. 
The election of Panchayat members is in reality mostly 
t 
the selection of dominant big farmers of the village who sel-
ect or elect the members. The Sarpanch and his group, make 
selection of the women members and the Scheduled Caste members 
on the basis of their'relationship and loyality. The other 
members are also sleeted "and sometimes elected on the basis 
of the recommendation of the Sarpanch and other leaders of 
the village. The women or scheduled caste members or as a 
women's representative of - the village. As their choice 
is due to their personal relationship with the Sarpanch (and 
his group) , their personal charactc-ristics are hardly taken 
V r. o 
into consideration. Their only role is to strengthen the 
position of the Sarpanch, 
The marginal and small farmers and landless labourers 
are so much dependent on the non-poor and also are so badly 
trapped in debts to them that there does not seem to be any 
way out. Even the Scheduled Caste Panchayat members are not 
capable of doing anything in this regard. Thus we see that 
all the scheduled caste members supported the sarpanch and 
his group either because of loyalty or because of dependence 
or because of their elitist attitude. These Scheduled Caste . 
members thus failed to represent their interest groups in 
the Panchayats, 
THE SARPAIviCH: 
To understand the ways of functioning of the Sarpanch 
we asked them questions in three areas (1) major achievements 
of the Panchayat in the past and the work that Panchayat wants i' 
to take up in future, (2) the major problems of the village 
and (3) the problems of the poor. Though the answere were 
diverse, there emerged a certain common pattern of thinking. 
The major achievements of the panchayats in the past, 
according to the Sarpanchs were concerning facilities in the 
villages, euch as, a pucca approach road to the village, paved 
roads in the village, street lights, panchayats building, 
dhobighat, a building for Balmandir, water works etc.etc., I 
These works were financed by the regular income of the Panchayat, 
or by the 50% contribution from the people and 50% from the 
State Government. I When we asked them as to why certain facilities were less 
in some low caste areas (paved roads, street lights, water tap) , 
S 
1 9 "J 1 0 
and why some facilities 'were used less (Balmandir, domestic 
light, water taps in the house etc.) by some sections of the 
society, they had different answers; such as, (a) the need 
was less in those areas, (b) the resources were limited so 
they could not provide facilities to all the areas, (c) the 
poor should think that the Panchayat has given them the 
facilities wheA they have paid nothing. It was felt by all 
that if the poor could not afford to pay for the facilities, 
and therefore did not use them, the panchayat could not do 
much about it. 
As regards the questions about the future work that the 
Panchayat would like to take up, the Sarpanch had almost 
similar answers. The Sarpanch of Adaun (A) wants a garden-
cum-zoo for children, a bigger Panchayat Ghar, and a separate 
building for the Balmandir, the Sarpanch of Sikri (K) wants 
tubewellS, a bigger Panchayat building and a hospital; while 
the Sarpanch of Berthai (K) wants better housing for the Jats, 
a library, and a rest house. The Sarpanch of Imlani (A) wants 
an approach road, a Balnj-andir building and an irrigation cannal 
for the village. All the Sarpanchs want substaintial grants 
from the government for these works. 
What are the major problem of the village? According to 
the Sarpanch of Imlani (A) the lack of irrigation and the lack 
of proper educational facilities were the major problems of 
the village. The Adaun (A) Sarpanch thought the high argic-
ultural production costs, high electricity charges for irri-
gation and high oil prices were the major problems of the 
village. The Berthal (K) Sarpanch said that what the village 
^ r, n i d 
needed very badly was a factory in the public sector and 
some relief in the rising cost of cultivation. The Sarpanch 
of Sikri (K) thought that the village needed an expansion in 
the non-agricultural sector, preferably a factory (to produce 
some important product) in the i^ublic sector. The village 
also needed better supplies as well as lower prices of agri-
cultural products. 
Thus it seems that there is a clear elite boats in the 
thinking of the Sarpanchs. This is also reflected in the 
functioning of the panchayats. The requirements of the 
villages are determined on the basis of the needs of the 
big farmers and other rich of the villages. If the poor 
are benefitted, it is only incidential. The special needs 
of the marginal and small fanners and landless labourers do 
not get a high priority in the eyes of the Sarpanchs. 
In shor.t, the Sarpanchs of the villages have limited 
understanding about the real constraints of the 'marginal' 
men of the villages. 
They are concerned more about their o\^7n problems than 
about the problems.of the poor. 
The study of the functioning of the village Panchayats i' 
thus clearly shows that the panchayats serve the interests 
of mainly one group, nrimely, tho grovip of big farmrrs belon-
ging to high castes. The members of this group who hold the 
power of decision making in the Panchayat (and the same group 
holds this power in other village organizations, such as, FSS, 
Milk Cooperative Society etc. also) use the power in furtherinc 
their own interests. This elite group does not bother to 
TABLE NO. 4.21/ 
OFFICE - BEARERS OF DIFFERENT ORGANIZATION 
i d J 
Sarpanch 
Deputy Saurpanch 
P ernehayat Member 
Mm 
Chairman FSS 
Secretary FSS 
Chairman MCS 
Secretary MCF 
IMLANI (A) 
I 
BF 
BF 
7 
Mm,F3 
SF/4 
BF 
SF 
BVF 
MmF 
ADAUN (A) 
VBF 
VBF 
7 
VB-2 
B-3 
N 
BERTHAL (K) SIKRI (K) 
BP 
MmF 
VBF 
VBF 
VBF 
7 
VB-1 
B-4 
Mra/2 
SF-1 
AL-1 
VBF 
BF 
VBF 
BF 
VBF 
VBF 
7 
VB-2 
B-2 
Mm-2 
SF-1 
MF-1 
AL-1 
VBF 
BF 
VBF 
BF 
VBF 
BF 
MmF 
SF ^ 
LF 
AL 
Very Big Farmer owning 25 plus acres of land. 
Big Farmers owning 12.5 to 25.00 acres of land. 
Medium Farmers owning 5.00 to 12.5 acres of land. 
Small farmers owning 2.5 to 5.0 acres of land. 
Marginal farmers owning less them 2.5 aces of land. 
Agricultural led>ourers owning no land. 
i •! 'J 
unc3crstanf1 the problems and constraintn of the poor. Cn the otlicr 
hand, the masses, who belong to lov; or lower or middle caste and 
who own little or no land, have practicaly no say in the decision 
making process of the Panchayats. Cven the Panchayat members of 
Scheduled Castes are not capable of helping their o^ -m lot in any 
significant way. 
Table gives information about the office bearers of F33, 
KC3, Panchayats etc, and t,heir landholdings. It is clear from 
the statement that almost all the key ponitions in these organi-
zations are held by the fanners trrtio^ own more than 5 acres of land. i 
It is worth noting that no landless labourer is holding any impor-
tant position in any of these organisations. 
Such a situation is likely to increase the accessibility of 
big farmers to new inputs and new technology. 
Let us caste light on the magnitude and severity of poverty 
in our study villages. Vie use Sen's Poverty Index to estimate 
the severity of poverty. We have calculated consumer unit on the 
basis of Lusk Coefficient. (Table 4.8) . 
For examining inter-village and intro-village differences in 
the r.cvor1l:y of poverty mcnn incomc' Ifvol^ nnd the levels of cirop-
output per acre have been correlated. We observe positive corre-
lation betv/cen the Cien's loverLy Incltjx .ind l he -nini Coefficient 
of land dicJtribution. 
I 
Wehhave delineated two distinct sets of agrarian structures: 
Adaun (A) and Berthal (K) constitute group (A) v/herces Imlsni (A) 
and Sikri (K) constitute jgroup (B) . Wc hove attempted to shov; 
U i 
that these two groups of villages differ significantly in the 
incidence of poverty. They also differ in^matter of technolog-
ical development in agriculture. There are wide differences 
in crop-output per acre, cropping patternand cropping intensity, 
concentration of land anc assets, composition and distribution 
of farm and non-farm inoomes, in the two groups of villages. 
There is more landlessness, inequitable distribution of 
land and other productive resources and higher intensity of 
poverty in the developed villages of group 'A' where agricul-
ture is more developed, comnercialized and diversified than in 
group 'B* villaqes. These developed villages are bigger in 
size and have a higher population density than we find in group 
'B' villages. 
The agrarian structures of group *A* villages are highly 
inequitous. The Jats in Berthal (K) and The Thakurs in Adaun (A) 
are cultivators by caste. They are known for a highly skilful 
cultivation and farm acunen. These cultivating castes have lully 
exploited land fertility and othe r productive resources. They 
have consolidated the economic base of their villages. Their 
professional ^ill and agrarian leadership have provided them 
a constant flow of social and economic power. The concuonnitant 
result is that they have become the most powerful group in their 
villages. 
In group 'B' villages i.e. Sikri (K) and Imlani (A), land 
is as fertile and has the same production potential as in group 
'A' villages. But unlike group 'A' trhere is no single dominant 
group controlling both land and other resources. Their social 
organization has not been much helpful in promoting capital 
accumulation. Ownership of land and other resources is diffused. 
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These factors have restricted the pace of commercialisation 
and diversification of their economies. Their cropping pattern 
is not as optimising as we find v^ n group 'A' villages. 
As we have said before there is inequitable distribution 
of land in all the four villages. But the degrees of inequ-
ality ^ are different. Land distribution in Berthal (K) is 
the most inequitable while in Imlani (A) it is the least ineaui-
table. At the time of this study the mean income was higher 
in group 'A' villages than in group 'B' villages. It was 
because productivity per acre was higher in group 'A' villages 
than in group 'B' villages. But the mean income of the popu-
lation below the poverty line was higher in group 'B' villages 
than in group 'A* villages. 
There were more inequalities of income in group 'A* vill-
ages than in group 'B* villages. The Gini Coefficient of 
income distribution was 0,532 in Berthal (K) and 0,374 in 
Adaun (A) of group 'A' villages and 0,323 in Sikri (K) and 
0.2908 in Iralani (A) of group 'B' villages. The share of 
bottom 40% of population was 13,56% in Berthal (K) and 30,69% 
% 
in Adaun (A) and 20,29% in Sikri (K) and 31.79% in Imlani (A) 
^o bottom 40% of population got a higher percentage of income 
in group 'B* villages than in group 'A' villages. But the 
share of top 20% was 58,82% in Berthal (K) and 37,44% in Adaun 
(A) in group 'A* villfiqes thnn 34.77% in Sikri (K) and 29.13% 
in Imlani (A) of group 'B' villages (Table^.lS). 
Table 4,18 shows that the share of small size holdings 
1.e. (.1 - 2,5 acres) is 10.59% and 31.38% in Berthal (K) and 
> 
Adaun (A) whereas it is 17,32% and 33.05% in Sikri (K) and 
Imlani (A) respectively. The share of medium size ho. dings is 
H 3 
26.43% and 30.78% in Bejrthal (K) and Adaun (A) and 25,24% and 
31.28% in Sikri (K) and Imlani (A) respectively. The share of 
big size holdings ( 5 acres + ) is 52.69% and 42.39% in Berthal 
(K) and *^ daun (A) and 46.85% and 41.08% in Sikri (K) and Imlani 
(A) villages. 
Aa we have said before GrouR^ 'A' villages are more advan-
ced than Group 'B* villages. But it does not necessarily mean 
that literacy will be higher in the former than the latter. In 
fact the literacy rate was higher in Group 'B' villages than 
in Group 'A* villages. It was 57.26 and 33.33 in Berthal (K) 
and Adaun (A) and 60,6 and 36.8 in Sikri (K) and Imlani (A) 
respectively. 
The ^ove statements show that therewere more inequalities 
of income and land in group 'A* villages than in group 'B' 
villages. In the same way the intensity of poverty was higher 
in group 'A* villages than in group 'B' villages. So our 
findings is that there is more poverty in villages where there 
is more concentration of land and productive resources in 
the hands of a single dominant caste than we find in villages 
( 
where land and income distribution is less inequitable and 
economic power relatively diffused so inspite of a higher rate 
of agricultural development, concentration of economic resour-
ces leads to a higher magnitude and intensity of poverty.CTable4 
H c n c r , t-he n'^cd f o r s t r u c t u r a l chnnnr i n tlic n ' l r a r l nn n' « \if>. 
TABLE . 
LOCATING OF BASIC SOCIAL I^TITUTIONS 
AMENITIES IN THE SAMPLED VILLAGES 
I /I ' 
KARNAL VILLAGE ALIGARH VILLAGE 
AMENITIES BERTHAL SIKRI ADAUN IMLANI 
Village Panchayat Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cooperative society Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank . 6 km. 7 km. 2 km. 
Dispensary/Sub Centre 6 km. 7 km. 2 km. 
Veterinary hospital/ 
dispaneary First Aid Yes 6 km. Yes 15 km. 
Centre ^ 
Primary School Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Middle School Yes 6 km. Yes 2 km, 
High/Higher Sec. Yes 6 km. Yes 2 Km. School 
Community Radio Set Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agro-Service Training 
Centre 6 km. 12 km. 22 km. 
Marketing centre Yes 6 km. Yes 6 km. 
Clean Drinking Water 
Supply Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Street Pavement Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Electricity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Post and Telegraph 
Office 2 km, 7 km, 3 km, 
VLW Headquarter 6 km. Yes 6 km. 
Block Headquarter 6 km. 15 km, 22 km. 
Child VJelfare Project No Yes Yes 
* Kilometer indicats the distance from the respective village 
at which a given institution/amenity is available. 
14:. 
Thus, i t i s c l e a r t h o t Lhc hiqli c a s t c n o f i.h<j:.;(. v i l l a g e s not 
o n l y ho l d l a r g e s h a r e s o f l and andN :n j oy a b e t t e r o c c u p a t i o n a l 
s t a t u s , b u t they a l s o h o l d pov;er t o nake rr.ajor economic d r c i s i o n s , 
such as , d e c i s i o n s about c r e d i t , d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n p u t s and i m p l e -
nients, ma rke t ing e t c . ( T a b l e 4 .17 ) 
T h i s c e s t e - c l a s s r e l a t i o n s h i p , however , can i n f l c n c e the 
p r o c e s s o f p e r c o l a t i o n o f b e n e f i t s o f g rowth i f the c a s t e s o l i d a -
r i t y i s s t r o n g enough . As the f a m i l i e s b e l o n q i n n to the sarre c a s t e 
a r e bound by p u r i t y - p o l l u t i o n and k i n s h i p r e l o t i o n s h i p , and as they 
l i v e i n the same r e ? i d e n t i c i l o r e a r , they n o r m a l l y e n j o y a s t r o n g 
f e e l i n g o f c a s t e s o l i d a r i t y . In ou r s tudy v i l l o g e r . t h i s f e e l i n g 
i s s t r o n g enough. 
USE CF AMD FECIL IT IE5 IN 'HiS VILLAGE BY DIFFERZXT CPS'TLZ'. 
V i l l a g e panchaya t s and c o - o r c r . : t i v c n o c i e t i o s have been 
w o r k i n g i h a l l the f o u r s tudy v i l l a ^ - e s . Banks, D i s p e n s a r i e s , 
Vetenary H o s p i t a l s , H i gh/H i ghe r Secondary S c h o o l s , Ma rke t ing 
C e n t r e s , P o s t a l f a c i l i t i e s e t c , a re g e n e r a l l y a v a i l a b l e e i t h e r 
i n the v i l l a g e s o r v ; i th in a s h o r t rnnqe o l 2 t o 12 K i l o m e t r e s . 
I t shows t h a t the s tudy v i i l l a g e s have nor;t o f the i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l 
f a c i l i t i e s ( T a b l e ) . 
TVie s e t t l e m e n t p a t t e r n in the r^clt c tod v i l I n n e r , i s as usu 1, 
c a s t e - b a s e d . F o r e x a m p l e ' t h e r e i a a J a t B a s t i , Thakur E a s t i , 
H a r i j a n V a s , Phang i Vas e t c . i n a l l the v i l l a g e s . Schedu l ed 
c a s t c s have t h e i r hut s i n the o u t s k i r t s o f the v i l l a g e s . The 
house s i n t h e s e B a s t i e s and Kutcha c r l u c c a d e p e r f i n g on the 
f i n a n c i a l c o i i d i t i c n s o f l-.h'" r e s i c c n t a ( T a b l e ' 1 .12 ) . 
I t was ob se r ved t h a t the r e l a t i v e l y iroro tl.rn the san.e t o 
t h e a b l e t o h i g h c a s t e s xjere r e l a t i v e l y r o r e than the seme to the 
l ow c a s t e s . Even the conmon f a c i l i t i c ^ s '- 'cre mere a c c e r s i b l e to 
t h e h i g h e r castr -s than t o ^ l h e lov? co :>tcs . Thin was due to a 
nunb^r o f rc.-. '-ons. Firr.-.t o£ a l ] , Ih^- o T ' l c o l - f^.^ors of I'l^e •'^ jrar. 
Pancl iayalr ; h^ i'""' g i v e n p r o f r r ' ncx- to l l ic i i " o\.'n r e ; ! ' cciti. ' ' l ti o.is 
v ;h i l e p r o v i d i n g those f c c i l J t i c s . Sv-cci dl^;, whenever t h e r e 
Vv'Qs aguf'r, L ien o f p a y i n g f o r the f c i l i t i c s , the h i r h 
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were 
castes, who were rich/able to pay for them, while the poor 
castes could not pay. Thirdly, certain facilities like Balvadi, 
Yuvak-Mandals, Mahila Mandala etc. Were not considered useful 
by low castes. Naturally, the high castcmcn gave preference to 
their own castes while distributing the facilities in the vill-
age. (For example, street lights, and public water taps) , 
The caste-wise differences in the availability and use f 
of various amenities and facilities were observed in all the 
villages. It was observed that though all the four villages 
had electricity, the houses of high castes were lit with elec-
tricity while the Harijan and other low castes had dark houses. 
It is estimated that the cost of installing a metre and a 
poimt in the house comes to around Rs. 350-500 which is beyond 
the means of these people. The same was the case with water 
taps in their houses (Table 4.13) . 
It was also observed that the streets in the Jat or the 
Thakur areas were well lit, while the low castes had a lamp 
post in a corner in the whole street. The streets also were 
paved or pucca in high daste residential areas, while in the 
Harijan Bastis, the streets were kutcha and full of mud in the 
rainy season. 
Thus higher castes do enjoy better amenities and facil-
ities partly due to their economic po\\rer and partly due to 
their caste solidarity. 
1 1 '1 f 
The Jats exercised full control over the village lands 
and secured for themselves the economic advantages of virtually 
every aspect of the village economy. Being skilful cultivatiors 
themselves, they took a kocn int'-rert in village lando. 
The Jats had a free hand to exploit for themselves 
their fertile soil through increases in cultivation of corrjn-
ercial crops and by effecting improvements in land. Known for 
their thrifty lifestyle, they used their vr/ealth and pov/er, 
gained through total control over the village resources and 
group solidarity^ to improve the economic base of their villages 
f 
Their investments were in the form of land improvements, irri-
gation facilities, cattle, money lending and trading. The 
villages in this group have the highest moan income levels. 
The percentage of area under irrigation to net sown area is the 
highest there and so are the cropping intensity and yield 
levels. Comrr.ercial crops such as sugarcane and cotton occupy 
a prominent place in the cropping pattern of these villages. 
Thcr percentage share of trade and coinihorco in the total income 
is higher in BERTHAL AND ADAUN villages than in the remaining 
two villages. 
These higher levols of mean income and crop output per 
I 
acrc, greater irrigntion .-"nf^  th*" pract.ico oT multiple croi-^ pinn 
and, the progress towards oonanecciolisation of agriculture, 
hov;ever, have not had any ameliorating efCect on poverty. The 
% 
incidence as well as the severity of poverty is higher in these 
villages. The tenancy abolition legislation seeking to provide 
land to the tenants and the att.'\npts at increasing the incomes 
I / ! - ; 
o f a l l s e c t i o n s o f the r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n through ? g r e a t e r 
d i f f u s i o n o f HYV seeds r e l a t e d t e c h n o l o g y w i t h the h e l p o f 
\ 
e x t e n s i o n s e r v i c e s , s a l e s and c r e d i t c o - o p e r a t i v e s have 
n e i t h e r succeeded i n b r e a k i n g the power s t r u c t u r e nor have 
they made a d e n t on the p rob l em o f povort^ ' in the se v i l l a g e s . 
The b i g f a r m e r s s t i l l c l a i m more than h a l f o f the t o t a l l and 
a v a i l a b l e i n t h e s e v i l l a g e s and we f i n d t h a t the c o n c e n t r a t i o n 
o f l and i s h i g h e r t h e s e . A l o n g w i t h i nve s tment i n l and i m p r -
ovemts and agricultural mach ine ry , the r i c h f a r m e r s i n these 
v i l l a g e s a re i n v e s t i n g i n s h a r e s , bank d e p o s i t s , j e w e l l e r y 
and i n su r ance p o l i c i e s , . The i n e q u a l i t y i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f p r o d u c t i v e a s s e t s i s h i g h e r t h e r e . S i m i l a r l y , i n e q u a l i t y 
i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f incomes which a r i s e s f r om o w n e r s h i p , 
c o n t r o l and u s e o f incomes, l and and o t h e r p r o d u c t i v e a s s e t s , 
i s a l s o found t o be h i g h e r i n t h e s e v i l l a g e s , 
{ 
Although between 80 to 85 per cent of the farm hold-
ings make use of HYV seeds in these villages, it is the big 
farmers who have benefitted most from the new technology, I 
W h i l e o n l y about f i f t y p e r c e n t o f the sma l l f a r m e r s i n t h e s e 
v i l l a g e s use the most p r e f e r a b l e comb ina t i on o f H W seeds -
f e r t i l i s e r s - i r r i g a t i o n , p ackage i s adopted u n i v e r s a l l y 
among the b i g f a r m e r s . The y i e l d p e r ac re i s h i g h e r on the 
b i g f a r m s . They are i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o a f f o r d c o s t l y 
s e e d s f o r HYV c r o p s o f suga r cane and c o t t o n and devo te g r e a t e r 
p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e i r l and t o ca sh c r o p s . 
In thosf- v i l l , nq f r , wVu-rt- i VK m r n r L n n st in ictnro In 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d by LhC' exij^tencc- uL o cJominont g roup , g r e a t e r 
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concentration of land and other productive assets and where 
the use of land for coimiercial crops is more prominent, the 
response of HYV seeds delated technology, in respect of 
poverty amelioration has not bcon positive. These villages 
which have the higher levels ofSjnean incomes and crop output 
acre also have higher levels of income inequality and abso-
lute poverty. 
The poor who derive their incomes mainly from wage 
paid employment have extremely limited opportunities of work 
in non-agricultural activities in those villnqes and they 
depend mainly on hiring out their labour for agricultural 
operations, except the marginal fanners who c^evote a part 
of their labour time working on the family farm. The farmers 
in these villages use a greater number of tractor hours per 
acre of cultivated area and we observe that the person-days 
of employment per worker among those living in poverty are 
lower in both BERTHAL (K) Altt) ADAUN (A) . As a consequence 
the severity o£ poverty is also higher in these villages. 
In the villages of IMLANI (/i) N<ID SIKRI (/C). although 
the quality of soil is the same as in the villages of BERTHAL(K) 
and ADAUN (A ) , there was no single dominant group controlling 
land and other village resources. These villages are populted 
mainly by the Thakurs, The Brahmins and Schf^ dviled Castes who 
do not have the same reputation GS the Jat cultivators have 
for skilful cultivation and agricultural enterprises. They 
have neither the entrepreneurial acumcn nor the social orga-
nisational mechanism of the Jats. 
15/ 
(^ iniiiKip-l nl cropn did imL iMU'dnir ,i |i-.i(iic t.i o-jr IculLurul 
production in those villnqor,. Tlify rfiii.-i i n- fl b^hln*! tho 
first group of-villages in the improvement of land and 
irrigation facilities but their fertile soil ensured them 
secure returns from food grains cultivation. 
Currently around 80 per cent of the farm holdings 
are using HYV seeds in these villages and differences in 
the adoption of the preferred combination of HYV seeds -
irrigation fertilisers between small, medium and big hold-
ing are less striking. 
The levels of mean income and crop output as well as 
I 
the intensity of cropping in this group of villages are the 
lower than in BERTHAL (K) and ADAUN (A ) but the level of 
income inequality and the incidence and severity of poverty 
t' 
in also lower in these villages. 
Therefore, in this group of villages where the agrarian 
structure is characterised by the absence of a dominant group, 
there is less emphasis on ciJltivation of commercial crops and 
where the control over land and other productive assets is 
relatively diffused, we observe a different kind of fit between 
poverty and technology. 
Apart from wage paid employment in agriculture, the 
poor in these villages also have relatively greater opportu-
nities of wage paid enployment in non-agricultural activities, 
particularly in small soale industry, trade and commercial 
making. The higher labour intensity of the HYV crops has not 
been vitiated in these villages t\^rough greater use of tractor 
hours per acre. Although the wage rates have remained s tagnant 
I5i 
the person days-of employnient per amonn those living 
below the poverty line are higher in these tv;o villages. We 
find that the severity of poverty, as measured by the value 
of Sen's Index, is lower here. (Table 4.8) 
The main conclusion of our study, therefore, is that the 
incidence and severity of poverty of poverty has not followed 
a linear path along mean income levels or crop output per acre. 
The structural conditions for inter village differences in 
income inequality and poverty vjere crucial factors. Kodem 
technology has not been able to interfere with these structural 
features and the response of HYV seeds related technology in 
respect of poverty depends substantially on these structural 
characteristics. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
To conclude, our analysis of the structure of the village 
societies shows that the societies are divided into different 
strata on the basis of land owncyrship, castc and power. All 
the three stratifications play an imporlicjnt role in Uic funct-
ioning of the village economies and thereby in the process of 
percolation of gains of development in the villages. As those 
stratifications are hierarchical in nature and are overlapping, 
there exists a group at the top, v;hich enjoys maximuin gains of 
development. The families v/liich are l i n k e d up \;ith t h i s group 
e i t h e r by c a s t e , c ] nnr. o r pov;or .iro l i k e l y to r e c e i v e ^oir>c ) ;ene-
1 i • 1 .n t those v/hcj ,ii<' outsiUc Mk'c I i mI • .iii liV.( I to ti.nuilri 
away from the process of percolation of g a i n s of development. 
C H A P T E R - 5 
LEVELS OF LIVING OF AGRARIAN CLASSES 
Vj2 
We visualise the level of living as a leve.l of satisf-
action of the needs of the people assured by a given flow of 
goods and services in a unit of time. On this basis, we 
choose a set of components which, in our judgment, are e n -
able of representing the various fiqa'cts of tho level of living. 
V 
Each component Is supposed to represent a distinct class of 
human needs, the satisfaction of which contributes to the 
content of living. The componr'nts chosen should be capable 
of covering as fair as possible the whole tangible spectrum 
of human needs if they are to serve as an adequate represen-
tative of the concrete reality of living. 
The next step is to locate indi^cators or variables related 
to the satisfaction of needs under each component. After selec-
ting appropriate components and indicators, we proceed to 
construct indicator indices. These indices are based on certain 
forms, of what is considered as minimum, because the absolute 
values of the indicators mean little if they are not compared 
with sych norms in the case of relevant indicators. 
The next step is to aggregate indicator indices into the 
respective component indices, and the component indices again 
into a composite, index. The construction of both component 
and composite indices presents the problem of assigning weights 
which may be based either on technical considerations or on 
certain traditional norms. 
r^o 
COMPONENTS OF LEVELS OF LIVING: 
N u t r i t i o n , hous ing , m e d i c a l c a r e , e d u c a t i o n , c l o t h i n g , l e i s u r e , 
s e c u r i t y & env i r onment , 
PRIMARY COMPONENTSI 
N u t r i t i o n , hous ing , m e d i c a l c a r e & e d u c a t i o n . 
SECONDARY COMPONENTS: 
L e i s u r e , s e c u r i t y & env i r onment . 
The l e v e l o f l i v i n g r e s t s upon the b a s i c f a c t o r o f r e s o -
u r c e endowment by which we shou ld unde r s t and ( a ) the n a t u r a l 
r e s o u r c e endowmentgj^^j •(fc,)the i n s t i t u t i o n a l endovinent. The i 
l i B t t e r comprehends a number o f s o c i o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f income depend ing upon the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the means o f p r o d u c t i o n . 
The most b a s i c and g e n e r a l component o f the l e v e l o f l i v i n g 
is nutrition. The level o f nutrition seems to be the most gene-
r a l i z e d e x p r e s s i o n o f the l e v e l o f l i v i n g i n a c o u n t r y w i t h a 
v a s t b a s e o f mass p o v e r t y . Hence n u t r i t i o n i s the key v a r i a b l e , 
" L e v e l o f l i v i n g i s the a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n o f l i f e " . W h i l e 
" S t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g " i n d i c a t e s the a s p i r a t i o n s o r i d e a s o f what 
.ought to b e , 
U . N . e j ^ e r t s committee on INTERNATIONAL DEFINITION & 
MEASUREMENT OF STANDARD OF LIVING, headed by Prof, V.K.R.V.R^) 
t 
f e l t the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f a p l u r a l i s t i c approach and a c c o r d i n g l y 
s u g g e s t e d the use o f s e v e r a l "components" o f the L e v e l s o f 
L i v i n g ( such as h e a l t h , e d u c a t i o n cjruJ d s p e c i f i c s t a t i s t i c a l 
measure o r i n d i c a t o r i n respp»ct o f thf^so components . 
•( r.: 
L .J > 
The INTER AGENCY working party in their INTERIM GUID 
"•proposed nine components of levels of living: 1. Health 2,Food 
Consvunption & Nutrition, 3. Education, 4. Employment & condition 
of work, 5, Housing, 6, Social Security, 7, Clothing, 8,Recrea-
tion and 9. Hxaman freedom. 
Further work was undertaken at the U.N.RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. Its attempt was to make the level of 
living an operationally useful i^ jidicator of social development, 
whereas National Income could at best be an indicator of econo-
mic development. The focus thus shifted to the study of inter-
action between economic growth & social development and possi-
ble correctives to the planning of economic development. 
Recently, another Report "STUDIES IN THE MEASUREMENT OF 
LEVELS OF LIVING AND WELFARE" prepared by Jan Drewnowski (1970) 
on behalf of the U.N, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, 
has proposed a new version of the level of living index (Report 
No. 70,3) , The main premises on which the earlier index was 
based have remained unchanged, but several changes have been 
introduced in them While the revised version has seven 
components, the surplus income component in the earlier index, 
which was defined in terms of money, has been replaced by 
"Environment, "which has been defined in terms of non-monetary 
elements such as communication, travel, sports etc," However 
the component 'environment' has not been fully developed. 
We do n o t have a s i n g l e un ique s e t o f components and Indlc-
n l o r s oE I . f 've ls o£ l l v i n q . Thf l in . i l ch()ir:f> <,( (•< )I,l[^ t >11 • i ' . u 
i n d i c a t o r s depends l a r g e l y on t h f i i r r e l e v e n a c e to t h e type o f 
t h e community o r communiti a s under i n v e s t i g a t i o n ^ 4 i p o n the 
I5J 
availability of statistical variables. There is the problem 
of assigning values to the 'critical points', A certain level 
of food comsumption which may be a starvation level in rich 
countries may be quite adequate in poor cuntric-s for ob-zioc-: 
reasons. Even within a given country they depend to some 
extent on the nature ol the occupation. The same problem 
arises in the case of housing for which the social norms differ 
from one class of people to another & from one community to 
another. The values for the 'Critical points' are mainly 
givenon the basis of 'informed opinion*. There is an obvious 
element of subjectivity in prescribing these values. Another 
weakness of the levels of living studies, is the failure to 
deal with the method of weighting. Whatever procedure we may 
follow v/ith regard to assigning of weights this is bound to 
be arbitrary & would depend upon value judgements. 
But such value judgments arc not without precedent. 
following the definition provided by the UNRISD, levels 
of living are defined'in terms of the satirefaction of human 
needs or wants. Some of them may be considercc^ absolutely 
essential and defined as subsistence needs. These are the 
needs which any society should undertake to satisfy. Food, 
clothing S; shelter satisfy "subsistence needs". Most modern 
societies regard both education & medical care es equally imp-
ortant i Those five components together satisfy our primary 
needs. The list of needs is not, however exhaustive. There 
cire oLhet liuiiicin rc:c|ul i t.nii.-u tnjli .1.. 1 '(.(.•. r t i«v 1 loiuitenl , 
s e c u r i t y , l e i s u r e and . e n t e r t a i n m e n t . Most s o c i e t i e s have 
s t a r t e d layir^g i n c r e a s i n g l y g r e a t e r emphas is on t h e s e a spec t s 
t ^ " I J l" 
I n I n d i a , a w e l l b a l a n c e d economic l i f e has n o t 
y e t b een a t t a i n e d anr" the l e v e l s o f l i v i n g o f the masses 
remain m i s e r a b l y l o w . The lovi/er the p u r c h a s i n g power the 
wo r s e the l e v e l s o f l i v i n g . Th^ r e i s a s t r o n g t i e be tween 
t h e wanes and a g r i c u l t u r a l h o l d i n g s on one hand and l e v e l s 
o f l i v i n g on the othe i r . A g r i c u l t u r a l h o l d i n g s and t h e i r 
p r o d u c e s e r v e as the spu r t o the c u l t i v a t o r v.'ho o b t a i n s the reb -
the means to s a t i s f y n o t rr.erely the b a r e rera i i rerrents o f 
l i v i n g b u t a l s o c e r t a i n c o n v e n t i o n a l needs , c o m f o r t s and 
l u x u r i e s v;hich a r e i n c i d e n t a l tV h i s l e v e l o f l i v i n g . B a s i -
c a l l y , the s i z e o f h o l d i n g and the l e v e l s o f l i v i n g a r e 
i n t e r - d e p e n d e n t and i n t e r r e l a t e c ^ , T h e r e f o r e , the l e v e l s o f 
l i v i n g o f an a g r a r i a n s o c i e t y arc the d i r e c t r e f l e c t i o n o f 
t h e a g r a r i a n s t r u c t u r e wViich in i t s t u r n r e f l e c t s the c o n t r o l 
o f the a g r i c u l t u r a l w e a l t h i n d i f f e r e n t p r o p o r t i o n s by d i f f -
e r e n t c l a s s e s o f r u r n l p o p u l o t i o n . Lin ail h o l d i n g s b r i n g down 
t h e i r l e v e l s o f l i v i n g to the p h y s i c a l m a l n u t r i t i o n and s o c i a l 
i s o l a t i o n , 
' • 'hi le c o n s i d e r i n g the l e v e l s o f l i v i n g o f c a r e r i a n 
c l a - s c . s the concept o f p o v e r t y l i n o h - n not c losf^ 
Acccrc ' inq to our e s t i n o t e , honr^f 1 lolri.- havinr j inconic low 
f 
r , R l , 4 l p e r c a p i t a p': r month ore be lov; the pcvert^• l i n e . 
15/ This 'poverty line' is not to be inter-preted as a 
'starvation' line. It is to be interpreted rather as a 
level of consumption below which it is possible to exist, 
but at reduced levels of activity, efficiency and resis-
tance to disease. 
The debate on poverty in India has been dominated by 
the poverty line approach. The poverty lines have been 
defined both in money tcmms as w e l l as in c a l o r i c norms, 
A study group set up by the Planning Commission in 
1962 recommended a per capita per month conrunption expen-
diture (excluding health and education) of Rf. 20 at 1960-61 
prices, as the bare miriimum level of living in India. The 
report does not specify what prices were used in the cost 
calculations of the minimum diet and what nutritional norm 
formed its basis, but it has the acceptance of the Indian 
Planning Commission and sereral scholars have used this as 
a minimum standard of living in ^ndia, Dandekar and Rath 
took into account the difference in the cost of living 
between rural and urban areas. The poverty line fixed by 
them was Rs. 15 per capita per month for the rural areas 
and R:;. 22.5 for the urban areas at 1960-61 prices. Bardhan 
used a still lower figure for the urban poverty line, i.e. 
Rs. 18 per capita per month; his rural poverty line remained 
at fc. 15 - the same as the one adopted by Dandekar and Rath. 
Minhas and Vaidyanathan, whose studies concern only rural 
poverty, used the figure of R:;. 20 per capita per month reco-
mmendof^ by iho Planninq Conmtinr.lori ntufly qrovip. 
i r '"> I b 
In the absence of any specified nutritional norm for 
a minimum diet, the above definitions of the poverty line 
remain .somewhat arbitrary. The second group of definitions 
of the poverty line which are based on the criterion of 
caloric sufficiency fro moderate physical activity repre-
sent an attempt to redyce the element of arbitrariness in 
the specification of a minimum di^t. Ojha and Dandekar and 
Rath have taken 2,250 calories per day as the minimum requi-
rment for an average Indian. Chatterjee, Sarkar and Paul 
have stipulated 2,400 calories per day as the minimum, 
Bardhan has taken the minimum dirt to be 2,100 calorics and 
55 gms, of protein per day, the same as recorrorended by Patwar-
dhan for an adult in moderate physical activity, and cited in 
the Central Government Employees' Pay Commission Report. 
I 
Bardhan's calculations show that a per capita consumption 
expenditure of Rs. 20 per month (at 1968-69 prices) was needed 
in order to satisfy the doove - mentioned dietary requirement. 
Rudra has worked out a figure of R;. 22.73 per capita monthly 
consumption expenditure (at 1960-61 prices) as a minimum diet 
V 
•for the rural areas in India, nis estimates are based on the 
minimum food basket recommended by Sukhatme, which aims at a 
high level of both calories and protein. 
Here we shall examine two aspects of levels of living, 
namely, (1) the relative levels and distribution pattern of 
households consumption expenditure in the villages, (2) the 
levels of living of the rural elite (or the rural power group) , 
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DiSTRIBXrriON PATTERN OF HOUSEHOLDS CONSWg^TION I£VELS; 
It is interesting to note that the average consumption 
levels of agricultural labourers are still below the poverty 
line in all the four villages and the percentages of agricul-
tural labour households living below poverty line are quite 
high. The percentages are 80,39 in Berthal (K)and 75.20 in 
Sikri (K) , 59.59 in Adaun (A) which are comparable with 83.33 
in Imlani (A) , This indicates thnt agricultural labourers 
have benefitted only marginally by irrigation and modern farm 
t 
technology. 
The smaller benefits to agricultural labourers seem to 
be due to a member of reasons: to start with agricultural 
labourers do not have any substaintial size of land to parti-
cipate in the green revolution and to gain thereby. Also, a 
large number of migrant labourers - seasonal as well as perm-
anent - have migrated into the developed villages and this had 
a clanipening effect on the increnso in the wage rate. The 
migrant labourers also share the increase in agricultural 
employn-ent. Consequently, though they gain through some extra 
in the total employment, the gain is quite low compared to the 
gains of some landholders. 
Table 5,1 shows that trade and services are the occupat-
ions where the incidence of poverty is low in all the four 
% 
villages. 
Table 5,2 gives inforrration about the pattern of distri-
biil.lou ol lioiint'ho]<l3 iutjoirlirni u\v.ii lf)ii;i r-oir.niiii. L Ion fjroupy. 
It shows that the villages of Adaun (A) and Berthal (K) have 
a relatively larger proportion of the households in the lowest 
IG? 
consumption expenditure groups and a relatively small 
proportion of the total households in the highest expen-
diture groups. . Whereas the villages of Imlani (A) and 
Sikri (K) have a smaller proportion of the households in 
the lowest consumption expenditure bracket and comparat-
ively a larger proportion of the total households about 
the poverty line. Almost 46,95% of the households in 
Imlani (A) are below the poverty line having less than 
Ri. 81.41 per capita per month consumption expenditure as 
against 63 .60% in Adaun (A) 47% in Sikri (K) and 63,23% 
in Berthal (K) . Also 12,19% of the households in Imlani 
(A) are having more than Rs, 200 per month pet capita consu-
mption fexpenditure while the same percentages are 13,09 
for Adaun (A), 12 for Sikri (K) and 12,94 for Berthal (K) . 
Though irrigation and modern technology have raised the 
average consumption expenditure levels in the study villages, 
there are still a large number of families that are living 
below the poverty line. For example, though Berthal (K) has 
the highest average consumption level almost 63,23% of its 
households are below the poverty line. These percentages 
are 46.95 for Imlani (A), 61.60 for Adaun (A) and 47 for 
Sikri (K). Thus the impact of technological development of 
agriculture has been differential on different sections of 
the village societies. ^ It seems that greater inequalities 
have originated largely from - three factors: firstly, farmers 
with large holdings have benefitted much more by modern farm 
technology than the othpr farmers because of their better 
accessibility to the new inputs and their greater cropping 
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intensity, and, the farmers with very small pieces of land 
have not been able to participate in the qreen revolution 
because of their poor accessibility to the productive reso-
urces, and thL dly, agricultural labourers as we have already 
seen, have gained only marginally^from technological develop-
ment, 
I£VELS OF LIVING OF THE ELITE: we observed that there were a few families in each of 
the villages who were in a favourable position as regards their 
caste, class and power. That is, they belonged to high castes, 
owned large landholdings and were the office bearers of the 
village panchayats, farmers service societies. Milk Cooperative 
Societies etc.. We identified these families in the selected 
villages and studied their consumption levels. 
Our study (Table 5,3) shows that -Wiese families of rural 
elite belonged to the highest consumption expenditure groups. 
They included the families of the sarpanch, the deputy sarpanch^ 
the other unreserved seat holders of the village panchayat the I 
chairman and the secretary of the FSS, MCS, the MLA • and the 
MP from the villages etc. All these families belonged to high 
castes and owned large l^ds. i' 
•the fact that these families enjoy highest consumption 
levels in the villages confirms our observation that the fam-
ilies at the lower or even middle consumption levels have 
little power in the decision making process at the village 
If'V^l. Thr» nKfUT 1 ncorri'^  lov'^l's o( llu- jxnir in nil I be toiir 
villages fall short of the consutription expenditure required 
to meet the nutrition based poverty norm, and the inter-
I G j 
village differences explain the variations in the severity 
of poverty as measured by Sen's Index.* The poor in all 
these villages depend on incomes mainly from v?age-paid 
employment in agricaltaral and non-agricultural activities, 
dairying and the cultivation of crops which highlights the 
fact that the poverty groups in all these villages are 
comprised of the same categories of the households. These 
are the landless labourers and the marginal farmers. This 
is corroborated from the occupational distribution of those 
living in poverty, (Table 5.2 ) 
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SEN'S POVERTY MEASURE 5« i G ? 
ALl the households belov the poverty line ere not 
equally poor. Since the percentage method is based on 
a general head-counting procedure, it does not tske Into 
consideration the shortfall In Income by v^ iich the house-
hold falls below the poverty line. Bils is taken Into 
account In the poverty measure suggested by Sen. 
Sen*s •?• measur is a measure \*ilch Is closely akin 
to Ginl measure. It uses rank order veights in a manner 
Vhlch is sensitive to the gap between the beiow-the-poverty-
llne Income of the poor and the poverty line itself. Thus it 
gives more weight per unit to the income farthest below the 
poverty line. Ahead count of people with incomes below the 
poverty line records a cecllne in poverty if a number of person 
belonging to an income class just belov the poverty line move 
about it. But, if there is a tranfer of income from persons 
with higher income to thbse with lower incomes, vithin the 
population below the poverty line, the U S U P I herd count proce-
dure does not record a decline in poverty. This mrves no sense 
in terms of welfare. Evidently, there is a greater welfare 
gain if abject poverty becomes less abject than if some poverty 
cases at the margin are tranformedi into above-the-border-line 
poverty cases. The weighting system used by Sen overcome this 
problem. 
'*^ ccordinB to Sen, the measure is concerned not merely 
with the number of people below the poverty line but also with 
the amounts by which the incomes of the poor fall short of 
-f r G I f 
the specified poverty line. In addition, the bigger the 
Shortfall from the poverty line, the greater the veight per 
unit of that shortall in poverty measure, llhus, the 'P'oeFSure 
differs from the Gini co-efficient in tvo ways, viz , (a) in 
being concerned only vith the people vho lie belov the poverty 
line, end (b) in calculating the income differences from the 
poverty line and not from the average income of the distribution 
itself. ' 
Bie graphical interpetation of the poverty measure may be 
given vith the help of the folloving figure taken from Sen. 
In this figure 'P* measu-res the poverty area represented by OCD, 
OF is the poverty line normalised in percentage units and OQ is 
the number of poor, for estimating «P« income differences are 
calculated from the poverty line and not from the mean income 
of the distribution. Thus, the 'P* measure leaves out of the 
rackoning the area OCB as well as the and corresponds to 
the area OCD divided by the OAQ. 
The 'P« measure of poverty is given by: 
p = £_Z q (Z-Yi) (q+1-i) 
(q+1) nz i=1 
where, 
'P' is the measure of poverty, n the populttion size, yi 
the income of the ith individual arranged in ascending order of 
magnitude, q the number of people ^t or below the poverty line 
and Z the poverty leval. 
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l a l i aa Booaoaie Raviav, Vol. V.Io. 1 ( i p r U 1970). 
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CHAPTER ~ 6 
ECONOMIC POLICY FOR POTERTY ALLEVIATION 
The frequently e^^ressed concern for the eradication of poverty 
and generation of employment has ledVhe Governincnt to initiate 
several policies and pirograiTjnes, the more important of which at 
the moment are the Integrated Rural Development Programme, the Nat-
ional Rural Employment Programme, and the Rural Landless 
Employment Guarantee Programme, Besides, there are a few State 
schemes like the Employment Guarantee Scheme of Maharashtra, It 
may, hov^ever, be noted that these schcmco have not emerged suddenly 
but have been the outcome of a long process of experimentation. 
It should, therefore, be pertinent and useful to examine them in 
the context of their evolution in order to appreciate their rat-
onale, judge their efficacy, evaluate the chances of their success 
and suggest improvements, if any. 
Poverty in India is basically a rural problem. And in rural 
areas, it is-the landless agricultural labourers and rural artisans, 
in general, and the Scheduled Castes and the Schodulcd Tribes, in 
particular, who constitute the hard core of the poor. Any strategy 
for the alleviation of povecty should, therefore, b e examined with 
particular reference to these sections. The main components of the 
strategy adopted so far have been the rate of growth and the 
generation of additional enployrtient opportunities, distribution of 
assets to the rural poor. Investment in human capital through educa-
tion and training, area specific schemes and target group oriented 
progrojTrnies rsuch as the SFDA, IRDP, NRKP, R L E C P . a'^ .sistance for 
handlooms, handicrafts, Ichadi and village industries, programmes 
for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled T r i b e s and the Minimum 
Needs Programme, 
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The earlier five year plans had generally proceeded on 
the assumption that the normal programrres of development part-
icularly those undertaken in n.iral areas, like those in agric-
ulture, irrigation, industries, electrification, transport and 
coirjnunications, would produce a multiplier effect and thereby 
generate employment and raise the living conditions of the 
poor, Tlio Community Development ProgramHie (CDP) introduced 
in 1952, the Intensive Agriculture District Prograimve (IJ^ DP) 
introduced in 1960-61, the Intensive Agricultural Area Prog-
ramme (lAAP) Introduced in 1964 and, high yielding varieties 
prograirmes (HYVP) introduced in 1966-67 belong to this category. 
Hence, not much direct attention came to be focussed on the 
problems of poverty and unemployment. 
The utter failure of the above-mentioned "trickle down 
strategy" to produce any,-visible impact on the economic cond-
ition of the weaker sections led to the adoption of a target 
group approach from the Fourth Plan, The objective was to 
produce a direct lii5)act on the economic status of the rural 
poor. It started with the Small Farmers Development Agency 
(SFDA) and has multiplied since then. The much-publicised 
Integrated Rural Development Programme of these days is a direct 
offshoot of the SFDA. 
The Small Farmers Envelopment Agency (SFDA) was estab-
lished on the basis of a recommendation made by the All-India 
Rtir^jl Crcrl it . Rev iew Conimittee i n 1969. Among o t i i c r l. li lngs, 
the committee found that 'the benefits of the then existing 
rural development programmes did not flow to the small farmers 
either in proportion to their numb&txs ot needs. The coirmittee. 
therefore, proposed the setting up of special institutions 
called the SFDAs in selected dis^ticts for giving support 
to small fanners in terms of credit, technical guidance,etc. 
The Government of India accepted this recorrji.endation and 
started 46 SFDA pilot projects during the Fourth Plan. In 
addition, the Government also est^lished 41 Marginal Farmers 
and Agricultural Labourcts Agencies (MFAL) for improving the 
lot of these groups. In 1973, the National Ccxranission on 
Agriculture recommended the merger of these two agencies into 
one. This was accepted and acted upon from the Fifth Plan. 
The combined agency came to be known as the SFDA. The prog-
ramme was further extended and it covered 168 agencies in 
198 districts in 1979 before it was merged with the IRDP. Each 
SFDA was expected to cover 50,000 families of small and marginal 
farmers' and agricultural labourers. The main objectives of 
the SFDA were (i) to identify the members of the target group 
(small farmers, marginal farmers and agricultural labourers) 
and their problems, (ii) to draw up and execute plans (schemes) 
for investment and production in respect of activities which 
might be taken up by them for their own benefit and (iii) to 
review the progress and effectiveness thereof. A budget of 
Rs, 1.5 crores was allowed for each SFDA for five years and the 
entire amount was provided by the Government of India, Financial 
assistance to beneficiaries included a subsidy of 25 per cent 
of the cost in the case of small farmers and 33 V s per cent 
in the case of marginali farmers and agricultural labourers 
subject to a maximum limit of Rs. 3,000. The balance amount 
was supposed to come as a loan from bahks. 
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The poverty line defined here was an income below R-.3500 
per year per family. It v;as assumed that a rural family 
may have five members on an average. 
The outlay for a block was P>5.35 lakhs during the Sixth 
Plan. The programme provided for the selection of 600 
beneficiaries per year per block of 3,000 durinq the Sixth 
Plan period, addressing up to 1.5 crores for the country 
as a whole. The beneficiaries were to be selected on the 
basis of household surveys in clusters of villages. Since 
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled T .ibes constitute 
a significant proportion of the population belov; the poverty 
line it was laid dovm that at least 30 per cent of the 
families assisted through this prograirme should be drawn 
from SC/ST categories and at least 30 per cent of the amount 
invested should go to them. 
' An industries, services and business component (ISB) 
was built into the IRDP in February 1979 with the objective 
of maximising the employment opportunities in the secondary 
and tertiary sectoraS". Out of 600 IltDP beneficiaries in a 
block in a year, 200 have been suggested to be taken up 
under the ISB, adding up to 10 l^h families ppr year in 
the country as a whole. This compon< nt had a small beginning 
in 1979-90 but has been picking up since. The number of 
beneficiaries were 1,2 lakhs, 1.79 lakhs and 1,22 Itikhs 
during 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82 and 1982-83 respectively. 
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I 
The absorbtion of the poorest rural household, particu-
larly the youth, in rural industries and trades becomes diff-
cult because they do not possess the necessary skill. A 
I 
national schrme for Training Rural Youth for Self-Enployment 
(TRYSEM) was, therefore, initiated by the Central Governirent 
s 
in August 1979 as a part of the I^iDP, The scheme aims at 
equipping the rural youth with necessary skills and technology 
so as to enable them to take up self-employment. Only youths 
belonging to the families of the IRDP target group, i.e, those 
below the poverty line and in the age-group of 18-35 years are 
eligible. The target is to train two lakh rural youth every 
year at the rate of 40 youth per block in the country. Only 
one beneficiary is to be taken from one family. Priority 
categories for selection are the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled 
Tribes and ex-servicemen. For women, a target has been sugg-
ested to the extent of :,oneJthird of the TRYSEM trainees. 
The scheme envisages organisational and operational likages 
with other institutions so that supporting services like credit, 
{ 
marketing, supply of raw material and design development are 
also provided to the trainees at the appropriate time. 
Each trainee is given a monthly stipend as per prescribed 
I 
rates during the training period and, at the end, he gets a tool 
kit of an anount up to Rs. 500, An amount up to Rs, 50 per trainee 
per month is also given as training expenses to training insti-
tutions. 
A new scheme known as the scheme for Development of Women 
and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) was launched under the IRDP 
by the Ministry of Rural Developmrnt from September in82. It is 
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implemented on a pilot basis in 51 selected backward districts 
in different states. The scheme seeks to enable rural women 
to participate more effectively in rural development progra-
t 
mmes, in general, and IRDP, in particular. An outlay of fc.15,60 
croreshad been sanctioned for this scheme during the Sixth Plan 
period. 
With the introduction of the IRDP to all the blocks in 
the country in October 1980, the SFBJA programme was merged with 
the former. The IRDP is similar to the SFDA programme ie it is 
a target group, agency-oriented, subsidy-cum-credit-based prog-
ramme of self-eir5>loyment. There are, however, some differences 
between the two programmes "in terms of contents, coverage and 
emphasis. Firstly, while the coverage under the SFDA is confined 
to agricultural sector, the non-agricultural sector, including 
industrial and tertiary sectors, has now been brought under the 
purview of the IRD. Secondly, the emphasis under the IRD is not 
on providing just some kind of assistance and achieving the 
target of an impressive number of beneficiaries but on provi-
ding substantial assistance to the identified participants 
which should increase their incomes to a significant extent so 
that they cross, once for all, the 'poverty line'. Thirdly, 
while under the SFDA, even among the members of the 'target 
group' who with relatively larger land holdings derive maxi-
mum benefits. Under ^^e II^ the Antyodaya approach has been 
recommended in regard to the selection of the beneficiaries 
under which the poorest of the poor are to be selected first. 
Another major departure in the new prograrritie of the IRD is 
that family is the basic unit of development, and economic 
prograiiijiics have to be devised for the family as a whole. 
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Apart from-providing' subsidies and arranging for loans, the 
SFDA was required to organise and arrange for supplies of inputs 
such as fertilizers, seeds and pesticides, agricultural impleme-
nts, marketing services and other facilities to small and margi-
nal farmers. 
The SFDA ushered in a new approach to development which 
has three distinguishing features. These have been carried 
forward to the IRDP also. Firstly, in place of the earlier 
strategy of taking up development ^hemes, oriented towards 
specific projects or areas, it undertook specific beneficiary-
oriented schemes to improve the economic status of the target 
group, . . Secondly, subsidy-cum-credit-based method of 
helping the target group was evolved such that a beneficiary 
could finance his entire investment even if he had no funds of 
his own. The subsidy provided by the Government s e r v e d the 
purpose of margin money for taking bank loans. Thirdly a new 
system of administering the programme was evolved. The SFDA 
came as an innovation on the administrative map of India. 
The agency had a separate structure of its own with power 
to open bank accounts, raise loans, receive funds from the 
Government and act as catalytic agent for enabling beneficiaries 
to obtain loans from financing institutions. It also had strong 
linkages with the regular sdndnistrative system. 
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The a s s i s t a n c e provided should cover the whole p a ckage of services 
considered necessary to lift the family above the poverty line 
and not merely stray items like supply of storage bins, organi-
sing a demonstration or distribution of implements, etc. 
One of the basic problems of the rural poor has been under-
employrrent/unemployment. In order to deal with this, the Third 
I 
Five Year Plan had proposed to organise a "rural works progra-
mme" on a mass scale to provide employment for about 10 million 
mandays in the first year of the Third Plan progressively rising 
to about 250 million mandays in the last year, at an estimated 
total cost of Rs. 150 crores during the plan period at the then 
S, 
prevailing prices. The plan had also indicated the possibility 
of considering "ways of paying wages in part in the form of food-
grains." But the scheme did not gain much ground because only 
fc. 19 crores could be made available for such prograrrines. The 
crash scheme for rural employment initiated by the Union Gover-
nment in 1971 aimed at providing work to about a thousand persons 
in every district at to. 100 per month. The goal was to ensure a 
means of livelihood to at least one member in each family with 
no employed adult. But this was never achieved and the expendi-
ture incurred was largely infructuous. 
Meanwhile, the Maharashtra Government introduced the 
Employment Guarantee Scheme in 1972-73. In due course, the 
Karnataka Government started a . similar but somewhat modified 
Scheme known as the Employment Affirmation Scheme. In April, 
1977, the central Government launched a nation-wide Food for 
Work Programme". (FWp) to enlarge erriplo^ nnent opportunities for 
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the rural poor. It was kept outside the plan. Under this 
prograirme, wages were to be paid in terms of foodgrains. 
The basic objectives of the prograjrjme were (i) to generate 
additional gainful employment to a large number of uneirployed 
and under-enployed persons, both men and women, in rural areas 
for raising their incomes and consequently their nutritional 
levels; (ii) to create durable comirunity assets and strengthen 
the rural infrastructure^^^ liii^ to utilise surplus foofigrains 
for the development of human resources. This programme was 
based on the pattern of the rural works or crash employment 
prograirmes launched earlder. But, unlike them, a massive effort 
was made for the first time. 
Since October 1980, the Foo^' for Works Programme was 
renamed as the National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) and 
made a part of the five year plan. A centrally sponsored prog-
ramme with equal contributions of the Central and State Gover-
nments, the NREP, like the FWP, provides supplementary employ-
ment opportunities to work-seekers during the lean period of the 
year. It aims also at creating durable community assets. Apart 
from cash, wages are also paid in foodgrains ( 1 kg.) so as to 
raise the nutritional standard of the rural poor, Inter-State 
allocation of foodgrains is made on a rational criteria related 
to the population size of the target group, ie State population 
of marginal farncro and agriculturul lobourers and their rural 
population below the poverty line. 
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A new prograrrane named as the Rural Landless Employment 
Guarantee Programme (RI£GP) was launched on 15th August, 1983. 
The basic objectives of this prograirme are (i) to improve and 
e^and employm.ent opportunities for rural landless with a 
view to providing employment for at least one member of every 
landless labour household, up to lOOdays in a year and (ii) to 
ere at durable assets for strengthening rural infrastructure 
which will lead to rapid growth of rural economy. The Central 
Government meets the entire expenditure on this prograirne. A 
sum of Rs, 100 crores had been allocated for this during 1983-84 
and Rs. 400 crores during 1984-85 to generate employment of about 
60 and 300 million manday^, respectively. Other features of the 
programme are similar to those of the NREP. 
The Fifth Five Year Plan introduced the Minimum Needs I 
Programme which aimed at providing free or subsidized services 
through public agencies so as to improve the consumption levels 
of those living below the poverty line. This approach was carried 
through further in the shape of the Revised Minirrum Needs Prog-
ramme enunciated in the Draft Five Year Plan 1978-63, with a 
substantial step-up in the quantum of resources and occvipies 
an important place in the Sixth Plan docvimcnt. The programme 
covers eight items: elementary education, rural health, rural 
water supply roads, rural electrification, housing assistance 
to rural landless labourers, environmental improvement of urban 
slums and nutrition for small children. The provision of free 
or subsidised service through public agencies is expected to 
improve the consumption levels of t hose living bc lov ; the p o v e r t y 
line and therby improve the productivity and efficiency of both 
•( Q 
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the rural and urban workers. The total outlay for the Miniimini 
Needs Programnie was to the tune of It-, 5,827 crorcs during the 
Sixth Plan period (1980-§^5) . Of this, rural water supply, 
rural roads, elementary education and rural health got a 
larger part of the outlay. 
The Drought-Prone Area Programme was started during the 
Fourth Plan period in 557 blocks spread over 74 districts in 
the country. This is an integrated area development progra-
mme and aims at optimum utilisation of land, water and live-
stock reasources, restoration of ecological balance and stab-
ilisation of incomes of people, particularly those belonging 
to the weaker sections. The major aim of this progrjamme ia.-. » 
to merge "integrated area development" approach with "target 
group-oriented" efforts towards poverty—alleviation. The 
individual beneficiary contents of this programme will be 
I 
supported through the IRDP; The agency reflects a basic shift 
from approaching drought as an emergency when hurriedly conce-
ived rural works prograirmeSwere implemented as relief measures 
to a well-planned preventive effort that would avoid this 
wastefulness and inefficiency. 
The Desert Development Prograirme was launched in 1977-76. 
The programme aims at covering 18 districts in hot and arid zones 
of Rajasthan, Haryana and Gujarat, defined as desert areas.The 
cold arid zones of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir and the Spiti 
region of Lahsul in Spiti District of Himachal Pradesh are also 
Covered under the programme. The objective is integrated deve-
lopment of the areas covered with the aim of raising their 
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productivity, thereby increasing the income levels md. empl-
oyment opportunities for the local population. 
Thus we see that the poverty alleviation and employment 
generation programmes have matured from their general character 
to a more specific target grcxip and area based programmes with 
the main thrust being on the eradication of poverty and \xmemp-
loyment in rural areas on a national scale. 
INCIDEI^ TCE OF POVERTY: 
Available data from different sources do not present a 
rosy picture of the imijact of the plan.-j on p<.>V3rby alleviation. 
They indicate that the condition of the poor, specially in rural 
areas where the hard core of poverty lies, continues to be as 
(if not more) appalling as it was at the beginning of planning. 
It seems better to assume the poverty percentage to be more 
or less the sane. Constancy of the proportion would, however, 
imply an increase in the ,nvimber of people below the poverty line 
over the period because of the growing population. 
The Sixth Plan (1980-85) had estimated that a reduction 
in the percentage of people below the povetty line from 48,7 
per cent in 1979-80 to 38,9 per cent in 1984-85 would taXe place 
due to economic growth, and that a further decline to 30 per 
cent would result from special poverty alleviation measures 
to be taken during the plan. The number of persons below the 
poverty line in 1979-80 has since been revised to 339 millions 
(51,1 per cent) due to faster growth of population than was 
of the SIXTH PLAN has claimed that the poverty percentage was 
rcd i icrd by 9 .6 pf^r c on t o v e r o pori<i<! ol jusL Lwo y< <.ir:i. 
But that claim is not justifiable. The t%vo assumptions 
on which it is based are highly questionable. It is 
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difficult to agree with the assumption that the "increase 
in real income is uniform in all the expendituire classes". 
Past experience provides no basis for this . Equally 
untenable is the assumption that "the number of families 
brought above the poverty line is relatable directly to 
( 
the corresponding expenditure in IRDP and NREP." The 
evaluation studies conducted so far do not provide any 
justification for such a bold statement. The two progra-
mmes are incapable df lifting every beneficiary above the 
poverty line. Those immediately below the poverty line 
might have been lifted up, but those who lie far below 
the poverty line might not have been, 
SEVENTH PLAN STRATEGY 
As poverty still continues to be the most important 
problem confronting the country and the removal of poverty 
by the end of the century has been stated as a national 
goal, it is of interest to see how the Seventh Plan prop-
I 
oses to tackle this issue. Its specific focus is on the 
direct attack on poverty. The main programmes that cons-
titute this approach are the individual household progra-t 
mmes of income generation through asset and s k i l l endow-
ment, namely, the Integrated Rural Development Prograimie 
(IRDP) as well as the programm^ of direct supplemental 
wage employment, namely , the N a t i o n a l R u r a l Employment 
Programme (NREP) and the more r e c e n t R u r a l L a n d l e s s Emplo -
yment Gua ran tee Programme (RLEGiO . 
tp'; 
In the recent past several evaluation studies of these 
programmes have been conducted, particularly of the IRDP, 
In these IRDP studies, an attempt has been made to asce-
rtain the extent of income generation through the provision 
of assets. There are four evaluation studies of the IRDF 
with an alioIndia coverage, namely, the Evaluation Report 
of the IRDP by the Pirogramme Evaluation Organisation of the 
Planning Commission (PBO Study) , the study of IRDP^by-^the 
.study of the-IRDP by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI study), 
the study of IRDP by the National Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (NABARD Study) and the Economic Assessment 
i' 
of Poverty Eradication and Rural Unemployment Alleviation 
Programmes and their Prospects by the Institute for Financial 
Management and Reserch (IFMR Study) . In addition there are 
the various studies conducted at the state-level as well as 
the concurrent evaluation studies which have been coitmiss-
ioned by the J^epartment of Rural Dovelopmont cincc October 
1986. 
According to these, it is estimated that the number of 
persons that have crossed the poverty line would not exceed 
40 per cent of those assisted though the individual studies 
give figurs ranging from 17 per cent in the case of the RBI 
study to 49.4 per cent in the case of PEO study. Although 
the studies also point out that adc'itioanal incomes had 
\ 
accrued in the case of 55 to 90 per cent of the beneficiaries, 
considering that only 40 per cent of the beneficieries (and 
that too on a liberal scale) had crossed the poverty line. 
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•the general conclusion that emerges is that the impact of 
the programme-has not been satisfactory and that there is 
a need to make the IRDP more effective. 
These studies also identify the following two specific 
failings of the progranme: 
(1) There was wrong identification of the beneficiaries 
to the extent of 15 to 20 per cent at an all-India level 
though this ranged from 47 per cent to 70 per cent in diff-
erent states. This has been treated as one of the major 
shortcomings of the IRDP, 
(2) The selection of activities was wrongly done without 
any consideration being given to the ability of the benef-
iciaries, differences in infrastructural support, backward 
and forward linkages, etc. As a result of all these the 
activities did not prove to be viable thereby affecting the 
impact of the programme, 
SEVENTH PLAN STRATEGY: 
An overall reading of the Seventh Plandocument leads to 
the surmise that the basic enphasis is on the generation 
of productive employment rather than the alleviation of 
I 
poverty which was the primary objective of the Sixth Plan, 
THE programme for poverty alleviation should be regarded 
as supplementing the basic plan for overall economi growth 
in terms of generating productive assets and skills as well 
as incomes for the poor. 
The plan's reading on the situation is that the failure 
of these programmes is basically due to the administrative 
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weaknesses and is not due to any shortcomings in the prog-
rairme design. It is, therefore, of the view that the change 
in strategy required is in the organisational dorrwiin and 
that by nierely effecting these changes it would be possible 
to provide the necessay forward and backward linkages and 
assist all the poor households to cross the poverty line. 
Towards this end it plans a three-pronged strategy of, firstly, 
decentralising programme formulation and implementation 
through local bodies so as to ensure proper selection of 
projects and beneficiaries. Secondly, strengthening the admi-
nistrative machinery and suitably training it and thirdly 
taking up group-oriented activities through co-operatives, 
informal groups, etc. 
The major change that has been effected in the programme 
is that the poverty line has now been defined at Rs. 6,400 
per annum for a household instead of the earlier limit of 
te, 3,500 ( or Rs. 700 per capita income ) . However, since 
the programme will continue to aim at the poorest of the 
poor, the operating limit for identifying the households 
for assistance has been fixed at Rs. 4,800 end 10 million 
beneficiaries are to be thus assisted. Further, while the 
subsidy ceilings fixed i for different cate^gories of benefic-
iaries would remain the same, the average subsidy is to be 
stepped up from Rs. 1,000 to Ri;, 1,333 thus allowing a capital 
investment level of Rr.'4,000. It is interesting to see the 
implications of this step. According to the IMFR study, the 
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incremental capital output ratio (ICOR), as enqperically 
S 
observed, comes close to the Planning Commission's assum-
ption of 1,5 only in the better developed districts while 
in the case of others, it ranges between 2 and 3. This 
being the case, the most optimistic projection of increm-
ental income comes to Rs, 2,000 while the most pessimistic 
estimate works out to Rs. 1,333. In the initial, household inco-
me willrange between Rj. 6,600 and Rs. 6,133 but as this does 
not take into account the loan repayment amount the actual 
probability of the household crossing the poverty line 
would be low. 
Another measure for improving the supply of raw materi-
als and other inputs as ..well as marketing of the products 
mentioned in the plan is the setting up to District Supply 
and Marketing Societies (DSMS) . Though this idea was mooted 
over five years ago the DSMS are yet to be set up and this 
requires a much greater degree of effort if this is to be 
i' 
pursued seriously and result in properly functioning organ-
isations. 
The Seventh Plan, however, reiterates that the NREP will 
form an integral part of the total anti-poverty strategy and 
"The same principle would apply in the choice of projects 
which would, therefore, have to take account of labour-inten-
sity of projects, their capacity to provide reasonably long 
spells of employment during implementation, direction towards 
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poor, long-term income and employment generation potential, 
capacity to create a base for productive asset endovment and 
capacity for filling gaps in vital infrastructure." 
Wrong identification was ax;pund 7 per cent at the 
national level in the half yearly survey and though at the 
all-India level around 60 j^ er cent beneficiares were selected 
by the Gram Sabha (a measure which accordino to ihe plan 
docximent will reduce the incidence of wrong identification) 
in some states where over 80 per cent of the identification 
was done by this mode there was wrong identification ranging, 
from 10 to 17 per cent. As regards income differences, in 
46 per cent of the cases the differene ranged between Rs.SOO 
to 1000. Despite intentions of providing post-asset acqui-
sition services only 4 per cent beneficiaries were given 
training while 25 per cent were given after-care support. 
Since poverty still continues to he the most inportant 
problem' confronting the India economy, and rural poverty is 
its major facet, a more substantial debate on the strategy 
and design of anti-poverty programmes is essential. Rather 
than blaming 'poor implementation* or 'weak administration', 
a fuller understanding of the social end physical environment 
including its organisational aspects, would go a long way 
in making a dent on the problem of poverty. 
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INTSGRATED RiiRAL DE'VELOP^ ENT PROGRAI-T^ a) 
OHE COMCEPT 
•Ihe concept of Integrated. Rural Development (IRD) v.^as origi-
nally dravn up by the World Bank. Ihe V/orld Bank's definition of 
rural development is "that rural development prograrrmes or projects 
are intended to provide a sustained incro; se in tvie output and level 
of living of a significant proportion of rur...l poor in a given area 
-——the focus is on activities iv'hich either r?.ise incomes directly, 
or at least provide the potential to be more productive". The 
general definition of IRD "Integrated Rural Development is a series 
of mutually supporting ( inter-related ) agricultural and non-
agricultural activities oriented tov^ ards a st^ .ted objective. It 
involves the progression of rural sub-systems in the rural system 
as a v.*iole." 
Bie starting point of such an apiroach is vrelfare function 
v^ich is oriented towards both economic field as veil social sp^ iere. 
!Bie concept of an integrated rurid development stratcg', as described 
above is not nev v+ien one considers, on the one hand, the long knovn 
I 
cocmunity development programmes of and 60's, and on the other 
hand, t^ e theory of "balanced gro^ 'th" drovn up by Nurkse, Xei-ds, 
Kaldor' and Myrdal . It does not even introduce any essentially nev; 
elements, for it has alvc.ys been an a c c e p t e d fcict thr.t development 
tov-ard a hicher level of i.-elfare i s not p o ' i a i b l e ' ' i t h o u t s o c i c l prog-
ress. K a j o r i t y of economists, regcrcl econotnic deve lopment r.s i: pre-
requissite of social progress.Hoselitz writes that social progress 
provided tSoe pre-condition for raising production and not vice-versa. 
He regards social progress as the first link in the chain of effects 
and thereby reverses the line of thou^it hitherto advanced by the over-
"v^ elming majority of economist. 
t O i 
Dr. V.K.R.V, Rao defines Integrated Rural Development as follovs: 
"Intogro.ted Rural Development involves both natural and human resources 
and this had to be done vithin defined areas. It also requires the 
identification of the poor and specific measures designed to lift t^em 
above the level of poverty. Integrated Rural Develojpment has to include 
all productive activity such as .secondary and tertiary and primary other 
than crop-raising and to provide for full employment and an equitable 
distribution of the proceeds of developme^ t^ vdth particular reference 
•V 
to the elimination of poverty,; He suggests (a) Restructuring and recom-
posltlon of existing villa;-es for integrated rur.ii development, (b) The 
more equitable distribution of productive assets among rural households; 
(Dr.Rao advocates that surplus land should be redistributed to increase 
the size of the holdings of small and marginal farcers rather than add 
to their number by giving land to the landless labourers); (c) Greater 
accessibility of inputs and other facilities to the rural poor; 
Deoocratisation of the ruiiil po^ jer structure; and (e) creation of nece-
ssary consciousness and organisation among the rural poor for ensuring 
their effective participation in and influencing of the rural develop-
ment process. 
According to the draft Sixth Plan (1978-83) integrated Rural Deve-
lopment contempl^tes a multi-pronged attack on the problems of rural 
development. 'Integration' here covers four principal dimensions; integ-
ration of sectoral programmes, spatial integration, integration of social 
and economic processes and above all the policies vith a viev to achie-
I 
v lng .'i l i c t tcr rit between c rov th , roraovtCl oT poverty and oniployraont f o n e -
ration. More specifically, it involves a sharp focus on target groups 
comprising small and marginal farmers, agricultural labourers and 
rural artisants and extremely locution sfecific planning 
in the rural areas. Tfie planning coDDiission in the 
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Draft Plan (1978-83) has explained the concept of IRD as 
follows: "The new approach will aim at integrating field 
procrpmmes reflecting the economic activity of the rural 
family whose emnloyment and development is the basic objec-
I 
tive. It is proposed to bring this about by developing the 
Tjrimary, secondary and the tertiary sectors. In the primary 
sector programmes for agriculture, animal husbandary, fish-I 
erlf=?s and forestry development will be intensified. In the 
secondary sector programmes for village and cottage industries \ 
as v;ell as small scale industries, skill formation and suppor-
ting services will be substantially enlarged and strengthened. 
Tertiary sector will be developed by creating facilities for 
organised marketing, processing and allied activities so as 
to absorb increasing number of local people. The programme 
of animal husbandry will be specially oriented to include a 
good part of the rural labour population with special reference 
to scheduled caste families who are generally a major component 
of the landless. The social forestry programmes will be 
suitably oriented to give a fodder base to such labour families 
for animal husbandry development, in the backward sections of 
the nopulatidn like fishermen class are given suitable rights 
of exploitation, t 
The programmes which are proposed to be integrated 
are: (1) programmes of aaricultural development including 
efficient utilisation of land and water resources with scien-I 
tific technology available. 
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2) programmes of animal husbandry as a subsidiary 
occup?»tion mainly directed to small peasant households so 
as to maximise utilisation of by-products in the farms and 
at the same time aiming at commercial manufacture of animal 
husbandry products. Necessary at infrastructure for commer-
cialisation would be inbuilt in the programme. 3) programmes 
of inland water and brackish water fisheries to maximise 
output of fish per unit of water and develop as an important 
occupption for the fishepmen classes an<l such oihor b<ickv;nr<^  
classes in the economy. 4) Programmes of marine fishery inclu-
ding harvesting of natural resour^^es through trr>wlers, mecha-
nised boats and country boats keeping in view the need to 
maximise employment of the poorer section of the fishermen 
population and preventing unhealthy competition among the three 
sectors to the detriment of the poorer sections, 
5) Proqramrnes of social forestry to provide a base for fuel 
and fodder in the economy and with special ear-marking of 
usufruct for the poorer sections of the coimiunity for explo-
itation as an occupation or as fod'^ er for an animal husbandry 
programme, 6) Programmes of farm forestry through the small 
peasant households as a subsidiary income and also for maxi-
mising use of land. 7) Village and cottage industries including 
handlooms, sericulture, bee reprinc etc. as a full or pert 
time oct-up^ t^ion to the r-rtisan clessrs of the rural 
I 
t)Ooulation. 8) 55ervice sectors o f the r u r a l economy as s e l f -
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employment for .the poorer fatnilir?s both an s .-nepins of 
providing for a felt-want in tho economy anr'. as a iTieans 
of better livelihood to the poorer section. 9) Labour 
prograraTies of sTcill formation and labour mobility to meet 
the needs of organised labour for development works and of 
the nature of employment guarantee programmes where necessary. 
THE PROG^MT'^E 
The I n t e g r a t e d R u r a l Development programme was 
initiated in the year 19.76-77, in 20 selected districts. 
I t c o n s i s t e d o f two p h a s e s : ( i ) P r e p a r a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s 
inventory, malady-remedy analysis and action plans for the \ 
s e l e c t e d - i i s t r i c t s ; and ( i i ) Implemention o f t h e programme. 
The programme, howeve r , c o u l d not make d e s i r e d p r o g r e s s , 
a s t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e i n v e n t o r i e s and a c t i o n p l a n s 
t u r n e d out t o b e a t ime -consuming p r o c e s s . The Government, 
t h e r e f o r e , came t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the programrrve, as 
o r i g i n a l l y c o n c e i v e d , was not l i k e l y t o a c h i e v e t h e n a t i o n a l 
o b j e c t i v e o f f u l l employment w i t h i n a d e f i n i t e t i m e - f r a m e . 
The orogramme, was , t h e r e f o r e , r e s t r u c t u r e d r-^ nd t h e new IRD 
programme van i n i t i a t e d d u r i n g 1978-79. 
The I n t e g r a t e d R u r a l Deve lopment w i l l b e f o c u s s e d on 
t h e ' t a r g e t group* c o n s i s t i n g o f sma l l and m a r g i n a l f a r m e r s , 
p o r i c u l t u r ^ l l a b o u r e r s , and r u r a l a r t i s a n s whose economic 
Irrmrovement i s an important concern o f rur?>l deve lopment . 
tfj^ i 
The Introduction 6f the Inteqrated Sural Development 
Progrpinme in 1978-79, marks a major deprature in emphasis, 
content, an-! coverage. The principal objective of the progranrae 
is to ensure gro^ r^th vjith justice for the weaker sections of the 
community, namely, small and marginal farmers, landless labour-
ers, the share-croppers and tenants. Scheduled C?»stes and 
Tribes etc. 
The new programme of envisages in':egration of the 1 
methodology and approach of all the three on-going special 
programme, i.e. the SPDA Programme, DPAP and CAD progrpmme. 
Accordingly, all the principal comoonents of these prograwnes 
have been incorporated into the new Droqrpmme of I^). Inscead 
of tjroviding assistance on a piece-meal basis to selected 
beneficiaries, the new programme aims at adopting the family 
as a unit and enabling the family to undertake productive 
investment, the returns on which aro Inrge enounh to lift the 
family above the poverty line and keep it t h e r e . Another 
important objective of the programme is to reach blocks. It 
/ 
is expected that apart from the investment proposed to be 
directly undertaken as part of the I^ .D and other special 
programmes, the investment in the itate and Central Plans 
and that in th^ ? private sector will help to brinn about full 
employment within time frame. 
The Sixth Five Year Plan (1978-83) has defined the 
principle objectives of planning, as achieving within a 
period o-^  ten years' (1) removal of unemployment and 
I S ; 
s i g n i f i c a n t under -employment , ( 2 ) rin p p p r ^ c i a b l e r i s e in the 
s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g o f t h e p o o r e s t s e c t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n ; 
f 
( 3 ) P r o v i s i o n b y the s t a t e o f some o f t h e b a s i c needs o f t h e 
p e o p l e in t h e s e income g roups e t c . 
The I^D Pfograitrne i s e x p e c t e d t o c o n t r i b u t e s i g n i f i -
c a n t l y t o t h e r e a l i s a t i o n o f t h e t i r s t two o b j e c t i v e s . 
The main o b j e c t i v e s o f the programme a r e : ( a ) t o 
i d e n t i f y the p o o r e s t o f t h e poor f a m i l i e s i n r u r a l a r e a s ; 
( b ) t o a s s i s t them in r a i s i n g t h e i r income above t h e p o v e r t y 
l i n e ; and ( c ) t o c r e a t e s u b s t a n t i a l a d d i t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
o f employment in t h e r u r a l s e c t o r . 
Thus s o l v i n g t h e p rob l em o f r u r a l unemployment and 
r e d u c i n g t h e i n c i d e n c e o f p o v e r t y , speedy growth w i t h d i s t r i -
V 
b u t i v e j u s t i c e a r e t h e c h i e f ob j ec t i ve : : , o f t h i s programme. 
CONT^MTS 0? TH^ PR0G^W>-1E 
The c o n t e n t s o f t h e programme a re b r o a d l y on the 
l i n e s o f t h e scheme i n c l u d e d in t h e S^DA v/ith s h a r p e r t o cu s 
on t h e a m e l i o r a t i o n o f the economic c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e t a r g e t 
a r o u p s . The programme i s ma in l y b e n e f i c i a r y - o r i e n t e d and 
as in t h e ca se o f ^^DA the proaramme e n v i s a g e s p r o v i s i o n o f 
s u b s i d i e s l i n k e d to i n s t i t u t i o n a l c r e d i t . T h e schemes t ha t 
can b e taken un-ler the I'^D a r e d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e b r o a d 
c a t e g o r i e s : ( i ) I n d i v i d u a l b e n e f i c i a r y schemes; ( i i ) Schemes 
f o r i n f r a s t r u c t u r e development and ( i i i ) s u p p o r t t o c r e d i t 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
d e t a i l s o f t h e s e sche.nes a r e as f o l l o w s : 
i' 
I n d i v i d u a l B e n e f i c i a r y Schemes : 
Minor i r r i g a t i o n - C o y e r Dug v/e l l s , shal lov/ t u b e w e l l s 
b o r i n g and deepen ing o f w e l l s , r e n o v a t i o n o f o l d w e l l s , 
pumpsets , e l e c t r i c motors , d i e s e l e n g i n e s , pump h o u s e s , c o s t 
o f e n e r g i s a t i o n o f pumpsets e t c . which a r e owned and o p e r a t e d 
n r W a t e l y by i n d i v i d u a l c u l t i v a t o r s . (25"4 o f t h e c e p i t a l 
c o s t as s u b s i d y f o r SF and 3 3 — ^ t o MF ) . 
I 
Community I r r i g a t i o n works : 
Deep t u b e w e l l s and b i g d i a m e t e r d u g w e l l s w i th pumpsets , 
l i f t i r r i g a t i o n schemes on r i v e r , n a l l a e t c . ( s c a l e o f s u b s i d y 
« 
50'/4 o f t h e c o s t o p p o r t u n i o n a b l e t o the sma l l and m a r g i n a l 
f a r m e r s . 1 
V a i l e d W e l l S u b s i d y t 
subsidy upto Rs.lOOO/- per well subject to the condition 
that tho water available i.T so little that the well has to be 
abandoned as a source of irrigation. 
Inputs : 
s u b s i d y f o r p o t a s s l c 5n<-1 p h o s n h a t i c f e r i l i . s e r a t tho 
r a t e o f ?nd t o SFs and MPs r e s p e c t i v e l y : lio s u b s i d y 
i s e l l ov ;ed on s e e d s , p e s t i c i d e s , n i t r o g e n o u s f e r t i l i s e r s . 
I S -
a g r i c u l t u r e demonst ra t ion : 
"^.200,/- pe r demonst ra t ion f o r an a rea o f one q u a r t e r 
t o o n e - h a l f o f an a c r e ta'ken up o f t h e p l o t s o f SPs and l-IPs. 
Inrplements S t o r a g e B ins : 
Rate o f s u b s i d y i s the same v i z . 25% o f the c o s t o f SPs 
end o f MPs. 
Lend L e v e l l l n n , Land Shaping and Water Channels 
Reca lamat lon o f S a l i n e and A l k a l i n e L?nds 
Rate o f s ub s i dy i s t h e same as mentioned above . 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f mi lch an ima l s , sheep, g o a t s , p ig# p o u l t r y 
ducks , e t c . 
^ a t e oi: t he sub s i dy i s th^ s?me as mentioned above . 
P lough Bu i l ocks/Bu l l ock -Ca r t s/Came l/Came l C a r t s 
H o r t i c u l t u r e 
A s s i s t a n c e "ror t h e co s t o*^ s e e d l i n g s , i n c u t s , l a n d - l e v e l l l n g , 
S 
d i g q l n q o f p i t s , ga rden t o o l s and a p p l i a n c e s , f e n c i n g e t c . 
same r a t e o f s u b s i d y . 
Custom S e r v i c e s : 
Same r a t e o f s u b s i d y . 
P i s h e r i e s 
Subs i dy i s a l l owed on the same r a t e towards the co s t o f 
f i n g e r l i n g s , n e t s , b o a t s manures and f e r t i l i s e r s , d e s i l t i n g 
o r r e c a l a m a t i o n o f t anks i f t anks a r e g i v e n on l e a s e by 
ppnchayats t o f i s h fa rms f o r minimum p e r i o d o f t e n y e a r s . 
sericulture 
M u l b e r r y ' p l a n t s , c u t t i n g s , r e a r i n g a p p l i a n c e s , r e a r i n g sheds , 
ecruipment f o r s i l k r e e l i n g and t r a i n i n g of f a r m e r s . 
Fprm "Forestry 
s u b s i d y on c o s t o f p l a n t i n g m a t e r i a l s . 
Bee Keep ing 
S u b s i d y on c a p i t a l c o s t on i tems l i k e b ee h i v e s , honey 
e x t r a c t o r same r a t e o f s u b s i d y . 
I n f r a - s t r u c t u r e Development - The se I n c l u d e 
s o i l c o n s e r v a t i o n w o r k s , r a i s i n g of n u r s e r i e s a r t i f i c i a l 
i n s e m i n a t i o n c e n t r e s , c h i l l i n g / c o l l e c t i o n c e n t r e s , t r ? n s p o r t 
v e h i c l e s , tr j=i ining o f t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s . 
s u p p o r t t o c r e d i t I n s t i t u t i o n s 
I n t e r e s t - f r e e s h a r e - c a p i t a l l oans -money s h o u l d not be p a s s e d 
i n t o t h e hand o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s b y t shou ld be p l a c e d a t t h e 
d i s n o s a l o f t h e p r i m a r y c r e d i t s o c i e t i e s f o r enro lment o f 
the i d e n t i f i e d b e n e f i c i a r i e s . M a n a g e r i a l s u b s i d y i f p r o v i d e d 
t o Parmern g e r v i c o s Societies ( '^ss ) and l a r q e si^ed M u l t i p u r -
p o s e s o c i e t i e s (Lamps) in the t r i b a l a r e a s . 
T-unds under t h e I^D Programmes m '^y a l s o be u t i l i s e d f o r 
p r o v i d i n g a s s i s t a n c e f o r s e t t i n g up r u r a l i n d u s t r i e s . For 
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promot ion and deve lopment o f r u r e l i n d u s t r i e s . D i s t r i c t 
I n d u s t r i e s C e n t r e s a r e b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d . Khf»di v i l l a g e 
and I n d u s t r i e s C e n t r e s , A l l I n d i a H a n d i c r a f t s Boa rd s , have 
t h e i r own programmes o f p romot ion and deve lopment of kh ad i , 
handlooms and h a n d i c r a f t s . The p l a n n i n g Commission has 
i d e n t i f i e d s i x I n d u s t r i e s v i z f o o d p r o d u c t s , b e v e r a g e , 
t o b a c c o and t o b a c c o p r o d u c t s ; c o t t o n t e x t i l e s , t e x t i l e 
p r o d u c t s , i n c l u d i n g w e a r i n g a p p r e l , wood and wood p r o d u c t s , 
l e a t h e r and f u r p roduc t ' s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e above i n d u s t -
r i e s o t h e r i t ems l i k e c e r am ic s , h a n d i c r a f t s , p o t t e r i e s , 
c a r p e n t e r y , b l a c k s m i t h y e t c . may be encou raged . F u r t h e r , 
maintenance o f a g r i c u l t u r a l implenients, mach inery , t r a c t o r , 
pumpset , d i e s e l e n g i n e , e l e c t r i c f i t t i n g s e t c . may r e q u i r e 
s e t t i n g up o f wo rkshops . Fo r i n d u s t r i e s / a r t i s a n s a c t i v i t i e s 
about 100 f a m i l i e s a re t o be s e l e c t e d e v e r y yea r in each b locks 
E?ch o f t h e s e f a m i l i e s may be g i v e n f i n a n c i a l a s ' i - t a n c e a t 
t h e r a t e o f o f t h p u n i t t o a maximum o f Rs.3000/- f o r 
t h e i^evelopment o f t h e s e l e c t e d i n d u s t r y . The f i n a n c i a l 
a s s i s t a n c e i s t o b e g i v e n f o r ( i ) marg in money ( i i ) p u r c h a s e 
o f t o o l s and equipment < i i i ) sha re c a p i t a l t o s e c u r e f u r t h e r 
j » s s l « t « n c e f rom any o the r s ou r ce and ( i v ) r^tofnotion o f 
common s e r v i c e s and o r g a n i s a t i o n ^ f t h e i n d i v i d u a l b e n e f i -
c i a r i e s f r om a g roup o r c o o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t y . In t h e s e r v i c e 
and m;3rket:ing s e c t o r f i n a n c i a l a s - ' i s t a n c e can be g i v e n f o r 
( i ) r e p a i r end maintenance workshop ( i i ) shoe mak ing/ r epa i r 
u n i t s ( i i i ) s n t c e s g r i n d i n q unit, ( i v ) t a i l o r i a q shops and 
^v ) r i ck shaw p u l l i n g e t c . 
20: 
FIWANCIMG THE PROGRAMME 
I t was c o n s i d e r e d t h a t a Government investment o f Rs.20 
l a k h s in a b l o c k a l o n g w i t h t h e r e q u i r e d I n s t i t u t i o n a l c r e d i t , 
wou ld be a b l e t o l i f t 600-800 f a m i l i e s i n epch b l o c k above 
the p o v e r t y l i n e . 
t 
The TRD progrr^mme I s f i n a n c e d p a r t l y by s u b s i d y and 
p a r t l y b y bank l o a n s . The s u b s i d y v a r i e s betv;een 25 -
o f t h e c o s t o f t h e scheme depend ing on t h e s t a t u s o f t h e 
b e n e f i c i a r y i . e . s m a l l f a r m e r s or m a r g i n a l f a r m e r . The 
s u b s i d y has been p r o v i d e d t o make t h e scheme more v i a b l e 
and t o p r o v i d e an i n c e n t i v e t o t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s so t h a t 
they may o b t a i n c r e d i t f o r meet ing p a r t o f the c o s t o f the 
schemes. The o b j e c t i v e i s t o t a k e up a package o f schemes 
which would g e n e r a t e enough a d d i t i o n a l income t o e n a b l e t h e 
b e n e f i c i a r y t o c r o s s t h e p o v e r t y l i n e once f o r a l l . F u r t h e r 
i t was e n v i s a g e d t h a t t h e r e i s l i k e l i h o o d o f misuse and 
w a s t a g e i f s u b s i d y was d ' i s t r i b u t e d w i t h o u t a c r e d i t p l a n and 
t o a s s o c i a t e bank o f f i c i a l s a t the s t pce o f i n d e n t i f i c e t i o n 
o f b e n e f i c i a r i e s and fo rmul i^ t ion o f schemes f o r i n d i v i d u a l 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s . 
0 p. n 4. V ; • 
PATTERN OP Fr-^AtJCIAL y.SSTSTANCE 
The g e n e r a l p ? t t e r n o€ f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e in r e s p e c t 
o f schemes e l i q i b l e f o r a s s i s t a n c e un^ier t h e T>.Vi procrpiT\:ne i s 
as f o l l o v ; s : 
I t ems/type 
type o f B e n e f i c i p r y 
I n d i v i d u a l 
b e n e f i c i a r y 
scheme 
Community C e i l i n g on 
s u b s i d y 
1) Sma l l f a r m e r s 25 % t o 50 % o f t h e P; .3000/- t o !^ .4000/-
c a p i t a l c o s t o£ an in r e s p e c t o f b l o c k s 
approved work a p p o r - s e l e c t e d f r o m DPAP 
t i o n a b l e t o the e r e a s 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s 
i i ) M a r g i n a l f a r m e r s 
i i i ) A g r i c u l t u r a l Lab -
o u r e r s 
3 ^ / 0 
3 
- d o -
- d o -
- d o -
- d o -
- d o . 
I v ) N o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l 
I p b o u r e r s - d o - - d o - - d o -
v ) ^ .T i c l n r l e s 5(yA 
v i ) T r a i n i n g schemes 
under IRD 
v i i ) "vUral I n d u s t r i e s / 
R u r a l A r t i s a n s 
program-ne 
FuJLl c o s t t o be met f rom I^D funds 
o f t h e c a p i t a l c o s t Rs.BOOO/-
P u l l Cos t o f T r a i n i n g : a ) Rs.lOO/- pg r tr<ninee per month 
f o r the t r a i n i n g p e r i o d , 
b ) Rs,50/- pe r t r a i n e e per month 
f o r t r a i n i n g expenses to t r a i n i n g 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
9 ^ 
The basic principles for administration of subsidy 
are: (i) subsidy should not be passed on the participants 
in cash, but should be paid in kind; (ii) subsidy be paid 
on behalf of the participants; (a) to the loaning institutions 
co-operatives or commercial, if thp progr?>inine is tied up v;ith 
loans; or (b) to the approved suppliers or body or organisa-
tions supplying goods and services directly ?nd not through 
loaning institution, if the progremrne is not tied up with 
loan; (c) to an approved agency or institution which has been 
( 
authorised by the sanctioning authority to execute the work 
on behalf of and for the benefit of the loanees; (iii) the 
limits o£ subsidy should be strJctly in acconlonce with the 
approved percentage or'pattern of assi^^tence; (iv) the 
financial adjustments of subsidy may be made on completion 
of work end it may not wait till the last instalment of loan 
is repaid, (v) that maintenance of accounts in this respect 
should be done in accordance with the state rules and prac-
tices; (vi) that procedure be such as to ensure proper 
utilisation of subsidy taking the local situation into account, 
BLOCK LKVISL PLANNING 
• I 
Under IRD programme CD blocks have boea accepted -^ s 
the unit for planning and iiTipleniem:a'"ion. c'iled planning 
for rp»lf»vant households vrhich cons itute the target group 
under T^ T) progratmie, have been desicned under the Block plan. 
The objectives of a model Block P^ .in rre (i) to irlentify 
0 n ; 
K' 'J > 
the grov?tb p o t e n t i a l o f b l o c k a r e a in te rms o f the l o c a l land, 
w = t e r f-^ nd! o t h e r r e s o u r c e s i t u a t i o n ; ( i i ) t o i d e n t i f y t h e 
human r e s o u r c e s i t u a t i o n and in p a r t i c u l r . r , the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
and n o n - e g r i c u l t u r a l f a m i l i e s , which a r e e i t h e r unemnloyed 
o r s l r i n i ^ i c a n t l y under employed ; ( l i i ) to r e v i e w t h e o n -
g o i n g development a c t i v i t i e s and t h e i r r o l ^ v a n c e t o ( a ) the 
need f o r o p t i m i s i n g p r o d u c t i o n and ( r ) ni^nornting enir)loyments; 
( i v ) t o f o r m u l a t e a package o f schemeg/programmes which w i l l 
seek to o p t i m i s e p r o d u c t i o n and a l s o augment the d u r a t i o n and 
p r o d u c t i v i t y o f enployment o f the poo r and t h e under employed 
t o a l l e v i a t e unemployment th rough a d d i t i o n a l schenies i n c l u d i n g 
n u b l i c wo rks ; ( v ) t o i d e n t i f y gaps in t h e s o c i a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
r e g a r d i n g the Minimum Needs Programme; and ( v i ) t o f o r m u l a t e 
s p e c i a l nrogrammes f o r the r u r a l poor and t h e s chedu l ed C'-^stes 
pnd s chedu l e t r i b e s p o p u l a t i o n d e s i g n e d to improve t h e i r 
economic c o n d i t i o n s . A b a s e l i n e su r vey o f thn s i t u a t i o n in 
the b l o c k i s an e s s e n t i a l s t a r t i n g poin> Tor the f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f a b l o c k l e v e l p l a n . T h i s i n c l u d e s a r e s o u r c e i n v e n t o r y . 
T h i s should i n d i c a t e t h e p h y s i c a l and b i o l o g i c a l r e s o u r c e s , 
a a r i c u l t u r e and l and use , s o i l c o n d i t i o n s , l end u t i l i s a t i o n , 
a r e a under c r o p s , i r r i g a t i o n and d e t a i l s rr-qnrdina l e v e l and 
use o f a g r i c u l t u r a l i n p u t s : The b a s e l i n e survey may al'so 
•^eal w i t h i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ar}d i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of electricity, banking and credit r<-ic i 1 Jt i.:s, dirtribution 
o f a g r i c u l t u r a l i n p u t s , market ing e t c . 
TABLE N o . 6 . 1 
SCHEMEVffSE PARTICIPATION IN THE FOto VILLAGES 
0 n r-
1 Crop protection tools 
2 Improved agri. tools. 
3 Fruit trees 
^ Fertilizers 
Bullocks 
Bullock carts 
Demontration plots 
Camel cart 
Cattle shed 
J .Jlgri. Kits 
11 Nev veils 
12 Old veils - deepening 
13 Electrical motor/engine 
IV Pump room 
15 Pipe line 
16 Lift Irrigation 
17 Agricultural Inputs 
18 Milk animal scheme 
19 Pultry farms 
20 An4)ar charkha 
21 Shop/Vendor 
22 Training - farmers 
23 IRYSEM 
SCHEl^ ES INTRODUCED 
IMLAKI ADAUN BERTHAL SIKRI 
41 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
• 
* 
* 
* 
« 
* 
• 
NOTEi * Indicates that the scheme has been introduced in the village. 
/.J 'J 
The f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e nivjiber oE f a m i l i e s b e l o w 
the p o v e r t y l i n e and t h e i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s t o be done by 
a h o u s e h o l d s u r v e y . The o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e h o u s e h o l d su rvey 
are ( i ) t o identify f a m i l i e s b e l o v tho p o v e r t y l i n o (ii) t o 
c l a s s i f y t h e f a m i l i e s i n te rms o f annua l p e r c a p i t a income 
g r o u p s end ( i i i ) t o f o r m u l p t e t h e p ro^ luc t i on proarfim-nes f o r 
e ach f n m i l y i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e head o f t h e h o u s e h o l d 
v ' i th a v i e w t o r a i s i n g i t s income above the p o v e r t y l i n e . 
I n o r d e r t o make b e n e f i c i a r y pronr.-^nraes mor=? e f f e c t i v e 
i t hps be«^n though t necesr a r y to m.-^ ke 3Uor>orting investrnent 
i n i n f r ' - > s t r u c t n r e . M^ lo r inves tment i n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e i s 
e x n e c t e d t o be mpde by the S t p t e Governments ?s o p r t o f 
t h e i r norm??l nlr^n. These may i n c l u d e ( a ) r^|Jp-.ly o f e^•ti "pnoni 
t o cD - opp r . ^ t i v e s o f m i lk p r o d u c e r s , p o u l t r y f a r m e r s , 
f i s h e r m e n e t c . ( b ) t r a n s p o r t f a c i l i t i e s to p r o d u c e r ' s c o -
o p e r a t i v e s ; ( c ) a s s i s t a n c e t o c o - o p e r ? t i v e s o f members o f 
t a r g e t s g r oups f o r f a c i l i t i n g p r o c e s s i n a , ma rke t ing and 
s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s , ( d ) s e t t i n g up l i v e s t o c k f a r m s , f e e d 
mi5<ino r d e n s , m u l b e r r y farmr, f o r s e r i c u l i . u t e e t c . (G rants -
i n - a i d t o the e x t e x t o f 50% o f t h e c o s t o f c h i l l i n g / 
collr-rtion C'?ntr'-> (limited to Ps.ri Inl-hs) 'o co-(-Jpf^ r.•|^ • ive 
t^ociei ion i:-] nrovided out oT ttie TID fun-!-. 
20"' 
The income p a r t i c u l a r s a re f u r t h e r a n a l y s e d t o a s s e s s 
t h e impact o f the schemes on the t n r r j c t q r o u p n . F o r t h i s 
p u r p o s e a p r o b e i s made to see hov^many members o f the t a r g e t 
g r o u p s c r o s s e d the p o v e r t y l i n e . Tho p o v e r t v l i n e was dravm 
a t Fc. 975 p r c a p i t a p e r annum, (pr, 81 .40 p o r c a p i t a p e r 
month) . The d a t a r e v e a l t h a t b e f o r e the IRDP Progrerrrres o f 
the r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e b e l o w the p o v e r t y l i n e . I t mcnns t h a t 
a b o u t % were above p o v e r t y l i n e , Dvo to t h e DRTA Schemes 
% v/oro bo l ow the p o v e r t y l i n e , r.o o n l y c r o n s o d the 
p o v e r t y l i n e . I t i m p l i e s t h a t the impact o f d e v e l o p m e n t a l 
schemes has been v e r y m a r g i n a l i n h e l p i n g the smal3 f a r m e r s 
t o c r o s s t he p o v e r t y l i n e , ( T a b l e 6 , 2 ) 
Among the m a r g i n a l f a r m e r s S3% we re b e l o w the p o v e r t y 
l i n e b e f o r e the IRDP, I t means t h a t a b o u t 47% o f the member 
w e r e above the p o v e r t y l i n e , when they g o t the schemes . The 
( 
a n a l y s i s o f impac t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e h a s been v i r t v i a l l y 
no impact o f t h e scheme on m a r g i n a l f a n r e r s c a t e g o r y , , , , . , , 
( T a b l e 6 . 2 ) 
i' 
I n the c a s e o f a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r e r s , 61 .53 were be lov ; 
t h e p o v e r t y l i n e . I t means t h a t 38.47% we re above the p o v e r t y 
l i n e a t the t ime o f r e c e i v i n g the b e n e f i t s u n d e r IFUDP-Schemes. 
A f t e r t he LI^DR Schemes 69.23% were b e l o w the p o v e r t y l i n e . 
Thf cT-ldi fcionvJl a b o u t 8% o f a g r l c u 1 Mi ccil Ictbonrcr ' ; j o i n r d the 
b e l o w the p o v e r t y - l i n e c a t e g o r y , ( T a b l e 6 , 2 ) 
Our a n a l y s i s r e v e a l s t h a t the impact o f the schemes on 
s m a l l f a r m e r s was n e g l i g i b l e and on m a r g i n a l f a r m e r s n i l . In 
t he ense o f nq r i cn 1 t^irnl laboTirer ; ; it vjnr. n r - qp t i v ^ . A l thouah I 
OA? U ' 
15,3% o f s m a l l f a r m e r s and 15.6% o f m a r g i n a l f a r m e r s and 
I 
5.9% o f a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r e r s r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e r e had been 
r i s e i n t h e i r income y e t the r i s e was no t enough t o r them 
to c r o r s the p o v e r t y l i n e . A l l theV: : f actoC5 co 1 l e c t i v e l y 
r e n d e r e d the economic p o l i c y vinder IRDP i n e f f e c t i v e . The 
i m p a c t o f DRDA schemes shows t h a t the c o v e r a g e h a s been f a r 
f rom the e x p e c t e d . Absence o f a p p r o p r i a t e t e c h n o l o g y and 
i n a d e q u a t e i n f r a s t r a t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s appea r ed to be key 
f a c t o r s i n the f a i l u r e o f the p o l i c y . The IRDP schemes, no 
d o u b t , g e n e r a t e d work i n c e r t a i n c a s e s bu t n o t i n c o m e . Those 
who c o u l ^ c r o n s t h e p o v e r t y l i n e on account o f the schen e 
w e r e n e g l i g V b l e . On the c o n t r a r y , the a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r e r s 
s u f f e r e d a d e c l i n e i n t h e i r income th f - r eby r e v e a l i no the c o u n t c r 
p r o d u c t i v e e f f e c t o f t h e shcemes on the t a r g e t g r o u p s . 
T h i s p r o v e s o u r h y p o t h e s i s N o . l 
An a' se.' sinent o f v a r i o u s DKDA schoiH.;: "hcwr th^t Dnrlcr 
m i n o r i r r i g a t i o n schemes w e l l d eve l opment and e l e c t r i c motor 
I 
and u n d e r an imal h u s b a n d r y sh? ep r e a r i n g u n i t s p r o v e d to be 
p o t e n t i a l l y v i a b l e . M i l c h c a t t l e shccmes p r o v e d to be c o u n t e r -
p r o d u c t i v e . P h y s i c a l a s s e t s l i k e c a r t and b u l l o c k , p l o u g h and 
b u l l o c k and house s i t e s had f a v o u r a b l e e f f e c t on t h e t a r g e t 
g r o u p s . I t was f ound t h a t l a n d , t r a d i t i o n a l s k i l l s and p h y s i c a l 
a r j s p t s - o r i ' ^ n tr'd schom^s were s t n t o d to be more p r o m i s i n g than 
o t h e r tyjje.'i c f s chemes . In U ie Crcjc oL l.lio:;e sch'me'-, which d i d 
n o t make much impac t , the i n a d e q u a t e scope o f t e c h n o l o g y , g a p s 
i n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and u n s u l t a b i l i ty o f qf\~cl iip.ft i c env i r onment 
ncnnunt Tor Ihe f a i l u r e o f tho sch'IIK r.. ( I '-blf^ 
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TABLE NO. 
PROGRESS OP THE (IRDP) IN THE STUDY VILLAGES 
DURING 1980-85 
o / / 
I tem 
T o t a l number o f 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s 
P e r b e n e f i c i a r y 
s u b s i d y lis. 
benp f i c l s r ' * ' 
C r e d i t (fc) 
( 
P e r b e n e f i c i a r y 
investrr.ent (te) 
S e c t o r w i s e c o v e r a g e 
a . P r i m a r y s e c t o r 
b . Seconda ry S e c t o r 
c . T e r t i a r y s e c t o r 
ALIGARH VILLA3ES 
IMLANI ADAUN 
36 
684 
1156 
1785 
94 .78 
2 .15 
3 .07 
66 
990 
1886 
2725 
86.75 
3.90 
9 .35 
KARNAL VILLAGES TARG 
BERTHAL S IKRI ETS 
35 
1064 
2056 
3117 
75 
1005 1000 
2099 2000 
2153 3000 
70 .20 74 . 50 
18.46 12.75 
11.34 12.75 
The t o t a l number o f b e n e f i c i a r i e s i s 212. P e r b e n e f i c i a r y 
s u b s i d y has b een b e l o w the t a r g e t i n I m l a n i (A ) and Adaun (A) . 
I n t h e same way, p e r benefic: j .airy c r e d i t and p e r b e n e f i c i a r y i n v e -
s tment have been the t a r g e t i n the above v i l l a g e s . The p e r f o r m a n c e 
o f B e r t h a l (K) ha s b e e n the h i g h e s t i n a l l t h e f o u r v i l l a g e s . 
S o f a r as s e c t o r w i s e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f lUDP i s c o n c e r n e d , t h e 
s h a r e o f t h e p r i m a r y s e c t o r h a s b e e n t h e h i g h e s t i n Imlc in l ( A ) and 
t h e l e a s t i n B e r t h a l ( K ) . The c o v e r a g e o f s e c o n d a r y s e c t o r and t h e 
t e r t i a r y s e c t o r h a s b e e n t h e h i g h e s t i n B e r t h a l (K ) and S i k r i (K) 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . ( T a b l e 6.4) 
<) o 
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CHAPTER - 7 
SOCIOLOGY OF EGONCKIC POLICY ~ I 
SOCIAL CTRATIFICATIOH AND PERCOLATION OF DEVLLOPMENT BENEFITS 
S o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n b y d e f i n i t i o n , r e f e r s t o some 
k i n d o f i n e q u a l i t y w i t h i n a s o c i e t y . 
I n s o c i o l o g i c a l t e rms , t h e r e i s no s o c i e t y i n the 
w o r l d wh ich i s n o t s t r a t i f i e d a l t h o u g h t h e r e a r e v a r i a t i o n s . 
• The b a s i s o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n o f a s o c i e t y h a s r e c e i v e d 
much a t t e n t i o n b o t h b y S o c i o l o g i s t s and E c o n o m i s t s , But 
s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s d i f f e r i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s o f the c r i t e r i a 
o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
In the h i s t o r y o f the e v o l u t i o n o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n 
t h e o r y , K a r l Marx b r o u g h t o u t the most s y s t e m a t i c a l l y the 
i m p o r t a n c e o f i n d i v i d u a l s ' o r g r o u p ' s l o c a t i o n i n the e c o n -
omic s t r u c t u r e as a d r i t e r i o n o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s 
emphar-is c o n t r i b u t e d to one o f the e s s e n t i a l f o u n d a t i o n s 
f o r a l l s u b s e q u e n t s t r a t i f i c a t i o n t h e o r i e s . Marx o b s e r v e s , 
" I n the s o c i a l p r o d u c t i o n wh i ch men c a r r y on t h e y e n t e r i n t o 
d e f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s t h a t a r e i n d i s p e n s a b l e and i n d e p e n d e n t 
o f t h e i r w i l l The t o t a l i t y o f t h e s e r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d -
u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s the economic s t r u c t u r e o f the s o c i e t y -
t h e r e a l f o u n d a t i o n , on v;hich l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l s u p e r s t -
r u c t u r e a r i s e 'nhe i iorle o f p r o d v i c t i o n o f n i p . t c r i n l 
l i f e d e t e r m i n e s the g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r o f the s o c i a l , p o l i -
t i c a l , and s p i r i t u a l p r o c e s s o f l i f e . In te rms o f t h e i r 
s t r u c t u r c i l l o c a t i o n iri the s o c i a l s y s t e m , iitmb' r s o f the 
s o c i e t y a re d i v i d e d b y Marx i n t o two s t r a t a o f " c l a s s e s " . 
S 
0 -: (j 1 
These two c l a s s e s a r e the owners o f the means o f p r o d u c t i o n 
and the wo rke r s whom they emplo^,!^. 
I n the l i g h t o f f u r t h e r r e f i n e m e n t s i n s t r a t i f i c a t i o n 
t h o o r i e s t h i s i s a v e r y c rude c o n c e p t o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c -
atior>. Tho social r' nlity CcinnoL b'- .Klfcpjutoly anulyLifd 
w i t h t h i s c o n c e p t . F i r s t l y , i t doe s not d i s t i n g u i s h between 
what might be l a b e l l e d as the economic , the p r o d u c t i v e and 
the o c c u p a t i o n a l a s p e c t o f the s t r u c t u r e o f the s o c i e t y . 
S e c o n d l y , Ma rx i an t h e o r y o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n tends to minimise 
the r o l e o f a v a r i e t y o f o t h e r s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e f a c t o r s such 
as l i n e a g e and k i n s h i p a f f i l i a t i o n s i n a l l s o c i e t i e s , o r 
e t h n i c o r g roup a f f i l i a t i o n s in s o c i e t i e s t h a t a re e t h n i c a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t a t e d , 
A f t e r Marx, Max W e b e r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s in the deve lopment 
o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n t h e o r y i s s i g n i f i c a n t , Weber d i s t -
i n g u i s h e d th r ee t y p e s o f s o c i a l l o rma t i on r e l e v a n t to the 
Study o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , namely, c l a s s , s t a t u s g r o u p s and 
p a r t i e s . 
To Webe r , c l a s s e s ^ p e a r i n the c o n t e x t o f market s i t u a -
t i o n s , The b a s i c c a t e q o r i e s , t h a t he a g r e e s w i t h Marx, a re 
p r o p e r t y h o l d e r s and n o n - p r o p e r t y h o l d e r s . W i t h i n these two 
c a t e g o r i e s , c l a s s e s may a l s o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d by sou rce o r 
amount o f income. W e b e r ' s main p o i n t i s tha t c l a j ^ s e s , as 
d i s t i n c t firom s t a t u s g r o u p s , a re c o l l e c t i v i t i e s d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
f r om each o t h e r by a d i f f e r e n t i a l p o s i t i o n w i th r e g a r d t o a 
market whe re in they confpete to m a x i m i s e m a t e r i a l g a i n . 
^ ' r (•J t J 
"I'n c o n t r a s t to c l a s s " , Weber w r i t e s , " s t a t u s g r oups 
a r e n o r m a l l y comniunit ies . They a r e , however , o f t e n o f an 
amorphous k i n d . In c o n t r a s t t o the p u r e l y e c o n o m i c a l l y 
deteinninecl ' c l a s s s i t u a t i o n ' we w i s h to d e s i g n a t e as 
' s t a t u s s i t u a t i o n * e v e r y t y p i c a l component o f the f a t e o f 
men t h a t i s de te rmined by a s p e c i f i c , p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e , 
s o c i a l e s t i m a t i o n o f h o n o r . T h i s honor may be connec ted 
w i t h any q u a l i t y sha red by a p l u r a l i t y , and, o f c o u r s e , i t 
can be knit to a class situation: class distinctions are 
l i n k e d i n the most v a r i e d ways w i t h s t a t u s d i s t i n c t i o n s . 
P r o p e r l y as such i s n o t a lways r e c o g n i s e d as s t a t u s q u a l i -
f i c a t i o n , b u t i n the Ipng run i t i s , and w i t h e x t r a o r d i n a r y 
r e g u l a r i t y , " 
To Weber the genu ine p l a c e o f ' c l a s s e s ' i s w i t h i n the 
economic o r d e r , t h e p l a c e o f ' s t a t u s g r o u p s ' i s w i t h i n the 
s o c i a l o r d e r and ' p a r t i e s ' l i v e in a houso o f ' p o w e r ' . 
I n the c o n t e n ^ o r a r y p e r i o d i t i s T a l c o t t P a r s o n s , and 
K i n g s l e y D a v i s and W i l b e r t E ,Moo re , who have c o n t r i b u t e d 
most t o the c o n c e p t u a l deve lopment o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n 
t h e o r y . These t h e o r i e n have s t r e s K ' d tho p r e s t i g e d imens ion 
o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n t h e o r y . They have a p p l i e d VJeber 's 
c o n c e p t o f " s t a t u s " as ai g e n e r a l i s e d phenomenon t o a l l p o s i -
t i o n s i n the o c c u p a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f s o c i e t y . To them, 
p r e s t i g e i a the r f e s u l t o f two f a c t o r s ; ( ! ) a system o f v a l u e 
and (2 ) the f u n c t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the r o l e as embodied 
i n the o c c u p a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . T h i s f u n c t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , 
i n t u r n , i s de te rmined by the r e l a t i v e c a p a c i t y o f a r o l e f o r 
? 15 
" p r o c y c i n g " some s e r v i c e o r goods in l;hG s o c i c t y . 
Pa r sons , in a d d i t i o n t o h i s i n t e r e s t in the c i r rens ion 
o f p r e s t i o e , has a l s o b en i n t e r e s t e d in ihc po'..'er aspec t 
o f r ioc in l ntirnt I f Ic . ) l«'i on . 
Pa rsons , D a v i s , and Moore have been £iccused of f a v o u r i n g 
i n e q u a l i t ' in s o d i a l systcrr;s, under-cn 'p ' -as iz ing c o n f l i c t 
and povzer aspec t o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , and f a v o u r i n g 
s o c i a l e q u i l i b r i u m r a t h e r than s o c i a l change. 
Thus, V7hile t o Marx ' C l a s s ' apireared as an impor tant 
source o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , t o V^obor in a^v i i t ion t o c l a s s i t 
i s s t a t u s and p a r t y , and in pc rr^ons and Dnvin end r.oorc i t 
i s Hio ].rfv".I".igo eliTnon.'-.ion oT r.oi Ir i l .str- ihi iJo t i o n 
v;as o f impor tance . Thus t h i s dcvc l lopr^ent o f s o c i a l s t r c ' t i -
f i c a t i o n theory sugges t s t h a t r o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i s c o n t -
c;-;Liuil .uid inultidinit iit.;J.uii.j I . 
Th i s i r .u l t id imcnsional conceptua l model o f s o c i a l s t r^^t i -
f i c a t i o n has been u t i l i s e d in t h i s chap t e r t o e>:plain hov; 
b e n e f i t d i s t r i b u t i o n from d i f f e r e n t deve l cpr ' en t p rog re r j r e s 
in Ui«' r\ir<"l arcias occurs in ;< 1. i ion lo ll.f- nu l t i d i i , . nsicn. 1 
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n in the rur ; 1 coi.i uni t i e s o f A l i g a r h and K a m a l 
D i s t r i c t s , '-e s h a l l exarr.ine hov; c a s t e , c l a s s and po'wer 
i n f l u e n c e the p e r c o l a t i o n o f d e v e l opnen t b e n e f i t s arrcrjg 
d i f f o r o n t agr^irian c l a s r . e s . 
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Before examining the relationship between a stratificat-
ional factor and the development benefits, it would be nece-
ssary to see if the benefits occuring from the developrent 
prograirires are differentially distributed. We, hypothesized 
that there is a differential distribution of development 
benefits among the rural people, 
INEQUALITIES IN DEVELOPMENT GAINS; 
We examine the question of distribution of development 
benefits with the help of several benefit measures. Table 
7,1, 7,2, 7,3 and 7,4 present data relating to the distri-
bution of the development benefits. 
Data in Table 7,1 deal with the composite measure of the 
I 
development benefits comprising of adoption of improved tech-
nology and material assistance. The distribution of the 
respondents in different benefit categories clearly revealed 
« 
that the development benefit scores ranged from 0 to 100 
which was indicative of the extreme variation in the develop-
\ 
ment benefits received. The inteir-quartile range was found 
to be 25,51 which in view of total range, was suggestive of 
a high degree of heterogeneity among the respondents in resp-
ect of their development benefit scores. 
229: 
The distribution of the respondents in Table 7.1 
revealed ^hat the. benefit scores of more than one-third of 
the total respondents ranged from 0 to 20, of 51 per cent 
from 21 to 50 and of 14 per cent benefited poorly whereas a 
small portion benefited to a far greater extent from the 
I 
development ptogr?mtnes« 
By using median as dividing line, 53 9 of the 1140 
respondents (45.53 per cent) emerged as high benefit recipient 
and the majority (54.47 per cent) as low benefit recipients. 
This indicated that the difference between the proportion of 
respondents receiving high and low development benefits was 
significant (Z - Value ® 20.26). 
The above finding was further reinforced by an examina-
tion of the distribution of respondents according to each 
component of the overall development benefits, namely, adoption 
of improved technology and material assistance. 
<jata in Table 7.2 indicated the variation among the 
respondents with respect to their adoption scores. Here again, 
the adoption scores of the respondents, ranqed from 0 to 100. 
In the light of this, the interquartile range of 36.24 was 
indicative of a high degree of variation among the respondents 
with regard to the adoption of improved technology. 
It may also be noted that the adoption scores of nearly 
one - third of the total respondents ran-red from 0 to 30, 
of 37 per cent from 31 to 60 and 30 per cent from 61 to 100. 
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On the basis of the median value, we found 54,46 per 
cent of the total respondents 620,in the low and 45.54 per 
cent (520) in high adoption categories. The Z-test applied 
on the data indicated that there was significant difference 
in the proportion of respondents represented in.the low and 
in the hiqh adoption categories (3 - value 21,02), 
Turning to the d'istribution of material assistance, we 
again noted the phenomenon of differential distribution of the 
development benefits. As can be seen from Table 7,3 nearly 
half of the respondents did not receive material assistance 
at all. The material assistance received by the respondents 
during the reference period, when expressed in terms of rupees, 
ranged from 0 to Rs,37,500 or more. Nearly two-third, 66^12% 
of the total respondents (748) received either no assistance 
or little ;<s';lstance uplfo Rs.2500. 
^ven if we do not take into account extreme cases, nearly 
11.63% per cent of the total respondents received material * I 
assistance between Rs,625 and Rs.2500, 22,74 per cent between 
Rs,2501 and Rs.12,500 and 11.14 per cent between Rs, 12500 and V I. 
Rs.37,500 and above. This is suggestive of the inequalities in 
the material assistance received by the responrlents from the 
development programmes. 
ir we c-onnl'i'^ r only that f.il:r;<iory oT ro.'jfioivlcntn which 
rorolvpd mat f^ rlnl afl.-nl.itrinro, m ly not-p thni" nearly 59.06;i 
of such respondents received material assistance below Rs. 12500, 
<) o o 
fo J 
TABLE > 7.4 
DISTRIBXJTION OP RESPONDEMTS ACCORDING TO ASSET INCREASE AND BENEFITS FROM SOCIAL AMENITIES. 
/"n - 1140 7 
BENEFIT MEASURE BENEFIT CATEGORY J^* 
LOW HIGH 
Benefit from 
social amenities 708 (62.81) 432 (37.39) 17.357 
Increase in 
assets 772 (68.78) 368 (31.22) 15.218 
*Z v a l u e s i g n i f i c a n t , p / .01 
17.98% between is. 1250/- and Rs,6250 and little less than 18.08% 
between Rs.6250 and Rs.25000. The proportion of the respondents 
who received material assistance above Rs,25000 was only 4.09 
per cent. 
Using mean as dividing line, we noted that 70.53 per 
cent (800) of the total respondents figured in the low and 
M ^ 29.47 per cent (340) in the high material assistance category. 
i' 
The Z-test applied on data indicated significant difference 
in the proportion of respondents represented in the two 
material assistance categbries (Z-value = 15.03). 
The fact of uneven distribution of the development bene-
fits was further substantiated when we examined supplementary 
measures of benefits, namely, increase in the value of assets 
and benefits reported from social amenities. 
As it can be seen from Table 7.4, nearly 31.22 per cent 
(368) of the total respondents figured in the high asset-incre-
ase category whereas a malority of respondents (772) (68.78) 
represented in the low assfet-increase category. The Z-value 
indicated highly significant difference among the respondents 
in respect of increase in assets. V-
L i k e w i s e , 37 .39 p e r c en t o f the t o t a l r e spondent - (4 32) 
r e p o r t e d g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s f rom s o c i a l a m e n i t i e s , w h i l e m a j o r i t y 
(708 ) ( 6 2 . 6 1 ) we re found in t h e low b e n e f i t c a t e g o r y . The 
r e s u l t s o f t h e Z - t e s t i n d i c a t e d s i n n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e among the 
r e s p o n d e n t s w i t h r e s p e c t '.o tho b e n e f i t s r e p o r t e d f rom s o c i a l 
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amenities. 
The analysis has so far been confined to the discussion 
of observed variatioh among the people with respect to the 
development benefits* The observed facts, however, may not be 
identical to the perception of the respondents. It is possible 
that the people may not have perceived differences in the period 
1978-79 & 1983-84. This possibility was examined with the help 
of three questions! (a) how much do you thinTc the development 
programmes have benefitted you ? (b) how much do you think your 
family income has increased as a result of the development 
prograitmes ? (c) how much pf the increase in your assets do 
you think is due to the development programiies ?. 
The analysis of the teaponsen in Table 7.5 has indicated 
differential perception of the people about the benefits they 
have derived from the development programmes d u r i n g 1978-79 & ' 8 3 - 8 4 
The following specific points emerge from this analysis. 
(a) Over one-third of the total respondents (388) perc-
eived "no benefits", about half of the sample (588) perceived 
"little Benefits" and nearly 16 per cent (160) perceived "much 
benefits" from the development programmes. 
(b) Nearly 18.95 per cent of tha total respondents 
perceived increase in their family income upto 25 per cent 
and nearly 40.46 per cent perceived ^ncrease ranning from 
26 to 50 per cent. By contrast, 37 per cent of the total 
r«»nponrl«'«nt:n who po rco l v^ f l /ibovci I ' i pi-r <cnJ 1 ncTr-.-t.-irj fn lneOiiitT. 
() o n 
a-
TABLE NO. 7 .6 
DISTRIBOTIOM OP RESPONDENTTS BY CASTE AND DEVELOPMENT 
BENEFITS 
/"N - 1140_7 
Development 
Benefits 
Caste 
LOWEST LOW HIGH HIGHEST 
All 
C a s t e s 
LOW 288 136 168 28 
( 9 3 . 5 2 ) ( 8 0 . 7 2 ) ( 3 8 . 2 3 ) ( 2 6 . 3 6 ) 
620 
(54.49) 
High 20 32 384 84 
( 6 , 4 8 ) (19. 'S8) ( 6 9 . 7 7 ) ( 7 3 . 6 4 ) 
520 
( 4 5 . 5 1 ) 
Total 308 164 552 112 1140 
X ' = 174,2 df « 3 P/ ,01 
Gamma = ,080 
TABLE NO. 7«7 
DISTRIBOTION OP RESPONDENTS BY CASTE AND ADOPTION 
OP IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY 
LOWER HIGHER 
(BPL) (APL) 
/"n - 1140_7 
Adoption Caste All Castes 
LOW 440 168 628 
(99.21) (28.68) (55.29) 
High 40 472 512 
(7.79) (71.32) (44.71) 
X^ » 229.0 df - 1 
o J 
( c ) L i k e w i s e , o f the 1140 r e s p o n d e n t s , 892 ( 7 8 . 5 
p e r c en t ) r e p o r t e d an i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r v a l u e o f a s s e t s , 
whe rea s 248 ( 2 1 . 5 p e r c en t ) d i d n o t r e p o r t e d i n c r e a s e . 
Such an i n c r e a s e was a t t r i b u t e d by the g roup to the 
deve lopment programmes i n v a r y i n g p r o p o r t i o n s . W h i l e 
o n l y 18,24 p e r c e n t o f such r e s p o n d e n t s (208) a t t r i b u t e d 
0 t o 25 p e r c e n t o f t h e i r a s s e t i n c r e a s e t o t h e deve lopment 
programmes, an overwhe lming m a j o r i t y (568) a t t r i b u t e d 51 
t o IDO %. 
I t may b e i n f e r r e d f rom the above t h a t the b e n e f i t s 
o f f e r e d b y t h e deve lopment programmes were d i f f e r e n t i a l l y 
I 
d i s t r i b u t e d among the p e o p l e . T h i s p r o v e s o u r h y p o t h e s i s 
NO.2. 
SECTION I CASTE AND DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS 
H a v i n g no ted t h a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the deve lopment 
b e n e f i t s was d i f f e r e n t i a l , we nov; t u r n t o the q u e s t i o n as 
t o how such a d i s t r i b u t i o n i s r c l o t e d t o d i f f e r e n t a t r a t i -
I 
f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r s v i z , c a s t e , c l a s s and p o w e r . V7e s h a l l 
f i r s t c o n c e n t a t e on. the r o l a i iuni;liii.> bctv/cen c a s t e and the 
dovcloiJiiicnt b c n c l i t i . 
r, 
In orclcjr It) l.oril I hf .i)>ov<- 1 lyi ><>• 1 if>ri i r., rciiir.irlo rofi 
s e v e r a l measures o f the deve lopment b e n e f i t s . D a t a show-
i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between c a s t e and each such b e n e f i t 
measure a r e p r e s e n t e d i n T a b l e 7 ,6 and 7 . 7 , 
T a b l e 7.6 show the a s s o c i a t i o n between c a s t e and o v e r -
a l l deve lopment b e n e f i t s i n the group 'A* and g roup ' B ' 
v i l l a g e s . A l ook a t the T a b l e r e v e a l s t h a t a g r e a t e r p r o p -
o r t i o n o f the p e o p l e o f h i g h e r c a s t e than t h o s e o f l o w e r 
t 
c a s t e r e p r e s e n t e d i n the h i g h b e n e f i t ca tego i ry . The r e s u l t 
o f Gamma showed t h a t the two v a r i a b l e s were i n agreement t o 
t h e s i g n i f i c a n t a s s d c i a t i o n between c a s t e and the deve lopment 
b e n e f i t s . These r e s u l t s s u g g e s t t h a t the b e n e f i t s o f the 
deve l opment programmes have f l o w n more t owa rds the h i g h e r 
c a s t e p e o p l e than o t h e r s . 
T h i s f i n d i n g r e l a t e s t o the compos i te measure o f the 
deve lopment b e n e f i t s c o m p r i s i n g o f adopt i on o f improved 
t e c h n o l o g y and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e , VJe have , t h e r e f o r e , 
examined the a s s o c i a t i o n o f c a s t e w i th each o f the se two 
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p r ima ry components^adoption o f modern t e chno l ogy and m a t e r i a l , 
a s s i s t a n c e in T a b l e 7 .7 and 7 . 8 . 
The p e o p l e o€ h i g h e r c a s t e s (APL) f i g u r e d mote in h i gh 
adopt i on c a t e g o r y w h i l e tho se o f l ower c a s t e s in low adopt ion 
c a t e g o r y . The CHI - Square t e s t r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e d h i g h l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n between c a s t e and adopt ion o f inproved 
t e c h n o l o g y . 
Lil<ewise, t h e p e o p l e o f higher c a s t e b e n e f i t e d g r e a t l y 
f rom the m a t e r i a l as55istance o f f e r e d by the development 
programmes. T h i s i s e v i d e n t from t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y h i ghe r mean 
s c o r e s d f m a t e r i e l a s s i s t a n c e ( T a b l e 7 . 8 ) . The a n a l y s i s o f 
v a r i a n c e t e s t r e v e a l e d s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s among c a s t e 
groups in r e s p e c t o f t h e m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e r e c e i v e d by them. 
I t . is presumed t h a t t h e adopt ion o f improved t echno logy 
combined w i th m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e might have h e l p e d t h e p e o p l e 
in i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r income and, t he r eby , w e a l t h . The growth in 
t h e i r income and w e a l t h , t h e r e f o r e , p r o v i d e s an i n d i r e c t 
e v i d e n c e o f the development b e n e f i t s accrued t o the p e o p l e . 
Moreove r , the i n c r e a s e i n w e a l t h may a l s o p r o v i d e some 
e v i d e n c e o f the corresponding increase in Income consequent 
upon the development programmes. T h e r e f o r e , an attempt was 
made to s ee i f a s s e t s o f the respondents have i n c r e a s e d d u r i n g 
the r e f e r e n c e p e r i o d . In measur ing o n e ' s a s s e t s , we have 
c o n s i d e r e d a g r i c u l t u r a l as w e l l as n o n - a a r i c u l t u r a l a s s e t s . 
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TABLE • 7»10 
DISTRIBUTION OP RESPONDENTS BY CASTE & REPORTED 
BENEFITS PROM SOCIAL AMENITIES 
/"n - 1140_7 
Benefit 
Lower 
(BPL) 
Caste 
Higher 
(APL) 
All Castes 
Low 456 
(96,21) 
244 
(37.02) 
700 
(61 ,81) 
High 20 
(3.79) 
420 
(62.98) 
440 
(38.19) 
Total 476 664 1140 
X^ • 177.1 df « 1 
O rj 
(: J 
I t may b e no ted 'from T a b l e 7 . 9 t h a t a l l the c a s t e 
g r o u p s w i t n e s s e d an i n c r e a s e in t h e i r a b s o l u t e a s s e t v a l u e 
d u r i n g the r e f e r e n c e p e r i o d . However , the v a r i a t i o n among 
I 
c a s t e g roups w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r mean a s s e t s in columns 
3 and 5 r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e economic d i s p a r i t i e s betvfeen c a s t e 
g roups were much g r e a t e r i n 1983-84 than in 1978-79 . A l s o , 
d a t a in columns 4 and 6 i n d i c a t e d t h a t the p r o p o r t i o n a t e sha re 
o f d i f f e r e n t c a s t e s in t h e t o t a l a s s e t s remained more or 
l e s s unchanged in s p i t e o f t h e a p p r e c i a b l e i n c r e a s e in t h e 
a b s o l u t e a s s e t s d u r i n g t h e r e f e r e n c e p e r i o d . T h i s can be 
e x p l a i n e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t t h e b e n e f i t s a cc rued t o each c a s t e 
g roup in terms o f i n c r e a s e d a s s e t we r e d i r e c t l y i n p r o p o r t i o n 
t o i t s r e l a t i v e a s s e t p o s i t i o n i n 1978-79 . 
B e s i d e s p r o v i d i n g t e c h n i q a l and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r 
t h e i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t s . S o c i a l deve lopment programmes a l s o 
p r o v i d e d c e r t a i n b a s i c ament ies in t h e form o f minimum needs 
programme in ordeB t o improve t h e l e v e l s o f l i v i n g o f a g r a r i a n 
c l a s s e s . T h e s e i n c l u d e d a c t i v i t i e s such as v i l l a g e s c h o o l , 
K 
h e a l t h c e n t r e , v e t e r i n a r y h o s p i t a l , s t r e e t s , s t r e e t l i g h t , 
e l e c t r i c i t y e t c . from t h e s e a m e n i t i e s a l s o t h e p e o p l e o f 
h i c h e r c a s t e s r e p o r t e d g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s than t h o s e o f l ower 
i' 
c a s t e s as can be seen from T a b l e 7 . 1 0 . The s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n between the two v a r i a b l e s was 
I n d i c a t e d by t h e Ch i - S q u a r e r e s u l t s . 
As most o f t h e c a t t l e w e a l t h was owned by t h e h i g h e r 
c a s t e p e o p l e , l ower c a s t e s d i d not r e c e i v e much b e n e f i t f rom 
TABLE 
c a s t e AND THEIR MEAN SCORES OF DIFFERENT BENEFIT MEASURES 
(N =640 ) 
235 
Villages Behefi't Measures 
H l g R ^ Lower Air 
GROUP "A" 
1. BERTH AL (K) 
N = 340 
N = 300 
1.Coroposite Devel- 56,42 
opment benefits, (yioo) 
2 . M a t e r i a l 14.67 
A s s i s t e n c e . (100) 
3.Adoption of 68.26 
iiiproved (loo) 
Technology. 
4.Asset (60.60 
Increase. UOO) 
5.B e n e f i t f rom 80.65 
s o c i a l (100 ) 
Amen i t i e s * 
2, ADAUN (A) 1. Conposlte Deve-lopment benefits. (lOO) 
2 , M a t e r i a l 15.27 
A s s i s t a n c e . (100) 
3.Adoption of 72.66 
Improved (lOO) 
Technology. 
4 , A s s e t 57.25 
I n c r e a s e . (100) 
5 . B e n e f i t s f rom 84.20 
s o c i a l (100) 
Amen i t i e s 
16.84 
( :>9.84) 
1.30 ( 8.86) 
31.85 
(46.65) 
3.85 
( 6.35) 
18.76 
(23.26) 
1 6 . 2 6 
( 29 .15 ) 
1.22 
( 7 . 08 ) 
29.72 
(40 .90 ) 
3 .12 
( 5 .44 ) 
19.50 
(23 .15 ) 
39. 
(69 .1? ) 
9.00 
(61.34) 
52.85 
(77.40) 
37.82 
(62.40) 
55.45 
(68.75) 
37.33 
(66 .92 ) 
8 . 7 1 
(57 .03 ) 
54.60 
(75 .14 ) 
33.44 
(58 .41 ) 
( 54 .00 ) 
(Figures in Parentheses are Index Numbers) 
TABLE 7.12 
CASTE AND THEIR MEAN SCORES OP DIFFERENT BENEFIT MEASURES 
(N « 500 ) 
r, r^ ' I 
i i : 
village Benefit Measures 
Higher L o w e r A l l 
GROUP "B" t 
!• IMLANI (A) l.Conposite Devel-opment benefits. 4 3 . 1 8 ( ^ 0 0 ) 
1 7 . 8 4 
( 40 . 48) 
3 2 . 5 7 
( 7 5 . 4 2 ) 
N = 164 
2.Material 
Assistance. 
3.Adoption of 
In^jroved 
Technology. 
1 1 . 5 5 2 
( 1 0 0 ) 
6 1 . 6 1 
( 1 0 0 ) 
1 . 4 0 8 
( 1 2 . 1 8 ) 
3 0 . 5 8 
( 4 9 . 6 3) 
7 . 3 0 5 
( 6 3 . 2 3 ) 
4 8 . 6 3 
( 7 8 . 9 3 ) 
4.Asset 
Increase. 
5 7 . 8 2 
( 100) 
4 . 0 1 
( 6 . 9 3 ) 
3 6 . 2 9 
( 6 2 . 7 6 ) 
5.Benefits from 
Social 
Amenities. 
7 1 . 2 5 
( 349 ) 
2 0 . 4 3 
( 2 8 . 6 7 ) 
5 2 . 3 0 
( 7 3 . 4 0 ) 
2, SIKRI (K) 1.composite Devel-opment benefits. 
4 8 . 6 5 
( 1 0 0 ) 
1 9 . 4 6 
( 4 0 ) 
3 6 . 1 4 
( 7 4 . 2 8 ) 
N = 336 
2.Material 
Assistance. 
1 2 . 0 2 
( 1 0 0 ) 
1 . 5 5 
( 1 2 . 8 9 ) 
7 . 5 3 
( 6 2 . 6 4 ) 
3. Adopt ion of 
Improved 
Technology. 
6 0 . 7 5 
( 1 0 0 ) 
3 0 . 9 9 
( 5 1 . 0 1 ) 
4 7 . 9 9 
( 7 6 . 9 9 ) 
I 
4.Asset 
Increase. 
5 5 . 9 5 
( 1 0 0 ) 
4 . 7 2 
( 8 . 4 3 ) 
3 3 . 9 9 
( 6 0 . 7 5 ) 
5.Benefits from 
social 
Amenities 
1' 
7 2 . 5 2 
( 1 0 0 ) 
2 1 . 1 1 
( 2 9 . 1 0 ) 
5 0 . 4 8 
( 6 9 . 6 0 ) 
(Figures in Parentheses are Index Numbers) 
Cn c o m p a r i s o n -^.-e f i n d t h a t ' t h e l o w e r c a s t e i n g r o u p ' E ' v i l l a g e s 
h a v e g o t a h i g h e r p e r c e n t r . g e o f d e v o l o r r r . e n t b e n e f i t s t h a n i n 
arout> ' A ' v i l l n g c n . 
fj o o 
k- -1 • ' 
veterinary hospitals. Proportionately, more children of 
higher castes than of lower castes were studying in the 
schools. Most of the dlectricnl]y operated tube wells were 
owned by the higher caste people as they had generally such 
a size of land where tiibe-wells were viable, with regard to 
the domestic consumption of electricity, most of the houses 
lising electricity belonged to the higher caste people. 
The mean benefit scores were also used to study the 
caste differentials with respect to the development qains. 
It may be noted from Table 7.11 and 7.12, that the mean 
benefit score of higher castes were consistently higher than 
those of lower castes. 
In Group 'A* villages, there is one caste dominance. 
Jats are dominant in BERTHAL whereas Thakurs are dominant 
in ADAUN. They hold from 80 to 85 per cent of the land in 
the villages. There is concentration of social, economic 
and political power. Nearly all village institutions are 
headed by them. It leads to lesser degree of participation 
by the people particularly the poor in the development 
programnnes. so, there is very little percolation of develop-
ment benefits* 
The indices of benefit measures in Group 'X* and 'B' 
villages clearly demonstrate the inenalitririan structure. In 
t 
Group •A* villages, the share of lower castes in development 
in 
benefits, is less than/Croup 'B' villages. It is obvious 
from all benefit measures. 
PERCEPTION OF 
TABLE 
DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS BY CASTE 
(H 
2 3 9 
- 1140) 
Perception of 
benefits C A S T E 1 Statistical 
Lower Higher TOTAL test 
(a) ^ten ' of Benefits **ceived : 
Ho benefit 323 75 398 178.09 Little Benefit 142 420 562 df = 2 
Kuch Benefit 13 167 180 P Z .01 
Total 478 662 1140 
(b) Extent of increase 
in family income 
NIL 68 2 70 217.88 
25% or below 197 16 213 df •» 5 
26% to 505i 119 124 443 P Z .01 
5\% to 75^ 51 139 190 
15% to 100^ 35 245 280 Above \00% 8 138 144 
Total 478 662 1140 
(c) Proportion of 
asset Incroase 
attributed to 
derelopment 
programmes. 
iriL 
25% or below 
265^  to 50$^  
to 15% 
to lOOjt 
47 
116 
55 
30 
9 
Total 237 
(d) Total No.of 237 respondents who 
perceived increase 
in assets. 
Total No. of 
Respondents who did 
not perceive increase 
in Assets. 
241 
12 
35 
80 
392 
137 
655 
655 
59 
151 
115 
412 
146 
X s 170.19 
df = 4 
i .01 
892 
892 
248 
such an inegalitarian distribution of development 
benefits was further substantiated by an examination of 
the concentration of such benefits. Our data indicated 
that higher castes constituting nearly 58 per cent of the 
total hour?eholds shared over 90 perVcent of each benefit 
leaving behind only a negligible portion to be shared by 
the lower caste households. 
Our focus has so far been on the observed variation 
among caste groups with respect to the development benefits. 
We have, therefore, attempt to study whether caste groups, 
differ also in respect of their perception of (a) extent of 
benefits received (b) extent of increase in their family 
income, and (c) proportion of asset-increase attributed to 
the development proqrnmme?;. 
The data presented in Table 7.13 indicated that 
a greater proportion of higher caste than of lov/er caste 
respondents perceived 'much benefit' from the development 
programmes. Among t h o s e who p e r c e i v e d ' l e a s t b e n e f i t * 
lower caste respondents figured in greater proportion. 
A g a i n , among t h e r e s p o n d e n t s p e r c e i v i n g g r e a t e r income-
f 
incre?<se, t h e h i g h e r c a s t e r e sponden t s r e p r e s e n t e d more than 
t h o s e o f l ower c a s t e s . 
Likewise, almost all the higher c^ isto rcrspondents rep-
orted increase in their assets, while nearly 50 per cent of 
the lower castes respondents reported s o . Among t h o s e who 
/." 
reported asset-increase, the higher caste respondents, attr-
ibuted greater portion of the asset-increase to the development 
pronraimips than did lower caste respondents. The association 
in each case was found statistically significant as indicated 
I 
by the Chi-square results. 
While as'ked as to which caste group benefited most from 
the development programmes, both the respondents and the extension 
agents, in overwhelming proportion (72 per cent and 87 per cent 
respectively) perceived:-; higher castes as the most benefit^ ljBidl 
group. The study of perception, thus, confirms to the 
observed association between caste and the development benefits. 
To sum up our data have consistently supported the 
argument that inegualities in the development benefits and 
caste stratification are ossociated. Tho people of higher 
castes received greater development benefits, adopted more 
number of improved technological practices, obtained greater 
amount of material assistance, reported greater benefits from 
social amenities and witnessed greater increase in their 
assets. This proves our hypothesis No, 3 (1) 
DISCUS*?TON I 
It is pertinent here to askt why people enjoyinq 
different positions in hierarchy tend to rf-celve benefits 
rti f 1 V ? Whnt r1 r fumnt nnoon noulH 1 on'l t o mioh n 
consequence o f t h e development proqrr-immor. 7 . 
/ .I ^  I . • 
It is well known that casts system in India supported 
gross inequality and rigidity in social and economic relations. 
Caste tends to be in correspondence with local distribution of 
I 
power and wealth. It has served to strengthen the exclusi-
veness of caste groups. Logically, caste was also found to 
be in correspondence with the distribution of the development 
benefits. 
This partly explains as toVwhy planned development 
efforts, even with the intent of reducing poverty and inequa-
lity could not alter the relative economic position of different 
c a s t e groups. This simply suggests that the development plans 
were distorted at the level of local implementation by what 
Myrdal calls a rigid inegalitarian social stratification. 
As traditional strticture of relntions lays its stress on the 
preservation of status quo, it does not give way to the 
radical changes in the established attitudes and institutions. 
This is evident from the fact that the higher caste people 
enjoy supremacy in the emerging economic structure, hold 
dominant positions in the democratic institutions and exercise 
relatively greater influence on the functioning of the 
extension agents. Caste system still performs a discriminatory 
role in the emerging economy. In fact, the problem of diff-
orontlnl -^ Unfr Ihut-Ion oT < lio (lovi=l • >i niimiL l»«=inr;l'iLa la aii 
outcoiiT! of the intprnctl,on botwocii two inoln forccs, namely, 
n' cncttiro of the fTevelopinent procjrfiimie.'j anil existing inequa-
lities among caste groups in respect of their ability to 
0/" O 
k '1 » 
seek and absorb the development benefits. 
It is well known that the bulk of development progranmes 
concentrate on the improvement of acriculture. It has consumed 
roost of the time of the extension agents and substantial port-
I 
ion of the development funds. Undoubtedly, such programmes 
were meant for landowning section. Since most of the village 
land is owned by the people of hiaher castes relatively 
greater emphasis on agricultural development in terms of 
heavy investment of man and material served the interests of 
S 
this section more. Lower castes consisting mainly of landless 
labourers and artisans were benefitted l e a s t from such 
proarammes. 
The extension agents, while extendino material assis-
tance and technical help, confined their contacts no re or less 
to the people of higher castes. This is not surprising for 
more reasons than one. Firstly, since most ©f them had 
higher caste back-ground, their sympathy lies with the 
people of their own caste status. Secondly as hospitality 
is generally offered by the people of higher castes during 
their visits to the village, extension agents tend to reci-
procate by giving their clients preferential t r e a tment in 
the distribution of the development gains. Thirdly, the 
pressure of showing results requires extension agents to work 
through such sections which may help them in achieving their 
targets quickly. The higher caste people can help in this 
f 
task as they have necessary capital, resources and power. 
0 
Institutions lilce panchayats and cooperatives 
democratic demand that the members of the community are 
treated as equals; that members are guided by the ideas of 
efficacy and that they should have the community's interests 
as their goal. These demands are, Beteille says, new to our 
traditional social strufcture and inconsistent with the hier-
archical nature of village society in which different caste 
groups are arranged in a scale of superordination and subor-
dination. The official' recognition and transfer of power 
and responsibility to plan and execute development funds to 
these newly formed democratic institutions have made them what 
Dube calls " an instrument to rework the pov;er alignment". 
The castes which enjoyed supremacy in the past have come to 
occupy positions of leadership in these institutions. This 
change has further strengthened their socio-politico-economic 
position. 
The control of these institutions by hinher castes, 
has direct relevance to the problem of uneven distribution 
of the development benefits. These institutions are supposed 
to serve the interests of the comiiunity as a whole, particu-
larly those of the weaker sections. In practice, however 
there exists a large area of discretion as to the individuals 
and groups who may be assisted. Under such a situation, a 
( 
large portion of development funds may pass to persons and 
groups who are already better off. Moreover, hierarchy and 
? 1 
e x p l o t a t l o n e re so deep r o o t e d i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t they 
do not f e e l g u i l t y o f c o r n e r i n g the c 'evelopment b e n e f i t s i n 
t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . I t appea r s d i f f i c u l t t o r e v e r s e such 
a t r end p a r t i c u l a r l y in a s i t u a t i o n where p a n c h a y a t s and 
c o o p e r a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s a re j^oor ly r e p r e s e n t e d by the r o o r l o w e r 
c a s t e rriembers. 
Even i f the deve lopment •'rograivnics^ i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t n i c -
t u r e and e x t e n s i o n agents become n e u t r a l t o c a s t e , the p e o p l e 
o f l o w e r c a s t e may not p r o b a b l y be a b l e to use and a b s o r b the 
deve l opment b e n e f i t s . The f a c t o r s v;hich g e n e r a l l y de te rmine 
o n e ' s a b i l i t y to u s e the e x i s t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f f e r e d by the 
deve l opment programmes a r e l a n d , o c c u p a t i o n and income. Among 
t h e s e , l and i s the m.ost :Lmportant f a c t o r . Those who do not own 
l a n d are h a r d l y a b l e t o b e n e f i t f rom the c 'evelopment prograrijties 
due to g r e - i t e r emphocis on a g r i c u l t u r o l '"'GvelopiTcnt p a r t i c u l a r l y 
where thera i s a v i r t u a l absence oy;" o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n n o n - a g r i c u l -
t u r a l s e c t o r . Even i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , the p e o p l e o f 
l o w e r c a s t e s do n o t Cind thomfjelvo." in n p o s i t i o n to d e r i v e rruch 
b e n e f i t s s i n c e they own on l y a sma l l p o r t i o n o f the a v a i l a b l e 
l a n d . T h e i r r e s o u r c e b a s e b e i n g cxLrenic ly pot.>r, they are no t 
i n a p o s i t i o n to ta'ke r i s k tha t e n t a i l s the u s e o f i n n o v a t i o n s . 
They cannot a f f o r d to p u r c h a s e nev/ i u ' ^ i t s end f a i l to u t i l i z e 
c r e d i t f a c i l i t i e s . Th i s a l s o d e p r i v e s new i n p u t s and f a i l t o 
u t i l i 7 . o c r e d i t f a c i l i t i o G . T h i s a lno - i o p r i v e s t h e lo\^?or c o s t e 
p e o p l e f rom t a k i n g advantage o f new i n n o v a t i o n s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , 
t h e economic gap w i d e n s . A l l thi '^ showR Hiat c a s t e d i s t i n c t i o n s 
seem to have s t r u c t u r e d not o n l y the a b i l i t i e s o f the p e o p l e to 
a c h i e v e t h e i r g o a l s b u t a l s o the f u n c t i o n i n g o f p a n c h a y a t i r a j 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , c o - o p e r a t i v e s and the change a g e n t s . T h i s e x p l a i n s 
how p l anned deve lopment e f f o r t s a r e i n h i b i t e d and d i s t o r t e d a t 
t h e l e v e l o i l o c a l imp lementa t ion l.^ v Ulic r i g i d i n c q a l i t a r i a n 
s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . Our s tudy s'"ems to c o n f i r m t h a t forms rray 
change b u t f u n d a m e n t a l l y c a s t e r rnudns the sar.ie. Though, c e r t e 
f 
i s weakening i n c e r t a i n r e s p c:t'j, i t i s O' r f o r m i n g d i n c r i i r i n n t i n n 
r o l e i n o t h e r a s p e c t s o f the emerning economy. 
0 ft r 
L L b 
(0 
n 
m 
2 to 
W a: 
0 
1 
I Ht 
OS ^ 
H 
O 
O 
2 
m 
CO 
ID 
rH 
O 
« 
•P 
0 
•p CD q> 
X 
g . 
g ' S 
.H IM 
0) <D 
> C 
0) Q) p to 
o 
<M NO 
o 
vO 
r-
o* 
in 
fO 
I/) 
in 
n 
00 
o 
CO 
<D 
8 
3 
in 
in 
in 
r-
u-
iH 00 
N w 
CM 
CM 
r-
r-r-
ok 
0^ ' 
ro o\ 
O • 00 • o NO CM 
fO N n n yo T4 
00 00 CM 
• Tl CM VO • r-1 iH in m 
€ 
O 
CM in 
CM 
00 
CM 
A) 
O 
o 
cu 
CO 
iw 
•O 
\o CM • 
\o 
00 
N 
k 'i -
SECTION II * CLASS AND DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS 
In this section, we shall mainly focus our attention 
on the question whether,class also effects the distribution 
of the development benefits. 
Most of the development benefits have been reaped by 
the people who had large landholdings," greater assets, and 
better economic positioVi. Accordingly, the benefits accruing 
to a person from the development programmes tend to be in 
accordance with the position he or his group enjoys in the 
class hierarchy, it was, therefore, hypothesized that deve-
lopment benefits tend to be positively associated with class 
hierarchy. V 
DISTRIBITTION OF BENEFITS AMONG CLASSES t 
Tor testing the above hypothesis, several measures of 
development benefits were taken into account and the relation-
ship of class with each such measure was examined. Tables from 
7.14 to 7.20 indicate the distribution of the development 
benefits among different classes. 
Data in Table 7.14 reveal the association between 
class and overall development benefits. We have already noted 
that, of the 1140 respondents, 520 (45.5%) figured in high 
benefit category and the rest in low benefit category. 
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On examin ing t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f such r e s p o n d e n t s 
a l o n q c l a s s l i n e s , we f i n d t h a t a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e 
h i g h e r c l a s s than o f t h e ' l o w e r c l a s s r e sponden t s f i g u r e d in 
h i g h development b e n e f i t c a t e g o r y . The Ganma v a l u e o f . 8 
i n d i c a t e d a v e r y h i g h agreement be tween c l a s s and the d e v e -
lopment b e n e f i t s . The Ch i - s q u a r e t e s t showed h i g h l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n be tween t h e two v a r i a b l e s . O b v i o u s l y , 
the p e o p l e o f h i g h e r c l a s s b e n e f i t t e d more i n terms o f b o t h , 
improvement i n t e c h n o l o g y and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e . I t r e v e a l s 
t h a t c l a s s s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and i n e q u a l i t i e s in t h e deve lopment 
g a i n s a r e c o r r e l a t e d . ' 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between c l a s s and t h e deve lopment 
b ene^ ' i t s w^s , t h u s , in the h y p o t h e s i z e d d i r e c t i o n . N o t a b l y , 
I 
above f i n d i n g r e l a t e s t o t h e compos i te measure o f t h e d e v e -
lopment b e n e f i t s . Hence , t h e a s s o c i a t i o n o f c l a s s w i t h each 
o f t h e p r i m a r y con^onents o f deve lopment b e n e f i t s was examined . 
On account o f t h e i r b e t t e r economic p o s i t i o n , t h e p e o p l e 
o f h i g h e r c l a s s we r e a b l e t o adopt new i n n o v a t i o n s and t h e r e b y 
b e n e f i t e d more improvements i n the e x i s t i n g t e c h n o l o g y on 
account o f t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y poo r economic p o s i t i o n , ( T a b l e 7 , 16 ) 
The r e s u l t s o f a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e showed t h a t t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e s between c l a s s e s w i t h r e s p e c t to m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e 
r e c e i v e d from t h e deve lopment pronrammes we re h i g h l y 
s i a n i f i c a n t , ( T a b l e 7 .16 ) 
I t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n o f m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e 
and ador-tton o f improved t e c h n o l o g y would h e l p in incro^ is ing 
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TABLE . 7«18 
DISTRIBOTTON OF RESPONDENTS BY CLASS ARE REPORTED 
BENEFITS FROM SOCIAL AMENITIES 
BENEFIT CLASS 
BPL APL TOTAL 
LOW 576 132 708 
( 8 9 . 2 6 ) ( 2 5 . 8 6 ) ( 6 1 . 8 1 ) 
H i g h 64 360 432 
( 1 0 . 7 4 ) ( 7 4 . 1 4 ) ( 3 8 . 1 9 ) 
T o t a l 640 500 1140 
y} - 206.72 d f » 1 .01 
9 'a 4' J ,» 
income and t h e r e b y a s s e t s . P r e sumab ly , the p e o p l e o f 
h i g h e r c l a s s shou ld e x p e r i e n c e g r e a t e r i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r 
a s s e t s than those o f the lov/er c l a s s . ( T a b l e - 7 ,17 ) 
( 
I t i s e v i d e n t f rom Columtas 3 and 5 t h a t the mean 
a s s e t s o f each c l a s s i n c r e a s e d <furing the r e f e r e n c e p e r i o d , 
b u t the v a r i a t i o n between c l a s s e s i n t h i s r e s p e c t was much 
g r e a t e r i n 1978-79 than i n 1983-84 . I t may a l s o be no t ed 
i n columns 4 and 6 t h a t the p r o p o r t i o n a t e s h a r e o f each 
c l a s s r e l a t i v e to the o t h e r i n the t o t a l a s s e t s remained 
more o r l e s s u n a l t e r e d ^ though t h e r e was an a p p r e c i a b l e 
i n c r e a s e i n the a b s o l u t e a s s e t s d u r i n g the refer<~nce p e r i o d . 
T h i s shows t h a t such an i n c r e a s e was sharccj by each c l a s s 
i n p r o p o r t i o n to i t s r e l a t i v e a s s e t p o s i t i o n t h a t e x i s t e d 
i n (he y o o r 1978-79 . 
f 
In the e a r l y s t a g e s o f deve lopment , p r o v i s i o n of 
s o c i a l a m e n i t i e s i n t h e v i l l a g e r e c e i v e d a cons ideraJ^le 
e m p h a s i s . From such a m e n i t i e s , the p e o p l e o f the h i g h e r 
I 
c l a s s than o f the l o w e r c l a s s r e p o r t e d g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s as 
i s e v i d e n t f rom d a t a p r e s e n t e d i n T a b l e 7 . 1 8 . The C h i - s q u a r e 
v a l u e i n d i c a t e d s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i f i n i f i c n n t ar i r -oc i r t ion bctv/een 
c l a s s and b e n e f i t s f rom s o c i a l a m e n i t i e s . 
TABLE 7.19 
CLASS AND THEIR MEAN SCORES OF DIFFERENT BENEFIT MEASURES 
(N = 640 ) 
V i l l a g e s B e n e f i t Measu re s 
H i g h e r Lov.'er A l l 
GPOUP "A " 
1 . BERTHAL (K ) 
i 
1 . c o m p o s i t e D e v e l -
opment b e n e f i t s . 
4 7 . 4 3 
( 100 ) 
21.50 
( 47 .32 ) 
32.77 
(60 .09 ) 
N = 340 
2 . M a t e r i a l 
A s s i s t e n c e . , -
3 . A d o p t i o n o f 
improved 
T e c h n o l o g y . 
1 3 . 8 4 
(100 ) 
6 6 . 1 5 
(100 ) 
231 
( 16 .69 ) 
35.59 
( 53 .73 ) 
7 .389 
(52 .72 ) 
49.02 
(69 .48 ) 
4 , A s s e t 
I n c r e a s e . 
7 3 .47 
(100 ) 
7 .96 
( 10 .79 ) 
36.39 
( 49 .34 ) 
5 . B e n e f i t f rom 
s o c i a l 
A m c n i t l o o . 
7 8 . 8 7 
(100) 
33.12 
( 41 .99 ) 
53.25 
( 67 .51 ) 
2 . ADAUN (A ) 1. Compos i te D e v e -
lopment b e n e f i t s 
45.75 
• (100) 
20.85 
( 45 .57 ) 
34.13 
(7,4.60) 
2 . M a t e r i a l , 
A s s i s t a n c e . 
13.03 
(100) 
2 ,2? 
(17 .03 ) 
7 .98 
( 61 .24 ) 
N = 300 3 . A d o p t i o n o f 
Improved 
T e c h n o l o g y , 
% 
67 .72 
(100) 
36.44 
(58 .80 ) 
53.12 
(78 .44 ) 
4 . A s s e t 
I n c r e a s e . 
72 .44 
(100) 
7 .07 
( 9 . 71 ) 
( 42 .06 
( 57 .82 ) 
5 . B e n e f i t s f r om 
s o c i a l 
A m e n i t i e s 
7 7 . x / 
(10 0)- ( 45.77) 
'-iti.Ol 
( 74 .59 ) 
( F i g u r e s in P a r e n t h e s e s a r e Index Numbers ) 
TABLE 7.20 
CLASS AND THEIR MEAN SCORES OF DIFFERENT BENEFIT MEASURES 
(N = 500 ) 
255 
V i l l a g e B e n e f i t Measu re s 
H i g h e r Lower A l l 
GROUP " B " 
1. IMLANI ( A ) ' 1 .Compos i t e D e v e l -
opment b e n e f i t s . 
46 .50 
(100 ) 
21.94 
( 47 .18 ) 
32.57 
(70 .04 ) 
i: = 164 2 . M a t e r i a l 
A s s i s t a n c e . 
13 .808 
(100 ) 
2.340 
( 16 .04 ) 
7 .305 
(312) 
3 . A d o p t i o n o f 
Improved 
T e c h n o l o g y . 
6 4 . 2 3 
(100 ) 
36.70 
( 57 .13 ) 
48.6 3 
(75 .71 ) 
4 . A s s e t 
I n c r e a s e . 
7 0 . 6 5 
(100) 
8 .30 
(11 .74 ) 
35.29 
(49 .95 ) 
5 . B e n e f i t s f rom 
s o c i a l 
A m e n i t i e s . 
7 5 . 1 2 
(100) 
34.87 
( 46 .01 ) 
52.30 
( 69 .62 ) 
2 . S IKRI (K) 1 • compos i t e D e v e l -
opment b e n e f i t s . 
4 7 . 8 8 
( I C Q ) 
. ' ^ 3 . 4 9 
( 4 9 . 0 6 ) 
3 3 . 9 4 
( 7 0 . 8 6 ) 
N = 336 2 . M a t e r i a l 
A s s i s t a n c e . 
1 4 . 7 8 
( 1 0 0 ) 
2 . 9 2 
( 1 9 . 7 5 ) 
8 . 0 0 
( 5 4 . 1 2 ) 
1 
3 . A d o p t i o n o f 
Improved 
T e c h n o l o g y . 
6 6 . 6 0 
( 1 0 0 ) 
3 7 . 7 2 
( 5 5 . 7 3 ) 
5 0 . C 9 
( 7 5 . 2 1 ) 
4 . A s s e t 
I n c r e a s e . ' 
7 2 . 5 5 
( 1 0 0 ) 
1 0 . 3 1 
( 1 4 . 2 1 ) 
3 6 . 9 8 
( 5 0 . 9 7 ) 
5 . B e n e f i t s f r om 
s o c i a l 
A m e n i t i e s 
7 6 . 7 5 
( 1 0 0 ) 
\ 
3 0 . 7 5 
( - 1 7 . 8 0 
5 7 . 0 * ^ 
( 6 7 . 8 6 ) 
( F i q u r o s i n Pnccn these s a r e Index Numbci::;) 
By niciking a com--orot ivo s tudy o i the two (ironi'r: ol vJ. l ' l .nu' 
"C 'c\:t. •'•c l o c l a s s e d i n g roup ' B ' v i l l a n e s have 
d e r i v e d a g r e a t e r amount o f dev2?u( prrent b e n e f i t s than in 
c roup ' A ' v i l l a g e s . 
o r 
b 0 
J u s t as the c a s e o f t h e h i g h e r c a s t e s , the p e o p l e 
o f h i g h e r c l a s s were found d e r i v i n g g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s f rom 
t h e s o c i a l a m e n i t i e s c r e a t e d b y t h e government a t a c o n s i -
d e r a b l e c o s t , which i n c l u d e d , f o r example , v e t e r i n a r y h o s p i -
t a l , v i l l a g e s c h o o l s , s t r e e t pavement, e l e c t r i c i t y , s t r e e t 
l i g h t s , e t c . 
7rom t h e above f i n d i n g s , i t may be I n f e r r e d t h a t t h e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e deve lopment b e n e f i t s among c l a s s e s was 
not a t a l l e g a l i t a r i a n . The c l a s s d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h r e g a r d t o 
t 
V a r i o u s development b e n e f i t s become more e v i d e n t when c l a s s e s 
we r e compared in terms o f t h e i r mean b e n e f i t s c o r e s . As can 
b e seen f rom T a b l e 7 . 1 9 and 7 . 2 0 , t h e mean b e n e f i t s c o r e s o f 
t 
t h e h i g h e r c l a s s r e spondent s were c o n s i s t e n t l y h i r h e r than 
t h o s e o f t h e l owe r c l a s n . 
The itrpact o f c l a s s s t r u c t u r e oti t he p a t t e r n o f 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f g a i n s i s v i s i b l e f rom T a b l e s 7 . 1 9 & 7 . 2 0 
i n g roup 'A* & 'B* v i l l a g e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n g roup ' B ' 
v i l l a g e s , t h e s h a r e o f l ower c l a s s e s i s more t h a n in 
v i l l a g e ' A * . I t i s b e c a u s e the J a t s and Thakurs in t h e 
v i l l a g e s o f BERTHAL & ADAUN dominate the c l a s s s t r u c t u r e . 
The c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f economic power in t h e i s hand l e a d s t o 
l e s s e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n . o f t h e p o o r . Thus l e a d i n g t o t h e i r 
economic d ^ ) x i v a t i o n .
TABLE - 7 . 2 1 
J 
PERCEPTION OP DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS BY C L A S S 
1978-79 - 1983-84 (» = 1140) 
P e r c e p t i o n of , CLASSES 
tower Higher'' TOTAL test 
( a ) Extent of 
Benef its 
received : 
Ho benef i t 
L i t t l e 
Benefit 
Much 
Benef i t 
568 
248 
24 
32 
312 
156 
400 
560 
180 
X^ q « 201.59 
df » 2 
P Z 
Total 640 500 1140 
( b ) Extent of i nc -
rease in family 
inc on-e 
NIL 68 
1 
0 68 
25^ or belov 208 8 216 x^ « 193.51 
263^  to 505^  176 64 240 df = 5 
51^ to 92 100 192 P Z .01 
76^ to 100^ 76 204 280 
Above 1009^  20 124 144 
Total : 640 500 1140 
( c ) Proportion of 
asset increase 
attr ibuted to 
development 
programmes. 
m 56 
'^ ^jt or b»low 136 
26J6 to 505< 52 
51 Jt to 15% 120 
76^ to 100^ 40 
0 
12 
60 
300 
116 
56 
148 
112 
420 
156 
x^ . 127.09 
df « 4 
p = Z 
Total 404 468 892 
(d )Tota l Ho.of 404 
respondents who 
perceived increase 
in assets . 
Total No.of 
Respondents who did 
not perceive increase 
in Assets . 
488 
12 
892 
248 
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The higher class constitutinq nearly 43 per cent of 
the total households, shared various ben efits ranging from 
73 per cent to 87 per cent and therdiy deprived the other 
class of its due share. Consequently, a snail portion of 
the total benefits was thinly distributed aT.ong the lower 
class respondents consisting of 57^ of total population. 
ks can be seen frooj Table 7.21 a g r e a t e r proportion 
of the higher class respondents thun those of the l ower 
class perceived "^uch benefits'* from the devalopT.ent 
programines. Likewise, the higher c l a s s respondents [loroeived 
greater increase in their family income as co^npared to those 
I 
o f the lovcer c l a s s . A g a i n , a l l the h i ghe r c l a s s r e sponden t s 
r e p o r t e d incre^ise in their a-^octs w h i l o coccoupon.ling porco-
n t a g e o f the l ower c l a s s Respondents was o n l y 248. Among 
the r e s p o n d e n t s the h i ghe r c l a s s r e s p o n d e n t s a t t r i b u t e d 
g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n o f such i n c r e a s ^ to the development p r o g -
rammes than those o f the l owe r c l a s s . The r e s u l t s o f c h i -
s qua re t e s t i n d i c a t e d that the a s s o c i a t i o n in each c a s e 
was s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . T h i s shows d i - f e r e n t i a l 
p e r c e p t i o n of c l a s s e s w i th r e s p e c t to the dovolopr.en t b e n e f i t s 
r e c e i v e d by them. 
The above discussion leads uo to the conclusion that the 
position of the povjer wi elders in the present socio-economic 
political circumstances is self-perpetuating. The power and 
authority, control cover fu^ds, officials reco«yiition and 
linkages with the official change agents and party leaders 
have all served to further consolidate and strenothen the 
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a l r e a d y p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n o f t h e upper s t r a tum i n t h e r u r a l 
I 
s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . As such, t h e p o l i c y o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a -
t i o n in development has s imp ly amounted t o l o d g e t h e v i l l a g e 
deve lopment i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o t h e hands o f p r i v i l e g e d s e c t i o n s 
who tend t o use t h e s e as fi new d e v i c e f o r r e i n f o r c i n g t h e i r 
p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n . 
I n r e s p o n s e t o a q u e s t i o n as t o which g roup they f e e l 
b e n e f i t e d most , the h i g h e r c l a s s was named by an ove rwhe lming 
p r o p o r t i o n o f b o t h , t h e r e spondent s and t h e e x t e n s i o n a g e n t s . 
T h u s , t h e s tudy o f p e r c e p t i o n o f deve lopment b e n e f i t s has 
f u r t h e r suppo r t ed t h e o b s e r v e d a s s o c i a t i o n be tween c l a s s and 
t h e deve lopment b e n e f i t s . Thus our h^^pothesis N o . 3 ( i i ) i s 
conf irrr:ecl. 
DISCUSSION : 
« 
The f a c t o f p o s i t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n between 
c l a s s s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and i n e q u a l i t i e s in t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
t 
the development b e n e f i t s has ones a g a i n r e f u t e d the n o t i o n o f 
p e r c o l a t i o n o f deve lopment b e n e f i t s t o the l ower c l a s s c o n s i s -
S 
t i n g m a i n l y o f r u r a l l a b o u r h o u s e h o l d s end s m a l l f a r m e r s . The 
m i s s i v e deve lopment e f f o r t s , have f a i l e d t o r educe the economic 
d i s p a r i t i e s among the d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s . What p o s s i b l e e x p l a -
n a t i o n CPin be g i v e n f o r such a consoanence ? t e s p e c i a l l y when 
t h e emphasis in our p l a nne d deve lopment was p l a c e d on " the 
common man, t h e weaker s e c t i o n s and the l e s s p r i v i l l e g e d " . 
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It is generally asserted that the wealth not only t 
perpetuates itself but monopolises other Tieans to incre.^se 
the wealth It means that the economic 
gains that one can achieve from the opportunities offered by 
the development programmes depend upon his economic position 
which, in turn, is based on such factors as income, land-
ownership, occupation, asset position, etc. Since class 
hierarchy reflects inequalities in respect of these factors, 
the people of different classes differ in their abilities to 
secure benefits from the development programmes. 
Hence, the gain secured from such programr.es have gone 
more to the landed class rather than to the landless labourers 
and artisans. The increased investment in agricultural develop-
ment in each sU)sequent plan, therefore, amounted to favour 
the land-owning higher class. 
Vie have earlier noted that the distribution of available 
land was skewed and nearly two-third of the total respondents 
owned either no land or little 1 an c^ -up to acres. Under such 
a situation, technological, financial and other support provided 
for increasing farm production has benefitted the people in 
proportion to their landholding rather than in proportion to the 
labour inputs. 
The l o g i c b e h i n d such a consequence a p p e a r s to b e s i m p l e . 
The uso of new farm techno lony foe ohorp i o T o o i n tho f i rm 
L'O 1 
yield requires relatively higher investment on inputs and 
secured irrigation. On account of their better capital 
resources and assured irrigational facilities, large farmers 
were in a better position to benefit from nevM farm technology. 
I 
It is often argued that new farm technology is neutral to 
farm size, but the constraints of small size can be overcome 
only when managerial, technologic'al and r e source bo ttl en ec ks 
are removed. It is noted that small farmers v.etG gsnerally 
economically handicapped voith a deficit family budget, 
thereby, leaving hardly anything for investment for maximum 
farm yield. The bulk of such farmers were, therefore, 
incapable of obtaining much benefits from the new technology. 
Considering the financial limitations from which small 
farmers and tenants suffer, some relaxations were introduced. 
Credit system was made production-oriented; and loan ceiling 
was increased. By this, it was expected that every farmer 
or tenant will be able to use modern inputs and benefit from 
new farm technology. But the credit v\orthine5S of the poor 
farmer .depends upon his borrowing power or repaying capacity, 
which in turn are determined by the land he ov.ns or the land 
he cultivates or the crop he produces. This step again 
tended to favour laroe, farmer rather than the smaller one t 
since the letter operates only a small area of land and 
produces mainly for consumption rather than for market. 
ZQ?. 
On accotht of the same reason, the lonq-term crodit facili-
ties involving massive outlays for iteois such as tractors, 
I 
tubewells, pumping sets, etc. have also benefited the laroe 
farmers more as these could be absorbed only on the large 
holdings. 
The expectation, that cooperatives and panchayats with 
democratic constitutions may helpy^the poor and the weaker 
sections, did not come true. It was noted that the leadership 
and the management of these institutions were primarily in 
the hands of a socially and economically poverfull section. 
The discretionary power put at its disposal with regard to the 
distribution of the development funds is often used to stre-
ngthen its ov\r» position. The cooperative leadership, at times, 
denies membership to lower class people. Forced by the 
economic circumstances and lack of resources, the holding 
too small to support ^ family is, therefore, leased out by 
some of the small farmers. 
Besides above, elaborate arrangements for research, 
extension, marketing, price support, storage etc. were also 
made to'support new farm technology. Amongst the present 
agrarian classes of large landov\ners having adequate capital 
resources to use modern inputs are generally able to make 
effective use of the research results and extension services. 
Since, they often produce marketable surplus, the benefits of 
marketing and storage facilities and price support v.'?re 
2G3 
generally reaped by these people. Likewise, stress on mecha-
nisation and labour saving devices have practically benefitt^ed 
the large land owners most. 
The functioning of extension agents, like development 
institutions also seems to be weighted in favour of higher class 
people for more than one reason: (i) the targets assigned to 
the extension agents can also be met more effectively and without 
much difficulty by working with large farmers who have the req-
uisite resources and capacity to absorb the new innovations: 
(ii) the terms and conditions of receiving benefits are such 
that generally resourceful persons are able to fulfill : and 
(iii) the extension agents tend to be sympathetic towards the 
higher c l a s s respondents only bocause the l a t tor provide a l l 
physical comforts besides helping them in meeting their targets. 
"" \ The entire discussion boite dov\n to the conclusion that 
existingNinequalities among classes combined with the nature 
of the rural development programmes seem to have resulted in 
the differential distribution of the development benefits along 
class lines. "This tendency according to Myrdal" is a natural, 
indeed a necessary, consequence of applying uplift policies in 
an inegalitarian society without prior or simultaneous efforts 
to break-down the existing institutional \iartierr. to greater 
equality.« 
2Gt 
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POV,'E\ AND DEVELOPMS^T 3£1^=FIT3 
I t i s r e c o g n i s e d tha t the p e o p l e who w i e l d power 
tend to use i t i n o r d e r to f u r t h e r t h e i r own soc io -Hconomic 
p o l i t i c a l g a i n . T h i s i s more so when the d i s c r e t i o n to 
d i s t r i b u t e and use c e r t a i n b e n e f i t s l i e s w i th them. As a 
r e s u l t , t e c h n i c a l and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t e n c e o f f e r e d by the 
deve lopment programmes i s l i k e l y to b e a v a i l e d o f more b y 
power w i e l d e r s than by o t h e r s . 
Some s t u d i e s have shown that ma jo r m a t e r i a l advan -
t a g e s of the deve lopment programT.es were r e a p e d by the l o c a l 
i n f l u e n t i a l s and a f f l u e n t i n d i v i d u a l s and the p e o p l e w i th 
l i t t l e or no say in the deve lopment i n s t i t u t i o n s , l i k e p a n c -
h a y a t s and c o o p e r a t i v e s , have a lmos t been i g n o r e d . 
BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION A M C M G F O W ' E H GROUPS : 
The d a t a i n T a b l e s 7.22 t o 7 . 2 9 r e v e a l the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
1 
o f d i f f e r e n t deve lopment b e n e f i t s among povMsr g r o u p s . 
T a b l e 7.22 r e v e a l s the a s s o c i a t i o n between pov^er 
and the deve lopment b e n e f i t s . I t may b e no ted tha t a g r e a t e r 
p r o p o r t i o n o f the h i ghe r power g r oups than o f the l o v e r po\\er 
g r o u p s f i g u r e d in h igh b e n e f i t c a t e g o r y . The r e s u l t s of qamma 
r e v e a l e d a very h igh agrf^o-n^nt betwoen pov.er and the d e v e l o p n o n t 
b e n e f i t s . The ch i - square^ t e s t i n d i c a t e d s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i c f i i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n ht^tweoo tho tv\o v a r j . a b l o o . T h i s shows 
I 
TABLE » 7 .23 
« 
DISTRIBXJTIONOP RESPONDENT BY POWER AND 
ADOPTION OF IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY 
^ f: k- »i 
/"n - 1140^7 
A d o p t i o n POWER GROUPS 
Lower Highest Total 
Low 568 
(65.24) 
60 
(22.64) 
628 
(55.29) 
H i g h 304 
(34.76) 
208 
(77.36) 
512 
(44.71) 
T o t a l 572 268 1140 
,2 65.25 d f « 1 P Z , . o i 
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that the technical and material assistance have flown more to 
the people holding power in formal institutions. 
« 
The above finding relates to the composite development 
benefits. It was, therefore, con^dered relevant to find out 
whether the power groups differ with respect to each of the 
primary components of the d ev el o i->m on t b(?nefitG also i.e. 
adoption of improved technology and material assistance. 
On examing Tables 7.22 and 7.23, one may note that 
our data further supported the above finding. Table 7,23 
shows that a much greater percentage of the higher power groups 
respondents than that of the lower power group was represented 
in high adoption category. The association betv\'Gen power and 
adoption of improved technology turned out to be statistically 
significant as indicated by the chi-square test. 
The above findings, thus, suggest that the people 
holding positions of authority in village institutions dire-
cted material and technical assistance, offered by the deve-
lopment programmes, to meet their own individual and factional 
in terests. 
I 
It is expected that the technological iT.provements 
combined with material assistance help people in increasing 
their income and thereby assets. »ie have earlier noted that 
there was a differential increase in assets. 
*••*<Likewise, the mean scores on material assistance for the 
higher power groups were svJbstantially hioher than those of 
the lower power groups (Table 7.24). The'result of the analysis 
of variance indicated highly sionificant differences among 
power groups with respect to material assistance. 
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TABLE - 7 .26 
DISTRIBUTION OP RESPONDENTS BY POWER AND 
( 
RKPOPTED BENEFITS FROM SOCIAL AMENITIES 
/"N » ii4q_7 
273 
Benefit POWER GROUP 
LOWER HIGHislR V, TOTAL 
Low 624 76 700 
(71.57) {29.A3) (61.81) 
High 244 196 440 
(28.23) (70.57) (38.19) 
Total 868 272 1140 
X^ • 67.87 df - 1 P ^ . 0 1 
i _ 
Table 7.25" shows that assets of each power group 
have increased during the reference period. However, the 
variation between power groups with regard to their assets 
was found to be much greater in 1983-84 than in 1978-79. 
It may also be noted frorfi columns 4 and 6 that the proper-
tionate share of the pov^ 'er groups in the total assets did 
not sho\>! any appreciable change th\>ugh the absolute assets 
increased by nearly 50 pe r cent; This in.-lic.itoG that the 
increase in assets was shared by the power groups roughly 
in proportion to their relative asset position in 1978-79. 
one may, however, note that the proportionate share of 
higher power groups showed an increase whereas that of lower 
power groups decreased slightly. 
According to Table 7.:Xi , thp^opls of hi^hsr power 
groups benefited more from social amenities. In this respect 
also, the higher power group reported greater benefits than 
the lov.ar povjsr group. The chi-square results shoved that 
the association was statistically s i gn i f i cant . 
Wost of the respondents of highor power group enjoyed f 
higher class and caste status also. The cattle wealth of 
such people was far greater than that of others and, therefore, 
they benefited more from veterinary hospitals. Proportionately, 
1 
thoy '•."O i. nr<'.it->r n<«nV><»r oT'V.hi'l !r.-ii to .r\i>'>l', .u> ! I\i.>y 
benefi-teJ from electricity mora as i t helpeJ their td^e i.'.ells 
and electrification of their houses. They vver e also located 
TABLE 7.27 
pa-.-ER AND THEIR MEAN SCORES OF DIFFERENT BENEFIT MEASURES 
(N = 640 ) 
r n 
V i l l a g e s B e n e f i t Measu re s 
, H i g h e r Lo\%'er A l l 
GROUP "A " 
1 . 3ERTHAL (K) 1 .Compos i t e D e v e l -
opment b e n e f i t s . 
5 4 , 7 0 
(100 ) 
25.82 
( 47 .20 ) 
32.57 
(59 .54 ) 
K = 340 
2 . M a t e r i a l 
A s s i s t e n c e . 
21 .80 
(100 ) 
\ 
63 .77 
2.863 
(13 .13 ) 
7 .305 
(23 .50 ) 
3 . A d o p t i o n o f 
improved 
T e c h n o l o g y . 
44 .01 48.6 3 
( 76 .25 ) 
4 . A s s e t 
I n c r e a s e . 
7 3 .48 
(100 ) 
23.65 
( 32 .18 ) 
35.29 
(48 .02 ) 
5 . B e n e f i t f rom 
s o c i a l 
A m e n i t i e s . 
70 .00 
(100 ) 
61 .93 52.30 
( 70 .83 ) 
2 . ADAUN (A ) 1. c ompos i t e D e v e -
lopment b e n e f i t s . 
56.75 
( 1 0 0 ) 
2 2 . 2 8 
( 3 9 . 2 5 ) 
3 1 . 0 1 
( 54 .64 ) 
N = 300 
2 . M a t e r i a l 
A s s i s t a n c e . 
23.50 
( 1 0 0 ) 
2.75 
( 11 .70 ) 
8 . 0 0 6 
( 3 4 . 0 4 ) 
3 . A d o p t i o n o f 
Improved 
T e c h n o l o g y . 
65 .75 
(100) 
4 0 . 2 2 
( 61 .71 ) 
46.68 
( 7 0 . 9 9 ) 
4 . A s s e t 
I n c r e a s e . 
7 7 . 8 8 
( 1 0 0 ) 
2 0 . 5 1 
( 2 6 . 3 3 ) 
3 5 . 0 4 
( 4 4 . 9 9 ) 
5 . B e n e f i t s f r o m 
s o c i a l 
A m e n i t i e s 
73.25 
( 1 0 0 ) 
5 6 . 2 5 
( 7 6 . 7 9 ) 
6 0 . 5 5 
( 8 2 . 6 6 ) 
( F i q u r o s in PnrcnthcGes a r e Index Number.-;) 
TABLE 7.20 
PAV-ER AND THEIR MEAN SCORES OP DIFFERENT BENEFIT MEASURES 
(N = 5 0 0 ) 
283 n o S 
V i l l a g e B e n e f i t Measures 
f H i g h e r Lower A l l 
GROUP "B " 
1. IJ-!LANI (A ) 
N = 164 
2. S IKRI (K) 
N = 336 
1 . compos i t e D e v e l - 5 5 , 7 9 25.30 
opment b e n e f i t s . (100) (45 .34 ) 
2 . M a t e r i a l 22.45 2 .11 
A s s i s t a n c e . (100) ( 9 .39 ) 
3 . A d o p t i o n o f 66 .32 42.24 
Improved (100) (63 .69 ) 
T e c h n o l o g y . 
4 . A s s e t 77.11^ ' 2 2.46 
I n c r e a s e . (100) (29 .12 ) 
5 . B e n e f i t s f rom 70 .00 42.98 
s o c i a l (100) ( 61 .4 ) 
A m e n i t i e s . 
1 . compos i t e D e v e l - 56.79 27.82 
opment b e n e f i t s . (100) (46 .98 ) 
2 . M a t e r i a l 24.25 3.02 
A s s i s t a n c e . ( i 5o ) (12 .45 ) 
3 .Adop t i on o f 65.27 40.40 
Improved ( l o o ) (61 .89 ) 
T e c h n o l o g y . 
4 . A s s e t 75 .21 24.22 
I n c r e a s e . ( loO) (32 .20 ) 
5 . B e n e f i t s f rom 73.45 40.22 
s o c i a l (100) (54 .75 ) 
Ameni t i es 
32.80 
(58 .79 ) 
7.47 
(34 .26 ) 
48.98 
(73 .85 ) 
36.19 
(46 .93 ) 
53.05 
(75 .78 ) 
40.23 
(70 .83 ) 
26.29 
(1.08) 
51.05 
(78 .21 ) 
46.07 
(61 .25 ) 
54.46 
(74 .14 ) 
( F i g u r e s i n P a r e n t h e s e s a re Index Numbers) 
An o b s e r v a t i o n o f Tab l e Mo. 7.27 & 7 .28 shows tha t i n group ' e ' 
v i l l a g e s lov/er power g roups have g o t a h i g h e r p e r c e n t a g e o f 
developrr,ent b e n e f i t s than in group ' A ' V I N ^ c s where p o l i t i c o -
e c o n o r i c power i s concentratcci in the hnnds of n^ r a l e l i t e s . 
9 ' 
S 
in the centres of the villages, and hence benefitted more 
from such aoienities as street paveTient, street linht etc. 
It can be seen from Tables 7.27 and 7.28 that the 
distribution of developmnn t benefit war, inogalitarian and 
mean benefit scores of the high power group were consistently 
higher than those of the I'ower power groupi 
The majority of both the respondents and the change 
agents indicated that higher power groups benefited most 
from the development programmes. 
The above findings, in generVl, suggest that the 
Power holders have been able to influence the flow of material 
benefits and technical assistance to serve their own interests. 
The fact of cor respondence between r;o' r-r hierarchy and the 
development benefits again substantiates the vievj that strati-
fication and inequalities in the development gains are correlated, 
B_EHEFITS P£I^SlVg:)_BY_POV.-&H fflOUPS : 
Having noted the observed variation, we nov\ turn to the 
study of perceived variation among power grouf)s '.%ith respect 
to the development benefits. The d i f f e r e n t i a l perception of 
pov«er groups was studied in terms of (a) extent of benefits 
received, (b) extent of increase in thoir faT.ily incoT.e and 
(c) proportion of asset-increase attributed to development 
proor ammes. 
1AM. 7.29 s 
PfiRCBPTlON' OF DEVELOPKEMT BEHliir'ITS BT POWER GROUPS 
1 9 7 8 - 7 9 - 1 9 8 3 - P 4 (I - 1140} 
Perception of 
benefits POWER GROUPS 
Lower Higher TOTAL 
(a) ^tene-of Benefits '^ceived t 
Ho benefit 384 14 398 Little Benefit 407 1S5 562 Much Benefit 81 99 180 
Total 872 268 1140 
(b) Extent of increase 
in fanily incosLS 
HIL 66 4 70 
or belov 206 7 213 to 213 30 243 
51J< to 75St 141 49 190 
75St to 100^ 171 109 280 
Above 75 69 144 
Total Q12 268 1140 
Statistical 
test 
(c) Proportion of 
asB«t incrsass 
attributed to 
dSTSlopcent 
programses. 
VIL 
or bslov 
26J< to 505i 
to 
to lOQjt _ 
54 
134 
82 
275 85 
Total 630 
(d) ToUl Ho.of 630 resposdents vho 
perceived increase 
in assets. 
Total Ho. of ^^^ 
Respondents who did 
not perceive increase 
in Assets, 
5 
16 
35 
262 
262 
59 
150 
117 
421 145 
892 
892 
248 
X > 82.1 SP df i 2 
P L 
X- 23.31 
df = 5 
p L 
X 
df 
P 
= 22.78 
» 4 i .01 
273 
Data in Table 7.29 reveal the association between 
power and perceived development benefits. It may be noted 
that a much greater proportion of the higher pov.er group 
respondents thart those of the lower power group perceived 
^uch benefit* from the development programmes. The lower 
power group respondents figured among those who perceived 
benefit*. Similarly, the higher power group tespondents 
perceived greater income-increase as a result of the develo-
I 
pment programmes. Again, a greater proportion of the higher 
power group than of the lower power group respondents repor-
ted increase in their assets. Among these respondents, the I 
higher power cpoup respondents attributed a greater propor-
tion of such an increase to the development ptogramines than 
did the lower power group respondents. These findings lend 
further support to the observed association between pov\er and 
the development benefits. This c o n f i r m s o u r hypotesis No.3(iii) 
PI XUSSIOM : 
In the light of the positive association between power 
hierarchy and inequalities in the development benefits, one 
would like to ask how and why the power wielders availed 
themselves of the advantages offered by the rlevelopxent prog-
rammes more than othrrn? 
One of the most probable explanations is that the 
democratic set up of the newly created institutional structure 
is incompatible with the ineqalitarian character of our rural 
0 - 7 n 
L s -
society. The nature of powet located in organisations and 
I 
institutions such as cooperatives and panchayats and the 
composition of people using such pov>er have great relevance 
to the understanding of the problem of uneven distribution 
of the development benefits. 
In the process of enlisting mass participation in the 
planning and implemention of the development plans, stress 
has been laid on the local self-determination. This has led 
to the emergence of self-governing democratic institutions 
like panchayats and cooperatives. These institutions v.'ere 
entrusted with power and responsibility of planning projects, 
raising and spending fund,s for the development activities. 
It was assumed that these institutions will show special 
consideration for the vulnerable sections of rural society. 
such an institutional structure was envisaged for a 
society which was highly stratified and which laid stress 
on preserving the established order of unequal relations. 
Consequently, the people of status and v.ealth managed to 
come to power in these institutions. They take all care 
to see that the programmes averse to their interests are 
not put into operation : nor they have any inhibitions about 
cornering the benefits since exploitation in the rural 
soc i e t y w i^s dyGp-rootod. a s weak'^r aortlun^; liuve l i t t l e 
or no voice in these institutions, their interaots were 
generally overlooked by the power wielclers. 
27'; 
B e s i d e s t h i s , m a t e r i a l and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e o f f e r e d 
by the e x t e n s i o n agents i s a l s o x:)OSGcd on to the power w i o l d r s 
s i n c e the e x t e n s i o n agents g e n e r a l l y w r k through therr. under 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n , i t i s i n c o n e e i v a b l e to th ink t h a t powe r -
w i e l d e r s w i l l be saver;^e to t h o i r own i n d i v i d u a l and f a c t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t s . 
I n v i e w o f the f a c t t h a t each s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r 
w a s s s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e l a t e d v;ith the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the d e v e l -
opment b e n e f i t s , r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e c x e r c i s s d by 
c . i r j U c - , t:lii. ' ;r; .-inrt power In r:rimViii i. 1 on v; i 1 h nny tv/o f nvoii r.">b lo 
f a c t o r s tend to e f f c c t the phenomenon more than they e-o i n d i v -
I 
i d u a l l y . By the same taken , the combinat ion o f th ree f a v o u f a -
b l o iao iu i . . * ; ' oot .c Iriori mI I I I mp I' i hil liu'iK'n on tl 1 ;il u l ln i -
t i o n o f the devlopment b e n e f i t s . Among two f a c t o r s e t s , the I 
combinat ion o f c l a s s and power e x e r c i s c d maximum i n f l u e n c e on 
the phonomonon. T h i s mny br rvJ^l^in^d by the f a c t t h a t v;hen 
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r s were cons i de r ed i n d i v i d u a l l y , c l a s s 
cind povvor liod atronqcst nr.r.ocinMon v/ilh i"ho rli';triliu tion of 
the deve lopment b e n e f i t s . 
Th i s S i g g e s t s t h a t the prob lem of d i f f e r e n t i a l d i s t r i -
b u t i o n o f the development b e n e f i t s become more acute when the 
f a c t o r s , which a r e c o n s i d e r e d s i q n i f i c a n t , e x r r c i s e t h e i r 
i n f l u e n c e t o g e t h e r . Hunter has ap t l y remarked: ' The e q u a l i t y 
o f o r sV'iiire o f c o n t r o l by smnl l iir>n i c v i r tu . -^ l ]y i m p o s s i b l e 
p a r t l y f rom g e n e r a l i gno rance and p o v e r t y , b u t a l s o because 
the b i q onos have so imny s t r i n o s to ^-heir bov/ o f domina t i on -
c a s t e , l andownersh ip , t h e i r p o s i t i o n ns c r rT l i t o r s and p o l i t i c a l 
b o s s e s , • , 
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Under these circumstancest it is not difficult to 
understand as to-how the development benefits channelled 
through newly formed ins^tutions were grabbed by the power 
i' 
wielders. Though the terms and conditions of governmant 
assistance for various schemes are prescribed which appear 
to favour underprivileged sections, yet they frequently 
leave.a large area of discretion as to individuals and groups 
to be assisted in the process of development. Consequently, 
a large proportion of such assistance is passed on to meet 
personal- ^nd factional interests of the power vMielders. 
The hold of the power wielders is further strengthened 
I 
when democratic framework of the newly created institutions 
was paralleled by the existing hierarchy of the official 
extension agents. At all levels, the official change agents 
work with the members of these institutions and help them in 
planning and implementing the dev^opment programmes. Such 
an arrangement is likely to bring power wielders in closer 
contacts with the government on the one hand and make the 
extension agents responsible to local political influence 
on the other. It seems that the harmonious relationship 
between the two led to sibstantial gain to the power wielders. 
Even otherwise also, the official extension agents 
do not find themselves free in their f unc tionin g b ec ause 
of the involvement of povver wielders in planning and execution 
of the development programmes. Con sonuen t l y , instead of 
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d i r e c t i n g t h e i r a t t empt s towards more d e s e r v i n g i n d i v i d u a l s 
and the - extens ion a g e n t s tend to o r i e n t t hemse l v e s 
more to the i n t e r e s t s o f power w i e l d e r s . 
VJorking through power w i e l d e r s a p p e a l s to the change 
a g e n t s a l s o f o r the f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n s : ( i ) under the p r e s s u r e 
t o show q u i c k r e s u l t s , change a g e n t s r e q u i r e the c o o p e r a t i o n 
of local i n f l u e n t i a l s who had r e a l roots in the m a s s e s . One 
o f t h e e a s i e s t ways o f d o i n g t h i s was to work th rough e l e c t e d 
power w i e l d e r s and seek t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n ; ( i i ) on account o f 
t h e i r b e t t e r economic p o s i t i o n and g r e a t e r f a m i l i a r i t y w i th 
the l i k e l y b e n e f i t s o f a g iven programT.e, the r e s p o n s e o f 
power w i e l d e r s i s g e n e r a l l y more o n t h u s i s t i c , ( i i i ) s i n c e the 
e l e c t e d f r ame -wo rk o f i n ' s t i t u t i on 5 and the h i e r a r c h y o f 
o f f i c i a l e x t e n s i o n a g e n t s were b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r i n a w e l l -
k n i t o r g a n i s a t i o n , b o t h power w i e l d e r s and the c h a n g e a g e n t s 
tend to fee l o b l i g e d to each other in a c h i e v i n g the programT.e 
o b j e c t i v e s , a n d ( i v ) wo rk ing i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i th the power 
w i e l d e r s e n s u r e s the change a g e n t s - n e e d e d p h y s i c a l c o m f o r t 
d u r i n g t h e i r v i l l a g e v i s i t s on tho hand ond . i ch i r ^v^ont o f 
the t a r g e t s s imply by p a y i n g sho r t v i s i t s on the o t h e r . N o 
wonder , then , tha t e x t e n s i o n a g e n t s m igh t have d i r e c t e d 
m a t e r i a l and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , a s a r e w a r d , t owa rds 
p i jop iu wli'.) un joyed (>ovjv.'L' pO',! Lioiio in t h j dfVt.'ioi .;n(jn t 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The a b i l i t y o f power w i e l d e r s to b e n e f i t from the 
deve lopment programmes depends upon t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i th 
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the leaders of the political parties also. Beteille has 
rightly pointed out that "the pOv>er of the villano leodors 
such as Panchayat Pr esident derives only partly from the 
support within the village. To a comi-5.?r a'ol-j e-^tent, it 
is based on the strength of,ties with in fl U3n ti.:il people 
i' 
outside the village." In fact, povjer wielders serve as a 
link between the village and the outside world. The higher 
level officials and politicians approach the villagers 
through them since they theniselves do not have direct 
contacts with the masses. Because of their ov^ n socio-
economic position and the patronage they extend to others, 
local power wielders command considerable support of their 
followers. They are, therefore, often referred as «vote-t banks". The dependence of official change agents and 
political parties for their purposes enhances the position 
of local power wielders considerably. In turn, they are t 
rerjarded in the form of valuable help such as licence from 
some department: allocation of quota for suoar, cement, 
s 
fertilizer and other commodities, sanction of grants or 
loans from the government or some bank etc.. Th'^  local 
power wielders pass dovjn only a part of the boncfits they 
receive from the above to their followers in order to ensure 
their continued support. 
Thus, the mobilisation of power of such institutions 
is particularistic and reciprocal. The po\';or vdelders and 
L i k e w i s e , f o r m u l a f o r p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s 12.34 and 
14.23 were o b t a i n e d f rom the above g e n e r a l f o r m u l a by s u b s -
t i t u t i n g the p r o p e r Numbers , The f o rmer r e p r e s e n t s p a r t i a l 
c o r r e l a t i o n be tween deve lopment b e n e f i t s end c a s t e and the 
l a t t e r r e p r e s e n t s p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n be tween deve lopment 
b e n e f i t s and p o w e r . 
The r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d from the computa t ion o f second i' 
o r d e r p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s each h a v i n g two c o n t r o l s a r e 
g i v e n i n T a b l e 7 , 3 2 . 
The r e s u l t s of p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s r e v e a l e d t h a t 
among the t h r e e stratificational f a c t o r s , c l a s s ( r 13.24 = 
0 ,574 ) was the most s e g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r a s s o c i a t e d v.'ith the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f deve lopment b e n e f i t s when the r ema in ing tv/o 
f a c t o r s were h e l d c o n s t a n t . I t c o n f i r m s our h y p o t h e s i s H o , 5 . 
I n terms o f s t r e n g t h o f a s s o c i a t i o n , c l a s s was f o l l o w e d by 
f 
Pov/er, 
T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t among the t h r r e f a c t o r s , c a s t e had 
the w e a k e s t r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the deve lopment b e n e f i t s . 
\ 
COMBIKTCD EFFECTS: 
Hav ing noted independent and r e l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e o f 
c a s t e , c l a s s and power on the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the deve lopment 
b e n e f i t s , we now turn ou r a t t r n t i o n to a c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t 
o u e s t i o n : how 
rruch o f the t o t a l v a r i a t i o n i n '^he d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f the developi i .ent L c n c f i t c i : ; cxpliiiii'-c3 by coivbincc' c o n t r i -
b u t i o n o f t h r e e - f a c t o r and t v j o - f a c t o r s e t s , and in v.'hat vay 
i t v ; i l l d i f f e r from t h e e u ^ l r i n e d ley each f a c t o r i n d i v i d u a l l y ? 
2 Q O 
the clients, who are favoured by the poirer and resources 
of liii»',n ill •)! I I III i on >), .ii'n, (|i'ii.-i ill y I liy lli" in Jin-
(T.cntal r olation ship. It <iim^ ily Imh-U.that only tho-.o 
persons are generally favoured who are able to return the 
obligations received from the povMcr wielders. To the 
extent such obligations are returned, the relationship is 
endured and a series of exchanges of obligations provide 
stability to it. This enables pov-er wielders to continue 
I 
the use of development resources for their personal or 
factional ends. 
The above discussion leads to the concl nsion that 
the position of the pov>er wieldsrs in the pre'^ -ent socio-
economic political circumstances is self-perp'^tuatiri9«,. Their 
power and authority, control over funds, official recognition 
and linkages with the offical change agents and party leaders 
have all served to further consolidate and strengthen the 
a l r e a d y privileged position of ths upper stratum in the rural 
social stratification. As such, the policy of self-determi-
nation in dovelopm ot has simply amomted to l o d g e the 
village development institutions into the hands of privileged 
SGCtions who tend to usu these as a new device for ceinforcing 
t h oi r pr i vi 1 ogod po oi ti on, 
0 o 
c - 0 > 
TABLE 7 ,30 
RELATIONSHIP AMONG STATIFTCATIONAL FACTOFIS 
(N = 1140) 
F a c t o r Lower H i ghe r 
/ 
T o t a l d f P 
C a s t e C l a s s 
Lower 460 20 480 236.045 1 / .01 
H i g h e r 180 480 660 
C a s t e 
T o t a l : 640 500 1140 
V o w e r 
Lower 456 20 476 71.903 1 £ . . 0 1 
H iqhe r 
T o t t l : 
416 
872 
248 
268 
664 
1140 
C l a s s POy-er 
Lower 590 50 640 87.129 1 / _ . 0 1 
H i g h e r 178 222 500 
T o t a l : 768 272 1140 
0 o 
6 ' J . > 
SECTIOIT - IV 
rJDTVIOUAL & CUMULATIVE ^EF^^rTS QT:* ??r'^ATTyTCATIONAL 
FACTORS ON DTSTRTRTrriON OF DT^I^EFTTS 
V?c bnve noted p r e v i o u s l y that the development b e n e f i t s 
were s i g n i f i c a n t l y and p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h each s t r a -
t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r . But such an a s s o c i a t i o n cannot be I 
a c c e p t a b l e a t i t s f a c e v a l u e , which a r e found t o b e a s s o c i a -
t ed w i t h the deve lopment - . b e n e f i t s , may a l s o be 
c o r r e l a t e d w i t h each oth,er . i t may, then be a r gued t h a t t h e 
o b s e r v e d a s - ^oc i a t i on between a g i v e n s t r s t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r 
and t h e development b e n e f i t s may T^ e due, a t l e p s t in p a r t , t o 
the o p e r a t i o n o f the rema ln ino s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f p c t o r s . Hence 
t h e r e i s a need t o examine the a s s o c i a t i o n o f each s t r n t i f i c a -
t i o n a l f a c t o r , independent o f o t h e r s , w i th the deve lopment 
b e n e f i t s . 
we aim in t h i s p a r t t o examine t h r e e main q u e s t i o n s ; 
( 1 ) whether or not s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r s a r e p o s i t i v e l y 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h each o the r ? ( 2 ) which o f t h e t h r e e f a c t o r s 
i s more s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d than o t h e r s v;ith the development 
b e n e f i t s ? ( 3 ) how rtiuch o f t h e t o t a l v a r i a t i o n in t h e d i s t r i -
b u t i o n o f t h e deve lopment b e n e f i t s i s accounted f o r by the 
t h r e e f a c t o r s i n combinat ion and i n d i v i d u a l l y ? 
RELATIO'S!!TP AMONG .ST RAT IP J CAT TONAL FACrO=<S : 
t 
The q u e s t i o n , w*^  e the r s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r s o f c a s t e , 
c l a s s and pove r a r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h each o t h e r , has been examin-
ed in T a b l e 7 .30 Data r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e h i g h e r c a s t e c o n t a i n e d 
9 0 ^ ' 
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l a r g e n r o p o r t i o n o f the responflent-^ w i t h h i c h e r c l a s s and 
h i q h e r power p o s i t i o n s . ' L i k e w i s e , t h e r e was a g r e a t e r concen -
t r a t i o n o f t h e h i g h e r c a s t e and h i g h e r power r e sponden t s i n t h e 
h i q h e r c l a s s . One may a l s o n o t e t h a t t h e h i g h e r power g roup 
was composed more o f t h e h i g h e r c a s t e and h i g h e r c l a s s r e s p o n -
d e n t s . The c h i - s q u ? e t e s t i n d i c a t e d s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
a s s o c i a t i o n be tween c a s t e and c l a s s , between c a s t e and oower 
I 
and be tween c l a s s and povjer . Thus , our h y p o t h e s i s No . 4 i s 
c o n f i r m e d , 
INDEPENDENT INFLUENCE : 
The f n c t of p o s i t i v e nsfioci.ii ion nmonn r . t rat 1 f I c n t i o n n l 
f a c t o r s makes us b e l i e v e t h a t t h e V r e l a t i o n s h i p between any 
o f t h e s e f a c t o r s and t h e development b e n e f i t s might i n f l u e n c e d , 
t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , by the r ema in ing tvra f a c t o r s . As such, 
i t can not be s a i d t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s among 6 a s t e g roups 
or among c l a s s e s or among power g roups w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e 
deve lopment b e n e f i t s a r e not due to t h e r ema in ing two f a c t o r s 
i n s t e a d . The q u e s t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , a r i s e s : whether each s t r a -
t i f i c a t i o n a l factor i s a s s o c i a t e d , independent o f t h e remain ing 
two, w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e deve lopment b e n e f i t s ? 
If we l e t 1,2,3 and 4 denote development b e n e f i t s , c a s t e , 
c l a s s pnd power r e s p e c t i v e l y , c o e f f i c i e n t by r e p r e s e n t w e i g h t 
o r I n f l u e n c e t h a t c l a s s (3) e x e r t s on the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e 
development b e n e f i t s ( 1 ) when i n f l u e n c e o f the o t h e r tv.-o 
f a c t o r s namely, c a s t e (2) and power (4) i s e x c l u d e d . L i k e w i s e , 
an independent i n f l u e n c e e x e r c i s e d by c a s t e and pov;er may b e 
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TABLE 7 .31 
E e r t i a l r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r c a s t e , c l a s s 
and power by flevelopment benefits 
P a r t i a l r e g r e s s i o n 
e a u a t i o n ( b ' s ) 
P a r t i a l 
c o e f f i -
c i e n t s 
S t anda rd ' t » v a l u e 
e r r o r f o r f o r each 
each CO- c o e f f i c i e n t 
e f f i c i e n t 
C a s t e and development 
^ ^ ^ 12.34 ) .1478 
.n276 5.2796 
C l a s s and development 
n.35 
.0335 10 . 2098 
Power and deve lopment 
0.660 .0452 14.6292 
0 O r 
e x p l a i n e d by p a r t i a l c o e f f i c i e n t s . 
b , and b r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
12.34 12.23 
Looking a t T a b l e 7 .31 con t a in inn the r e s u l t s o f p a r t i a l 
r e g r e s ? i o n , one f i n d s t h a t each c o e f f i c i e n t was s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t . Qu i te c l e a r l y , each s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r was 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i th the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the d e v e -
lopment b e n e f i t s independent o f the i n f l u e n c e o f the remain ing 
two f a c t o r s . Thus , our h y p o t h e s i s i s s uppo r t ed . 
Hav ing o b s e r v e d the indepenc^ent r e l a t i o n s h i p o f c a s t e , 
c l a s s and power wi th the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the development 
b e n e f i t s , the q u e s t i o n now emerges? v;hich o f the t h r e e f a c t -
o r s i s more s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d than o t h e r s w i th the d i s t r i -
b u t i o n o f the development b e n e f i t s ? In o r d e r t o ansver t h i s 
q u e s t i o n , p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s be^.ween each s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l 
f a c t o r and the development b e n e f i t s , c o n t r o l l i n g f o r the 
remaining two, were computed. For i n s t a n c e , p a r t i a l c o r r e l a -
t i o n between development b e n e f i t s ( 1 ) and c l a s s ( 3 ) c o n t r o l l -
ing f o r c a s t e s ( 2 ) and power ( 4 ) was computed by us ing the 
f o l l o w i n g fo rmula 
TABLE 7.12 
second o r d e r p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s o f c a s t e , c l a s s 
and power v/ith developmont b e n e f i t s 
/ "N = 1140__7 
p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s C o e f f i c i e n t o f 2nd order 
p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s 
Ca'^te and ^loveloprnent benefits ( r . „ _ . ) 0 .257 i . J 4 
C l a s s and development b e n e f i t s 0.574 
power and d»=velopment b e n e f i t s C 1^14.23^ 0.356 
<) O Q 
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TABLT^ 7 .33 
SOUARRn imiTTPLE CORRELATIONS FOR CASTE^ CLASS AITO POV.'ER 
AND THEIR COMBINATIONS BY DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS 
GROUP (A) & (B) VILLAGES 
2 
Independent f a c t o r s and t h e i r comb ina t i ons R 
c a s t e ( R ^ . 2 ) .3663 
C l a s s ( R ^ . 3 ) .5346 
power ( R ^ . 4 ) .4653 
C a s t e + C l a s s ( R ^ . 2 3 ) .5742 
C a s t e + Power ( R ^ . 2 4 ) .6336 
C l a s ^ + power ( R ^ . 2 ^ ) .6732 
2 
C a s t e + C l a s s + power (R^ .234 ) .693 
F = R a t i o in each c a s e , s i g n i f i c a n t , p / .01 
'J J 
F o l l o w i n g t h e r e g r e s s i o n e o u a t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h e one 
used ab6ve and b y s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e p r o p e r s u b s c r i p t s o f t h e 
d eve l opment b e n e f i t s w e r e f o r a l l p o s s i b l e c o m b i n a t i o n s o f 
i n d e p e n d e n t f a c t o r s a s shown i n T a b l e 7 . 3 3 . The s q u a r e o f 
2 
c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t ' (R ) i n d i c a t e d t h e t o t a l amount o f 
v a r i a t i o n i n t h e deve lopment b e n e f i t s e x p l a i n e d b y a g i v e n 
c o m b i n a t i o n o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f p c t o r s . L e t 1, 2, 3 and 4 
d e n o t e deve lopment b e n e f i t s , c a s t e , c l a s s and power r e s p e c -
2 
t i v e l y , s q u a r e o f m u l t i p l e c o r r e l a t i o n R 
1 .234 
i n d i c a t e s t h e v a r i a t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e d e v e l o p -
ment b e n e f i t s ( 1 ) wh i ch i s e x p l a i n e d by a m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n 
e q u a t i o n c o n t a i n i n g c a s t e ( 2 ) , c l a s s ( 3 ) and pov/er ( 4 ) L i k e w i s e , 1 2 
R g i v e n t h e c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n deve l opment b e n e f i t s 
( 1 ) and two f a c t o r s s e t o f c a s t e and c l a s s i g n o r i n g p o w e r . 
I t i s e v i d e n t f r om T a b l e 7 . 3 3 , t h a t the amount o f 
v a r i a t i o n e x p l a i n e d b y t h e t h r e e f a c t o r s i n d i v i d u a l l y v a r i e d 
f r om 36 p e r c e n t (R 1 . 2 = 0 . 3 6 6 ) ^ f o r c a s t e t o 53 .46 p e r c e n t 
2 
(R 1 .3 = . 5346 ) f o r c l a s s . Power e x p l a i n e d 0 .467 p e r c en t 
v a r i a t i o n when two f a c t o r s w e r e combined , t h e r e s u l t s we r e 
h i g h e r t han t h e i n d i v i d u a l f a c t o r a l o n e . The two f a c t o r s e t s 
2 
accountof^ for 5 7 . 4 2 p e r cent (R 1 .23 = .574 ) t o 6 7 . 3 2 pe r cen t 
2 (R 1 .34 = . 6732 ) v a r i a t i o n i n t h e deve l opment b e n e f i t s . T h e 
r e s u l t s w e r e s t i l l h i g h e r when c a s t e , c l a s s and power w e r e 
2 combined (R 1 .234 = . 6 9 3 ) , s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e t h r e e f a c t o r s 
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r e i n f o r c e each o t h e r beyond t h e i n f l u e n c e o f e i t h e r f a c t o r 
a l o n e . 
These r e s u l t s , c o n f i r m our h y p o t h e s i s 4, t h a t c a s t e , 
c l a s s and power e x e r c i s e g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e in comb ina t i on 
than they do i n d i v i d u a l l y on the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e 
deve lopment b e n e f i t s . 
i' 
Of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e was the f a c t t h a t c l a s s 
2 
a l one accounted f o r 53 .46 p e r cent (R 1 .3 = .5346) v a r i a t i o n 
in t h e deve lopment b e n e f i t s , when power was added t o c l a s s , 
n e a r l y 97.14 p e r c e n t o f the e x p l a i n e d v a r i a t i o n ( . 6732 o f the 
.693 ) WPS accounted f o r . The combinat ion o f t h e two most 2 
r a v o u r a b l e f a c t o C s must have h e l p e d in o b t a i n i n g R 1.34 much 
2 
c l o s e r t o t h a t o f R 1 .234 . C a s t e i n d i v i d u a l l y accounted 
2 
f o r 37 p e r c en t (R 1 .2 = .37 ) v a r i a t i o n which was t h e l o w e s t . 
I 
Whatever form o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n we may c o n s i d e r , i t 
i s c l e a r l y e v i d e n t f rom the above t h a t s t a t u s i n e q u a l i t i e s 
we re p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d w i th the i n e q u a l i t i e s i n t h e d e v e l o p -
I 
ment b e n e f i t s . 
we f i n d t h a t t h e major i tyy^of bo th t h e r e spondent s 
V 
and t h e e x t e n s i o n aqent s c o n f i r m " the f o u r r e a sons a c c o u n t a b l e 
f o r t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e deve lopment b e n e f i t s . 
Th'^y wr>r<^ q r e p t e r in f lu f^nce anii ->pproPch, r e r . o u r c e f u l -
nmrj, greater access to extcnnioii i^nr-ntr; nnd obligr-Llon on 
exionnion nqontr.. Thf nollcy of tn r n<-> t i i on n-. a ronr.on 
9 0 0 
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was a l s o a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e phenoitifnon by a m a j o r i t y o f the 
re5;pon<ieats. B e s i d e s t h e s e , e x t e n s i o n a gen t s c o n s i d e r e d in 
m a j o r i t y o f c a s e s , f o u r more r o a r o n s : p a r t i s a n s h i p o f p a n c h a -
y a t i r a j and c o o p e r a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s , g r e a t e r a b i l i t y t o meet 
p o l i c y r e q u i r e m e n t s , g r e a t e r d e s i r e f o r economic g a i n s and 
( 
g r e a t e r r i s k - b e a r i n g c a p a c i t y . 
I t i s a commonsense o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e p e o p l e in our 
v i l l a g e s do not e x e r c i s e e q u a l i n f l u e n c e . O f f i c i a l e x t e n s i o n i' 
agen t s and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s t end t o work g e n e r a l l y through 
t h e l o c a l i n f l u e n t i a l s as i t i s c o n s t r u e d as an ensy way t o 
e n l i s t s uppo r t o f the p e o p l e f o r t h e i r c a u s e . T h i s , in t u r n , 
b r i n g s f a v o u r f o r t h e i n f l u e n t i a l s . Moreove r , p a n c h a y a t i 
r a j has made the e x t e n s i o n a gen t s more r e s p o n s i b l e t o l o c a l 
p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . Consequen t l y , the p e o p l e w i t h l i t t l e 
o r no i n f l u e n c e in t h e v i l l a g e a r e g e n e r a l l y i g n o r e d by the 
e x t e n s i o n a g e n t s . 
( 
The g a i n s f r om the deve lopment program-nes depend a l s o 
upon t h e r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s o f the b e n e f i c i a r i e s . As some i n n o -
v a t i o n s a r e c o s t l y and i n v o l v e r i s k , r e s o u r c e f u l f a rme r s a r e 
in a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o i n v e s t on such i n n o v a t i o n s . 
Even i f t h e f i n a n c i a l o.ssl>;tnnco i s made a v a i l a b l e , 
a p o o r p e r s o n i s r e q u i r e d t o have adequate r e s o u r c e 
b a s e t o be a b l e t o s e c u r e and a b s o r b such an a s s i s t a n c e . 
The e x t e n s i o n agen t s a r e a l s o hand icapped i n thr^ir a c t i o n s 
b y cert^-»in p o l i c y r e q u i r e m e n t s . They have to d i r e c t t e c h n i c a l 
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and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e p r i m a r i l y t o t h o s e i;ho have t h e 
a b i l i t y t o make i n i t i a l investnvsnt as a mark o f s e l f - h e l p . 
T h e p r o v i s i o n o f g r a n t s o r l o a n s f o r t h e i tems such as 
t r a c t o r s , t u b e w e l l s e t c . have no meaning f o r t h e landless o r 
sma l l farm o p e r a t o r s . 
The e x t e n s i o n agen t s a r e g u i d e d i n t h e i r a c t i o n s a l s o 
t 
by t h e i r c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e p e o p l e . I t was no t ed t h a t some 
p e o p l e had g r e a t e r a c c e s s t o e x t e n s i o n a g e n t s . Among the 
r e sponden t s who came t o s e e t h e e x t e n s i o n a gen t s in t h e i r 
o f f i c e s , 96 p e r c en t wer4 o f the h i g h e r c ? s t e s , 78% o f the 
h i g h e r c l a s s and 70 p e r cent were o f vhe h i g h e r pov;er g r o u p . 
L i k e w i s e , among the r e sponden t s r e p o r t e d to be v i s i t e d by 
the e x t e n s i o n a gen t s du r i ng t h e i r v i l l a g e v i s i t s , 94 per c e n t 
were o f the h i g h e r c a s t e , 88 p e r cent o f the h i g h e r c l a s s and 
68 p e r c e n t o f the h i g h e r power g r o u p . I t i s no t s u r p r i s i n g 
i f t h e s e p e o p l e f i g u r e d in t h e l i s t o f the b e n e f i c i a r i e s . 
We have a l s o noted t h a t among t h e r e spondent s whom e x t e n s i o n 
a g e n t s i d e n t i f i e d as theifc h o s t s d u r i n g t h e i r v i l l a g e v i s i t s , 
a l l b e l o n g e d t o t h e h i g h e r c a s t e s , 88 pe r cent t o the h i g h e r 
c l a s s and 63 p e r cent t o the h i a b e r power g r o u p . T h i s way 
have put the e x t e n s i o n agent s under c o r t n i n o b l i n n t i o n s . I t 
w i l l , then , be e a s y t o d i s c e r n t h a t t h e e x t e n s i o n aqent s 
t ended to r e c i p r o c a t e the o e o p l e i :^ the shape o f t e c h n i c a l 
and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e . 
The p o l i c y o f t a r g e t i z a t i o n n l r o e x e r t s i n f l u e n c e 
on tho work inq o f t h e e x t e n s i o n poents in fnvour o f the 
r e s o u r c e f u l s e c t i o n s , p r e s s e d by the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f 
showing qu ick r e s u l t s and t h e r e b y improv ing t h e i r own 
r e c o r d , the e x t e n s i o n agents g e n e r a l l y work v.-ith the p r o s -
p e r o u s and i n f l u e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l s as t h i s was c o n s t r u e d 
as an ppsy way o f a r h l e v i n q ta rnot f? . 
The p r o b l e m o f p a r t i s a n s h i p o f p e n c h a y a t i r a j and 
c o o p e r a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s has been w i d e l y d i s c u s s e d . I t 
was e a r l i e r s t a t e d t h a t t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s a re e n t r u s t e d 
w i t h t h e deve lopment r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and g e n e r a l l y domina-
t e d by h i g h e r c e s t e and l and - own ing s e c t i o n s . U s ing t h e i r 
d i s c r e t i o n , t h e s e p e o p l e t end t o use the developnient funds 
p u t a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l t6 meet t h e i r p a r t i s a n i n t e r e s t s . 
DT^CUSSTON : 
Our f i n d i n g s w i t h r e g a r d to t h e r e l a t i v e independence 
o f c a s t e , c l a s s and pove r f rom epch o t h e r l e n t s u p p o r t t o 
W e b e r ' s argument t h a t " t h e s o c i a l and economic o r d e r a re 
n o t i d e n t i c a l " , t h a t s t a t u s g roups do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y p a r a -
l l e l the economic c l a s s l i n e s . The e a r l i e r n o t i o n t h a t t h e 
h i e r a r c h i e s o f c a s t e , c l a s s and power t end t o c o v e r a g e each 
o t h e r d i d not f i n d much ' support f rom our d a t a . Though 
c a p t e , c l a s s and pove r h i e r a r c h i e s v e r e s i c n i f i c a n t l y r e l a -
t e d v;ith each o t h e r t h e r e i s a c e r t a i n d e g r e e o f d i v e r g e n c e 
I 
o r what B e t e i l l e c a l l s " D i s c r e t e n e s s " among them. The 
d e g r e e o f autonomy e n j o y e d by c a s t e , c l a s s and power may be 
V 
a t t r i b u t e d , t o some e x t e n t , t o the ' i n c r e n s i n g importrince 
(.1 J 
of " a ch i e v ed v a r i a b l e s " such as lanf^, income, e d u c a t i o n , 
powor r t c . The o p p o r t u n i tiog wtilrh nrr» now in.idp DV.iilable, 
hr-^vp ennbled i n d i v i d u a l ? t o a c q u i r n h i qhe r poa i t i on r i v/ith 
r e a a r d to such v a r i a b l e s i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e i r " a s c r i b e d " 
s t a t u s , c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s p o s i t i o n he h o l d s 
coatc hltjr.ircy. In ol.h«'r wordn, ili< olil mH u.ition oC "all 
h i g h e r c a s t e h i gh and a l l l ower c a s t e low in a l l r e s p e c t s " 
ha s changed t o c e r t a i n e x t e n t . 
The q u e s t i o n t h a t we a r e now c o n f r o n t i n g i s : what 
a ccoun t s f o r v a r y i n g i n f l u e n c e e x e r c i s e d by the t h r e e 
f a c t o r s i n d i v i d u a l l y and in combinat ion on the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f t h e development b e n e f i t s ? . 
The main concerni 'o f the r u r c l development programmes 
was t o b r i n a r a p i d economic development and a c h i e v e sub s t - ' n -
t i ? l i n c r e a s e in the f a rm p r o d u c t i o n . The s t r a t e g y adopted 
f o r a c h i e v i n g t h i s pu rpose i n c l u d e d e l a b o r a t e a r rangements 
f o r r e s e a r c h and e x t e n s i o n , c r e d i t and s u p p l y , market ing 
and s t o r a g e e t c . T h i s programme p r e suppose s t h a t t h e b e n e f i t s 
o f t h i s s t r a t e g y go t o t h e l anded c l a s s e s : t h a t i n n o v a t i o n s , 
which i n v o l v e c o s t as a l s o r i s k , a r e adopted by r e s o u r c e f u l 
f a r m e r s ; t h a t heavy amount o f l o ans f o r item such as t r a c t o r s , 
t u b e v e l l s e t c . i s bor rowed by t>'0.so who have l a r n e a rea t o 
make use o f t h e r e i n n o v a t i o n s ; t h a t market ing and s t o r a g e 
f a c i l i t i e s a re a v a i l e d cff by tho^e who p r o i u c e s u r p l u s over 
t h e i r consumption r e q u i r e m e n t s . Undoubted ly , the b u l k o f 
o e o o l e b e l o n o t o h inhe r c l a s s andyth-? economic f a c t o r s v.'hich 
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t h e programmes g e n e r a l l y t ake i n t o cons ic3er?t ion in the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the b e n e f i t s de te rmine c l a s s s t r u c t u r e 
a l s o . Thus , t h e programmes by i t s v e r y n a t u r e , f a v o u r 
h i g h e r c l a s s . 
By c o n t r a s t , c a s t e and power h i e r a r c h i e s a r e not 
b a s e d upon such economic f a c t o r s which a r e t aken i n t o account 
f o r d i s t r i b u t i n g t h e deve lopment b e n e f i t s . T h i s i n p l i e s t h a t 
t h e r e s o u r c e f u l l andowning i n d i v i d u a l s may be '^ound bo th i n 
h i g h e r as vre l l as in l ower c a s t e s or pov:er g r o u p s . T h i s b e i n g 
the c a s e , t h e programmes o f deve lopment tend t o b r i n g s i m i l a r 
economic p o s i t i o n . Thus o n e ' s c l a s s p o s i t i o n , u n l i k e c a s t e 
nnd pove r p o s i t i o n s , d i r e c t l y a f f r >c t s the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e 
deve lopment b e n e f i t s . T h i s appea r s to be an important r ea son 
as t o why c l a s s has e x e r c i s e d g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e than any 
o t h r r s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e 
deve lopment b e n e f i t s . 
The emergence o f power as the second b e s t p r e d i c t o r 
mny be unders tood by c o n n i d o r i n q i t .iri ono o f t h e •modes ' o f 
d ln t . r i bn t i i i n find obt.inininn dovolopnir>nf b c n o f i t r ; . Wr* hnvo 
a l r e a d y noted t h a t development programmes a r e p l an n ed and 
implemfntod v;ith t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f the p e o p l e ' s i n s t i t u t i o n s 
rsnrb n^^nrhnyats, cooper?>tIves MCq, F . S . S . p t c . The 
' I I III I IIII I 11 < I i M111 II I ' I , , ,1 II I,, I 1 I 111 I 
wi th a l a r g e amount o f d i s c r e t i o i i to use the pov e r v/ieiciets. 
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C H A P T E R - 8 /'•J J ' 
SCCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC POLICY - I I 
In the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s , we have examined the s t r u c t u r e 
and the f u n c t i o n i n g o f the s e l e c t e d v i l l a g e economies and seen 
t h a t the economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s i n these 
economies have c r e a t e d a mechanism which tends to d i r e c t the 
g a i n s o f g e n e r a l deve lopment o f a f e w s e l e c t e d g r o u p s o f p e o p l e 
and which tends to l e a v e the masses o f the p o o r o u t o f the 
p u r v i e w o f the b e n e f i t s o f g r o w t h . 
The IRBF s t r a t e g y was d e s i g n e d to change t h i s s e l e c t i e impact 
and to take the b e n e f i t s to the p o o r . As the g e n e r a l deve lopment 
I 
e f f o r t s were no t r e a c h i n g the p o o r , i t wns thought t h a t t h e r e was 
a need to make s p e c i a l a r rangements to e n a b l e the p o o r to comc 
f o r w a r d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n v a r i o u s economic programmes. The f o r -
I 
ward to p a r t i c i p a t e i n v a r i o u s economic prograiut .cs . The s p e c i a l , 
programmes c r e a t e d such s p e c i a l f a c i l i t i e s as w e l l as s p e c i a l S 
d e l i v e r y systems to r each the p o o r , ' T h i s c h a p t e r examines the 
mode o f o p e r a t i o n o f the se f a c i l i t e s and imp l ementa t i on o f these 
p rogrammes . 
P o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n schemes u n d e r the IRDP were implemented 
i n the r u r a l a r e a s o f A l i g a r h and K a r n a l i n 1977 - 78 , The 
t a r g e t g roups i n these programmes a re d e f i n e d in terms o f l and 
h o l d i n g s si^-e and l a n d l e s s n e s s and n o t i n terms o f c a s t e o r t r i b e 
o r f a m i l y . 
The agent s o f the imp lementa t i on o f these p rogramnes are 
iiioinJy Lhr< (1) Kiircil burr-mjc racy t'-. Uio dr-ve lopiM<-n t: .idmln-
i s t r a t i o n o f the government v/hich takes the main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
o f imp l ementa t i on , ( 2 ) Middleman (3 ) the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
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s p e c i a l l y the banks t h a t p r o v i d e the main source o f c r e d i t and 
( 4 ) the panchaya t s t r u c t u r e and o t h e r l e a d e r s o f 
who h e l p the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s / a s w e l l as 
u n o f f i c i a l l y . T h i s c h a p t e r examines the mode o f imp lomenta t i on 
o f t h e s e f o u r a gen t s i n o r d e r to f i n d o u t whether the implemen-
t a i o n i s l i k e l y to r e v e r s e the p r o c e s s o f p e r c o l a t i o n o f g e n e r a l 
d eve l opment e f f o r t s d i s c u s s e d i n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s . 
RURAL BUREAUCRACY 
I n the imp l ementa t i on o f the a n t i - p o v e r t y programines, t h e r e 
h a s b e e n i n c r e a s i n g r e l i a n c e on the b u r e a u c r a t i c mach ine ry . B u r -
e a u c r a c y has become one o f the v i t a l i n s t rument s i n t r a n s l a t i n g 
p u b l i c p o l i c i e s i n t o r e a l i t i e s , SFDA/OKDA programmes are no 
e x c e p t i o n to t h i s phenomenon. T h e r e f o r e , a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s 
o f the r o l e o f bureaucra/^y i n deve lopment i s e s s e n t i a l . 
F o r the pu rpose o f implement ing t h i s programme the o r g a n -
i s a t i o n t h a t ha s b e e n c r e a t e d i s as f o l l o w s . A t the C e n t r a l 
l e v e l , the Depar tment o f R u r a l R e - c o n s t r u c t i o n i s r e s p o n s i b l e 
f o r f o r m u l a t i n g the p o l i c i e s and p r o v i d i n g g u i d e l i n e s f o r i m p l e -
ment ing v a r i o u s schemes. The Depar tment a l s o r e v i e w s p r o g r e s s 
o f the p r o j e c t . A t the s t a t e l e v e l t h e r e i s a S t a t e - l e v e l Sanc t -
i o n i n g Committee which s a n c t i o n s the schemes and g u i d e s the imp-
l e m e n t a t i o n . The S e c r e t a r y o f Government, F o r e s t and R u r a l 
Deve lopment Department^ i s the Chriirmnn and S G c r e t a r i r s / T ) i r e c t o r s 
o f the Deve lopment Depar tments are members o f the S t a t e - l e v e l 
Comrr.ittce. The J o i n t S e c r e t a r y / D e p u t y S e c r e t a r y o f F o r e s t and 
R u r a l Deve lopment i s the Convener o f t h i s commit tee . 
A t the D i s t t . l e v e l the C o l l e c t o r i s i n - c h a r g e o f 
C o - o r d i n c t i o n . He i s the Chai r i ran o f the a gency . The succe s s 
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ot the schane very much depends on this office which conti-
nues to enjoy the authority and prestige at the district 
level, since the state administration leans heavily on the 
collector roost of the district heads respond to his decisions 
and demands. The Project Officer who is redesignated as 
project Director under the new District Rural Development 
Agency is the king-pin of the scheme. He is generally 
drawn from development departments such as agriculture, 
I 
cooperatives, animal husbandry, and 30 or belongs to 
the All India Services. He is provided with a full com-
pliment of staff in his office at the district level con-
sisting of eight to nine officers of Assistant Director rank 
drawn from development departments such as agriculture, 
veterinary, cooperatives, fisheries, industries, statistics 
and planning and so on. (Chart no.l) 
The Block Developiyent Officer is the third important 
functionary in the DRDA programmest The BDO being the leader 
of the team, occupies a crucial r>osition. He is the key 
channel of communication.between the district authorities and 
field administration. He is responsible for processing the 
loan eppliciations of the DRDA and vforwnrdlng them to the 
district level. The functionaries are alr.o to see that the 
schemes are implemented properly. 
The Villaoe level worker (VU-; ) and the Extension 
Officers (EOs) provide the link between the administration and 
^ V the target groups at the grass-roots level. They carry the ' 
message of development, collect information, help in identi-
tying members of the target group, process their applications 
and push them upwards tor action. It is these tunctionaries 
who are to help the loeneticiaries in getting the schemes 
grounded. Therefore, the rural bureaucracy operating at the 
cutting eage largely determines the outcome of the DRDA schemes. 
T^ ie District Collector, project Director and his 
associates, BDOs and his extension team thus constitute the 
heart of the development machinery and it is on them the 
ettective working of DRDA depends. The existing organisational 
structure is shown in the Chart A^.with a view to achieving the 
targets, the Agcncy has been given autonomous 
status unlike most other government departments. This outo-
nomy can be exercised in selecting the area or fixing up the 
priorities and in assessing the needs of each area. 
For implementing the developmental programmes of 
DRDA the support and cooperation of a number of agencies 
like agriculture, anima^L husbandry, fisheries, industries, 
revenue, registration, cooperatives, panchayati raj, banks 
is necessary, it is true that there is some coordination 
at the district level but at the lower levels, there is 
no institutional mechanism to tacilitate coordination among 
various agencies engaged In an a<?ti».poverty programme like 
the IRDP. The Panchayat samithi has no ettective institutional 
fj 
linkage with the tunctionaries of various departments such 
as revenue, animal husbandry, electricity, banks, coopera-
tives. The BDO is the weakest joint among the various agencies 
at that level. 
The breakdown of co-ordination is almost total at the 
village. The Village Panchayat has no control over a number 
ot tunctionaries working at that level. The sarpanch and the 
village ofticer are generally found to be at loggerheads with 
each other.' The VLW state that the revenue tunctionaries 
exhibit an unhelpful attitude. The VLW at the village level 
Is the weakest link in the developmental chain. He has neither 
the power nor the prestige to secure the co-operation of other 
tunctionaries. Added to it most of the tunctionaries at the 
village level think that they have no stakes in the outcome of 
these schemes^ It is such institutional and attitudinal 
patterns that hamper the developmental process. 
Thus the DRDA is fraught with a nurtber of structural 
problems. Although it is autonomous, its autonomy is not looked 
upon favourably by the other district otticers. It is consi-
dered a sixth tinger to th6 coach of tho alstrict administra-
tion. 
The second major trend noticed in the rural administra-I 
tive structure Is the proliferation of the institutions at the 
grass-roots level. As pointed out earlier, at the level of the 
samithi and below there is no mechanism to secure co-ordination. 
There are several agencies such as Panchayat1 Raj, agriculture. 
co-operetives, revenue, banks which operate with strong n p 
d 0 
vertical linTcpges. These vertical structures, instead of 
taking the shape of a pyramid, emerge as parellel ladders 
each operating in its own style and juris "Miction. They 
* 
do not share any comnon purpose or perspective. Their 
understanding of a development policy is different from and 
sometimes even contradictory. Added to it, there is no 
collective responsibility for implementing the development I 
policy. This resulted in two negative conseguences? (1) the 
rural poor are made to go from plll.ir to post to have access 
to the benefit that the policy offers to them; and (2) the 
agencies sometimes operate at cros? purposes neutralising 
the developmental effort. 
The third trend in rural bureaucracy has been the criss-
cross linkages. Functionaries placed at various levels in the 
formal administrative ladder have 'non-formal* linkages. As a 
result the formal arrangement is put to severe test, sometimes 
an indiviiusl placed at a particular point in the hierarchy, 
because of his 'non-formal* linkaoes with the top officers 
or influential leaders of the ruling party, emerge as a power 
centre in the organisation. 
^nother aspect of these rclntionshlps has beon the 
tendency on the part of higher levels to lean on one or t^o 
members of the group inste.'d of the entire team. These indivi-
duals, it is observed, wield extrn-in.^titutional influence. It 
is noticed that the relations between the members of the teem 
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are based not on the formal structure but on various extaneous 
considerations such as caste, region, religion, language and 
sometimes "common interests", "^ his sort of non-formal linkages 
cause tensions in htunan relations. 
Another striking tendency is the widespread elitist bias 
of the rural bureavcracy. It is widely complained that officers 
contact only the influential persons is the village. In Imlani 
and Adaun villages, officers had personal contact with only 
2 2,6% of households, whereas this percentage was 30.6 in Karnal 
villages. On the whole they had contact with only 22.19% of 
households ( Table P.l ).' Village ol ficers paid iiore frcouent 
visits to those households which belonged to higher castes had 
higher income level and were big landowners. For example, 
officers visited 55.5% households of upper castes, 60% of house-
holds belonging to the higher income bracket and 75% of households 
of big landowners (Table 8,1 A) . 
It is these persons who decide whether a person should get 
a scheme or not. The officers confirm this feeling and maintain 
that it is physically not possible to v,ontact every villager in 
person. They add that implementing the programmes \N/ithout the 
support and cooperation of village leaders is difEicult. As a 
result, the elite groups in the villR<')es enjoy n uniqvic position 
and an added advantage. 
Yet another aspect of behavioural complexity has been its 
"de-presonalised' nature" . The Webcrian norms expect the burea-
ucracy to be impersonal for reasons of objectivity and imparti-
ality. Impersonal bureaucracy may have some advantaqes but in 
an anti-povrrty prograninie such as tho IIUJI' there is a nccr^  for 
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commitment and personal rapport with tho target groups. On the 
contrary, the rural bureaucracy is depersonalised vhich is mani-
fest on its indifference and hostile attitude towards the target 
group. Regarding the attitude of officers to the below-the-poverty-
line households, 63,73% respondents in Aligarh and 57,86% respondents 
in Kamal reported their attitude not helpful (Table 8,2) Making a 
villager go round a nvimber of offices, deliberately delaying the 
decisions and so on,, are symptomatic of depersonalisation or rural 
bureaucracy. In Aligarh, 58,4% of BFL households visited Govt, 
offices 349 times while 41,6% of BPL households in Karnal villages 
visited such offices 249 times to take benefit of developrrent 
schemes for poverty-alleviation, (Table 8,3) 
It is observed that the gap between people and the develop-
mental machinery in the rural • areas gave rise to middle-men in 
a number of villages. This institution a.'=-sumed considerable imp-
ortance on account of subsi<?y based antipoverty schemes. The 
institution of middle-man Is rooted in the social, political, 
economic and cultural ethos of the rural society. This institution 
is a result of bureaucratic procedural rigmarole. The gap between 
bureaucracy and the rural people added vigour to this institution. 
The field observations reveal that bureaucracy indirectly encour-
ages the institution of middle-man for various reasons. 
Thus the rural bureaucracy is faced with problems arising out 
of the existing structural arrangement and overall behavioural 
patterns appear to be not conducive to meeting the growing challenge 
thrown up by public policies for rural development with an anti-
poverty thrust. The role of bureaucracy is further constrained 
by an environmental culture in wViich it has to operate. 
THE •MTDOLEMAN' 
C J ^ 
b i i 
THE SCHEMES sponsored by DRDA tor the benefit of the 
target groups involve multiple agencies and several procedu-
ral formalities. The target groups, being poor and backward, 
need to be initiated into the process and assisted till the 
schemes become viable so that they can cross the poverty line. 
The administrative system, as pointed out earlier, has been 
found Inadequate for the taslc. The existing decision making 
levels, are inaccessible to the target groups living in 
villages spread over vast areas* The administration which is 
largely alienated from the poor is nlno apfltlally separated 
from them. This calls for effective institutional linkages 
and involves establishment of a number of Intermediate insti-
tutions through which the comnunication is facilitated and 
technology transmitted* The link between the rural bureaucracy 
( 
and the people is the middle-man. 
His main role is to provide a contact point between the 
administrative machinery.and its clientele. He pursues the 
cases, chases the files, goes round the offices in pursuit of 
the schemes promised to the target groups. Middle-man has 
come to assume considerable importance in SJJ'UA/URDA schemes. 
An examination of a public policy would be incomplete if all 
the institutions that affect it are not analysed. It is for 
this reason that this ;in»titatitan is analysed in detail 
in this study. 
o ' o 
o ^  
The origin of the institution can be traced to the 
teudal phase when the relations between the state and the 
people had been indirect from all the angles* It was for 
the intermediaries to provide links^ and channels of infor-
mation between the state and the people. In the process of 
gradual transformation the feudal institutiona aJ^ e being 
replaced by democratic structures. Although democratisation 
enlarged the base of the elite groups, it remained restricted 
to narrow circles. But the interaction between the govecnment 
and the people increased mani-folds because of a number of 
developmental schemes. While the scope for interaction has 
enlarged, the capacity and level of awareness of the people 
has not increased in commensurate measure. There is thus a 
vacuum which is filled by the middle-man. 
The administrative structures and procedures, through 
which the state operates, are devised to formalise the proce-
sses and rationalise, if not legitimise the working of govern-1 
ment administration. Further, the western bureaucratic models, 
which were evolved in a different socio-economic setting and 
cultural value set-up, had been borrowed by most of the countri-
es. This gave rise to new combination of socio-economic forces. 
It was Fred W. Rlggs who brought out the tremendous influence 
that the larget socio-economic system leaves on the working of 
the government and its administrative system. For in the 
^ y O 
fj L 
Interaction between administrative system and the society 
one is bound to influence the other. Riggs further explained 
that prismatic societies, which are in the process of trans-
ition, developed their own peculiar institutions. This is 
a result of combination of tradition and modernity. The 
Institution of middleman with Its repots in the traditional 
nature of the system stepped into the new roles. This can be 
considered as one of the products of prismatic culture. 
The people in developing societies lilre India are coming 
in increasing contact with governmental machinery and its 
complex operations. Karlier their interaction with the village 
socio-economic system and its elite groups was based on non-
formalised structures of action. Further the rural poor who 
were hitherto dealing with one or two agencies are now to deal 
with a large number of agencies which came into existence in 
the walce of new developmental process. The people lacTc 
necessary experience and exposure to deal with conplex processes. 
As a result they depend on Middleman to negotiate with new and 
f 
emerging situation^* 
In the past the position df the middleman was largely 
manned by the vlllaqe officer who held formal position of 
village elder in whom people had confidence. Of late* this 
institution seems to have acquired a new political dimension. 
I 
This fixer has to maintain political linkages with leaders 
at higher levels and use those contacts to do lobbying. 
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And the politicians use their contacts with middleman for purpose 
of elections. Thus their dependence is mutual - one institution 
reinforcing the other. In fact middleman-ship has become one 
of the means through vhich persons are initiated into rural poli-
tics. Because of the traditional nature of rural politics the rolrs I 
of politician and middleman appear to be overlapping. In Aligarh 
villages 384 BPL households and in Karnal villages 185 BPL house-
holds took the help of middlemen In taking advantage of IRDP schemes. 
In Aligarh villages the highest percentage of households took the 
help of Panchayat members as middleman whereas in Karnal villages s 
the highest percf;ntage of such householcLs (>10.40%) utilised the 
services of VIW as middleman (Table 8.4). 
The middle-man also cultivates different government officers 
with the help of whom he 'delivers the goods'. He employs different 
technioues to strike rapport with them. These techniques include; 
one, looking after the needs of the officials visiting the village; 
two, invoking the names of important political leaders; three, making 
the leaders 'to put in a word* to the officers and lastly, using 
vocal chords either to please or threaten the officers depending 
upon the demands of the situation. 
It is also noticed that bureaucracy discourages direct appr-
oach by members of the target groups to government officGjs. This 
lends strength to the institution of middle-man. The officials I 
maintain that it is difficult to deal with 8 mob and view it as 
a waste of time. They also argue that it is difficult to explain 
to the rural poor some of the administrative procedures which they 
think are beyond their comprehension. Instead, they think that 
dealing with a few midrlle-nicn would 
»> < p O J. 
be easy as they are considered to be well informed about the 
programmes. ^^ explains favourable disposition of bureau-
cracy towards the institution of middleman. 
The need for the institution of middleman arises on 
account of the inability of the rural poor to understand the 
conplex administrative mechanism, Again^ the rural poor feel 
that they would not be properly treated by officials and they 
suffer from diffidence. In addition the number of forms and 
procedures to be completed^and offices to be contacted are 
so cumbersome that they cannot handle it on their own. It is 
surely not economical - to lose the^r wages, incur the expendi-
ture on transport and stay at the headquarters - all to no 
purpose. Therefore, they leave the matters to the middleman in 
the hope that he would conplete the task. The institution of 
middleman acquired added significance and wider role in the 
wake of the introduction of subsidised schemes. The subsidy, 
from the point of view of a poor man in rural areas, is an 
amount doled out by the government. Although there is a 
heavy loan component, he would be too willing to pay •corami-
ssion» to the middle-man. In a society where paying of 
•commission* is accepted as an integral part of its socio-
caltaral ethos, the commission for the middleman goes well 
with the prevailing rural ethiQs, 
The' institution of middleman, however, caused certain 
unintended consequences to S F DA/DR D A schemes. Firstly, the 
o L : 
rural poor are made to appl'y for the needs not relt by them 
because of the subsidy component in the loan. This has had 
deleterious effect on the outcome of the schemes* Secondly* 
the 'commission* of the middleman cuts into even the loan 
conponent of the scheme, defeating the purpose of the subsidy. 
Thirdly, instances ate not lacking where the beneficiaries 
were not even aware of the total loan amount sanctioned; they 
were committed to more amount than was given to them. Fourthly, 
some of the middleman passed on distorted information to the 
target groo^^s. This distortion went to the extent of creating 
an impression that the loans would be written off. Fifthly, 
t 
middl^an being a part of the village socio-political framework, 
adopted partisan attitudes and helped only those members who 
were loyal to their groups, there ar^. instances of middle-man 
refusing even to give information to some of the members not 
belonging to their group in the village. Sixthly, it is obser-
ved that subsidy based schemes are used for political ends. 
Lastly, most of the middlen fead no interest in the welfare of 
the poor; therefore, their role in SPDA/DRDA schemes can only 
be of dysfunctional nature. 
On balance, it appears that while the middleman filled 
the gap caused by the absence of intermediate institutions -
political and administrative - their role created confusion 
about the schemes, largely defeated the purpose of subsidy 
and introduced distortions in the schemes. This is one example 
of how economic Policy can go off the track if it is not 
( 
backed by adequate institutional arrangements. 
0 ' Q fj L • 
At the district^ block and villeqe level rural bureaucracy 
have their structural relationship. Let us explain their func-
tional relationship now. The main functions of the staff are 
to itiaXe the target group population take up suitable prograrrmes 
and to help them in running the programmes successfully so that 
their livincf standards improve gradually. In other words, the 
function;!/would be: to en m y tVic eligible households in 
the area; (2) to investigate and identify their problems, (3) 
to provide them with suitable progrannies for their upliftment, 
and (4) to follow up the beneficiaries by helping them in 
irunning the schemes successfully. 
How does the development administration carry on these 
functions?. We are mainly interested in studying the mode of 
implementation of the IRD programmes in order to examine how 
far this mode is likely to make the programmes reach the poor 
in the present pattern of functioning of the village economies. 
We will therefore examine those aspects of implementation which 
are likely to influence the"process of percolation of the prog-
rammes. we will focus on the following points: 
1, The nature of targets for th^,programmes and the 
process of target fixation; 
2, The understanding and attitudes of the administration 
towards the problems of the poor, 
3, The mode of functioning of VDO/VLMs etc, at the village 
le ve 1, 
I Target Achievement and the process of target fixing^ 
The achievement of a target is an important measure of success 
not only of the programmes, but also oE the staff that implerents 
the programir.es. Consequently, the achievement of targets receives 
a very high priority in the implementation of the schemes. Starting 
from the Project Director, EDO etc, to the villaae level worker-
all are keen to see that the targets are achieved. Consequently, 
there is more emphasis on target achievement than on identifying 
the real poor and helping them. In f rjct, Il<D Prcgranirre-i are 
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basically target oriented and the administrative staff struggle 
I hard to achieve the target. 
The target achievements, however, are considered in terms 
of overall targets. That is, there are no fixeS targets for 
different areas or for different shcemes which must be met. 
Consequently, there is a tendency to achieve the targets by 
implementing 'easy* schemes in 'progressive' areas. 
The process of target fixing: 
At the district level, the targets for IRDP come from 
I 
above depending on the number of blocks in the district. However, 
the blockwise allocation was not rigid and 'capable' blocks were 
given higher targets to compensate the low targets of relatively 
backv/ard blocks, ' 
In Aligafb, it was observed that the blockwise targets were 
fixed on the basis of the past performance of the block in terms 
of execution, the capacity of the Block to take up the schemes 
which is roughly estimated on the basis of the infrastructural 
and credit facilities and the progs^CFsiveness of the people in 
the block. It is sometimes felt that backward blocks are consi-
dered difficult blocks for the special programmes. The sector-
wise targets are determined on the basis of the guidPlines which 
come from the centre or the state, by the Project Director, APO 
and BDO, As there is no seriousness about achieveing the sector-
wise targets they are fixed up mostly as a part of the routine 
work and as a guideline. 
9 n ti V 
The process of target fixation in i^istrict KAHMAL is 
no different. The considerations v?hile allocating the total 
target to different blocks are (a) the acceptablity of the 
schemes by the population in the DIOCTC which depends on the 
progressiveness of the population. (More progressive blocks) 
(b) the transportation - communication facilities and the 
general accessibility of the villages of the block and (3) 
banks and credit facilities in the block. The sector-wise 
allocation is more for a guideline than for actual achievement. 
It seems that the sectorwise allocation is done mainly to 
inform the blocks about the sectors which they are expected 
to enter. ^ 
There is no villagewise target fixation either in 
ALT-^ARH or in KARNAL. The ^RDA, BDO, the extension officer, 
end the VLWs tonether fix up the targets for different VLWs 
who operate in difficult groups of villages. This means that 
on an everaqe a VLW covered 9 to 10 villages in ALIGARH & 
10 to 15 villaoes in KARNAL done mainly on the basis of (1) The 
caoacity of the area, and (2) the capacity of the VLW. 
The former depends on the availability of infrastructural 
and credit facilities in the village, accessbility of the 
village and on the progressiveness of the population of the 
village. 
I 
It is ouite obvious that the considerations behind 
taroet flxlna are basically thO'^ e that help in target 
ach if?vements. 
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The Um^er^trn-linn and Attituoe of the Administrritors: 
far P53 the understpn-Unr- of the problems of the poor 
ij? concerned there ?re besicplly three tyoes of r^p^^rorches. 
( i) The most common aprroach which is followed by e .TI?jority 
of the '^ electe.-' administrators is this: (i) thos= poor who 
?>re -^ p»niHnely 1.n cominq up c?'n nlvays do so PP ? 
number of qovr»rnment prcqrom-nos nre desi'^ned to help 
them. The'ie noor do not ffice any r^ecions problem while takin."! 
up various programmes as the government stf'ff is always willing 
to help them. Such persons with honest intentions do not find 
it difficult to get guarantees for gettino bank loans also. 
The only thing these poor have to do is to approach the progra-
mme implementors. 
However, there are other poor also who are lazy and 
are a-^dicted to liquor and other vices. They are not inter-
ested in cominn up and there is no way of helping them. As 
i-hey will nf>vpr work hard and honestly to come up, thoy vrill 
not aet guarantees needed for bank loans. Thus unless they 
chanoe (and the administrator cannot chan^'e them), nobody 
cpn help them. 
As renards the beneficiaries v-ho take up th" schemes and 
pre not able to run them successfully, these people think that 
it is mainly because the beneficiaries have developed the pey-
cholooy of charity and they do not believe in repaying loans 
honr-stly. Once main the programme iinplrmentors think th^t 
«> o n 
oenuine cases of defaulters are always helped out. such 
f^efaulters either get their insurance pay for the loan, 
or bgnTcs reschedule their repayment instalments to help them 
out. 
(ii) According to the second approach, a serious problem 
of the poor is their poor accessibility to the bank credit. 
It is not always possible for the poor to get an advance 
from a bank as they neither have asset, <i7hich can be given 
as a security nor are they always able to net sinnatures 
of two guarantors. It is argued that banks are very conse-
rvative in their approach while londinq to tho poor. 13--^nks 
do not lend In faraway places. They also do not lend in 
those vlllaqes where some families have defaulte'' in the 
past and they rule out the cases vrho have unpaid debts of 
the oast. Consequently, not many poor can take advantage 
of bank cre-Ht and therefore cannot avail them^.elves of 
the special schemes for the poor. 
(iii) The third type of thinking prevailing among admini-
strators regarding the problems of the ooor is that the 
real poor can never get any significant benefits from the 
government programmes. ' 
According to this thinking, the poor are a helnless 
lot ly'na at the lowest runq of our society. They nre so 
much '^ e-oendent on the non-poor that they are not capable 
of doina much for themselves. That is, they will have to 
be helped out by some outside agencies. The rural rich 
'J 
are ?'lways interested in their own improvement and therefore 
they will not do any thing that will go against their own 
established power structure. They, therefore, cannot be 
relied upon to help the poor. The administrators also are 
a part of the system in 'th(? sense that they are also trapped 
in the power structure and they cannot afford to displease 
the rural rich, Conseau^ntly, the auminlstrators also will 
imolement the specifl ..roaraumies the way the rich want it 
by encouraoinn leaTcaqes and by dlscoura-^ing the really needy 
to CO Tie up to participate. 
why ere the -development staff following the interests 
of the rural rich the answer these people give is that first 
I 
of all, there is a constant danger of transfer if the 
Sarpanch or other influencial persons are not happy v.'ith 
any staff specially the lover level staff. SeconUy # the t 
staf^ nets different types of favours from the rich such as 
foodgrains, free gifts etc.. And lastly, it is a very tough 
Job to help the poor as they are n'^ t motivated enough and 
PS they cannot get bank loans easily. If the time is wasted 
on these tough cases, the targets will never be achieved. 
According to the third approach, therefore, there is 
not enouoh hope for the really needy poor masses unless the 
rural social <?tructure is rationalised. Indeed the practical 
aDproach is to accept this fact. 
O O 
o ^  
To sum up, therefore the first type of administrators 
blpme the poor, the second type blptne the banlcs, end the 
third tyre blame the systan in which they are functioning 
but all admit that all th/e poor cannot be helped. All of 
them feel that the special programmes cannot reach all the 
poor. 
* TTl. The Mode of Functioning of the 
VLWs at the village Leveli 
The VLVv's implement the schemes at tne village level. 
They have considerable power in deciding which schemes to 
imnlement in which villages and who should take up these 
schemes. The VLW is given the total targets to be fulfilled, 
the list of the schemes and he list of the villages in 
which the schemes are to be implemented. There are no rest-
rictions regarding the distribution of the taroets in various 
schemes or regarding the allocation of funds in d^^ferent 
vlllan<=»s oxcont that 'oeneral bnlanco' should be maini-ained. 
Selection of villages: 
There are no strict rules about VLWs* visits to 
villanes. It all depends on the Work. Which villages 
does a V1.W visit to imnlement the schemes for the onor? 
It seems that the selection of the village depends on a 
number of factors. If he gets amiications for some schemes 
from a village (through banks, through the APO or through the 
PDO o f f i c e ) , or I f the Stirpnnch ot n vll],-,r]o .inks him to 
visit the«village for imn 1 ernentinq^some schemes he visits 
the villeae. However, when he has to select the villages 
to implement schemes, he selects the villages on the basis 
of their accessibility, availability of other infrastruc-
tural facilities llTce banks, cooperetive milk society, etc. 
and progressiveness of the village copulation. The size 
of the village population is also a consideration as a 
larger village helps them in getting more cases. In other 
words, there is no study of the overall situation of the 
villages or no systematic approach on the part of the VLW 
to reach all the poor while selecting the villaQ'^s. 
Selection of the poor in the villages: 
^ How does the VLW function in the selected villages 
to select the poor for various schemes? There are two 
stages involved in the selection: one is of getting appli-
cations and the other is of selecting from them for forv.'ard-
inq to the concerned banks. 
When apnlications have already come through banks 
or the BDO office, the VLW contacts the applicnnts and 
screens various documents. Then he enquires from the 
sarpanch or the chairman/secretary of the milk society etc. 
whether the applicants are honest and can repay the loans. 
He then clears the applications. When there are no aopli-
f 
cations, the VLW tries to aet them by visiting the villages. 
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His usual method is to visit the office of the mllTc cooper-
ative society, the panchayat office and the house of 
saroanch and other leaders to get new names for the schemes. 
If some poor want the scheme, they are expected to contact 
the VLW in these places. The VLW, then prepares a tentative 
list of the persons who are likely to take up these schemes. 
< 
It is interesting to note that no VLW visits the houses of 
the poor. The VLW qives information to the poor about the 
schemer; only when they contact him in his usual place. 
The next stage is to select the beneficiaries from the 
list that is prepared. This is done on the basis of these 
conditions. (1) The applicant should provide the land certi-
ficate from the Patwari and the sarpanch, if he is a marginal/ 
small farmer. If he is an agricultural labour, he has to 
submit the income certificate signed by the Patwari and the 
sarpanch (2) If he wants a milch animal, he has to produce 
a certificate signed by the chairman of the millc cooperative f 
society that he is a member of tho society etc. (3) The 
applicant has to show that he will get two reliable persons 
as guarantors when he applies for the bank loan. The VLW 
also wants to be sure that the applicant is honest and will 
It wap felt by the VLWs that it is easy to implement the 
schemes in a village where the people are progressive i.e. 
the village is prosperous, the people exrosed to outside 
vorli and are interested on takinq the benefits of the 
soecial programmes. 
rj 
repay the loan befojre the DRDA finally sclects him. As he does 
not know this aspect of the applicant, he relies on the Sarpanch 
't 
or on the chairman of the milk cooperative society or on other 
village leaders for verification. That is, these leaders , 
recommend or reject the cases for benefits of the schemes to 
the viw. 
Selection of Schemes: 
The IRD Programmes have, in all, 40-45 schemes for the 
poor. How does the decide as to v;hich schrmps are to be 
implemented in the villages? 
All the VLWs have pointed out that this depends basi-
cally on people as the demand for schemes has to come from 
people. The knowledge about the s^^emes reaches through the 
sarpanchs and other village leaders, through the Patv;ari or 
through the VIW, When a person is willing to take up a scheme, 
he approaches the VLW, Thus apart from the VLW, the sarpanch 
and village leaders also introduce the schemes in the village. 
The sarpnnchs of nil our four study vlllflnrs clnlmrcl tli^it they 
had introduced a number of schemes in their villages. 
However, when the VLW informs the village people about 
the schemes, he suggests 'suitable* schemes to the poor, so 
that the success of the scheme becomes feasible. The suit-
ability of a scheme, according to the VlWs, depends on 
OO Q 'J . 
(1) the land held by the person (if there is land, land-
based schemes are given), (2) the caste or religion of the 
person (certain schemes are acceptably only to a few castes). 
(3) The requirements of the village (there cannot be too 
msny pan/tea shops or too many vegetable vendors in one 
village). (4) The economic capacity of a person (an extre-
mely poor person cannot be given a very expensive scheme) to 
borrow and to repay and (5) the sV>^ ll of the person (for cycle 
repairing, other ccafts etc. the sl<ill has to be there). The 
VLW decides about the suitability of the scheme for a person 
on the basis of the above considerations. The opinion or the 
advice of the village leaders is civen due considerption. 
It is interesting to note that all the four VhVls had 
roughly divided the poor into two categories, namely the 
•rich poor* and the poorer, while implementing the schemes, 
such a rough division helps the VLW in implementing the 
schemes fast. The 'rich poor* are small farmers with irri-
gation facilities or with bio family holdings. These farm-
ers, many times, belong to big families but are small only 
on paper. These farmers take up schemes like irrioation 
electric pumps# oil engine, pump room etc, schemes. 
0 n 
CREDIT ^ INST rfUT IONS 
The third major agent of imple^nentation of the special 
Droqrainmes is the credit institutions that provide credit to 
purchase assets. 
(The main agencies that provide rural credit are (apart 
from some few private sources) cooperative credit society, 
land Development Bank, Farmers Service Society and various 
types of banks such as nationalised banks (State Bank of 
India) and cooperative Banks. Cooperative societies are 
for providing mainly short ani medium term loans, while land 
development banks specialise in providing medium and longterm 
loans for farmers recommended by FSS. These FSS provide an 
I 
integrated package of services to the farmers including the 
supply of inputs and facilities for marketing the produce. 
Lastly, banks are expected to provide short term as well as 
i' 
long term credit for the implementation of the asset-based 
special programnes. It seems that banks are the main source 
of credit for special progr.-Ttnuns In ihosi' Tour villngcs. We 
will therefore examine the implementation of the prograntnes 
by these banks in the selected villages. 
For oeneral functioning a number of Guidelines have been 
aiven to the banks in the past to enable the poor to borrow 
lo^ n^s from them. Initially the emphasis was on the priority 
sectors and nradually it shifted also to the tarqet groups! 
A dlfferenti.nl inter^-st r^te (DIR) r.chome was d-vised to 
9 on 
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en.-=ble b^nks to repch the poor. Un^ .or the Sc"-rae the 
B?nk cpn len-^ l upto to poor person pt 4% interest 
r^te ••'oeinst person'->l security or '-^ n^ nlnpt sinple hypotheca-
tion. The relaxations qivon to the poor under these schemes 
pre: (1) Low rate of Interest 4% (2) no need for a security 
or 2 guarantees (3) group guarantees or mutual guarantees 
are acceptable (4) minimu'm procedural cost (5) extended and 
flexible periods of repayments and (6) legal action only 
when default is not justified. In short, it is now easy 
for a poor person to borrow from a bank if he has a scheme 
in his mind and if he can prove to the bank that he is 
genuinely interested in taking it up and is capable of 
mpn;=cinq it well. 
Now, the role of the banks is no more passive i.e. f 
it is now playing a borrower choosing role, which implies 
that it is also expected to identify the poor, identify their 
needs and formulate bankable schprnr-s for them ^nd to motivate I 
thorn to take them up. 
Mode of Operation of the Bank the Selected yil laqes: 
Let us ex?^mine how the ^bove policies are im.-^ lemented 
by the bankr? in the selected villanes. Though the banks -re 
-lifferent, the problems faced by them are s in liar, '.e have 
therefore first examined their approac'-, their con.strcints, 
their underst.mdinn of the problemr, of tho poor pnd thoir 
attiturle towards the ooor. 
9 0 < 
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The major factors which are likely to influence the 
ar>-ro?ch of bankers towards lendino to the poor ere likely 
to be ?s follows. First of ell, banks are profit making 
organisations in the sense that even v/hen they play the role 
of an instrument of chenge, they have to make profits, at 
least overall orofits. Consequently, economic viability of 
the scheme as well as credit worthiness and repayment capa-
city of the borrowers are imnortant considerations. Secondly, 
t 
the evaluation of the performance o'" n l:).mk nq-nt/bronch 
m.-'nnn'^ r in n rural nren is 'lone by thr^  bo^ .^ pr: on tho bar;is 
\ 
of Itn ovf^rall business and profits, nerfornv-^nce in recovery 
and on th® basis of the lenUnn to the poor. The first two 
consi'^ pT^ it ionr: arf» 'Ir^fnitnly more important and if there 
is a failure here, the concerned person can suffer in terms 
o* transfer,non-promotion or even demotion. There are no 
fixed targets aiven about lendino to the poor, only oeneral 
nijid'=»lin<^ s v^ re given. The anent who lenis to the poor at 
his own r^ 'sk, is cautious in his aporoach v;hile making advance 
to the poor. 
Thirdly lending to the poor is not an easy job in the 
sense that it can create a number of problems. The poor, who 
hpvo a hinh propensity to c'">nr^ ume ;nny bo t:emr>t.o!i to consume 
It is stated that the 7BI -Toes consi-'er the overall nrofi-
tabt]tty of a bank while evaluating the oerfDtmance, The 
nat ^ '^ nal ^ sed banks need not earn profit is a wrong assump-
tion. 
0 0 'J J.. 
the income generated by the asset^nurchased v/ith a b?nk 
loan, vhich may create recovery nrobiems. Also, they may 
not hpve s>cill or the culture to run the r;chemes efficien-
tly, which may anain create nroblems of recovery. Fourthly, 
rural branches of banks have to lend to a number of villages 
which are spread over a large area. This imnlies tha+-
contacts with the clients would be less and thus both t-he 
nroblems of supervision and recovery become relatively 
diffici'lt. 
The attitude of the bankers also depends on their 
understanding of the problems of the poor and the attitude 
tovards the-n. Our interviews with them reveal that all of 
them think thpt there are some noor wh'-> are very noor and 
wh'^  cannot reach the banks. However, the others are able 
to reach the banks to get benefits of various schemes. 
They feel that all those who deserve loans do get them. 
i' 
However, they also feel that banks are not charitable 
institnt v-^ ns and they cannot be expected to serve all the 
DOOr. For examole, thbse who cannot provide a security or 
two guarantees for a loan, cannot be helped by banks. 
* 
And lastly, though the dpvelopinont r.dminist r.-^t ion pl?ys 
an active role in preparing cases for bank loans they do 
not tpke any responsibility for recovery. In fact, it is 
a major complaint of t^e banks that the development 
d J d 
administration which identified the poor and also the 
schemej; for them does not pipy eny ?ctive role once the 
bank ndvance? are given. It becomer, the sole responsibi-
lity of the bnnks, who do not hr-ivf» r.tnff to run after the 
t 
borrov;ers, to recover the loans. 
Tt must be noted here that attempts have been made to 
coordinate the functionlnq of banks and development adminis-
tration. district consultency Committees (ncc) have been 
set ur» in both the districts of Alicarh & Karnal to bring 
about coordination and to sort out oroblems of rural credit 
in the districts. The collector is the chairman of this 
committee and ell the concerned staff of both the banks as 
well an 'he afiminifrtration are members oF this committee. 
Th(? comim't-toe is expected to meet once in three months. It 
is also expected to hold an annual district level review 
I 
meptinn for two days to review i' oituation .ni to rort out 
the nroblems. A standina commitlpe of the DCC also has been 
set up as a task force, to follow up the discussions taken 
place at the DCC to reviev; the anriications under di':ferent 
opmpnt schf^mes end to rr.viov7 thr^  i m»^ lprnp>nt3tion of the 
^nnupl action plan of each district. 
Tt is ntrikinn to noto t-hni n^c.n hnvp not 'lonr- much 
In t-r>rinn oF brinqinn -^ bout thr> lo-i m-^ l c x>rd i nnt io i. 
^^  Cnut io ns! 
Because of the above factors, the banks were cautious 
in their anrroach. The lending policy which ia agreed upon 
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(as Quir^elines) at higher levels is ^istorte-^ to a oreat 
extent while beinq implemented at the micro level. The terms 
and conditions laid down on paper for lenr5ing to the poor 
are not followed in implementation. 
First of all, there is limited lending gone to the 
v/eaTcer sections. There is also a tenclency to lend for big 
items (liTce oil engines, electric pumps, wells etc.) to a 
limited number of persons to make the lending safe and to 
( 
show relatively high achievements. Secondly, guarantee or 
security is always demanded though on paper they are told 
that they may not ask for it. Mutual or group guarantees 
are also not accepted (except in one case where some politi-
cal pressure was there to accept it.) 
Thus unless a poor person gives two guarantees (the 
guarantor has to have Rs.lO,non/- to 15,000/- worth property) 
he cannot even apply for a bank loan. Thirdly, an indebted 
person is never considered for a bank loan, though such a 
restriction is not necessary according to the guidelines laid 
down for banks. 
The cautious approach also resulted in the development 
of a tOD'iency, on the part of banker."?, to ask for rocommrncla-
tions or f.or confirmation from villnqe lea-^ers regarding the 
honesty and repayment capacity of the borrowers before sancti-
oning loans to them. That is, rrVomTiendations as well as 
2 
d ; 0 
rejections of the village leeders are imoortsnt factors in 
influencino the flow of bank credit to the weaker sections. 
It was observed that the banks usually net applica-
tions for loans from the Block administration. The banker 
or its «='taff, then visits the villaqos of the applicants to 
investioate the cases. After meeting the applicants and 
checking their guarantee etc. he prepares a list of such 
persons. He, then, meets the Sarpanch and other village 
leaders to check the honesty and the repayment capacity of 
I 
the applicants* He clears the applications only if the 
leeders of the village recommend the cases. 
When the banker ,wants to <^ et new cases, he visits 
villages on h-'s own. Our study revealed that the selection 
of villages was done on the basi^ of their accessibility and 
their progressiveness. When there vere 10-15 cases of default 
in a villaoe, it was completely rejected for bank loans as 
it was thought that the climate in such a village encouraged 
borrowers into default. 
The mode of operation of the banker in the village 
is described as follows. The banker first arranoes a 
meet inn of the poor with the help of the Sarpanch or the 
deouty sarpanch. He, then, tells them about various schemes 
for the poor and asks them to give their names, if they can 
give two nuarantees. A list of such potential cases is 
^J ; ! 
then prepared by the banker. After the meeting he checks 
\ 
with the Sarpanch and other important leaders of the village 
about the honesty and repayment capacity of various potential 
borrowers. He finalises the list on the basis of recommend-
ations and rejections by them and proceeds with further 
procedures. 
In one of our study villages, one important factor 
which influenced the list pf the borrowers significantly was 
•political pressure'.* starting from the ministers to MPs and 
MLAs many used their influence with the banks. The bankers 
had to sanction loans to such cases. Also these political 
pp^rsons P'ncouraged the poor to default nnrl thereby creatod 
unfavourable atmosphere for repayments. This effected their 
recovery adversely. 
To sum up, therefore, the banks are not able to irrple-I 
ment the policies agreed upon at higher levels. The constrain-
ts under which they function make them cautious and selective. 
The understanding about the problems of the poor make them 
i' 
conservative in their approach, when the bank agent has 
personal (CARKER) risk involved in lendinq and when there is 
This seems to be a very serious problems. It was m e n t i o n e d not 
Only by the managersof rural branches of banks, but also by 
hiqher level officers of the banks in the recional offices. 
It was expressed by them all that political pressure is^oreat 
interference in their functioninn. 
9 9 Q cJ -J •> 
no substpntiel help from the admin i.-^ trat ion in recovery of loans 
and they are not enthusiastic to play the role of * an 
instrument of eradication of poverty' in a big way. 
In the previous chapter we have nlreaiiy examined the 
functioning of the village Panchayats in the selected villages 
and seen that their members are neither representatives .of 
different socio-economic groups of the villages nor are they 
really doing much about the interests of the poor. Here v:e 
shall examine as to how the pancheyat Members as well as 
other leaders influence the implementation of the IRD 
programmes. 
Officially, the district panchayat (zila parishad)as 
well as the Block Panchayats are not arinocinted v;ith the 
implementation of the IRD progrprmies. At the village levels 
hov;ever, the panchayat is associated with these progrei.nies 
in a number of ways. Firstly, the Sarpanch's signature is 
necessary for identification of small and marginal farmers 
as well as agricultural labourers. That is, no body can get 
identified as a poor person for the benefits of IRD progranmes 
without the signature of the Sarp^nch. Secondly, as the 
oanchayat is expected to work for the development and '-el^are 
of the panchayat he is expected to brinn new schemes to the 
village, to propagate them and to help the VLW in implemen-
ting them. Infact, it is cleimed by all the sarpanchs of 
*> 9 0 d -J i' 
I our study villages that they were responsible for bringinq 
and also for not bringinq a number of schemes to their 
respective villages. 
I 
When an applicant for a scheme nee^s a certificate to 
show that he is a member^of a par^^icular cooper<itive society 
(for example, for the milch enimcil scheme) such a certificate 
is given by the chairman of the concerned cooperative society 
who is normally ? big farmer, (^^nerelly, he owns 5 acres 
or more l?>nd & belong?; to higher Cc>ste. 
Apart from this, the ssrnanch and village leaders 
in'^ lu'^ ncn tha "(flection of bene'=ici?ries in e number of 
other ways. First of all, they recommend (or reject) the 
cases of applicants to the VLW who finalir.es the list of 
potential beneficiaries for applying to the bank. Secondly 
they also recommend (or reject) applications to the bank 
agent v/ho consults them before finalising the sanction. 
Thirdly, they can alvrays nrovide a guarantee for a bank 
< 
loan to help a poor person to get a bank loan or refuse to 
give a Guarantee to these whom they consider non-deserving 
capes. In short, the sarpanch an^ ^ village leaders have a 
coni^iderable influence' in selection tho schemes ns veil fs 
the beneficiaries for the schemes. How they use this pov.'er, 
however, depends on thpir underrtnndino of the problems of 
the poor and their attitude towards the poor. 
3'] 9 
The village leaders are too concerned about their own 
problems to bother about the specific problems of the poor and 
that their understsndinq nbout th^ " problems of the poor also 
is limited rather prejudiced. As the dependence of the poor 
on the non-poor is the source of pov:er of the latter, the 
latter is not likely to do much to help the needy poor. Usually, 
the Sprpanch and other leaders ?»re not likely to u«e their 
influence in favour of the weaker sections. The BERTHAL 
Sarpanch, for example, has not given a guarantee to any poor 
person so far. The .SIKRI • sgrpanch does not believe in 
giving guarantee to any migrants (livina in his village for 
the last 10-15 years) oi? even in i-lentifying them as poor as 
he thinks that they are not reliable. The APAUN , Sarpanch 
thinks that some '16w caste persons are disobedient to him 
nnd it will be dangerous to help them in qr>tting any scheme 
for the poor •. 
The .IMLANI sarpanch feels that it is very risky to 
give loan to very poor families. According to him unskilled 
labour for wages is the best work for them. 
CONCLUSION 
Our discussion in thie ch?>pt'^ r clearly shown that 
the mode of implementation of the I-^ D pronr.-'mr.er does not 
sepm to be capable of reaching th-^  lov est strata of the rural 
0 ' 
society. In fact. It tends to support leakages and favours 
those poor who are favoured by the existing system. The 
three main agents of Implementation, namely, the development 
administration, the bank and the Panchayat have different 
objectives in impleinenting the special programmes. The 
administration is interested in reaching the targets, the 
banks are interested in the business and the Panchayat members 
etc, are interested in maintaing their special position. In 
the process no special attention is paid to reaching the real 
poor. The likely resul't is then the selective impact of the 
special programmes. 
P;tflTIClPATION & N0N»PARTICIAPTI0N 
By participation we mean t^ing up of different schemes 
for the poor by different households. That Is, are talking 
of a very simple type of participation by households on indlv-
dual basis. Our main emphasis in this chapter is on examining 
the participation pattern of households. However, we will begin 
with a brief study of scheme-wise and arcawise participation 
in order to emphasize the selective nature of the ijnpact of 
the special progranmes for poverty alleviation. 
SCHEMEWISE PARTICIPATION IN TOE PRC3GRAMMES; 
There are wide differences between the targets and 
achievments in both ttiQ districts. This seems to be due to the 
enphasis on the targets. The Table 8.6 shows that a very llmite< 
number of scheme;,were inqpl^nented during 1978-79 and 1983-84 
in Kamal and Allgarh against a target of 22 and 23 Schemes 
resp>ectlvely. 
Some schemes have done very poorly in both the districts. 
These schemes are relating to irrigation, crop protection, tools 
and Improved tools. The only scheme /.which has done better than 
the targets is the milch animal scheme in both the Districts, 
It seems that the schemes which are easiest to Implement 
have bdone the best. That is, the schemes which are easily 
acceptable to the poor, are cheap and therefore acceptable to 
the banks, have done the best. While the schemes which are 
costly, which Involve a collective action or which involve effo-
rts on the part of the extension staff to make them acceptable to 
the 
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poor, have done poorly as such schcrrios are not easily acceptable 
either to banks or to the,-poor. Consequently, the schemes rela-
ting to irrigation, introduction of the new technology in agric-
ulture, (new inputs, crop protection tools, improved tools etc.) 
and relating to information dissemination to the poor farmers 
(farmers' training, demonstration farms, management help etc.) 
have done poorly in both the Districts. Unfortunately these 
are the schemes which play an important role in bringing about 
technological change in agriculture and contribute substantially 
to the process of developrnent and to the incomes of the household. 
The schemewise allocation of the total targets is supp-
osed to have been made to.achieve development of different sectors 
and to bring about desirable increase in the incomes of the poor. 
The achievement pattern, however, indicates indifference 
of the implementors to these objectives. The adhoc considerations 
of the implementors result in the most unsystematic pattern of 
achievement, 
THE VILLAGEMISE PICTURE: 
Table 8,6 gives information about the implementation of 
the various schemes in the selected four villages. It shows that 
only a limited number of schemes were introduced in the villages. 
Imlani (A) harl 11 shcemes, Adaun (A) had 16 schcmps, while Berthal(K 
end Sikri (K) had 15 and 17 schemes respectively. 
The milch animal scheme is the most successful scheme in 
tern.s of number of beneficiaries in these villages. 
In the cancl irrigated arens of Berthal (K) and Sikri (K) 
the other schcmes introduced are the schemes relating to inputs, 
agricultural kits, bullocks, small shops and business, etc. In 
Adaun (A) where the well is the main source of irrigation, the 
beneficiaries of the well/pump schemes are large in number. 
( 
The other schemes introduced in the villages are the 
small shops/business, crafts such as making leafplates, bamboo 
work, bullock carts etc,etc. It is\ interesting to note that 
even in these irrigated villages, certain agricultural schemes 
like demonstration farms, farmers' training, co-operative irri-
gation, agricultural tools etc. have not acquired any popularity. 
This seems to be mainly due to the fact that such schemes are not 
easy to implement - especially among the weaker sections. 
Thus it seems that even though the villages have the infr-
astructural facilities and the institutional support required for 
the implementation the number of schemes introduced has remained 
extremely low and superficial. 
The socio-economic characteristics which are likely to 
influence the participation of a household in the IRD programmes 
appear to be the occupation of the household and the land held 
by it, the consumption level of the household, the caste, the 
literacy level and the power status of the household. However, 
the households which are placed in a favourable position as far 
as these characteristicsi'arc concornccl, but which are not poor 
according to the specific definition of the IRD programmes are 
also likely to take advantage of the schemes if they can have 
an acccsy to Lhcm. In othor won^ i , lhor<- ir. ponr.lMlity of 
leakages of these programmrs to the n o n - p o o r . Lot us first 
examine the nature and extent of the leakages and the socio-
economic characteristics of these non-poor beneficiaries. 
O r' 
rj 'i 3 
LEAKAGES IN PARTICIPATION; 
Basically, -the leakages of the programmes to the non-
poor can occur in two ways: (a) the non-poor manage to iden-
tify themselves as poor households (due to thr losseness of 
the definition of the poor) , or (b) they get the scheme for 
themselves under the name of some poor households. 
A non-poor household can manage to identify itself as 
a poor household in a number of ways. If the household owns 
more than 5 acres of land, it can divide the land, on paper, 
among its different members and call all the members small 
or marginal farmers. The land of the household can also be 
put under the ownership of one person and others can call 
themselves agricultural labourers, A non-poor household can 
also call itself poor by not reporting its non-agricultural 
income earned by some members in service or business. 
The second way by which leakages occur is that when a 
non-poor uses a poor person, a servant, a dependent or a poor 
distant relative to take \)p a scheme. In such a case, the 
benefits of the scheme go to the non-poor household while the 
person under whose name the scheme is taken either gets some 
reward or does not get anything at all. It was found that some 
times indebted poor did this for their employers who had lent 
them money. 
It was abserved that the Patwaris or the V D N ' S (special 
progrernnir s) were not unaware of these Irakages, The Patwaris 
not only knew but were also forced to give the required land 
certificates to the rural rich about their land holdings. The 
VLW also knew and helped in the l^akaqos willingly or \inwillingly, 
'J 4 J 
We identified and estimated both the types of leakages 
I 
by using different methods, Firet of all, we acquired the 
list of the landholdings and their owners in the village from 
the Patwari. We, then, identified ^n the holdings of the 
members belonging to the same households. When the owners 
were minor or were the wives of the husband (who also owned 
some of the family land) and called themselves as SF/MF, we 
covered them under the definition of leakage. We also checked 
whether the different members .had a common kitchen or were 
living separately as different households. If such households 
were found taking advantage of the IRD programmes, we put them 
as leakages of the programmes. 
* The Sarpanchs of Berthal (K) and Sikri (K) villages have used 
this way to allow their relatives to take advantage of the IRD 
Programmes, 
Secondly, we investigated the activities of different 
members of a participant,household to check its non-agricultural 
income. If the non-agricultural income of the household was 
more than RL, 2400/- per year, we c a l l e d them as l e akages of the 
programmes. 
To top the second type o f l e akage s , we at tempted t o 
i d e n t i f y the non-poor households who used some poor pe rsons to 
acqu i r e asse ts under the IRD proqran ii r;. Wo flir3 t h i s by check-
i n g two th ingss where the a s s e t was k e p t and who was l o o k i n g 
after it. If a non-poor household did both these things, we 
t 
cov e r ed ifc under l e a k a g e s . 
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TABLB NO.8.8 
i S m S S S m 9<fWPAT;9NS 
OP* SSRVICS SDSINjBSS OTHBHS TOTAL 
IMUNI 12 4 - 1 17 
(70.68) (23.62) ( 6.88) (100.00) 
ADAUN 20 12 t 4 - 36 
(SS.S5) (33.33) (11.11) 
i* 
(100.00) 
mm -PI ST W W « 
BSRTHAL 14 7 3 - 24 
(68,33) (29.16) ^(12.5) (100.00) 
SIKRI 23 4 6 32 
(71.87) (12.8) (10.00) (100.00) 
NOTSs •Leakages Include those which are based on 
the looseness of the entitled households as 
well as those which are based on the use of 
the poor • for the benefit of the non-poor. 
Figures In the brackets Indicate percentages. 
TABLE NO. 8.9 
iSAKAQSS Ai^ P. <?AgTI8 
BHAHHAN JAT THAKUB KDSIIMS YADAV OTKEBS TOTAL 
IKUNI 
ADAUN 
4 
(23,52) 
8 
(47.06) 
5 17 
(29.41) (ICQ) 
20 4 4 8 36 
(55.55) (11.11) (11.11) (22.22) (LOO) 
KAIP^AI PIgTMCT 
BERTHAL 3 20 
(12.25) (83.33) 
SIKRI 4 12 
(12.25) (37.5) 
13 
(40.62) 
1 24 
( 4.42) (100) 
3 32 
( 9.37) (100) 
dJ ; 
It must be pointed out that it was not always very easy 
to identify the leakages through the above methods. However, 
our familiarity with the, local situation helped us considerably. 
Table 8,7 gives infonriation about the nature and extent 
of leakages in the four villages, A striking feature of the 
Tdble e,7 is a high level of the leakages ( % of the non-poor) 
taking up the programmes in all the villages. The percentages 
being 23,75% in Imlani (A), 28,45 in Adaun (A), 29.70% in 
Berthal (K) and 22,14% in Sikri (K) . 
The occupation-wise picture of the leakages show that 
among the non-poor, big farmers take the maximum advantage of 
( 
the schemcs for the poor, followed by the families engaged in 
various services. Some trading families also take the advan-
tage of these schemes, (Table 8,8) The castcwise picture of 
the leakages, shows that the Thakurs and the Jats take maximum 
advantage of the looseness of the definition and of their power 
\ over the Patwaris, the VIW and the poor. 
The percentage of leakage for the Thsikurs is 55,55 in 
Adaun (A) , for the Jats 83,33 in Berthal (K) and for the Muslims 
and th6 Jats 40,62 and 37.5 respectively Sikri (k) and 
in Imlani (A) , The Muslims and the Jats constitute the dominant 
castes in this village. They have got nearabout equal share of 
the ledcages. The Brahmins have got 12.75% and others 9,37% 
leakages, (Table 8,9) 
In short, some big landholders as well as some high 
caste households have been able to take the benefits of li^ 
programmes for* the poor by unfair means. The main schemes 
in which the non-poor have taken part are irrigation, oil engine/ 
electric pumps and also the milch animal schemes. 
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It is found that a large number of households which are 
poor according to the definition under the special prograrrrres 
and are therefore entitled for the programmes are not really 
poor if we consider the povertyline constunption level. The 
( 
percentages of the poor household to the total entitled house-
holds are 78,00 in Adaun (A) , 78.8 in Berthal (K) , 64.88 in 
Silcri (K) and 75.60 in Imlani (A) .( Table 8.10 ) This indi-
cates that the special programmes cover a large number of non-
poor under their purview. 
Consequently, the lion's share of the special program-
mes has gone to the non-poor (leakages also have contributed 
to this) . The percentage of non-poor participants in Berthal (K) , 
Sikri (K) , Imlani (A) and Adaun (A) are 61.95, 47.91, 46.26 and 
48.43 respectively. (Table 8.10) . 
The crux of the poor are naturally left out of the special 
programmes. As the statfement shows, the percentages of the real 
poor participating in the special programtres in Adaun (A) , 
Berthal (K) , Sikri (K) and Imlani (A) are 31.88, 16.27, 53.19 
and 46.75 respectively. '(Table 8.10) . 
*> r d J J 
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PATTERN 
OF PARTICIPATION BY HOUSEHOLDS. 
The fators that are likely to influence the participation 
of a household in the IRD programmes are: 
I 
(a) the occupation of the household and the land held by it. 
(b) the consumption level of the household, 
(c) the caste of the household, 
(d) the pov«r status of the household. 
The occupation and the landholding of the household are 
likely to influence the participation of the household in a 
number of ways. Firstly, the size of the land held by a house-
hold influences its accessibility to the credit market as a 
reasonable si7-e of the land can be xisod as a security against 
which a loan can be taken for the special programmes. Secondly, 
the occupation or the size of the holding influences the economic 
status of the household which may influence its accessibility to 
the information about the IRD prograrrme, which, in turn, will 
influence its participation in the programmes. The consumption 
level of a household, which is of cource related to its land and 
the occupation, may also influence the participation as the cons-
umption level or the level of living determines the capacity 
of the household to repay the loans taken up under the special 
I 
progranmcs. If the consumption level of a household is relatively 
high, not only the household itself will be in a position to repay 
loans, but others - the bank, the VLW and the non-poor that are 
likely to provide guarantees for bank loans - will also think 
the household is capable of taking up the special prograirires 
which may help in its participation, A higher consumption level 
also implies a higher economic status and a better accessibility 
or ' 
to the information about the 
prograrmes and to the prograirme 
implementors. 
The caste of a household determines its social status 
and thereby its accescibility to the higher castes who have 
the knowledge about the special programmes as well as consid-
erable power to help a household in taking up any scheme. The 
caste also influences the accessibility of the household to 
the patwari/ the VIW and other staff who are expected to help 
I the poor in taking up the schemes for the poor. 
The power status of a household is expected to determine 
its exposure and contact with the outside world, A powerful 
( 
household therefore can itself know about the progranmes and 
how to take up a scheme for itself without depending on others. 
A higher power status is likely to improve the social status 
i' 
as well as awareness and confidence of a household which may 
improve its accessibility to the special schemes for the poor 
also. 
NON-PARTICIPATION 
The IKD programme strategy also has not been able to 
change this basic process of percolation of economic growth. 
The families that do not participate in these prograjrmes are 
generally those who have small or no land, who belong to lower I 
castcs and who enjoy the lowest living standards and power 
status in the rural social hierarchy. 
The guestion that arises now is why do not these poor 
I 
participate in the programmes for the poor ? What arc the 
factors that come in the way of their participation ? Why are 
not they coming forward to toko a'-Vc-intane of the spf^cial prog-
rammes when special arrangements are made for them to participate? 
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We shall to try to answer these questions by investigating 
in depth the problems of non-participants. 
NON-PARTICIPANTS: THOSE WHO TRIED TO PARTICIPATE AND THOSE 
WHO DID NOT. 
We have divided the non-participants into two parts: 
those who tried to participate and failed; and those who did 
not try at all. 
Though all the infrastructural facilities are availa-
ble inboth group 'A* and 'B* villages and the institutional 
support is conplete for participating in the prograinmes non-
participation for the last 5 years or more, is quite high. It 
is highest not in Groupr'B' where the level of development is 
relatively low but in Group 'A* where comir.ercialised agricult-
ure has made the village prosperous. About 70,52 of the poor, 
(i.e. those who are entitled to take part in the IRD programmes) 
in this group of villages are not participating in the progra-
mmes. This percentage is 53.11 i^n Sikri (K), 54.83 in Imlani(A) 
and 51% in Adaun (A) and in Berthal (K) . 
The percentages of the poor that tried to participate also are 
not high. It is 20.58 in Sikri (K) , 38.09 in Berthal (K) , 
36,66 in Adaun (A) and 41,17 in Imlani (A) C^ 'able 8,11) , 
A large number of the non-participants think that they 
arc ronulrec' to meet the snrrnnch if they want to apply. It 
is surprising that many of them do not know that they have in 
addition to the Sarpanch, to meet the VLW (for the special 
programmes) or the Patwari also for this purpose. This reflects 
the typical psychology of the villagers that the sarpanch is the 
most pov;crful person and he is tho one who can holp thrni. It 
0 r 'J : 
appears that the main reason for this limited knowledge is 
that the poor have not received any systematic information 
about the programmes through proper channel. The main sources 
of information is hearsay, gossip in the village. More than 
60% of the non-participants in these villages have come to 
know ^about the schemes through this source. It shows that 
(1) the VLW has not been able to reach the poor even in provi-
ding the information about the pirogrammes and (2) the sarpanch 
to whom a large number of poor look up for help, has not played 
any important role in spreading the information about the prog-
rarrmes for their upliftmpnt. Some of the non-participants want 
the schemes not for the income generation (it is secondary) as 
such, but to acquire a cheap-subsidised asset which also has a 
good resale value. Some non-particiants have no faith in the 
system. There is a deep frustration and also deep anger along 
with a strong sense of helplessness. These poor feel that the 
government and the panchayat cannot help them because these orga-
nisations do not want to help them. They seem to be convinced 
that the rural elite are not in the least interested in using 
their power in helping the poor. 
The net result is that the poor remain indiffrent to the 
income-employment generating progrojiuno;;. They find it better 
to remain as they are. This is what Galbraith calls "accommo-
dation" of the poor. Again, the poor prrccivc the schemes meant 
for them not exactly the way the planners do. The plannrrs assume 
that th^ poor want the asset based income/imployment schemes will 
enable them to improve their levels of living, gradually, which, 
in turn, will enable them to get into the mainstream of the 
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economy. However, the poor think in a totally different fashion. 
They do not want the schemes mainly to run them smoothly and to 
reach higher levels of Income but to sell off the assets if the 
need arises or for immediate gains. Again, the time horizon of 
the poor is short as the poor are more concerned about their 
problems of the present than the long run gains in incomes. 
ASPIRATIONS OP NON.PARTICIPATION; 
We measured the aspirations of the non-participants with 
I 
the help of the ladder technique. According to the ladder tech-
nique, a ladder with 10 steps is drawn where the steps indicate . 
indicate different levels of living. The lowest step indicates t 
the poorest level according to the respondent and the highest 
step indicates the most prosperous stage, accoring to the respo-
ndent's thinking. We, then, asked\im on which step he is at 
present, and on which step he was five years ago and on which 
step he thinks be would be five years latter. The answers to 
those questions would tell us about their aspirations. 
The main results of the investigation are expressed in 
Table 8.12. It seems that the majority of the non-participants 
are optimistic about the future in the sense that they think that 
they would be on a higher level of living after five years. Such 
positive aspirations were expressed by 90% of the non-participants 
in Imlani (A), 49,27% in Adaun (A), 44.90?/= in Berthal (K) and 
75,25% in Sikri (K) , It must be noted that the percentage of 
the families with positive aspirations are relatively low in 
Berthal (K) and Adaun (A) . They hoped that the government would 
help them by giving free household site moratorium of debt. 
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Antayodays type of help, or employment at a reasonable wage-
rate. 
Around 18% to 45% of the families felt that their 
position will not improve even in future. A small fraction i' 
of them even thought that their position would deteriorate. 
It c5)peared that high inflation, inc'ebtedness, helplessness 
and lack of faith in the present system \-jere the main reasons 
for these negative feelings. It must be noted that the poor 
had clear reasons to give for their negative aspirations. It 
was not a preference for leisure, but the constraints and the 
experiences of a series of frxistrations that were behind their 
• > negative answers. 
I 
What expectations do the non-participants have about 
their future. They want surety and regularity of some minimum 
income which can assure them their basic needs of life. What I 
bothers them most is that they do not get enough regular income 
to maintain themselves. This results either in starvation, 
S, 
especially in the slack season or in borrov/ing from others. 
Borrowing involves either land mortgaging or paying high inte-
rest rates in repa^ m^ient by vrarking at less than the market wage 
rate. It also involves swallowing insults and abuses also. 
The extent of unilateral dependance of the poor on the 
non-poor is dearly expressed in Table 8,13 , It shows how 
the non-participants face contingencies of their life and on 
whom do they depend in such strained circumstances. Table 8,13 
sho 
ws that majority of the non—participants, would borrow from 
their employers, shopkeepers, bio farnic rs, or relatives to meet 
an emergency. These borrowings involve land mortgaging, pa^-ment 
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o f i n t e r e s t , o r repayment i n wage .Iribour, tVir l u n t b e i n o i he 
most common p r a c t i c e . 
A l l the terms o f borrov/ino ore u n f a v o u r a b l e to the p o o r 
as ( a ) l and m o r t g a g i n g r e s u l t s i n a d r a s t i c r e d u c t i o n i n farm 
income and i s a l s o o f t e n a s t e p i n the d i r e c t i o n o f l and s a l e , 
( b ) r a t e s o f i n t e r e s t s a r e a lways on a h i g h s i d e , and ( c ) r e p a y -
ment i n wage l a b o u r r e s u l t s i n t o no t o n l y l o w e r than the market 
wage r a t e , b u t a l s o i n v o l v e s f o r c e d l a b o u r . 
I t sf^ems tha t i f the repay i i\nts a re not made i n t ime, the 
consequence s are s e r i o u s . The l e n d e r s e i t h e r cha rge compound 
r a t e o f i n t e r e s t o r f o r c e d wage l a b o u r from the members o f the 
b o r r o w e r ' s f a m i l y ( T a b l e 8,13 . I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h e r e f o r e 
t h a t v;hat b o t h e r s the p o o r most i s t h e i r low income and t h e i r 
h e l p l e s s dependence on the l e n d e r s ( i . e . b i g f a r m e r s , s h o p - k e e p e r s 
and money l e n d e r s ) to meet t h e i r b a s i c needs . 
Thp r eason o f the n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n seems to be the 
n e g a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f the r u r a l r i c h . The p o o r o f the s tudy 
v i l l a g e s were h i g h l y c r i t i c a l o f the a t t i t u d e o f the r u r a l e l i t e . 
I n A l i c a r h v i l l a g e s o f I m l a n i (A) and Adaun ( A ) , 57.37% o f the 
r e s p o n d e n t s r e p o r t e d t h a t the r u r a l e l i t e were no t h e l p f u l and 
7.18% r e p o r t e d t h a t they knew n o t h i n g about i t as they had know 
p e r s o n a l ' e x p e r i e n c e i s t h i s r e g a r d . In K a r n a l d i s t r i c t v i l l a g e s , 
52.34% o f thr r e s p o n d e n t s reportof" ' t ho t the a t t i tv :de o f the r u r a l 
e l i t e was no t o n l y h e l p f u l b u t h o s t i l e . ( T a b l e 6 .14 ) anc s i r rd l a r 
was the a t t i t u d e o f the ^pb l i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s l i k e the Sarpanch , 
The S a m i t i P r e s i d e n t , M . L . A . and I ' . P . e t c . . who h e l d the r j r a l 
power s t r u c t u r e . ( T a b l e 8 .15 ) . The p o s i t i v e d i cou rage i r en t g i v e n 
by t-h' sr r u r a l o l i tP* to 1 o r< r;n 11 i nq in t hr- n o n - p o r t i c i p o t ion 
f^ P n 
rdi 
o f about 10 to 76% o f the n o n - p a r t i c i n o t i ^ . I t i s not t h a t 
a l l t h e s e f a m i l i e s a re d i s c o u r a g e d . In r e a l i t y , some o f them 
j u s t f e e l t h a t they w i l l be d i s c o u r a g e d i f they t r y to take up 
the schemes, and t h e r e f o r e , they arc n o t even t r y i n g to take 
up the schemes. 
The ways i n which the emp loye r s ( b i g f a r m e r s o r i n f l u -
ent i .^1 p e r s o n s ) d i s c o u r a g e the p o o r are many. F i r s t o f a l l , 
t h e y t e l l the p o o r t h a t the schemes ar?- no t good f o r them as 
they are n o t c a p a b l e o f runn ing them p r o f i t a b l y ; they a l s o 
t h r e a t e n t h a t i f the p o o r g e t i n t o any mess ( d e b t s , f o r example ) , 
they w i l l no t be h e l p e d b y the r i c h . T h i s d i s c o u r a g e s the p o o r . 
S e c o n d l y , Llv r i c h p u t a number o l o b s t a c l e s in the way o f the 
p o o r by n o t g i v i n g g u a r a n t e e , by n o t rcconsTending the name o f 
the VLW o r by a s k i n g the banks not t o lend the l o a n s . T h i r d l y , 
the i rural e l i t e ask the P a t w a r i o r the vLW no t to p r o c e s s too 
many a p p l i c a t i o n s o f the, p o o r f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p r o g r a -
mmes, The r i c h h e l p them i n meet ing the t e r g e t s by a l l o w i n g 
l e ak a^e s , 
The n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s argued t h a t the r i c h would not 
a l l o w them to d e v e l o p b e c a u s e , then they would no t have many 
l a b o u r e r s to work on t h e i r f a r m s . They w i l l n o t have women-
f o l k o f the p o o r to work i n t h e i r househo lds? a l s o i f the p o o r 
d e v e l o p and l e a r n to s tand on t h e i r own f e e t , the r i c h w i l l not 
be a b l e t o use them i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r own power and s t a t u s , I 
THE IMPLEMENTING MACHINERY AIJD THE FCCR; 
I t v/ i l l ne t be o u t o f p l a c e l .ere to cxaminf^ s e p a r a t e l y 
the n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s ' vif^w regarc\ing the covornment s t a f f , bank 1 
s t a f f , panchaya t members e t c . I t w i l l throw l i g h t no t o n l y on 
fj r> 
the e x t e n t o f the "knowledge o f the p o o r r e g a r d i n g the v a r i o u s 
s t a f f b u t i t w i l l a l s o r e f l e c t t h e i r a c c e s s t o s t a f f and t h e i r 
e x p e c t a t i o n from the s t a f f . 
T a b l e 8 ,16 g i v e s a b r oad p i c t u r e o f the n o n - p a r t i c i -
p a n t s ' knowledge and a c c e s s i b i l i t y to the s t a f f i n the f o u r 
v i l l a g e s . The f i r s t t h i n g t h a t s t r i k e s most i s t h a t the p o o r 
have v e r y l i m i t e d knowledge about the s t a f f . The b e s t known 
p e r s o n s a re the Sarpanch and the P a t w a r i , 
The nex t known p e r s o n s are the 3C/ST Panchaya t members; 
f o l l o w e d by the secre ta r ,y and Chairman o f the l o c a l m i lk 
c o o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t y . The o f E i c e r s l i k e the VUA' ( a g r i c u l t u r e ) , 
the v L W - s p e c i a l programmes, the F33 Chairman and the o t h e r s are 
knov/n to a v e r y sma l l f r a t i o n o f the n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s : I t must 
b e noted t h a t the VLW ( s p e c i a l programmes) who i s e xpec t ed to 
implement the prograir.mcs i s knownv^to n o t more than 25% o f the 
n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s i n any v i l l a g e : 
Even when the n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s know about the s t a f f , no t 
a l l o f them have met the s t a f f . Cn ly a v e r y f e w o f them have 
asked f o r h e l p o r g o t any h e l p from them ( T e b l e ) , I t i s 
i ndeed v e r y r e v e a l i n g that o n l y 5 to lO'ji o f tlie; n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s 
have approached the Sarpanch f o r h e l p , h a r d l y 2 to 3% have 
approached the VIW s p e c i a l prograr^rres f o r h e l p , and l e s s than 
1% o f the n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s have a;^proached banks f o r h e l p . 
The n o n - a c c e s s i b i l i t y o r the n o n - a p p r o a c h a b i l i t y o f the 
s t a f f t o the n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s a p p e a r s to be a l s o due to the 
f a c t t ha t n e i t h e r the se s t a f f t r y to approach those p o o r nor 
the p o o r have the c o n f i d e n c e and Cf i i raqf^ t o ppp roach the i r , 
'iMio powf-r finfl UT"' ponLt-lori of Ihr- niril rich on Mie- onr 
p n 
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hand, and the h e l p l e s s n e s s o f p o o r on the o t h e r hand w i l l 
n o t a l l o w the b e n e f i t to p e r c o l a t e to the p o o r e s t to any 
s i g n i f i c c n t e x t e n t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the re w i l l a lways be a 
s i z e a b l e n o n - p a r t i c i a t i o n even i n d e v e l o p e d and s o - c a l l e d 
p r o g r e s r . i v e a r e a s . 
The v i l l a g e - w i s e p i c t u r e shov/s t h a t the h i g h e s t d e g r e e 
o f n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n and a l s o f r u s t r a t i o n o f the p o o r i s found 
n o t i n m o d e r a t e l y d e v e l o p e d I m l a n i (A) and S i k r i (K) b u t i n 
• the h i g h l y d eve l oped v i l l a g e s o f E e r t h a l (K) and Adaun (A) , 
' ^h is s e sn s to be due t o two r e a s o n s : I r r i g a t i o n has r a i s e d 
the a s s e t s and the incomes o f a number o f f an r . e r s , however , 
the v e r y sma l l f a r m e r s and l a n d l e s s l a b o u r e r s have n o t g a i n e d 
much Crom t h i s . They t h e r e f o r e f e e l f r u s t r a t e d a g a i n each o f 
the Group ' A ' v i l l a g e s ha s o n l y one dominant c a s t e , the J a t s i n 
B e r t h a l (K) and the Thakurs i n Adaun (A) , t h e r e f o r e are i n a 
s t r o n g e r p o s i t i o n t o p r e v e n t the b e n e f i t s o f growth f rom g o i n g 
t o the l o w e s t s t r a t a i n t h e i r v i l l a g e s . T h i s p e r h a p s i m p l i e s 
t h a t the h o l d o f the r i c h on the p o o r i n c r e a s e s w i t h economic 
T 
growth and t h a t the s p e c i a l progrerrrres which are e x p e c t e d to 
improve the c o n d i t i o n o f the p o o r are p e r h a p s i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r 
f r u s t r a t i o n . 
THE s o l e c t r d v i l l m e s o c i e t i e s a re not homogeneous. 
The re a re ma in ly th r ee t ypes o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s o f the s o c i e -
t i e s b a s e d on c a s t e , c l a s s and p o w e r . As these s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s 
a r e o v e r l a p p i n g the r e has emerged a sma l l g roup o f h o u s e h o l d s 
i n each v i l l a g e which h o l d s l a r g e h o l d i n g s , b e l o n g s to h i gh 
c a s t e s and has a c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e i n the d e c i s i o n making 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f the v i l l a g e . T h i s g r o u p , v b i c h can b e c a l l e d 
the e l i t e o r the r u r a l r i c h has c o n s l r i c r : i b l c |r>o\ror on the f u n c -
'J I c' 
- t i o n i n g o f the deve lopment , who c o n t r o l a lmost a l l r u r a l d n s t i t -
u t i o n s , a a m i n i s t r a t i o n , c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s e t c . 
I t seems t h a t the p a t t e r n o f l and d i s t r i b u t i o n , the 
c a s t e s t r u c t u r e and t h e v i l l a g e p a n c h a y a t have a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
i n f l u e n c e on the f u n c t i o n i n g o f the v i l l a g e e conomie s . A l l o f 
them t o g e t h e r have i n f l u e n c e d the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f income and 
p r o d u c t i v e r e s o u r c e s and the p a t t e r n o f l e v e l s o f l i v i n g i n 
t h e v i l l a g e s . I t seems t h a t the s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s o f the v i l l -
age s o c i e t i e s h e l p the b e n e f i t s o f g rowth to f l o w t o w a r d s those 
who are i n a f a v o u r a b l e p o s i t i o n as r e g a r d s c a s t e , c l a s s and 
p o w e r . 
The mode o f imple,mentation o f the s p e c i a l programmes 
f o r the p o o r has no t changed t h i s b a s i c p a t t e r n o f p e r c o l a t i o n 
o f b e n e f i t s . I n f a c t the t h r e e a g en t s o f the imp l ementa t i on , 
namely , the deve lopment a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the banks and the 
p a n c h a y a t s t r u c t u r e , f u n c t i o n i n such a way t h a t they tend to 
s t r e n g t h e n the e x i s t i n g power s t r u c t u r e and the s e l e c t i v e n a t u r e 
o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the s p e c i a l programmes. I t i m p l i e s t h a t 
t h e r e i s a good amount o f l e a k a g e o f the programmes to the 
n o n - p o o r . 
'J § -
The reason o f the n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n s c c p s Lx-' be the 
neg t i v c a t t . i tude o f the r u r a l r i c h . The p o o r o f the study 
v i l l a g e s were h i g h l y c r i t i c a l o f the a t t i t u d e o f thp r u r a l 
e l i t e . In A l i g a r h v i l l a g e s o f I inlani (A ) and Adaun (A) , 
57.37% o f the r e spondents r epo r t ed t h a t the r u r a l e l i t e were 
n o t h e l p f u l and 7.18% r epo r t ed tha t they knew noth ing about 
i t as t h e y had know p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e i n t h i s r e g a r d . I n 
K a r n a l d i s t r i c t v i l l a g e s , 52.34% o f the r e spondents r epo r t ed 
t h a t the a t t i t u d e o f the r u r a l e l i t e was not o n l y h e l p f u l b u t 
h o s t i l e , ( T ab l e 8,14) and , . s imi l a r was the a t t i t u d e o f the p u b l i c 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s l i k e the Sarpanch, the Scsniti P r e s i d e n t , M . L . A . 
M . P . e t c . who he ld the r u r a l power s t r u c t u r e . ( T a b l e 8.15) The 
p o s i t i v e d icouragement g i v e n by these r u r a l e l i t e seems to be 
r e s u l t i n g i n the n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f about .10 to 26% o f the 
n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I t i s not t h a t a l l these f a m i l i e s are d i s c o -
u r a g e d . I n r e a l i t y , some o f them j u s t f e e l t h a t they w i l l be 
d i s c o u r a g e d i f they t r y to t ^ e up the scheines, and t h e r e f o r e , 
they a re no t even t r y i n g to take up the schemes. 
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CHAPTER - 9 
SWiMARY, CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
INTRCDUCTION 
Economic P o l i c y does n o t f u n c t i o n i n a vacuum. I t o p e r a t e s 
i n a d e f i n i t e s o c i a l sys tem. I t i n f l u e n c e s the s t r u c t u r e 
and f u n c t i o n o f s o c i e t y . A t the same t ime the s o c i a l s t r u -
c t u r a l f u n c t i o n a l f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c e the f u n c t i o n i n g o f 
economic p o l i c y . 
Economics by i t s q u a n t i t a t i v e approach can answer the q u e s t -
i o n "who" g e t s " w h a t " . But i t f a i l s t o answer the q u e r r y 
"How" and "Why" one g e t s and the o t h e r d o e s n ' t . The answers 
t o 'How' and 'Why* f a l l ' i n the domain o f s o c i o l o g y . Hence 
t h e r e l e v a n c e and r a t i o n a l e o f s o c i o l o g y o f economic p o l i c y . 
We have d i s c u s s e d the s o c i o l o g y o f^ economic p o l i c y w i t h p a r t -
i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to p o v e r t y and i n e q u a l i t i e s i n the d i s t r i b u t -
i o n o f deve lopment b e n e f i t s i n the f o u r s tudy v i l l a g e s o f 
A l i g a r h and K a m a l d i s t r i c t s . 
P o v e r t y i n I n d i a i s b a s i c a l l y a r u r a l p r o b l e m . And i n r u r a l 
a r e a s , i t i s l a n d l e s s a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r e r s and r u r a l a r t i s a n s , 
i n g e n e r a l , and the Schedu l ed C a s t e s and the Schedu l ed T r i b e s , 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , who c o n s t i t u t e the hard c o r e o f the p o o r . Any 
s t r a t e g y f o r t h e a l l e v i a t i o n o f p o v e r t y s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , b e 
examined w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to the se s e c t i o n s . 
The e a r l i e r f i v e y e a r p l a n s had g e n e r a l l y p roceeded on the 
a s sumpt ion t h a t the normal p r o g r a n m e » o f deve lopment would 
p r o d u c e a m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t and t h e r e b y g e n e r a t e employment 
and r a i s e the l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f the p o o r . I n s p i t e o f n any 
n i u l t i - f a c e ted p o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n p r o g r o rnnes , p r o g r e s s i n 
t h i s r e g a r d , ha s not been u p t o the m a r k . 
"J i 
The p r e v a l e n c e o f p o v e r t y and i n e q u a l i t y has remained v i r t u a l l y 
unchanged o v e r the y e a r s . 
T h i s r a i s e s a b a s i c q u e s t i o n : where have we gone wrong i n o u r 
e f f o r t s ? . Have we gone wrong i n the d i a g n o s i s o f r u r a l p o v e r t y , 
i n p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n o r i n imp l ementa t i on? . The p r e s e n t s tudy 
a t t e m p t s t o answer these q u e s t i o n s b y examin ing the p e r f o r m a n c e 
o f one m a j o r r u r a l deve lopment s t r a t e g y namely. I n t e g r a t e d R u r a l 
Deve lopment Programmes s t r a t e g y . 
The main r e a s o n f o r s e l e c t i n g t h i s s t r a t e g y i s t h a t i t i s a 
m a j o r s t r a t e g y o f o u r p l a n n e r s a iming a t e r a d i c a t i o n o £ r u r a l 
p o v e r t y , 
I 
New p e r s p e c t i v e i n deve lopment have come to be e s t a b l i s h e d as a 
p a r t o f new deve lopment th in l c ing . These c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d 
a s f o l l o w s . 
( 1 ) An i n c r e a s e i n GNP o r i n p e r c a p i t a income i s no t l i k e l y 
t o r each the p o o r . A d i r e c t a t t a c k on p o v e r t y i s needed 
t o e r a d i c a t e p o v e r t y , A m i c r o - l e v e l approach would b e 
e f f e c t i v e i n t h i s r e s p e c t , 
( 2 ) Income d i s t r i b u t i o n and employrr'ent p o l i c i e s must be i n t e -
g r a l p a r t s o f p r o d u c t i o n p l a n s . 
( 3 ) A l l t h i s may need a d r a s t i c r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f p o l i t i c a l 
and economic power r e l a t i o n s h i p i f deve lopment has to 
sprcocl t o the v a s t m a j o r i t y o f p o p u l a t i o n . 
I n p o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n programmes imp lementat ion i s a s e r i o u s 
p r o b l e m . T h i s becomes a more impo r t an t i s s u e , when, w i t h o u t 
c h a n g i n g the power s t r u c t u r e , q iirorjr.niiiic; ii3 i n t roduced f o r the 
on "J / 
l e a s t p o w e r f u l g r o u p s o f t h e s o c i e t y f o r p r omot ing e q u i t y . 
P r e s s u r e f o r muta t i on can be ^ p l i e d a t the c h o i c e o f p r o j e c t , 
t h e c h o i c e o f t e c h n o l o g y , the c h o i c e o f p r o j e c t imp lementa t ion 
a g e n t . 
I n t h i s r e g a r d , t h e f o l l o w i n g tvA3 g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s can be made, 
( 1 ) I n c l a s s s o c i e t i e s , the p o l i c i e s o r the programmes o f the 
gove rnment a r e execu ted i n such a f a s h i o n as n o t t o a l t e r the 
e x i s t i n g unequa l and p o v e r t y - r i d d e n s t r u c t u r e o f the s o c i e t y , 
( 2 ) Even when a government adopts a p o l i c y o r programme v ^ i c h 
s p e c i f i c a l l y aims a t r e d u c i n g t h e e x i s t i n g i n e q u a l i t y and p o v e r t y 
o f t h e s o c i e t y , i n g e n e r a l t h o s e p o l i c i e s o r programmes a r e i m p l e -
mented i n f a v o u r o f .,the c o m p a r a t i v e l y b e t t e r o f f s e c t i o n s , 
> 
New s t r a t e g y has f a i l e d t o i d e n t i f y and a t t ack the c o n s t r a i n t s 
o f the p o o r t h a t come i n the way o f t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i n 
t h e i r way o f r unn ing the schemes s u c c e s s f u l l y . In o t h e r wo rd s , 
s ometh ing seems t o be wrong w i t h the d i a g n o s i s o f r u r a l p o v e r t y 
and the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n u n d e r l y i n g the t a r g e t group o r i e n t e d 
s p e c i a l programmes. There i s d e f i n i t e l y a need to t ake a f r e s h 
look at th« problems* 
V7e th ink t h a t the m a j o r l i m i t a t i o n s o f 
t h e s t r a t e g y a r e l i k e l y t o be i n t h r e e a r e a s : (1 ) The s t r a t e g y 
h a s n o t i d e n t i f i e d and a t t a c k e d the r e a l p r o b l e m s o f the p o o r . 
T h a t i s , i t l o c k s a p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the na tu r e o f p o v e r t y . 
{?.) The s t r a t e g y shows a l a c k o f p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the r o l e 
o f the e x p l o i t a t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f ou r r u r a l economy in i n f l u e n c i n g 
t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f xrurnl dcvelopniont proqrnirimcn. (3) The p o l i c y 
f r a m e o f the s t r a t e g y i s p a r t i a l i n the sense t h a t i t a t t empts 
rj { J 
t o e r a d i c a t e p o v e r t y o n l y by a t t a c k i n g a p a r t o f the p r o b l e m s . 
T h a t i s , i t does no t r e a l i s e t h a t the r u r a l p o v e r t y i s a c o n s e -i' 
quence o f the o v e r a l l f u n c t i o n i n g o f the r u r a l economy and i t 
c a n be e r a d i c a t e d o n l y by a t o t a l approach t h a t m o d i f i e s the 
f u n c t i o n i n g o f the economy. 
The p r e s e n t s tudy i s a c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l , i n t e r r e g i o n a l and i n t e r -
d i s c i p l i n a r y s t u d y . I t makes an attempt tov/ards u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between a g r a r i a n s t r u c t u r e , i n e q u a l i t i e s 
and p o v e r t y in a r e g i o n a l c o n t e x t . I t i s a s y n t h e t i c s tudy o f 
economic a s p e c t s o f s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e and s o c i o l o g i c a l a s p e c t s o f 
economic s t r u c t u r e o f the s e l e c t e d v i l l a o e . 
O b v i o u s l y , i t has a c l o s e r e l o v a n c e to p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n ; and 
i t s imp lementat ion towards a l l e v i a t i o n o f p o v e r t y and e l i m i n a t i o n 
o f i n e q u a l i t i e s o f income and w e a l t h among the v a r i o u s a g r a r i a n 
c l a s s e s . The s o c i o l o g y o f economicv ,po l icy i m p l i e s the s o c i o l o g i c a l 
f o r c e s t h a t i n f l u e n c e c e r t a i n i n s t rument s o f economic p o l i c y and 
t h e i r imp lementa t ion p r o c e s s in the f u c t i o n i n g o f r u r a l economy 
t h a t d e t e rm ine s the o p e r a t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n o f such f o r c e s . 
The v i l l a g e s o f A l i g a r h and K a r n a l were s e l e c t e d because they have 
bi cn ( lADP) D l n t r i c t s . Mnny o t h o r dovolopmont nnd p o v e r t y a l l e v i -
a t i o n programmes have been implemented i n the se d i s t r i c t s . Our 
o b j e c t i v e was t o examine how i n s p i t e o f w e l l d e v e l o p e d i n f r a s t r -
u c t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s and Green R e v o l u t i o n in the d i s t r i c t s and a 
v i g o r o u s a n t i - p o v e r t y programme, a m a j o r segment o f r u r a l s o c i e t y 
h a s f a i l e d to r i s e above the p o v e r t y l i n e . I t i s because o f s t r -
u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l f a c t o r s which have been s i d e t r a c k e d by t h e 
p l a n n e r s ? . 
^ 7 ^  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ' ' ^ 
VJe s t u d i e d the ag ro - economic f e a t u r e s o f the tv.o d i s t r i c t s 
o f A l i g a r h and K a r n a l , Out o f the two s e p a r a t e l i s t s o f b l o c k s 
i n the two d i s t r i c t s , the b l o c k s which seemed to be un ique o r 
d i s t i n c t i v e i n a g r i c u l t u r a l f e a t u r e s f rom the norms were removed. 
1 
From the b l o c k s i n the l i s t s , one b l o c k was s e l e c t e d randomly 
i n each o f the d i s t r i c t s , ,Two l i s t s o f a l l v i l l a g e s o f the two 
b l o c k s were p r e p a r e d . Out o f t h e s e l i s t s a f t e r d i s c u s s i o n w i t h 
t h e b l o c k a u t h o r i t i e s v i l l a g e s where some u n u s a l f e a t u r e s o v e r 
350 h o u s e h o l d s we re a l s o e l i m i n a t e d f rom the l i s t . 
The s tudy o f f o u r v i l l a g e s was c o n s i d e r e d adequate i n v i e w 
o f the r e l a t i v e homogenei ty o f the b l o c k s . The re were 1140, 
c u l t i v a t i n g as w e l l as n o n - c u l t i v a t i n g , h o u s e h o l d s i n t h e s e 
2 
v i l l a g e s . A l l o f them have been s t u d i e d i n t e n s i v e l y . In t h i s 
r e g a r d , v i l l a g e and househo ld s c h e d u l e s were p r e p a r e d f o r e l i c -
i t i n g r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n ! 
The wo rk ing heads o f t h e h o u s e h o l d s and a l l r u r a l b u r e a -
u c r a t s concerned w i t h the r u r a l deve lopment programmes, more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y IRDP, were i n t e r v i e w e d f o r the p u r p o s e . About 10 
t o 12 weeks were d evo t ed to c o l l e c t i n g d a t a i n each v i l l a g e . 
F o r a s s e s s i n g the c a s t e , c l a s s , povter, s t a t u s o f the f a m i l y 
m u l t i - s t a g e s t r a t i f i e d p u r p o s i v e random samp l ing t e chn ique s we re 
u s e d i n the n tudy . D a t a f o r the s tudy was c o l l e c t e d d u r i n g 
Sep t embe r 1978 - Augus t 1979 and aga in d u r i n g O c t o b e r 1983 -
December 1984. 
Our m a j o r emphas is was on d i s c u s s i o n . I t needed an i n d e p t h 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the v i l l a g e economy and i t s s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e as 
i t s m a j o r o b j e c t i v e was to b u i l d up an u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e g a r d i n g 
t h e i n e q u i t o u s pov;er s t r u c t u r e w i t h a l l i t s s o c i o - p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c 
nn"! 'D i : 
r a m i f i c a t i o n s in the v i l l a g e s . I t was a l s o e s s e n t i a l t o g a i n 
< 
p e r c e p t i o n o f the n a t u r e and e x t e n t o f economic d i s p a r i t i e s and 
r e s u l t a n t p r o b l e m s , f e a r s , h o p e s , e x p e c t a t i o n s o f the e x p l o i t e d 
and the n e g l e c t e d segments o f t h e r u r a l s o c i e t y . 
The c r u x o f the r e s e a r c h i s t o s u b s t a n t i a t e the t h e s i s t h a t 
p o v e r t y i s n o t o n l y a p rob l em o f p r o d u c t i o n economics b u t o f p r o -
d u c t i o n economics b u t o f s b c i o l o q y o f d i s t r i b u t i o n as w e l l . 
I n t e r v i e w schedu le was employed i n t h i s . s tudy to o b t a i n i n f o -
r m a t i o n f rom the r e s p o n d e n t s . Two d r a f t s c h e d u l e s were e d i t e d , 
m o d i f i e d and f i n a l i s e d . The f i r s t appendix c o n t a i n e d q u e s t i o n s 
b a s i c a l l y concerned w i t h the a g r i c u l t u r a l a s p e c t s o f r u r a l l i f e . 
The second Append i x c o n t a i n e d q u e s t i o n s on r e s p o n d e n t s ' c a s t e , 
c l a s s and power p o s i t i o n , amount o f deve lopment b e n e f i t s and t h e 
l e v e l s o f l i v i n g o f a g r a r i a n c l a s s e s , the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f h o u s e -
h o l d s b e l o w the p o v e r t y l i n e e t c . A s e p a r a t e i n t e r v i e w s c h e d u l e 
was used to o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n f rom the B lock e x t e n s i o n s t a f f on 
t h e p r o b l e m s . The i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n ^ b y the r e s p o n d e n t s was s u i t -
a b l y supp lemented and e d i t e d th rough p e r s o n a l o b s e r v a t i o n and 
c r o s s c h e c k s . 
In o r d e r t o s tudy c a s t e h i e r a r c h y , a l a r g e number o f j u d g e s 
r e p r e s e n t i n g d i f f e r e n t c a s t e g roups in each v i l l a g e , were asked 
t o rank the s t a t u s o f a l l the c a s t e s o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e v i l l a g e s 
i n the f o u r h i e r a r c h i c a l groups."^ Based upon median and q u a r t e l e 
v a l u e s o f r a n k i n g o f each c a s t e , a l l the c a s t e g roups were d i v i d e d 
i n t o f o u r h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r a t a . We have s t u d i e d c l a s s h i e r a r c h y by 
u s i n g compos i t e i n d e x b a s ed on l and o w n e r s h i p , income and o c c u p a t i o n . 
The t o t a l v a r i a t i o n between the h i g h e s t and the l o w e s t amount 
o f l a n d owned b y the r e s p o n d e n t s in each v i l l a g e was d i v i d e d i n t o 
10 e q u i d i s t a n t c a t e g o r i e s . These were ns::ignecl s c o r e s 1 to 10; 
Or^o J i :• 
1 f o r the l o w e s t and 10 f o r the h i g h e s t l and s i z e c a t e g o r y . The 
F 
t o t a l v a r i a t i o n i n the h o u s e h o l d income i n each v i l l a g e was d i v i d e d 
i n t o 10 e q u i d i s t a n t c a t e g o r i e s . These were a s s i g n e d s c o r e s 1 t h r o -
ugh 10, 1 f o r t h e l o w e s t and 10 f o r the h i g h e s t income c a t e g o r y , A 
l a r g e g r oup o f v i l l a g e r s b e l o n g i n g t o d i f f e r e n t o c c u p a t i o n s and 
c a s t e g r o u p s were asked t o rank a l l the o c c u p a t i o n s f o l l o w e d i n 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e v i l l a g e s i n t o 6 h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r s . These we re 
a s s i g n e d to rank a l l the o c c u p a t i o n s i n t o 6 h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r s . 
These were a s s i g n e d s c o r e s 1 th rough 6, 1 f o r the l o w e s t and 6 f o r 
t h e h i g h e s t r anked o c c u p a t i o n s . Based upon the t o t a l v a l u e s o f 
r a n k i n g , a l l t h e o c c u p a t i o n s we re d i v i d e d i n t o 10 e q u i d i s t a n t c a t e -
g o r i e s s c o r e s 1 through 10 were a s s i g n e d to them: 1 f o r the l o w e s t 
and 10 f o r the h i g h e s t ranked o c c u p a t i o n s . I f the members o f a 
h o u s e h o l d f o l l o w more than one o c c u p a t i o n , the s c o r e s o f a l l such 
o c c u p a t i o n s were averaged t o o b t a i n o c c u p a t i o n a l s c o r e s o f t h a t 
h o u s e h o l d . 
We have employed compos i t e index f o r t h e s tudy o f c l a s s h i e r -
a r c h y and t h r e e v a r i a b l e s i . e . 1and,^ income and o c c u p a t i o n we r e 
t a k e n as i n d i c a t o r s o f o n e ' s c l a s s p o s i t i o n assuming t h a t t h e y are 
r e l a t i v e l y more s t a b l e . Such an ^ p r o a c h has made i t p o s s i b l e t o 
have a p i c t u r e o f c l a s s s t r u c t u r e independent o f the s u b j e c t i v e 
v i e w o f c a s t e . 
As a second s t e p , the s c o r c s o b t u i n r d b y n r e spondent on the 
above two measures were sunmed u p . The maximum s c o r e s t h a t a 
respondent could obtain on two measures were 20, Based upon the 
s c o r e s t h u s o b t a i n e d b y a l l the r e s p o n d e n t s i n each v i l l a g e , median 
was computed and the r e sponden t s were a c c o r d i n g l y c l a s s i f i e d I n t o 
h i g h and l ow deve lopment b e n e f i t c a t e g o r i e s . 
-J S 
In o r d e r t o f u r t h e r s u b s t a n t i a t e ou r h y p o t h e s i s , t\^KD 
supp l ementa ry r reasures o f d e v e l o p n e n t b e n e f i t s , namely i n c -
r e a s e i n a s s e t s ^ ^ and b e n e f i t s f rom s o c i a l a m e n i t i e s were 
a l s o u s e d . To have an e s t i m a t e o f the i n c r e a s e i n the v a l u e 
o f a s s e t s d u r i n g the ^ r e f e r ence yreriod, we have c o n s i d e r e d 
a g r i c u l t u r a l as w e l l as n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l a s s e t s . The a c t u a l 
v a l u e o f a s s e t s was rounded o f f t o the n e a r e s t m u l t i p l e o f 
Pw.SOO/- and I s c o r e p o i n t was a s s i g n e d to each such u n i t s . 
The b e n e f i t s r e c e i v e d f rom such s o c i a l a m e n i t i e s were 
measured as the p e r c e n t a g e o f the programme f o r which the 
r e s p o n d e n t r e p o r t e d b e n e f i t s t o the t o t a l number o f such 
programmes a p p l i c a b l e t o h i s v i l l a ' : } e . Eased upon the s c o r e s 
o b t a i n e d by a l l the r e s p o n d e n t s i n each v i l l a g e , the median 
was computed. A c c o r d i n g l y , the r e s p o n d e n t s were d i v i d e d i n t o 
h i g h and low b e n e f i t c a t e g o r i e s . 
As the p r e s t i g e d imens ion has a l r e a d y been c o n s i d e r e d i n 
t h e s tudy o f c a s t e , we f o l l o w e d p o s i t i o n a l approach i n the 
s t u d y o f powe r , ^ 
Then we have used consumpt ion e x p e n d i t u r e d a t a r a t h e r 
income d a t a i n o u r a n a l y s i s o f consumption m a i n l y b ecause 
t h e e s t i m a t e s o f consumption e x p e n d i t u r e a rc l i k e l y t o be 
more a c c u r a t e than the income est im.ates i n r u r a l a r e a s . We 
u s e d d i f f e r e n t r e f e r e n c e p e r i o d s f o r d i f f e r e n t s e t s o f c o n s -
umpt ion i t ems so t h a t r e c a l l would no t c r e a t e any s e r i o u s 
p r o b l e m i n e s t i m a t i o n . Consumption o f each i tem waa d i v i d e d 
i n t o two p a r t s . Consumption o f homegrown q u a n t i t y and 
consumpt ion o f pu r chased q u a n t i t y . The homegro^im q u a n t i t i e s 
w e r e c o n v e r t e d i n t o v a l u e terms by u s i n g the p r e v a i l i n g r e t a i l 
I 
p r i c e s o f the i t ems i n the l o c a l marke t . 
AGRARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTUREi POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
A g r a r i a n s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e i s t o r n between the d u a l f o r c e s 
o f c a s t e and c l a s s . I n f a c t , t h e r e i s conve rgence o f bo th -
c a s t e b a s e d f o r c e s and c l a s s b a s ed f o r c e s . Whether we ^ o p t 
con tc bnr.crl r o r c c s o r clcinr. H N N C I Torf^CR., W H C ( - H ' ~ - R W G V L O Y I T 
c a s t e model o r c l a s s model , i ndependent use o f e i t h e r l e a d s t o 
h a l f t r u t h . I t i s b e c a u s e f o l l o w i n g the c l a s s model we a r r i v e 
a t d e c i s i v e s e m i - f e u d a l i s t i c f o r c e s which have in g e n e r a l a l s o 
r o o t s i n the a s c r i p t i v e s o c i a l system, whereas u s e o f c a s t e model 
b e t r a y s u s f rom the r e a l i t y o f a g r a r i a n s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e whn i t 
f a i l s t o e x p l a i n the c a u s e s o f economic m a l a d i e s i . e . P o v e r t y , 
I n e q u a l i t y and e x p l o i t a t i o n . So to say , c a s t e - c l a s s continuum 
as s u p e r - s t r u c t u r e can j u s t l y e x p l a i n as t o what i s h appen ing a t 
» 
m i c r o l e v e l s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . Power becomes mere d e r i v a t i o n . 
I t becomes s imp ly a t o o l f o r p romot i on , p r o t e c t i o n and p r e s e r v -
a t i o n o f i n t e r e s t s , s t a t u s and p r x v e l e g e s . Any change o f g r e a t e r 
i m p l i c a t i o n can o c c u r o n l y when t h e r e i s a change i n the p a t t e r n 
o f owne r sh ip o f l and as a r e s o u r c e s in the a g r a r i a n s o c i e t y . An 
• i n t e r d i s c r i p l i n a r y p e r s p e c t i v e i s a must f o r t h i s k ind o f i n v e s t -
i g a t i o n . 
In t h i s c h e a t e r 
an at tempt has been niadc to exaniine the d a t a 
i n the l i g h t o f the m a n i f e s t and l a t e s t t e n d e n c i e s i n the a g r a -
r i a n s t r u c t u r e s o f the s tudy v i l l a g e s . 
n o "J '-J -
We v i s u a l i s e the l e v e l o f l i v i n g as a l e v e l o f s a t i s f a c t i o n 
o f the needs o f the p e o p l e a s s u r e d by a g i v e n f l o w o f goods 
and s e r v i c e s i n a u n i t o f t i m e . On t h i s b a s i s , we choose 
( 
a s e t o f components wh ich , i n o u r judgement , a r e c a p a b l e o f 
r e p r e s e n t i n g the v a r i o u s a s p e c t s o f the l e v e l o f l i v i n g . The 
components chosen shou ld be c a p a b l e o f c o v e r i n g as f a i r as 
1 
p o s s i b l e the whole t a n g i b l e spectrum o f human needs i f they 
a r e t o s e r v e as an adequate r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the c o n c r e t e 
r e a l i t y o f l i v i n g . A f t e r s e l e c t i n g a p p r o p r i a t e components 
and i n d i c a t o r s , we p r o c e e d t o c o n s t r u c t i n d i c a t o r i n d i c e s , 
B e s i c a l l y , the s ' ize o f h o l d i n g and the l e v e l s o f l i v i n g a re 
i n t e r - d e p e n d e n t and i n t e r r e l a t e d . T h e r e f o r e , t h e l e v e l s o f 
l i v i n g o f an a g r a r i a n s o c i e t y a r e the d i r e c t r e f l e c t i o n o f the 
a g r a r i a n s t r u c t u r e which i n i t s t u rn r e f l e c t s the c o n t r o l o f f 
t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l w e a l t h i n d i f f e r e n t p r o p o r t i o n s by d i f f e r e n t 
c l a s s e s o f r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n . 
A c c o r d i n g to o u r e s t i m a t e , h o u s e h o l d s h a v i n g income b e l o w 
Ki, 01 ,41 p e r c a p i t a p e r month a rc b e l ow Lhc p o v e r t y l i n e . 
T h i s ' p o v e r t y l i n e * i s n o t t o be i n t e r - p r e t e d as a ' s t a r v a t i o n * 
l i n e . I t i s t o be i n t e r p r e t e d r a t h e r as a l e v e l o f consuirpt ion 
b e l o w which i t i s p o s s i b l e t o e x i s t , b u t a t reduced l e v e l s o f 
a c t i v i t y , e f f i c i e n c y and r e s i s t a n c e t o d i s e a s e . 
The overage consuniption l evc l y j o f aq r i cu Itnr.-i l l a b o u r e r s a re 
s t i l l b e l o w the p o v e r t y l i n e i n a l l the f o u r v i l l a g e s and the 
p e r c e n t a g e s o f a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r houscholr l s l i v i n g b e l o w 
p o v e r t y l i n e a r e q u i t e h i g h . The p e r c e n t o g e s a re 80,39 i n 
B e r t h a l (K) and 75 ,20 i n S i k r i (K) , 59,59 i n Adaun (A) which 
o o o 
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a r e comparable w i th 83.33 i n Im l an i (A) . ( T a b l e 5 ,1 ) i n d i c a t i n g 
t h a t a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r e r s have b e n e f i t t e d o n l y m a r g i n a l l y by 
I r r i g a t i o n and modem fa rm t e c h n o l o g y . 
T r ade and s e r v i c e s are the o ccupa t i on s where the i nc idence o f 
p o v e r t y i s low i n a l l the f o u r v i l l a g e s . Almost 46.95% o f the 
h o u s e h o l d s in Im l an i (A) are b e l o w the p o v e r t y l i n e hav ing l e s s 
than Rs. 81.41 p e r c ^ i t ^ p e r month consurtption e x p e n d i t u r e as 
a g a i n s t 61.60% in Adaun (A) 47% in S i k r i (K) and 63.23% in 
B e r t h a l (K) ( T a b l e 5 . 1 ) . A l so 12.19% o f the househo lds in 
I m l a n i (A) a re hav ing more than Rr,. 200 p e r month p e r c a p i t a 
consumption e x p e n d i t u r e w h i l e the same p e r c e n t a g e s are 13.09 
f o r Adaun ( A ) , 12 f o r S i k r i (K) and 12.94 f o r B e r t h a l (K) . 
Thus the impact o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l development o f a g r i c u l t u r e has 
been d i f f e r e n t i a l on d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s o f the v i l l a g e s o c i e t i e s . 
There were a f ew f a m i l i e ' s i n each o f the v i l l a g e s who were i n 
a f a v o u r a b l e p o s i t i o n as r e g a r d s t h e i r c a s t e , c l a s s and powe r . 
T h e s e f a m i l i e s o f r u r a l e l i t e b e l o n g e d t o t h e h i g h e s t consump-
« 
t i o n e x p e n d i t u r e g r o u p s . They inc luded the f a m i l i e s o f the 
s a r p a n c h , the deputy sarpanch, the o t h e r un re se rved s ca t h o l d -
e r s o f the v i l l a g e panchayats the^ chairmen and the s e c r e t a r i e s 
o f the F3S, the MLAs and the MPs e t c . f rom the v i l l a g e s . 
A l l t he se f a m i l i e s be l onged t o h i g h c a s t e s and owned l a r g e l ands , 
Such househo lds a r e 12, 16, 24 and 20 in I m l a n i , Adaun, B e r t h a l 
and S i k r i r e s p e c t i v e l y ( T a b l e 5 .3 ) . 
O n l y 348 (29 .82%) househo ld r j i n n i l LIk' v i ] l i .MO.s h o v e c l c c t r i c 
l i g h t w h i l e 428 (37 ,54%) h o u s e h o l d s h a v e p i p e d d r i n k i n g v/a t e r . 
O n l y 24 (4.54%) and 12 (2,27%) l a n d l e s s laJ^ourers h a v e e l e c t r i c 
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l i g h t and p i p e d d r i n k i n g w a t e r f a c i l i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y , whereas 
P9 .65% o f b i g f a r m e r s have e l e c t r i c l i g h t and 94.59% have 
p i p e d w a t e r f a c i l i t y . T h i s i n d i c a t e s a h i g h l y skewed d i s t r i -
b u t i o n o f i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s ( T a b l e "5.4) . 
A g r i c u l t u r e r l a b o u r e r s spend Rr, 19 .57 , and b i g f a r m e r s Rs.474.16 
p e r househo ld p e r annum o f r e p a i r and ma in t enance . 
The f r e q u e n t l y e x p r e s s e d concern f o r the e r a d i c a t i o n o f p o v e r t y 
and g e n e r a t i o n o f employment h a s l e d t h e Government t o i n i t i a t e 
I 
s e v e r a l p o l i c i e s and programmes, the more impo r t an t o f which 
a t the moment a r e the I n t e g r a t e d R u r a l Deve lopment Prograirme, 
and R u r a l Employment Programme. The main components o f the 
s t r a t e g y adopted so f a r have been the r a t e o f g rowth and the 
g e n e r a t i o n o f a d d i t o n a l employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s , d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of assets t o the rural poor, i nve s tment in human c a p i t a l 
t h r o u g h e d u c a t i o n and t r a i n i n g , a r e a s p e c i f i c schemes and 
t a r g e t g roup o r i e n t e d programmes such as the SFDA, IRDP, NREP, f 
RLEGP, the Minimum Needs Programme. 
The e a r l i e r f i v e y e a r p l a n s had g e n e r a l l y p r oceeded on the 
a s sumpt ion t h a t the normal programmes o f deve lopment p a r t i c u -
l a r l y tho se unde r t aken i n r u r a l a r e a s , l i k e t h o s e i n a g r i c u l -
t u r e , i r r i g a t i o n , i n d u s t r i e s , e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n , t r a n s p o r t and 
con.municat ions , would p roduce a m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t and t h e r e b y 
g e n e r a t e employment and r a i s e t h e l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f the p o o r . 
The u t t e r f a i l u r e o f the abovementioned " t r i c k l e dovm s t r a t e g y " 
t o p roduce any v i s i b l e impact on the economic c o n d i t i o n o f the 
w e a k e r s e c t i o n s l e d t o the a d o p t i o n o f a t a r g e t group approach 
f r o m the Four th P l a n , The o b j e c t i v e was to p roduce a d i r e c t 
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i m p a c t on the economic s t a t u s o f the m r a l p o o r . I t s t a r t e d 
v?ith the Sma l l Farmers Developmfi-nt Agency (SFDA) and has 
m u l t i p l i e d s i n c e t h e n , Thfe m u c h - p u b l i c i s e d I n t e g r a t e d R u r a l 
Deve lopment Programme o f t h e s e days i s a d i r e c t o f f s h o o t o f 
t h e SFDA. 
A n a t i o n a l ' scheme f o r T r a i n i n g R u r a l Youth f o r Se l f -Employi r .ent 
was , i n i t i a t e d by the C e n t r a l Government i n Augus t , 
1979 as a p a r t o f the IRDP. The scheme aims a t e q u i p p i n g the 
r u r a l youth v/ith n e c e s s a r y s k i l l s and t e c h n o l o g y so as t o 
e n a b l e them t o t a k e up ' se l f - employn>ent . Only youths b e l o n g -
i n g to tJte f a m i l i e s o f t h e IRDP t a r g e t g roup , i . e . t h o s e b e l o w 
t h e p o v e r t y l i n e and i n . t h e a g e - g r o u p o f 18 - 35 y e a r s a r e 
e l i g i b l e . The scheme e n v i s a g e s o r g a n i s a t i o n a l and o p e r a t i o n a l 
l i n k a g e s w i t h o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s so t h a t s u p p o r t i n g s e r v i c e s 
a r e a l s o p r o v i d e d t o the t r i a i n e e s a t the a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e . 
W i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the IRDP to a l l the b l o c k s i n the 
c o u n t r y i n O c t o b e r , 1980, the SFDA programme was merged v/ith 
t h e f o r m e r and a new agency c a l l e d DRDA was s e t u p . The IRDP 
i s s i m i l a r t o the SFDA programme i . e . i t i s a t a r g e t g roup , 
a g e n c y - o r i e n t e d , s u b s i d y - c u m - c r e d i t - b a s e d programme o f s e l f -
\ % 
employment . The re a r e , however , some d i f f e r e n c e s betv/een the 
two programmes i n terms o f c o n t e n t s , c o v e r a a e and emphas i s , 
S 
F i r s t l y , w h i l e the c o v e r a g e unde r 'the SFDA i s c o n f i n e d to a g r i -
c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , the n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r , i n c l u d i n g i n d u s -
t u r a l and t e r t i a r y s e c t o r s , h a s nov; been b r o u g h t under the 
p u r v i e w o f the IRDP, S e c o n d l y , the e m p h a s i s under the IRDP 
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i s n o t on p r o v i d i n g j u s t some kinci o f a s s i s t a n c e and a c h i e v i n g 
t h e t a r g e t o f an i m p r e s s i v e number o f b e n e f i c i a r i e s b u t on * r 
p r o v i d i n g s u b s t a n t i a l a s s i s t a n c e to the i d e n t i f i e d p a r t i c i -
p a n t s which shou ld i n c r e a s e t h e i r incomes t o a s i g n i f i c a n t e x t e n t 
so t h a t thoy CTOSS, once f o r a l l / the ' p o v e r t y l i n e * . T h i r d l y , 
w h i l e unde r the SFDA, even among the members o f the ' t a r g e t 
g r o u p * who w i t h r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e r l and h o l d i n g s d e r i v e d maximum 
b e n e f i t s , under the IRDP the Antyodaya approach has been r e c o -
I 
mmended i n r e g a r d t o the s e l e c t i o n o f the b e n e f i c i a r i e s under 
wh i ch the p o o r e s t o f the p o o r a re t o be s e l e c t e d f i r s t , ^^jiother 
m a j o r d e p a r t u r e i n the new programme o f the IRDP i s t h a t f a m i l y 
i s the b a s i c u n i t o f deve lopment and economic prograrr jres have 
t o b e d e v i s e d f o r the f a m i l y as a w h o l e . In A p r i l , 1977, the 
C e n t r a l Government launched a n a t i o n - w i d e "Food f o r Work P r o g -
ramme" (FWP) . Under t h i s programme, wages were t o be p a i d in 
t e r m s o f f o o d - g r a i n s . 
S i n c e Oc tobe r 1980, the Food f o r Work Frogranme was renamed 
a s the N a t i o n a l R u r a l Employment Programme (NREP) and made a 
p a r t o f the f i v e y e a r p l a n . The NREP, l i k e the FVJP, p r o v i d e s 
supp l ementa ry employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o w o r k - s e e k e r s d u r i n g 
t h e l e a n p e r i o d o f the y e a r . I t aims a l s o a t c r e a t i n g d u r a b l e 
community a s s e t s , ^ ^ a r t f rom c a s h , wages a re a l s o p a i d i n 
I 
f o o d g r a i n s ( 1 k g . ) so as t o r a s i e the n u t r i t i o n a l s t anda rd 
o f the r u r a l p o o r , V 
A new programme named as the R u r a l L a n d l e s s Employment G u a r a -
n t e e rrogramme (RLEGP) v/as launcli-'^d on 15th Augus t , 1983. The 
b a s i c o b j e c t i v e s o f t h i s programrm. are ( ! ) to improve and 
expand employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r r u r a l l a n d l e s s w i th a v i e w 
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t o p r o v i d i n g employment f o r a t l e n s t one member o f e v e r y l a n d -
l e s s l a b o u r househo ld up to 100 day s in a y e a r and ( i i ) to 
c r e a t e d u r a b l e a s s e t s f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g r u r a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e 
wh i ch w i l l l e a d t o r a p i d growth o f r u r a l economy. The C e n t r a l 
Government meets the e n t i r e oxprenc l i tu re on t h i s programme. 
The F i f t h F i v e Year : P l a n i n t r o d u c e d the Minimum Needs Programme 
w h i c h aimed a t p r o v i d i n g f r e e o r s u b s i d i z e d s e r v i c e s th rough 
p u b l i c a g e n c i e s so as t o improve the consumption l e v e l s o f t h o s e 
l i v i n g b e l o w the p o v e r t y l i n e . T h i s approach was c a r r i e d th rough 
f u r t h e r i n the shape o f t h e R e v i s e d Minimum Needs Programme 
e n u n c i a t e d in the S i x t h and the Seventh F i v e Y e a r P l a n s , w i th i' 
a s u b s t a n t i a l s t e p - u p i n the quantum o f r e s o u r c e s . The p r o g -
ramme c o v e r s e i g h t i t ems : e l e m e n t a r y e d u c a t i o n , r u r a l h e a l t h , 
r u r a l w a t e r supp l y road's, r u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n , hous ing a s s i s -
t a n c e to r u r a l l a n d l e s s l a b o u r e r s , env i r onmenta l improvement 
o f u r ban slums and n u t r i t i o n f o r sma l l c h i l d r e n . The t o t a l 
o u t l a y f o r the Minimum Needs Prograrrime was to the tune o f 
R.S. 5,827 c r o r e s d u r i n g the S i x t h P l a n and Seventh P l a n , 
of t h i s , r u r a l w a t e r s u p p l y , r u r a l r o a d s , e l e m e n t a r y e d u c a t i o n I 
and r u r a l h e a l t h g o t a l a r g e r p a r t o f the o u t l a y . 
The Drought-Prone Area Programme was started during the Fourth 
t 
P l a n p e r i o d i n 557 b l o c k s sp read o v e r 74 d i s t r i c t s i n the 
c o u n t r y . T h i s i s an i n t e g r a t e d ^ r c a deve lopment prograirme 
and aims a t optimum u t i l i s a t i o n o f "lar-l, v ;nter and l i v e s t o c k 
r e a s o u r c e s , r e s t o r a t i o n o f e c o l o g i c a l b a l a n c e and s t a b -
i l i s a t i o n o f incomes o f p e o p l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y tho se b e l o n -
g i n g t o the weaker s e c t i o n s . The m a j o r aim o f t h i s p r o g -
rairine has been t o merge " i n t e g r a t e d a r e a deve lopment " app -
roach w i t h " t a r g e t g r o u p - o r i e n t e d " , e f f o r t s t owa rd s p o v e r t y -
a l l e v i a t i o n . 
/ 
The D e s e r t Deve lopment rrogranimo was l aunched i n 1977-78, 
Thus we see t h a t the p o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n and employment 
g e n e r a t i o n programrrids have matured f rom t h e i r g e n e r a l c h a r -
a c t e r t o a more s p e c i f i c t a r g e t g roup and a r e a ba sed p r o g -
rammes w i t h t h e main t h r u s t b e i n g on the e r a d i c a t i o n o f 
p o v e r t y and unemployment i n r u r a l a r e a s on a n a t i o n a l s c a l e . 
I t i s admi t ted t h e s e has been o f a " l i m i t e d s u c c e s s in r e d i -
s t r i b u t i n g a s s e t s " , a l o w e r p a c e o f g e n e r a t i o n o f emplo\mient 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s and i n a b i l i t y o f l a r g e segments o f the p o p u l a -
r 
t i o n t o s h a r e i n tho b e n e f i t s o£ p r o g r c n s o f r ^ i r t i c i p a t e in 
the p r o c e s s o f deve lopment . I t admits t h a t the poo r have 
" b y and l a r g e remaintd untouched by dcvclopnient prograrmties 
so f a r " . I n s p i t e o f a l l t h e s e measures , the pe r f o rmance o f 
p o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n programmes has been p o o r t o m a r g i n a l . 
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The f o c a l p o i n t o f the p r e s e n t r e s e a r c h was : whether 
the p a t t e r n o f p e r c o l a t i o n o f deve l opment b e n e f i t s i s r e l -
a t e d w i t h s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r s . I n s p e c i f i c te rms , 
t h i s s tudy had t o examine ( i ) How i n s t i t u t i o n a l and o r g a n -
i z a t i o n a l f a c t o r s have a d e l e t e r o u s e f f e c t on the i n p l e m e -
n t a t i o n o f economic p o l i c y f o r p o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n ( i i ) t o 
e n c e r t a i n whethe r deve lopment b e n e f i t s a re d i f f e r e n t i a l l y 
d i s t r i b u t e d 7 ( i i i ) t o de t e rmine whethe r s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l 
f a c t o r s a re r e l a t e d w i t h deve lopment b e n e f i t s ( i v ) t o exam-
i n e the r o l e o f c l a s s i n the p e r c o l a t i o n o f deve lopment 
b e n e f i t s . 
A number o f deve lopment programmes implemented i n the 
s t u d y v i l l a g e s v;ere o f f e r i n g bo th t e c h n i c a l and m a t e r i a l 
h e l p i n d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s o f developm.ent f o r a s s e t b u i l d i n g 
and i n c r e a s i n g income and employment i n o r d e r t o r a i s e the 
t a r g e t g roups above the p o v e r t y l i n e . Deve lopment b e n e f i t s 
w e r e , t h e r e f o r e , measured i n terms o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a -
t i o n s adopted and m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e r e c e i v e d by the house -
h o l d s . Supp lementa ry measures o f the deve lopment b e n e f i t s 
such as i n c r e a s e i n a s s e t s and b e n e f i t s f rom s o c i a l ameni -
t i e s were a l s o c o n s i d e r e d i n o r d e r t o s u b s t a n t i t e the 
f i n d i n g s . 
The q u e s t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the d e v e -
lopment b e n e f i t s was s t u d i e d by t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
f i r s t the f a c t u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the b e n e f i t s and then 
p e r c e p t i o n o f the b e n e f i t s r e c e i v e d . 
The basic assumption that there is a differential dist-
ribution of the development benefits was found valid (Tables 
7,1 through 7,4) . The interquartile range of 25.51 and 
36,24 for composite development benefit scores and adoption 
of improved technology scores respectively, as against total 
score range of 100, were suggestive of a high degree of 
heterogeneity among the respondents with respect to the dev-
lopment benefits. Likewise, the distribution of material 
assistance was also found to be highly uneven and nearly half 
of the total respondents did not receive material assistance 
at all. These observations were further supported by the 
distribution of increased assets and benefits reported from 
social amenities, Thef results of 'Z* test ( p ,01 in all 
cases ) indicated significant different benefit categories. 
Also data indicated differential perception of the develop-
ment benefits received by them (Table 7,5) ( This proves our 
hypothesis No, 2 ) , 
Let us now find out whether^.the differential percolation 
of the development benefits was influenced by stratification. 
On examlng the relationship between caste stratification 
and the development benefits in the first place, it was noted 
that the people of higher castes received greater development 
benefits (X^ » 229, Odf = 1, ,01) (Table 7,7) obtained 
greater amount of material assistance ( F 3.517 = 27.01 
p/ ,01) (Table 7,8) witnessed grsstir increase in their 
assets ( Table 7,9 ) and reported greater benefits from 
soc ia l amcnties (X^ » 177.1, df = 1 p /_.01) Tabic 7.10) 
(Table 7.10 A & 7,10 B) of the land in these villages ? 
3 r ! 
The r e i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f s o c i a l , economic & p o l i t i c a l 
p o w e r i n a f e w h a n d s . N e a r l y a l l v i l l a g e s I n s t i t u t i o n s 
( 
a r e headed b y them. I t s l e a d s t o l e s s e r d e g r e e o f p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n by the p e o p l e p a r t i c u l a r l y the p o o r i n the d e v e -
l opment programmes so , t h e r e i s v e r y l i t t l e p e r c o l a t i o n 
o f deve lopment b e n e f i t s . 
The i n d i c e s o f b e n e f i t measures i n Group 'A* & 'B* 
v i l l a g e s c l e a r l y demons t ra te the i n e g a l i t a r i a n s t r u c t u r e s . 
I n G roup 'A* v i l l a g e s , the s h a r e o f l owe r c a s t e s i n d e v e -
lopment b e n e f i t s i s l e s s than i n Group ' B ' v i l l a g e s . I t 
o b v i o u s f rom a l l b e n e f i t measures ( T a b l e 7,11 & 7,/i ) 
An attempt was a l s o made to know we the r the o b s e r v e d 
f a c t s f i n d any s u p p o r t f rom the p e r c e p t i o n o f p e o p l e about 
t h e deve lopment b e n e f i t s r e c e i v e d by them. I t was no ted 
t h a t the h i g h e r c a s t e r e s p o n d e n t s have p e r c e i v e d "much 2 
b e n e f i t s " f rom the deve lopment programmes (X « 178 ,09 , 
2 
d f = 2 , p / ,01) , r e p o r t e d g r e a t e r income - i n c r e a s e (X = 
2 1 7 , 8 6 , d f « 5 , p / r O l ) and a t t r i b u t e d g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n 
o f t h e i r a s s e t - i n c r e a s e t o t j ie deve lopment programmes 
(X^ a 170,19, d f =« 4, .01) ( T a b l e 7 ,11 ) . ( T h i s con f i rms 
o u r h y p o t h e s i s No . 3 A . ) 
We have been conce rned w i t h d e t e r m i n i n g the a s s o c i a t i o n 
b e t w e e n c l a s s h i e r a r c h y and the deve lopment b e n e f i t s a l s o . 
Our r e s u l t s showed t h a t the p e o p l e o f h i g h e r c l a s s have 
r e c e i v e d g r e a t e r deve lopment b e n e f i t s (X^ ^ 186 .26 , d f = 
3 . p / .01) , ( T a b l e 7 ,14 ) adopted mare number o f improved 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l p r a c t i c e s (X^= 179 .9 , d f = 1, p / ,01) , ( T a t 
7 . 1 5 ) s e c u r e d g r e a t e r amount o f m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e 
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(F 3 .488 a 48 .30 , . 0 1 ) , ( T a b l e 7 . 1 6 ) , w i t n e s s e d g r e a t e r 
i n c r e a s e i n t h e a s s e t s ( T a b l e 7 .17 ) and r e p o r t e d g r e a t e r 
b e n e f i t s f rom s o c i a l a m e n i t i e s (X^ = 206 .72 , d f = 1, p / . 0 1 ) , 
( T a b l e 7 .18 ) , I n Group 'B* v i l l a g e s , the sha re o f lov/er 
f 
c l a s s e s (BPL) i s more than i n Group 'A* v i l l a g e s ( T a b l e 7 . 2 8 
and 7 .29 ) . The mean b e n e f i t s c o r e s o f l o w e r power g roup are 
c o n s i s t e n t l y h i g h e r i n Group 'B* v i l l a g e s than i n Group ' A ' 
v i l l a g e s , ( T a b l e s : 7^27 A and 7 .27 B ) . 
The o b s e r v e d v a r i a t i o n among c l a s s e s found f u r t h e r s u p -
p o r t when we examined the . r e l a t i o n s h i p between c l a s s and 
p e r c e p t i o n o f the deve lopment b e n e f i t s r e c e i v e d . I t was 
noted t h a t the p e o p l e o f h i g h e r c l a s s p e r c e i v e d g r e a t e r 
amount o f deve lopment b e n e f i t s (X^ = 201 ,59 , d f a 4, p / .01 ) 
2 
g r e a t e r i n c r e a s e i n f a m i l y income (x = 193.53, d f = 5, 
p / .01 ) , and a t t r i b u t e d g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e i r a s s e t 
increase t o the deve l6pment protrammes ( T a b l e 7,21) . ( T h i s 
s u b s t a n t i a l e s o u r h y p o t h e s i s No ,3 B) . 
T u r n i n g o u r a t t e n t i o n t o the s tudy o f r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w -
e en power and the deve l opment b e n e f i t s , we noted t h a t t h e 
p e o p l e o f h i g h e r power g roup s ecu red g r e a t e r deve lopment 
b e n e f i t s (X^ « 165 .8 , d f = 3, p ^ . 0 1 ) , ( T a b l e 7 .22 ) adopted 
more o f i np roved p r a c t i c e (X • 6 5 . 2 5 , d f « 1, p / ,01) 
( T a b l e 7 ,23 ) , h i g h e r amount o f m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e (P » 3 . 488 , 
110.78) ( • a b l e 7 
.24 ) , s ecured g r e a t e r i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r a s s e t s 
( T a b l e 7 .25 ) and r e p o r t e d g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s f rom s o c i a l ameni -
t i e s (X^ = 67 .87 d f = 1, •, p/__ .01) ( T a b l e 7 .26 ) , T h i s s u b s -
t a n t i a l e s o u r h y p o t h e s i s No, 3 c ) . 
o n ? 
The p e r c e p t i o n o f power g roups about the b e n e f i t s they 
have r e c e i v e d f rom the deve lopment programmes was a l s o 
s t u d i e d ( T a b l e 7 , 2 7 ) , The c h i - s q u a r e r e s u l t s showed t h a t 
t h e h i g h e r power g r oup p e r c e i v e d g r e a t e r deve lopment b e n e -
f i t s ( p / ,01) , g r e a t e r income i n c r e a s e ( p / .01) and a t t r i -
« 
b u t e d g r e a t e r p o r t i o n o f a s s e t - i n c r e a s e t o t h e deve lopment 
programmes, ( p / , 1 ) , T h i s l e n t f u r t h e r s u p p o r t to the 
o b s e r v e d a s s o c i a t i o n between power and the deve lopment b e n e -
f i t s ( T a b l e 7 . ) 
I t i s , however , s u spec t ed t h a t the s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l 
f a c t o r s , which were found to be a s s o r i a t e d w i t h the d e v e -
lopment b e n e f i t s , may a l s o be r e l a t e d w i t h each o t h e r . VJe, 
t h e r e f o r e , i n v e s t i g a t e d whethe r the t h r e e e f a c t o r s o v e r l a p 
o r c u t a c r o s s each o t h e r . The r e s u l t s o f c h i - s q u a r e t e s t 
i n d i c a t e d s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n be tween c a s t e and c l a s s 
2 
(X «s236.045, d f = 1, p / ,01) , b e tween c a s t e and power 
2 
(X =71 ,903 , d f = 1, p / ,01) , and between c l a s s and power 
(X^=87 .129 , d f « 1, p ^ . 0 1 ) , ( T a b l e 7 . 3 0 ) . The r e s u l t s 
pointed towards a tendency of each hierarchy to approximate t 
the other. It was, therefore, argued that the observed asso-
ciation between a stratificational factor and the development 
benefits might be due party tothe influence of the remain-
ing two factors. 
The q u e s t i o n which became r e l e v a n t was : whether each 
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the 
deve l opment b e n e f i t s when the r ema in ing two are h e l d cons t an t? 
THE r e s u l t s o f p a r t i a l ion n n n l y s l s showr<i t h a t each 
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stratlficational factor was clearly and convincingly d^le 
to assert itself when the xremaining factors were held cons-
tant ( in each case, 't' value significant, p/ ,01) 
(Table 7,31) . 
F u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n through p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n a n a l y -
s i s r e v e a l e d t h a t among the t h r e e s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r s , 
c l a s s '( r 13.24 « .574) was r e l a t i v e l y more s t r o n g l y r e l a t e d 
w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the deve lopment b e n e f i t s f o l l o w e d b y 
p o w e r ( ) ( r 13 .24 = ,32 ) and then b y c a s t e 
t o ( r 12.34 • ,257) < T a b l e 7 ,32 ) . Thus ou r h y p o t h e s i s no t e 
t h a t c l a s s i s the most impo r t an t f a c t o r t h a t i n f l u e n c e s the 
p e r c o l a t i o n o f deve lopment b e n e f i t s i s p r o c e s s , t h a t d e v e l -
opment b e n e f i t s tend to be p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h each 
o f the b s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l f a c t o r s v i z . c a s t e , c l a s s and power 
I 
independent of the remaining two was supported. (Hypothesis 
NO. ^ ) . 
Finally, we examined whether caste, class and power 
exercise greater influence in combination than they do indi-
vidually on the distribution of the development benefits ? 
The results of multiple correlation analysis showed that the 
three factors taken together explained 69.3 per cent varia-
tion in the distribution of the development benefits followed 
by two-factor sets and then by individual factors (Table 7,33) 
Among two-factor sets, the results of class-power combination 2 
were h i g h e r (R .34 • ,673) than t h e comb ina t i ons o f c a s t e -
powe r (RI^ ,24 o .633) and c l a s s - power (RI^.34 » .673) . 
T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t c a s t e , c l a s s and power r e i n f o r c e each o t h e r 
beyohd the i n f l u e n c e o f A i t h e r f n c t o r a l ono o r two f a c t o r s 
t a k e n t o g e t h e r and t h e r e i s p o s i t i v e c o r r e t a t i o n among the 
t h r e e s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a l . f a c t o r s . I t c o n f i r m s o u r h y p o t h e s i s 
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D r a w i n g upon the above f i n d i n g s , i t may be i n f e r r e d 
t h a t i n e q u a l i t i e s i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the deve lopment 
b e n e f i t s , i n g e n e r a l , a r e p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d w i t h 
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n v i z , c a s t e , c l a s s and p o w e r . T h i s s u g g e s t s 
t h a t the s t a t u s d i f f e r e n c e s among the r u r a l p e o p l e have 
bee,n a t the r o o t o f the p r o b l e m s o f uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f the deve lopment g a i n s . 
The d i l emma o f the s i t u a t i o n , nr. o u t l i n e d above , i s 
t h a t w i t h the economic deve lppment the gap be tween the 
r i c h and t h e - p o o r has w i d e n e d . The p r o b l e m i s p e r p l e x i n g 
i n t h a t economic i n e q u a l i t i e s have i n c r e a s e d i n s p i t e o f 
the p l a nn ed a t tempts to r educe them. 
There have been some a t t empts to u n d e r s t a n d the p rob l em 
1 
o f g r o w i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s r e s u l t i n g f rom p l a n n e d deve l opment . 
The e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e r eve - a l s the prominence o f s t r u c t u r a l 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m . T h i s s t r u c t u r a l approach l a y s 
e n p h a s i s on the p r e e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e as a p r i m a r y 
d e t e r m i n a n t o f the outcome o f economic deve lopment and the 
need f o r a c t i o n t o be d i r e c t e d t owa rds the weaker s i d e o f 
t h e s t r u c t u r e as a l s o t owa rd s c h a n g i n g t h i s s t r u c t u r e b e f o r e 
a c h i e v i n g deve lopment .^ 
The approach o f re l a t i n g ^economic deve loprrent w i t h 
s t r u c t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s h a s b e e n f u r t h e r ex tended by Myrda l 
i n .his c l a s s i c work " A s i a n D r o m o " . l ie h o l d s t h a t 
deve l opment does n o t seem t o r e s u l t i n the e l i m i n a t i o n 
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o f p o v e r t y and the e x i s t i n g s o c i o - e co n o mic i n e o u a l i t i e s . 
I f any th ing , i t o n l y t ends t o Intensify t he gep be tween 
t h e r i c h and the p o o r . Thus , i t i s no t so much deve lopment 
> 
programmes which p roduce change i n the s t r u c t u r e as i t i s 
t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r e which p e r m i t s e f f e c t i v e 
d eve l opment , "The p romot ion o f s o c i a l and economic e q u a l i t y " , 
a r g u e s M y r d a l . " i s a p r e - c o n d i t i o n f o r a t t a i n i n g s u b s t a n t i a l 
l o n g - t e r m i n c r e a s e s i n p r o d u c t i o n " . Th i s b e i n g the c a s e , 
when develo]^ment programmes a r e implemented v/ithout p r i o r 
o r s i m u l t a n e o u s change in the e x i s t i n g s o c i o - e c o n o m i c 
s t r u c t u r e , t h e p e o p l e e n j o y i n g h i g h e r s t a t u s a re i n a l l 
l i k e l i h o o d t o s ecu re a l a r g e r share in t h e deve lopment 
b e n e f i t s as c o m p a r e d , t o the p e o p l e o f l o w e r s t a t u s . 
The term " s t r u c t u r e " i s concerned v;ith the p r e v a i l i n g 
economic o r c l a s s s t r a t i f i c a t i o n t h a t encompasses a g r a r i a n 
I 
s t m c t u r e , income d i s t r i b u t i o n , p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s , l e v e l 
o f economic igrowth and the l i k e . Another u s a g e o f the 
term s t r u c t u r e ha s t o do w i t h s t a t u s o r c a s t e s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
The re i s y e t another impor t o f the term s t r u c t u r e w i t h i t s 
f o c u s on po\i?er r e l a t i o n s which does n o t seem t o have r e c e i v e d 
due a t t e n t i o n i n the d i s c u s s i o n o f the p r o b l e m . 
t 
These a r e , then , t h r e e meanings v;hich have g e n e r a l l y 
b e e n a t t r i b u t e d to the term s t r u c t u r e w h i l e a n a l y s i n g i t s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h economic deve lopment . However , each 
* 
s c h o l a r has attempted t o c x p l n i n the prob lom by e m p h a s i s i n g 
on a s p e c i f i c a s p e c t o f t h e s t r u c t u r e . Some s c h o l a r s , l i k e 
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P u r t a d o and F r ank , have s t r e s s e d on economic s t r a t i f i c a t i o n 
w i t h o u t g i v i n g h a r d l y ^ y c o n s i d e r a t i o n to s t a t u s and power 
d i m e n s i o n s . O t h e r s , l i k e M y r d a l , have a n a l y s e d the p r o b l e m 
o f deve lopment i n r e l a t i o n t o economic as w e l l as c a s t e 
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . Even i n such a thorough a n a l y s i s as t h a t 
o f M y r d a l , power d imens ion has been used n o t as an independent 
s t r u c t u r a l a t t r i b u t e b u t as a p a r t o f s o c i o - e c o n o m i c s t r a t i -
f i c a t i o n , I t i s i n t h i s r e s p e c t t h a t the p r e s e n t s tudy has 
made an advance o v e r the p r e v i o u s ones and examined c a s t e , 
I 
c l a s s and power as t h r e e i ndependent s t r u c t u r a l f a c t o r s i n 
i n f l u e n c i n g the consequences 6 f t he deve lopment programmes. 
The e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by o u r s tudy suppo r t the 
argument t h a t a l l the t h r e e a s p e c t s a re s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e l a t e d 
w i t h the i n e q u a l i t i e s i n t h e deve lopment g a i n s . 
Among t h e t h r e e f a c t o r s , c l a s s emerged as the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t , i t f u r t h e r c o n f i r m s the commonly h e l d v i e w 
t h a t economic b a s i s i s o f c r u c i a l impor tance in d e t e r m i n i n g 
t h e outcome of economic deve lopment no t o n l y a t the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l b u t a l s o a t the l o c a l l e v e l s . Pov;er 
emerged as t h e second b e s t p r e d i c t o r f o l l o w e d by c a s t e which 
I 
s u g g e s t s t h a t power d imens i on needs to be g i v e n s e r i o u s 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n any a n a l y s i s o f the p r o b l e m o f economic 
deve lopment and the c a s t e s t i l l p e r f o r m s d i s c r i m i n a t i n g « 
f u n c t i o n s i n the emerg ing economy. When c a s t e , c l a s s and 
power a rc cornbinded, t h e r c a u l i . s rirc h i g h e r than t h e i n d i v i -
d u a l f a c t o r a l o n e , s u g g e s t i n g \ .hat the t h r e e f a c t o r s t aken 
t o g e t h e r r e i n f o r c e each o t h e r beyond the i n f l u e n c e o f any 
f a c t o r a l o n e . 
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The e c o n o m i c , • s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s i n the se 
econonties have c r e a t e d a mcchanism v/hich tends to d i r e c t 
t h e g a i n s o f g e n e r a l deve lopment to a f ew s e l e c t e d g roups 
o f p e o p l e and which t ends to l e a v e the masses o f the p o o r 
o u t o f the p u r v i e w o f the b e n e f i t s o f grov/th. 
The IRDP s t r a t e g y was d e s i g n e d to change t h i s s e l e c t i v e 
impac t and t o t ake the b e n e f i t s t o the p o o r . The s p e c i a l 
prcgrainines c r e a t e d such s p e c i a l f a c i l i t i e s as w e l l as 
s p e c i a l d e l i v e r y systems to r each the p o o r . 
P o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n schemes unde r the IRDP were implerrented 
i n the r u r a l a r e a s o f A l i g a r h and K a r n a l i n 1977-78, The 
t a r g e t g r oups in these programmes a r e d e f i n e d i n terms o f 
l a n d h o l d i n g s s i z e and l a n d l e s s n e s s and no t in tenr.s o f c a s t e t 
o r t r i b e o r f a m i l y . The main agent s o f the imp lementat ion 
o f theye programmes a r e : (1 ) R u r a l b u r e a u c r a c y i , e . the 
deve l opment a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the government which t a k e s the 
main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f imp lementa t i on , (2 ) Middleman (3 ) the 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s s p e c i a l l y the banks t h a t p r o v i d e the 
main s ou r ce o f c r e d i t and (4 ) the panchaya t s t r u c t u r e and 
o t h e r l e a d e r s o f the v i l l a g e s who h e l p the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and 
c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n as v/ell as u n o f f i c i a l l y , 
I 
B u r e a u c r a c y has becomc one o f t h e v i t a l i n s t rument s in 
t r a n s l a t i n g p u b l i c p o l i c i e s i n t o r e a l i t i e s . 
The D l ^ A i s f r a u g h t v^ith a number of s t r u c t u r a l p r o b l e m s . 
The v e r t i c a l s t r u c t u r e , i n s t e a d o f t a k i n g the shape o f a 
pyro in id , emerge as p a r a l l e l l£:<^ders each o p e r a t i n g in i t s 
q o ? 
own s t y l e and j u r i s d i c t i o n . T h e r e i s no c o l l e c t i v e r e s p -
o n s i b i l i t y f o r imp l ement ing t h e d e v e l o p m e n t p o l i c y . T h i s 
r e s u l t e d i n two n e g a t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s : ( 1 ) the r u r a l p o o r 
a r o iiuxHtj Lo fjo From p i l l a r ^o ].or;l: l o linvc .ir-r-or-.n l-o the 
b e n e f i t t h a t t h e p o l i c y o f f e r s t o them; and (2 ) the a g e n -
c i e s sometimes o p e r a t e a t c r o s s p u r p o s e n e u t r a l i s i n g the 
d e v e l o p m e n t a l e f f o r t . 
I n r u r a l b u r e a u c r a c y t h e r e h a v e b e e n c r i s s c r o s s l i n k a g e s . 
F u n c t i o n a r i e s p l a c e d a t v a r i o u s l e v e l s i n t h e f o r m a l admi -
n i s t r a t i v e l a d d e r have ' n o n - f o r m a l ' l i n k a g e s . As a r e s u l t 
t h e f o r m a l a r r angement i s p u t t o s e v e r e t e s t . T h e r e i s a » 
t e n d e n c y on the p a r t o f h i g h e r l e v e l s t o l e a n on one o r 
two members o f t he g r o u p i n s t e a d o f t h e e n t i r e team. These 
i n d i v i d u a l s , i t i s o b s e r v e d , w i e l d e x t r a - i n s t u t i o n a l i n f l -
u e n c e . I t i s no t i c ' ed t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e members 
o f t h e team a r e b a s e d n o t on t h e f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e b u t on 
v a r i o u s e x t a n e o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s such as c a s t e , r e g i o n , 
r e l i g i o n , l a n g u a g e and sometime "conunon i n t e r e s t s " . T h i s 
s o r t o f n o n f o r m a l l i n k a g e s c a u s e t e n s i o n s i n human r e l a t i o n s , 
A n o t h e r s t r i k i n g t endency i s t h e w i d e s p r e a d e l i t i s t b i a s o f 
t h e r u r a l b u r e a u c r a c y . I t i s w i d e l y c o m p l a i n e d t h a t o f f i -
c e r s c o n t a c t o n l y the i n f l u e n t i a l p e r s o n s i s t h e v i l l a g e . 
On the w h o l e t h e y hkd c o n t a c t w i t h o n l y 22.19% o f h o u s e -
h o l r l s ( T a b l e 8 . 1 ) . O f f i c e r s v i s i t e d 55.5% h o u s e h o l d s o f 
u p j j o r C i i a tea , 60% oX liovuiohtj 1 flu IjuloiMjiiKj U> Uio hi'^jhcr 
income b r a c k e t and 75% o f h o u s e h o l d s o f b i g landov/ners 
( T a b l e 8 . 1 h) . 
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R e g a r d i n g the a t t i t u d e o f o f f i c e r s t o the b e l o w - t h e - p o v e r t y -
l i n e h o u s e h o l d s , 63.73% r e s p o n d e n t s i n A l i g a r h and 57.86% 
r e s p o n d e n t s i n K a m a l r e p o r t e d t h e i r a t t i t u d e was n o t h e l p -
f u l ( T a b l e 8 . 2 ) . Making a v i l l a g e r go round a number o f 
o f f i c e s , d e l i b e r a t e l y d e l a y i n g the d e c i s i o n s and so on, a r e 
symptomatic o f d e p e r s o n a l i s a t i o n o f r u r a l b u r e a u c r a c y . In 
A l i g a r h , 58.4% o f BPL h o u s e h o l d s v i s i t e d G o v t , o f f i c e s 349 
t i m e s w h i l e 41.6% o f BPL h o u s e h o l d s i n K a r n a l v i l l a g e s 
v i s i t e d such o f f i c e s 249 t imes t o t ake b e n e f i t o f d e v e l o p -
ment schemes f o r p o v e r t y - a l l e v i a t i o n . ( T a b l e 8 .3 ) . 
I t i s o b s e r v e d t h a t the gap be tween p e o p l e and the d e v e l o p -
m e n t a l mach inery i n the r u r a l a r e a s gave r i s e t o midd le -men 
i n a number o f v i l l a g e s . T h i s i n s t i t u t i o n i s a r e s u l t o f 
b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e d u r a l r i g m a r o l e . 
The middleman p u r s u e s the c a s e s , chase s the f i l e s , goes round 
t h e o f f i c e s i n p u r s u i t o f the schemes p romi sed to the t a r g e t 
g r o u p s . 
I n A l i g a r h v i l l a g e s the h i g h e s t p e r c e n t a g e o f h o u s e h o l d s took 
t h e h e l p o f Panchaya t mambers as middleman whe rea s i n K a r n a l 
v i l l a g e s the h i g h e s t p e r c e n t a g e o f such h o u s e h o l d s {40.48%) 
u t i l i s e d t h e s e r v i c e s o f VUW as middleman ( T a b l e 8 .4 ) . 
W h i l e the middleman f i l l e d the gap caused b y t h e absence o f 
i n t e r m e d i a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s - p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e -
I 
t h e i r r o l e c r e a t e d c o n f u s i o n about the schemes, l a r g e l y d e f e -
o t cd the pu rpose oC niibnidy onfl 1 n i roOucod c l i s to r l i ons in tlie 
schcrrios. 
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The r e i s more, emphas is on t a r g e t achievement than on i d e n t -
i f y i n g the r e a l p o o r and h e l p i n g them. The t a r g e t a c h i e v e -
ments , however , a r e c o n s i d e r e d i n terms o f o v e r a l l t a r g e t s . 
T h a t i s , t h e r e a r e no f i x e d t a r g e t s f o r d i f f e r e n t a r e a s o r 
f o r d i f f e r e n t schemcs which must be met . C o n s e q u e n t l y , 
t h e r e i s a t endency to a ch i eve the t a r g e t s by implement ing 
' e a s y ' i n schemes in ' p r o g r e s s i v e ' a r e a s . 
I t i s , sometimes f e l t t h a t backward b l o c k s a r e c o n s i d e r e d 
• d i f f i c u l t ' b l o c k s f o r the s p e c i a l programmes. 
T h e r e i s no v i l l a g e w i s e t a r g e t f i x a t i o n e i t h e r i n A l i g a r h 
o r i n K a r n a l . On an a v e r a g e a VUrJ cove r ed 9 t o 10 v i l l a g e s 
i n A l i g a r h and 10 to 15 v i l l a g e s i n K a r n a l m a i n l y on the 
1 
b a s i s o f C D The c a p a c i t y o f the a r e a , and (2 ) the c a p a c i t y 
o f the VLW. 
The f i r s t t ype o f a d m i n i s t r a t o r s b lame the p o o r , the second 
t 
t y p e b lame the banks , and the t h i r d t y p e b l ame the system i n 
wh ich they a re f u n c t i o n i n g b u t a l l admit t h a t a l l the p o o r 
c a n n o t b e h e l p e d . A l l o f them f e e l t h a t t h e s p e c i a l p r o g -
raiTimes cannot r e ach a l l the p o o r . 
The VLfr/s implement the schemes a t the v i l l a g e l e v e l . The 
VIW i s g i v e n t h e t o t a l t a r g e t s t o be f u l f i l l e d , and ' g e n e r a l 
b a l a n c e ' shou ld be m a i n t a i n e d . When he has t o s e l e c t the 
v i l l a g e s t o implemen-^ schemes, he s e l e c t s the v i l l a g e s on 
the liD.slfJ oi: t.lifiir ncco.';.oJl)ll 1 I y, ;iv.-i L lnl . l l I t y o f o t h e r 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s l i k e b ank * c o o p e r a t i v e m i l k s o c i -
e t y , e t c , and p r o g r e ^ s i v e n e s s o f the v i l l a g e p o p u l a t i o n .
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o t h e r words , t h e r e i s no s tudy o f the o v e r a l l s i t u a t i o n o f 
t h e v i l l a g e s o r no s y s t e m a t i c aj^/roach on the p a r t o f the 
VLW t o r e ach a l l the p o o r w h i l e s e l e c t i n g the v i l l a g e s . 
When a p p l i c a t i o n s have a l r e a d y come through banks o r the 
BDO o f f i c e , the VLW c o n t a c t s the a p p l i c a n t s and s c r e e n s 
v a r i o u s documents . Then he e n q u i r e s from the sarponch o r 
t h e c h a i r m a n / s e c r e t a r y o f the mi lk s o c i e t y e t c , whethe r 
t h e a p p l i c a n t s a r e h o n e s t and can r epay no a p p l i c a t i o n s , 
t h e VLW t r i e d t o g e t them by v i s i t i n g the v i l l a g e s . H i s 
u s u a l method i s t o v i s i t . . t h e o f f i c e o f the m i l k c o o p e r a t i v e 
s o c i e t y , t h e panchaya t o f f i c e and the house o f sa rpanch and 
o t h e r l e a d e r s t o g e t new names f o r the schemes. I t i s i n t e r -
e s t i n g t o no te t h a t no VIW v i s i t s the house s o f the p o o r . 
The n e x t s t a g e i s to s e l e c t the b e n e f i c i a r i e s from the l i s t 
t h a t i s p r e p a r e d . T h i s i s done on the b a s i s o f t h e s e c o n d i -
t i o n s , (1 ) The a p p l i c a n t s h o u l d p r o v i d e the l a n d c e r t i f i c a t e 
f r o m the P a t w a r i and the Sa rpanch , i f he i s a m a r g i n a l / s m a l l 
i' 
f a r m e r . I f he i s an a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r , he has to submit 
t h e income c e r t i f i c a t e s i gned b y the P a t w a r i and the Sa rpanch 
( 2 ) I f he wants a m i l dh an ima l , he has t o p r o d u c e a c e r t i f i -
c a t e s i g n e d by the cha i rman o f the m i l k c o o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t y 
t h a t he i s a member o f the s o c i e t y e t c . (3 ) The a p p l i c a n t h a s 
t o show t h a t he w i l l g e t two r e l i a b l e p e r s o n s as g u a r a n t o r s 
when he ^ p l i e s f o r the bank l o a n . He r e l i e s on the Sarpanch 
o r on the cha i rman o f the m i l k c o o p e r a t i v e s o c i e t y o r on o t h e r 
v i l l a g e l e a d e r s f o r v o r i f i c a t i o n . Tha t i s , t h e s e l e a d e r s r e c -
ommend o r r e j e c t the c a s e s f o r b e n e f i t s o f the schemes t o the 
VLW. 
* o. n Li 
The f o u r VlWs i n the s tudy v i l l a g e s r o u g h l y d i v i d e d the p o o r 
i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s , namely the ' r i c h p o o r * and the p o o r , 
w h i l e Implement ing the schemes.v,. The ' r i c h p o o r * a re sma l l 
f a r m e r s w i t h i r r i g a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s o r w i t h b i g f a m i l y h o l d -
i n g s . These f a r m e r s , many t i m e s , b e l o n g t o b i g f a m i l i e s b u t 
a r e s m a l l o n l y on p a p e r . These f a r m e r s t a k e up schemes l i k e 
i r r i g a t i o n e l e c t r i c pumps, o i l e n g i n e , pump room e t c , schemes. 
The t h i r d m a j o r a gen t o f imple ;r )entat ion o f the s p e c i a l p r o g -
rammes i s the c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t p r o v i d e c r e d i t t o 
p u r c h a s e a s s e t s . 
L e n d i n g t o the p o o r i s no t an e a s y j o b i n t h e sense t h a t i t 
can c r e a t e a number o f p r o b l e m s . The p o o r , who have a h i g h 
p r o p e n s i t y t o consume may b e tempted t o consxime the income 
g e n e r a t e d by t h e a s s e t pu r chased w i t h a bank l o a n , which may 
c r e a t e r e c o v e r y p r o b l e m s . They may n o t have s k i l l o r the 
( 
c u l t u r e to run the schemes e f f i c i e n t l y . Though the d e v e l o p -
ment a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p l a y s an a c t i v e r o l e i n p r e p a r i n g c a s e s 
for bank l o a n s they do n o t t ake any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for recovery 
The l e n d i n g p o l i c y which i s ag reed upon ( a s g u i d e l i n e s ) a t 
h i g h e r l e v e l s i s d i s t o r t e d to a g r e a t e x t e n t w h i l e b e i n g imp-
lemented a t t h e m i c r o l e v e l . The terms and c o n d i t i o n s l a i d 
dov/n on p e p o r f o r l e n d i n g to t h e p o o r a re n o t f o l l o w e d i n 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . 
T h i s c a u t i o u s approach a l s o r e s u l t e d i n the deve lopment o f a 
tendency , on the p a r t o f banker ; ; , to cisk f o r reconirnendations 
o r f o r c o n f i r m a t i o n f rom v i l l a g e l e a d e r s r e g a r d i n g the h o n e s t y 
t 
and repajinent cepacity of the borrowers before sanctioning 
l o a n s t o them. That i s , recommendations as w e l l as r e j e c t -
i o n s o f the v i l l a g e l e a d e r s a r e impor tant f a c t o r s i n i n f l u e -
t 
n c i n g the f l o w o f bank c r e d i t t o the weaker s e c t i o n s . One 
i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r which i n f l u e n c e d the l i s t o f the b o r r o w e r s 
S 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y was ' p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e ' . A l s o t h e s e p o l i t i c a l 
p e r s o n s encouraged the p o o r o f d e f a u l t and t h e r e b y c r e a t e d 
u n f a v o u r a b l e atmosphere f o r r e p a ^ e n t s . T h i s e f f e c t e d t h e i r 
r e c o v e r y a d v e r s e l y . 
A t t h e v i l l a g e l e v e l , the p a n c h a y a t i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e s e 
programmes i n a number o f ways . F i r s t l y , the S a r p a n c h ' s 
s i g n a t u r e i s n e c e s s a r y f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f sma l l and m a r g i n a l 
f a r m e r s as w e l l as a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r e r s . Tha t i s , no body 
can g e t i d e n t i f i e d as a p o o r p e r s o n f o r the b e n e f i t s o f IRD 
programme w i t h o u t the s i g n a t u r e o f the S a r p a n c h , A p a r t f rom 
t h i s , the Sa rpanch and v i l l a g e l e a d e r s i n f l u e n c e the s e l e c -
t i o n o f b e n e f i c i a r i e s i n a number o f o t h e r w a y s . F i r s t o f a l l , 
t h e y fecommend ( o r r e j e c t ) the c a s e s o f a p p l i c a n t s t o the VLW 
who f i n a l i s e s t h e l i s t o f p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i c i a r i e s f o r a p p l y -
i n g t o the b a n k . S econd l y they a l s o recommend ( o r r e j e c t ) 
a p p l i c a t i o n s t o the bank agent v/ho c o n s u l t s them b e f o r e f i n a -
f 
U s i n g the s a n c t i o n . T h i r d l y , they can a lways p r o v i d e a 
g u a r a n t e e f o r a bank l o a n t o h e l p a p o o r p e r s o n to g e t a 
bank l o an o r r e f u s e t o g i v e a g u a r a n t e e t o t h e s e \'jhom they 
c o n s i d e r n o n - d e s e r v i n g c a s e s . In s h o r t , the sa rpanch and 
v i l l a g e l e a d e r s have a c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e i n s e l e c t i n g 
t h e ischeines as w e l l au the b e n e f iciurJO:J f o r the sche i i i es . 
As t h e dependence o f the p o o r on the non -poo r i s the s o u r c e 
p f power o f the l a t t e r , the l a t t e r i s no t l i k e l y t o do much 
f. n r a • ? 
t o h e l p the needy p o o r . U s u a l l y , the Sa rpanch , and o t h e r 
l e a d e r s a re n o t l i k e l y to \Ee t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i n f a v o u r o f 
t h e weaker s e c t i o n s . 
The mode o f Imp lementa t ion o f the IRD programmes does no t 
seem t o be c a p a b l e o f r e a c h i n g the l o w e s t s t r a t a o f the r u r a l 
V. 
s o c i e t y . In f a c t , i t t ends t o Hupport l e a k a g e s and f a v o u r s 
t h o s e p o o r who a r e f a v o u r e d by the e x i s t i n g system. The 
t h r e e main a g en t s o f imp l ementa t i on , namely, the deve lopment 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the bank and t h e Panchayat have d i f f e r e n t 
o b j e c t i v e s i n implement ing the s p e c i a l programmes. The admin-
i s t r a t i o n o f i n t e r e s t e d i n r e a c h i n g the t a r g e t s , the banks 
a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n the b u s i n e s s and the Panchaya t members e t c , 
a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n m a i n t a i n g t h e i r s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n . In the 
p r o c e s s no s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n i s p a i d t o r e a c h i n g the r e a l 
p o o r . The l i k e l y r e s u l t i s then the s e l e c t i v e impact o f t h e 
s p e c i a l p r og ronmes . 
By p a r t i c i p a t i o n we mean t a k i n g up o f d i f f e r e n t schemes f o r 
t h e p o o r by d i f f e r e n t h o u s e h o l d s . Our main emphas is i s on 
examin ing the p a r t i c i p a t i o n p a t t e r n o f h o u s e h o l d s . However , 
we w i l l b e g i n w i t h a b r i e f s tudy o f s cheme -w i se and a r e a w i s e 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n o r d e r t o emphas ize the s e l e c t i v e n a t u r e o f the 
impact o f the s p e c i a l programme f o r p o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , the schemes r e l a t i n g t o i r r i g a t i o n , i n t r o d u c t -
i o n o f the new t e c h n o l o g y i n a g r i c u l t u r e , (new i n p u t s , c r op 
p r o t o c t i o n t o o l s , iniprovoci t oo l r . e t c . ) ..ind r e l j i t l n q t o i n f o r -
mat i on d i s s e m i n a t i o n to the p o o r f a r m e r s ( f a r m e r ' s t r a i n i n g , 
d e m o n s t r a t i o n f a rms , .mangere e n t h e l p e t c , ) l ^ a v e done p o o r l y 
a .5 
i n bo th the D i s t r i c t s . Even though the v i l l a g e s have the 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l suppor t 
r e q u i r e d f o r the implementat ion the number o f schemes i n t -
roduced has remained ex t r eme ly low and s u p e r f i c i a l . There 
I 
i s a p o s s i b i l i t y o f l e a k a g e s o f these programmes to the 
n o n - p o o r . S 
B a s i c a l l y , the l e a k a g e s o f the programmes to the non -poor 
can occu r i n two ways: ( a ) the non -poor manage to i d e n t i f y 
themse lves as poo r househo lds (due to the l o s s e n e s s o f the 
d e f i n i t i o n o f the poor ) , o r ( b ) they g e t the scheme f o r 
themse lves under the name o f some poo r h o u s e h o l d s , A non-
p o o r can d i v i d e the l and , on paper, among i t s d i f f e r e n t 
members and c a l l a l l the members smal l o r m a r g i n a l f a r m e r s . 
The l and o f the househo ld can a l s o be p u t under the ownersh ip 
o f one pe r son and o t h e r s can c a l l themse lves a g r i c u l t u r a l 
l a b o u r e r s , A non -poor househo ld can a l s o c a l l i t s e l f poo r 
b y no t r e p o r t i n g i t s n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l income earned by some 
members in s e r v i c e o r b u s i n e s s . The sccond way by which 
l e a k a g e s occu r i s that when a non -poor u se s a poo r pe r son , 
( 
a s e r v a n t , a dependent o r a poo r d i s t a n t r e l a t i v e to take 
up a scheme. In such a c a s e , the b e n e f i t s o f the scheme to 
go to the non -poo r househo ld w h i l e the p e r s o n under whose 
name the scheme i s taken e i t l i e r g e t s some reward o r does not 
g e t anyth ing a t a l l . I f v;as found tha t some t imes indebted 
pour did tills for l.lic-4.r cmi jloyers v/ho IK'KI ]i-IKI Uiern inoney. 
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I t was a b s e r v e d t h a t the P a t w a r i s o r the VLWs ( s p e c i a l 
prograinmes) we r e n o t unaware o f these l e a k a g e s . A s t r i k i n g 
f e a t u r e o f the T a b l e "8.7 t h e r e i s a h i g h l e v e l o f the l e e k -
a ge s { % o f the non -poo r t a k i n g up the prograirimes in a l l 
t h e v i l l a g e s ) , The p e r c e n t a g e s b e i n g 23,75% i n I m l a n i (A) , 
28 .45 i n Adaun ( A ) , 29.70% i n B e r t h n l (K) and 22.14% i n 
S i k r i (K) . Among the n o n - p o o r , b i g f a r m e r s t ake the maximum 
advan t age o f the schemes f o r p o o r , f o l l o w e d by the fami>!-
l i e s engaged i n v a r i o u s s e r v i c e s . Some t r a d i n g f a m i l i e s 
a l s o t a k e the advantage of the l o o s e n e s s o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n 
and o f t h e i r power o v e r the P a t w a r i s , the VU-: and the p o o r . 
The p e r c e n t a g e o f l e a k a g e f o r the Thakurs i s 55,55 i n Adaun(A) 
f o r the J a t s 83 ,33 i n B e r t h a l (K) and f o r the Musl ims and the 
J a t s 40,62 and 37,5 r e s p e c t i v e l y S i k r i (K) and i n I m l a n i (A) . 
The I-Xislims and the J a t s c o n s t i t u t e the dominant c a s t e s in 
S i k r i (K) . They have g o t n e a r a b o u t e q u a l s h a r e of t h e l e a k -
a g e s . The Brahmins have g o t 12.75% and o t h e r s 9.37% l e a k a g e s 
( T a b l e 8 .9 ) . 
The p e r c e n t a g e s o f the p o o r h o u s e h o l d s to the t o t a l e n t i t l e d 
h o u s e h o l d s a r e 78 .00 i n Adaun ( A ) , 78 ,8 in B e r t h a l (K) , 64 .88 
i n ' S i k r i (K) and 75.60 i n I m l a n i ( A ) . (TABLE 8 . 1 0 ) . T h i s 
. indicates that the special programmes cover a large number 
o f n o n - p o o r unde r t h e i r p u r v i e w . 
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C o n s e q u e n t l y , thr- l i o n ' s nhnnc; of thr- .spr;c:inl proornrirics 
h a s gone to the non -poo r ( I c a k n g o s a l s o hnve c o n t r Lbuted t o 
t h i s ) . The p e r c e n t a g e s o f n o n - p o o r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n B e r t h a l ( K ) 
S i k r i (K) , i m l a n i (A) and Adaun (A ) a r e 61 .95 , 47 .91 , 46.26 
and 48 ,43 r e s p e c t i v e l y . ( T a b l e P . 1 0 ) , The c r u x o f the 
p o o r a re n a t u r a l l y l e f t ou r o f the s p e c i a l progra i rmes . 
The p e r c e n t a g e s o f the r e a l p o o r p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the 
r 
s p e c i a l progranrnes i n Adaun (A) , B e r t h a l (K) , S i X r i (K) 
and I m l a n i (A) a r e 31 .88 , 16 .27 , 53.19 and 46 .75 r e s p -
e c t i v e l y ( T a b l e B . IO ) . « 
The f a c t o r s t h a t a re l i k e l y t o i n f l u e n c e the p a r t i c i p -
a t i o n o f a househo ld in the IRD progranmes a r e : 
( a ) the o c c u p a t i o n o f the househo ld and the l and h e l d 
b y i t . 
( b ) the consumption l e v e l o f the h o u s e h o l d . 
( c ) the c a s t e o f the h o u s e h o l d . 
( d ) the power s t a t u s o f thr ho iasebo ld . 
Though a l l the i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s a r e a v a i l a b l e 
i n bo th g roup 'A* and ' B ' v i l l a g e s and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
s u p p o r t i s comple te f o r p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the programnes 
n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r the l a s t 5 y e a r s o r more , has been 
q u i t e h i g h . I t i s h i g h e s t n o t i n Group 'B* v i l l a g e s where 
t h e l e v e l o f deve lopment i s r e l a t i v e l y low b u t i n Group 'A* 
v i l l a g e s where commerc i a l i s ed a g r i c u l t u r e h a s made the 
v i l l a g e s p r o s p e r o u s . About 70 .52 o f the p e e r . ( i . e . t ho se 
I 
v;ho a r e e n t i t l e d to t a k e p a r t i n the IRD progran i res ) i n 
t h i s g roup o f v i l l a g e s a r e n o t p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the p r o g -
ramn-.es. T h i s p e r c e n t a g e i s 53 .11 in S i k r i (K) , 54.83 i n 
I m l a n i (A) and 57% in Adaun (A) .incl 04 in U c r t h a l (K) . 
Some n o n - p a r t i c i a n t s have no f a i t h i n the sys tem. There 
i s a deep f r u s t r a t i o n and a l s o deep anger a l o n g w i th a 
,1 f o l 
s t r o n g sense o f h e l p l e s s n e s s . They f i n d i t b e t t e r t o remain 
as they a r e . T h i s i s what G a l b r a i t h c a l l s "accommodation" 
o f the p o o r . A g a i n , t h e t ime h o r i z o n o f the p o o r i s s h o r t 
as the p o o r a r e more concerned about t h e i r p r o b l e m s o f the 
p r e s e n t than the l o n ^ run g a i n s i n incomes . 
VJe measured the a s p i r n t i o n . i of i ho non-r>' 'rticii->antr; w i th 
t h e h e l p o f the l a d d e r t e c h n i q u e . The main r e s u l t s o f the 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n a r e e x p r e s s e d i n T a b l e 8 . 1 2 , I t must be noted 
t h a t the p e r c e n t a g e o f the f a m i l i e s w i t h p o s i t i v e a s p i r a t i o n s 
a r e r e l a t i v e l y l ow i n Ber th a 1 (K) and Adaun (A) . I t must be 
n o t e d t h a t the p o o r had c l e a r r e a s o n s t o g i v e f o r t h e i r 
n e g a t i v e a s p i r a t i o n s . I t was n o t a p r e f e r e n c e f o r l e i s u r e , 
b u t the c o n s t r a i n t s and the e x p e r i e n c e s o f a s a r i e s o f f r u s -
t r a t i o n s t h a t were beh ind t h e i r n e g a t i v e a n s w e r s . 
The e x t e n t o f u n i l a t e r a l dependance o f the p o o r on the non -
p o o r is c l e a r l y cxprePr-cd i n T a b l e 8 . 1 3 . I t shows t h a t 
m a j o r i t y o f the n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s , would b o r r o w from t h e i r 
e m p l o y e r s , shopkeepe r s , b i g f a r m e r s , o r r e l a t i v e s t o meet 
an emergency . I f the repayments are not made i n t i m e . The 
l e n d e r s e i t h e r c h a r g e compund r a t e o f i n t e r e s t o f f o r c e d 
wage l a b o u r f rom the members o f the b o r r o w e r ' s f a m i l y 
( T a b l e 8 .13 ) . 
r 
The r e a s o n o f the n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n seems t o b e the n e g a t i v e 
a t t i t u d e o f the r u r a l r i c h . The poo r o f the stvidy v i l l a g e s 
were h i g h l y c r i t i c a l o f the a t t i t u d e o f the r u r a l e l i t e . In i' 
A l i g a r h v i l l a g e s o f I m l a n i (A) and Adaun ( A ) , 53.37% o f the 
r e s p o n d e n t s r e p o r t e d t h a t the r u r a l e l i t e we re not h e l p f u l 
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and 7,18% r e p o r t e d t h a t they knew n o t h i n g about i t as they 
had no p e r s o n a l e j ^ e r i e n c e i s t h i s r e g a r d . In K a r n a l d i s -
t r i c t v i l l a g e s , 52,34% of the r e s p o n d e n t s r e p o r t e d t h a t the 
a t t i t u d e o f the r u r a l e l i t e v/as n o t o n l y h e l p f u l b u t h o s t i l e . 
CTable 8 .14 ) and s i m i l a r was t h e a t t i t u d e o f the p u b l i c r e p r -
e s e n t a t i v e s l i k e the Sa rpanch , the S a m i t i P r e s i d e n t , M . L . A . 
I 
and M .P . e t c . who he l d the r u r a l power s t r u c t u r e ( T a b l e 8 .15 ) 
The p o s i t i v e d i c o u r a g e m e n t g i v e n by t h e s e r u r a l e l i t e seems 
t o be r e s u l t i n g i n the n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f about 10 to 26% 
i 
of the n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
The ways i n which the emp loye r s ( b i g f a r m e r s o r i n f l u e n t i a l 
p e r s o n s ) d i s c o u r a g e the p o o r are many. F i r s t o f a l l , they 
t e l l the p o o r t h a t the schemes a re not good f o r them a t 
t h e y a r e n o t c a p a b l e o f r unn ing them p r o f i t a b l y ; they a l s o 
t h r e a t e n t h a t i f the p o o r g e t i n t o any mess ( d e b t s , f o r 
e x a m p l e ) , t hey w i l l not be h e l p e d by the r i c h . T h i s d i s c -
o u r a g e s the p o o r . S e c o n d l y , the r i c h p u t a number o f o b s t -
a c l e s i n the way o f the p o o r by not g i v i n g g u a r a n t e e , by 
n o t recommending the name t o the VLW o r b y a s k i n g the banks 
n o t t o l end the l o a n s . T h i r d l y , the r u r a l e l i t e ask the 
P a t w a r i o r the VLV7 n o t t o p r o c e s s too many a p p l i c a t i o n s o f 
the p o o r f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the programmes. The r i c h 
h e l p them i n m e e t i n g the t a r g e t s by jallovring l e a k a g e s , 
'I'ht^ power cjnrt the p o s i t i o n o C i bc r n r n l r:ich on the one h-nnd, 
and tho h e l p l e s s n e s s o f poo r on tlio otlu r hont^ v/ill not a l l o v 
t h e b e n e f i t t o p e r c o l a t e t o the p o o r e s t t o any s i g n i f i c e n t 
e x t e n t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e w i l l a lvjays b e a s i z e a b l e non -
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p a r t i c i ^ t i o n even in deve l oped end s o - c a l l c c p r o g r e s s i v e a r e a s . 
The v i l l G g c - v / i s e p i c t u r e .shovs that the h i g h e s t degree o f non-
p a r t i c i p a t i o n and a l s o f r u s t r a t i o n o f the poo r i s foun c not — n 
modora te l y <"lcvclopctT Iriilcini (A) .-inci : jL l :r i (k ) l i i t in line h i j h l y 
deve l oped v i l l a g e s o f Be r tha l (K) and Adaun (A) . T h i s seerr.s t o 
be due to tvjo reasons : I r r i g a t i o n horj r^i iscr the osso tc the 
incomes of a nvimber o f f a rmers , ho v c v e r , tVie v e r y smal l faru.ers 
and l a n d l e s s l a b o u r e r s have n o t ga ined much from t h i s . They 
t h e r e f o r e f e e l f i rus t ra ted again each o f the ' i roup ' A ' v i l l a g e s 
has o n l y one dominant c a s t e , the Ja t s i n B e r t h a l (K) and the 
Thakurs in Adavin (A) , T h e r e f o r e tl icy ore in a s t r o n g e r p o s i t i o n 
t o p r e v e n t the b e n e f i t s o f grovjth from go ing t o the lovrest s t r a t a 
in t h e i r v i l l a g e s . T h i s perhaps i iVp l i cs t h a t the ho l e o f the r i c h 
on the poo r i n c r e a s e s w i th economic growth and tha t the s p e c i a l 
prograrrmes which are e xpec t ed t o improve the c o n d i t i o n o f the 
p o o r are j c r h a p s I n c r e a s i n g t h e i r f r u s t r i i t i o n . 
I n s h o r t , the mode o f imp lemente t ion o f the s p e c i a l progranjres 
f o r the poor has no t changed t h i s b o s i c p a t t e r n o f p e r c o l a t i o n 
o f b e n e f i t s . In f a c t the t h r e e agents o f the implementa t ion , 
naificly, the deve lopment a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the baides and the panch-
nyp.t G t rnc t i i r c , r.unction in 5nirh n Mr;y tha t thoy ten''" t o G'-rc.ng-
t: :en the e x i s t i n g pov/cr s t r u c t u r e one! i ho s e l e c t i v e nature o f p a r t -
i c i p a t i o n in the s p e c i a l p r o g r a n r e s . I t i n r - l i o s t h e t t h e r e i s a 
'JOO<! •'iiK.junt ci] li.ohagti o l Ihc pro ' j r .N.n.* tj LO Ihe noii-pu->1 . 
?'.aving "knoviTi the f a c t o f e m p i r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p betv/een 
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and i n e q u a l i t i e s i n the developrr.ent g a i n s , 
the q u e s t i o n e m e r g e s ; . w h a t i s t h e r e about s t r a t i f i c a t i o n 
t h a t might l e a d to such a consequence o f the deve lopment 
p r o g r a r m e s ? . I t w i l l b e q u i t e i n t e r e s t i n g to s p e c u l a t e as 
t o how the e x i s t i n g system o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n g i v e s r i s e to 
the p rob l em o f d i f f e r e n t i a l g a i n s . As knov;, s t r a t i f i c a t i o n 
g e n e r a l l y a d d r e s s e s i t s e l f t o the p lacen.ent o f p e o p l e v/ithin 
a g i v e n h i e r a r c h y , Th'^ e p e o p l e who e n j o y h i g h e r p o s i t i o n tend 
t o a c h i e v e s u c c e s s more o f t e n than those o f l o w e r p o s i t i o n . 
A f t e r r e v i e w i n g a l a r g e nunibcr o f s t u d i o s . Ke l son 
h a s shown t h a t s t r a t i f i c a t i o n a f f e c t s n e a r l y e v e r y e l ement o f 
t h e s o c i a l system and t h a t "any s t a t u s v a r i a b l e i s the s i n e 
qua non o f p r o p e r understanding'^'-and p r o d u c t i o n o f coir i iunity 
b e h a v i o u r " . As such, s e c u r i n g dcvcloprricnt bene ! i t s i s not an 
e x c e p t i o n a l v a r i a b l e t h a t can be d e a l t v/ith a p a r t from the 
g e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f a t t a inment p r o c c s s r e l a t i v e to ones 
l o c a t i o n in the system o£ s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , 
VJhen the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f b a s e s o r r e s o u r c e s d e t e r m i n i n g 
o n e ' s a b i l i t y t o a ch i eve g o a l s does no t show any marked change 
o v e r t ime , the i n e q u a l i t i e s among p e o p l e in the g i v e n r e s p e c t 
become g r a d u a l l y r i g i d and u n y i e l d i n g . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the 
saTTie g roup o f p e r s o n s w i l l c o n t i n u e to a c h i e v e s ucce s s and 
seciirrj b e n e f i t s conr, Ln t cn t l y from f^vory O] n 'Ortuni ty tha t tuny 
a r i s e . Thr- economic i n o q u a l i t i c .-j thu.-., c o n t i n u e to i n c r e a s e 
e s p e c i a l l y when p e o p l e a re allov-'od to conpete f o r e x p l o i t i n g 
Lhe orportunitles. At times, i n e q u a l i t y ccmi's about th rough 
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a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f b e n e f i t s which ore o r i g i n a l l y o f f e r e d 
t o make v a s t m a j o r i t y o f the m r a l p o p u l a t i o n more 
I 
p r o d u c t i v e and s e l f - r e l i e n t . The d i f f e r e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f some b a s i c resourcpa e l l e a d s t o much g r e a t e r i n e q u a l i t y 
In a r u r a l coi^inunity the most irnportant r e s o u r c e i s l and 
which s e r v e s as a b a s i s o f i n e q u a l i t i e s no t o n l y i n the 
farm o u t p u t and income b u t a l s o i n a b s o r p t i o n o f r r a j o r 
deve lopment g a i n s i n an a g r a r i a n economy. The u s u r p t i o n 
of power and authority of the development i n s t i t u t i o n s 
i s another f a c t o r leaching t o the i n e q u a l i t i e s i n the 
' 3 deve lopment b e n e f i t s . 
When economic i n e q u a l i t i e s among the p e o p l e a re 
w i d e s p r e a d , p a t r o n a g e i s an impor tant cor'monly known 
mechanism which appear s t o p e r f o r m d i s c r i m i n a t o r y f u n c t i o n 
4 
i n tlie d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the d(;2velopment g a i n s , G a l j e r t 
d e f i n e s p a t r o n a g e as " a d y a d i c r e l a t i o n betv;een u n e r - j e l s , 
i n v;hich the p e r s o n o f s u p e r i o r s t a t u s p r o v i d e s economic 
b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n t o the p e r s o n of i n f e r i o r s t a t u s , 
who r e c i p r o c a t e s v/ith l o y a l t y ' , p r c . s t i g e , o r r e r s o n a l 
s e r v i c e s . F o r the dependant p e r s o n , p a t r o n a g e y i e l d s 
m a t e r i e l advantages which, hov/ever, s l i g h t they may b e , 
would not have been r e c e i v e d o t h e r w i s e " , The k ind o f 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t tends to d e v e l o p betv7cen the p a t r o n and 
the c l i e n t i s instrr-unrntal cnf"! i s qearecl t o irutuol b e n e f i t . 
The p a b i o n , v/ho i:avour.o a c l i < i iL, • yr i -cLs q r e tu rn of the 
f a v o u r . Each o f such a r e l a t i o n s h i p endures to the e x t e n t 
such o b l i n a t i o n s arc r e tu rnee^ 
X J 
' I n the k ind o f deve lopment framework, as the one v;e 
have , i t i s g e n e r a l l y the o f f i c i a l change agents on the 
one hand and the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s on the o t h e r who are 
i n a p o s i t i o n t o exl^end pa t r onage t o the v i l l a g e r s . Those 
v/ho o f t e n r e c e i v e such pa t ronage are the p e o p l e o f 
p r i v i l e g e d s e c t i o n s . 
The e x t e n s i o n agents who p r o v i d e s e r v i c e s i n the f i e l d 
o f a g r i c u l t u r e , h e a l t h , c r e d i t e t c . tend t o s e t themse l ves 
up as s p e c i f i c pa t r ons and are o f t e n approached as such by 
the v i l l a g e r s . ' The l o g i c o f the s i t u a t i o n demands t h a t the 
e x t e n s i o n agents should work p r e f e r a b l y w i th the p r o v i l e g e d 
s e c t i o n . The p r essure from h i s superiors t o show quick 
r e s u l t s l e a v e s no o p t i o n o t h e r than to approach the 
i n f l u e n t i a l landowning s e c t i o n . Th i s s e c t i o n p r o v e s h e l p f u l 
t o the e x t e n s i o n agents in throe v^ays: ( i ) i t g e n e r a l l y takes 
up new programmes w i thout much h e s i t a t i o n ov/ing t o i t s b e t t e r 
f i n a n c i a l c a p a c i t y and p r o g r e s s i v e out look? ( i i ) i t i s in a 
p o s i t i o n t o p r o v i d e n e c e s s a r y f a c i l i t i e s t o the e x t e n s i o n 
agent.s f o r str .y ; and ( i l l ) i t l i c l rn the cxtenr . ion ;>Qents in 
mee t i ng t h e i r t a r g e t s v/ithout i n v e s t i n g much time and e f f o r t . 
In r e t u r n , i t i s t h i s s e c t i o n which u s u a l l y f i g u r e s i n the 
l i s t o f b e n e f i c i a r i e s . ® 
P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a l s o depend on such peop l e who have 
c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e and cconornic - ower in the v i l l a g e 
f o r tv.'o main r easons , F i r s b l : , p o l i t i c : n l p a r t i e s g e n e r a l l y 
reach masses o n l y through l o c a l i n f l u e n t i a l s . Second l y , the 
members o f the r i c h i n f l u e n t i a l s e c t i o n arc p o l i t i c a l b r o k e r s 
who cornmand v o t e s o f the p o o r and the u n o r g a n i s e d m a s s e s . 
F o r i t s s u r v i v a l ^ a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y cannot da re to o v e r l o o k 
t h i s s e c t i o n . The dependence o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a l s o 
p r o v i d e s t h i s s e c t i o n a f a v o u r a b l e c o n d i t o n to u s u r p the 
deve lopment b e n e f i t s . , U s i n g t h e i r l i n k s vrith the g o v e m n e n t , 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s f i n d themse l ve s i n a p o s i t i o n to h e l p t h e i r 
i n f l u e n t i a l c l i e n t s i n the v i l l c i g e i n s e v e r a l ^^;ays. Hunte r 
w r i t e s : "Because one c o n t r o l s v o t e s , i n f l u e n t i a l p o l i t i c i a n s 
w i l l woo him, b e cause he c o n t r o l s p u b l i c f u n d s , c o n t r a c t o r s 
and o t h e r s w i l l \k>o hiir.; and s i n c e he can p a s s down t h e s e 
f a v o u r s which he r e c e i v e s f rom above, he w i l l be a b l e t o 
c o n t i n u e to c o n t r o l v o t e s ' ' . ^ 
POLICY G0IJ3TRAINT3 
I t i s t r u e t h a t s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s a r e impor tan t i n 
d e t e r m i n i n g the d i f f e r e n t i a l consequences o f the deve lopment 
y 
programmes. We however , b e l i e v e t h a t s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s 
wou ld n o t have e x e r c i s e d so much i n f l u e n c e had deve lopment 
ffxttllcy bean sound enough to check such a t r e n d and to d i r e c t 
l a r g e p o r t i o n o f a s s i s t a n c e tov/ards the p o o r e r and the weake r 
s i d e o f the s t r u c t u r e . I t v / i l l , t h e r e f o r e , be r e l e v a n t t o 
examine t h o s e c o n s t r a i n t s o f the deve lopment p o l i c y which 
gave V7ay to the s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s to i n f l u e n c e t h e outcome 
o f economic developm.ent, 
Since v e r y beg inning, our '"Icvolopii"-nt p o l i c y has been 
g u i d e d b y two main assumption? Ci ) t h e r e e x i s t s a l e g a c y 
o f community f e e l i n g among the v i l l a g e r s ; p e o p l e knov; each 
o t h e r i n t i m a t e l y and have i d e n t i t y o f i n t e r e s t s which w i l l 
promote c o o p e r a t i o n among them: and ( i i ) s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n 
towards the u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d s e c t i o n s may enable them t o 
I 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n the development and share i t s b e n e f i t s . 
I t w i l l be in o rde r t o examine the above assumptions 
ono by onG. The f i r s t nnsnniption in p robab ly cxprcsDcd in 
the p o l i c y goa l t o reach a l l f a m i l i e s in the comrr:unity 
p a r t i c u l a r l y those o f the weaker s e c t i ons and t o f o s t e r 
c oo j j e r a t i on and cohes i v eness among the r u r a l p e o p l e . The 
es tab l i shment o f s e l f - g o v e r n i n g u n i t s l i k e panchayats and 
c o o p e r a t i v e s w i th democrat ic c o n s t i t u t i o n s was cons idered 
t o be a s tep i n the same d i r e c t i o n . 
A ques t i on may, however, be r a i s e d whether such an 
assumption has any e m p i r i c a l v a l i d i t y . 
VILL/^E SOCIAL STRUCTUllE 
The v i l l a g e s o c i e t y i s ex t reme ly complcx in i t s 
t 8 
s t ruc tu r e and i s e s s e n t i a l y a " f a c t i o n s o c i e t y " . Th i s 
p a r t l y e x p l a i n s the f a i l u r e o f ^ t h e community approach in 
e n l i s t i n g the coope ra t i on and enthusiasm o f the v i l l a g e 
p e o p l e in development programmes. Land has a p r e s t i g e 
v a l u e . A v i l l a g e r v; i thout lane: i s l i k e a person v.'ithout 
c a s t e and the l and l e s s are the dec lassed o f ru ra l s o c i e t y . 
rroQreyj.'J, growth cukI dcvc;! < ipim'ii l. arc Torcign to a 
f a c t i o n - r i d d e n s o c i e t y . To nake room f o r them, i t s entire 
hi x'O 
c h a r a c t e r has to be changed . I t can not be done v/ithout 
c u t t i n g i t a t i t s r o o t s t h a t l i e deep i n the p r i v a t e 
owne r sh ip o f l and and i n the p r e s e n t unequa l d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f h o l d i n g s . A l l impor tant f a c t i o n s t h a t count i n the 
a f f a i r s o f a v i l l a g e as a v/hole a re those o f the l anded 
h o u s e h o l d s . They have f a l l e n a g a i n s t each o t h e r , a g a i n s t 
t h e i r o\-m k i t h and X in and a g a i n s t t h e i r ov;n castemen, 
on d i v i s i o n o f a h o l d i n g , t r a n s f e r o f l and muta t ion , f i e l d 
boundry , e n t r y o f l a n d r i ^ t s i n v i l l a g e r e c o r d s , s u b l e t t i n g 
and share c r o p p i n g , ejectment and surrender o f h o l d i n g , 
exchange o f p l o t s , p o s s e s s i o n and d i s p o s s e s s i o n o f l a n d 
shcures e t c . . T h i s s o c i o l o g i c a l r e a l i t y i s o f t e n missed 
i n most o f ou r d e l i b r a t i o n s on l and r e f o rm end p l a n n i n g 
o f the count ry s i d e . Around the l and p rob l em l i e the 
d i s c o r d and extreme d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n o f the v i l l a g e p e o p l e 
i n the c o u n t r y s i d e . The f a c t , t h a t I n d i a n v i l l a g e s o c i e t y 
i s s t r a t i f i e d and t o r n by c ! i \n f l i c t s , v/os b r o u g h t t o ou r 
n o t i c e by s e v e r a l s t u d i e s . I t does not mean t h a t our 
dnvcl.opment p o l i c y has not taken no te o f such a s i t u a t i on . 
I n f a c t , our Governiiient i s n u i t o s onsc i ou s o f the 
s t r a t i f i e d c h a r a c t e r o f the r u r a l . s o c i e t y and 
i t s p o s s i b l e conscquences . A c c o r d i n g l y , c e r t a i n g roups 
V, X -
were identified in the ceste and claes hierarchy which need to 
be given special attention in the process of development. Prom-
inent onong such groups are scheduled castes* scheduled tribes* 
small farmers* marginal farmers and agricultural labourers. 
Attenopts were also made to separate the poor from the relatively 
rich. 
( 
The problem arises when one finds that the demands of the 
development programmes are basically in conflict with the tradi-
tional pattern of social relations. The development progrmnes 
induce people to be rational and to seek change.* whereas tradi-
tional self-government and cooperation were concerned with prese-
rving established relations. The democratic franewozk of panchayat 
and cooperatives envisaged under the development progrannes demands 
that people interact ^ equals and that conounity's interests are 
given uppermost consideration* while the self-govemmnt and 
cooperation in the trttflitional social structure were based upon 9 
the interaction of hierarchically arranged \inequal groups. 
Under these circumstances* the estddlishment of democratic 
end self-governing institutions to implement development programmea 
has sijqply tended to reinforce the pattern of rural privileged 
and intensify the conflict of interests* It so happened that tte 
power to run those institutions rests with the sane privilege 
section that has been owning most of the village lands and doing 
traditional moneylending and trading. The people of this sectitt 
see to i t that policies and prtgrantoies averse to their interests 
are not put into effect or ere turned to their own benefit. The 
consequences of the development progranvne s in such a situation 
cannot be different from what we have noted. Myrdal has rightly 
observe d "Efforts to create machinery for self-government and 
coox>eration and popular participation without changing the basic 
social and economic structure and Essentially attempts to bypass 
the equality issue. 
^ Q H'. i 
UnlDce Galbralth's explanation of poverty, \4hlch Is based 
on social psychology of the poor ^^ Our explanation holds the 
agrarian structure, the institutional framework, or the in^erfect 
factor markets responsible for the mass poverty. Some of recent 
time economists who explained poverty in this way are G.Myrdal, 
M.L.Dantwala, C.T«Kurlen, Dandekar-Rath and others.^^ 
Let us formulate a micro level model to explain these 
f 
processes, 
Oir concept or lual poverty is as follows: 
(1) Rural poverty is the poverty of the masses who live below 
the minimim level of living, (absolute poverty) (2) It is 
essentially the deprivation of the poor. That is, the poor 
are deprived of their due, share in the total economic gains 
(relative poverty), (3) Rural poverty is a process in the 
sense that it is a consequence of the functioning of the rural 
economy, (4) Rural poverty is essentially the isolation of 
the poor from the main stream of the economy. That is, it is 
a result of their low level of participation in economic 
activities. ' 
When rural poverty is understood as above, it can be 
ejqplained by a model that analyses the process of percolation 
of economic gains and of participation by the poor. Such a 
model can also be useful for formulating policies for eradi-
cation of poverty, 
Percolation of gains and participation by the poor are the 
two sides of the same process, namely, the deprivation of the 
poor. The former refers to the availlbility of benefits to 
the poor, while the latter refers to their accessibility. 
4 1 9 
Any progress in eradication of the mass rural poverty, therefore, 
is possible only by making benefits available to the poor on 
the hand and by assuring their participation in such tt;tivities 
on the other hand. 
If a society is a homogenous society in the sense that all 
the households enjoy the same socio-economic status and have 
the influence on the decision making process, the accessibility 
of each household to the benefits of growth will be the sane. 
I 
Homogeneous society of the above type dees not exist in 
reality as in real life there are always some differences in 
the socio-economic status of different households. In our i' 
rural society, however, the differences are so distinct that 
they have acquired the status of strata of different types. 
The process of percolation in such a stratified society is 
likely to acquire a distinct nature. 
There are two important characteristics of social 
stratifications. Firstly, these stratifications are hierar-
chial in nature. Secondly the stratifications are overlapping 
in the sense that a large number of households enjoying a 
high economic status also enjoy a high social status. 
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The prograitanes f o r t h e poor under t h e IRDP s t r a t e g y 
a r e implemented b y the government a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t h e panchaya t 
and banks ( o r c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s ) . That i s , they e n t e r t h e 
v i l l a g e th rough t h e sarpgnch o r o t h e r panchayat members, the 
V . L . W . , the P a t w a r i o r the s t a f f o f b anks . Now, as the VLW, 
t h e P a t w a r i and bank s t a f f t a k e t h e h e l p o f t h e sa rpanch and 
o t h e r l e a d e r s i n iritplemeoting the prograitmes, and a s t h e 
sa rpanch e t c . have a c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e on t h e wo rk ing o f 
t h e s e s t a f f , t h e programmes e n t e r ^ i t h e r th rough t h e sa rpanch 
and o t h e r l e a d e r s o r a f t e r t h e i r c o n s u l t a t i o n and a p p r o v a l . 
Even i f some poo r a r e in t h e d i r e c t touch w i t h t h e VLV/, o r 
t h e pa tv ; a r i o r some bank s t a f f , t h e y cannot t a k e t h e b e n e f i t s 
d i r e c t l y , as they have t o go t o the sa rpanch f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . 
Thus t h e e n t r y o f the programmes w i l l b e th rough the 
r u r a l e l i t e . Now t h e r u r a l e l i t e w i l l b e i n t e r e s t e d i n s p r e a d -
i n g t h e programmes on the b a s i s o f c l a s s i n t e r e s t , c a s t e 
s o l i d a r i t y and power p o l i t i c s . However , as t h e prograrmies a r e 
meant f o r the househo l d s b e l o n g i n g t o low c a s t e s / c l a s s e s , t h e 
r u r a l e l i t e w i l l t r y t o adopt ways and means t o keep t h e poo r 
away f rom t h e programmes t o p r o t e c t t h e i r c l a s s i n t e r e s t s . The 
f i r s t way w i l l b e t o d e f i n e t h e m s e l v e s o r o t h e r non -poo r as 
p o o r . A^ t h e d e f i n i t i o n s a r e l o o s e and as t h e s t a f f o f the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a r e f a v o u r a b l e , t h i s w i l l not be a d i f f i c u l t 
t a s k . The non -poo r o r t h o s e who a r e suppo r t ed by the r u r a l 
. J _ 
r i c h w i l l thus be a b l e t o t a k e advantage o f t h e programmes. 
The second vay w i l l b e t o use t h e poor themse l ve s to t a k e 
t h e advantages o f t h e programmes. The r u r a l r i c h can use 
t h e i r employees o r dependent poor f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . They 
w i l l a sk and h e l p t h e dependents t o g e t t h e programmes, b u t 
w i l l t a k e away t h e s u b s i d i s e d a s s e t s . The poor w i l l g e t 
some nominal r ewa rd f o r t h i s and the r i c h w i l l g e t t h e a s s e t . 
I 
The t h i r d way o f k e e p i n g t h e poor away w i l l be o f e i t h e r not 
h e l p i n g them in t a k i n g up the progr?mmes o r o f c r e a t i n g p o s i -
t i v e o b s t a c l e s i n t h e i r way so t h a t the poor cannot t ake up I 
the programmes. The f o u r t h way w i l l be t o ask the VLW, 
P a t w a r i e t c . n o t t o g i v e b e n e f i t s o f the programmes to a 
V large 
number o f the poo r * As the VX«W can meet the t a r g e t s 
b y l e a k i n g ou t t h e programmes to the n o n - p o o r , he does no t 
mind o b l i g i n g the r i c h . In f a c t , toe o f t e n f e e l s s c a r e d o f 
t h e r i c h as he i s many t imes t h r e a t e n e d by them. 
The ne t r e s u l t i s t h a t the ooo r - a r e h a r d l y a b l e t o 
t a k e advantage o f t h e progrannmes» The p r o c e s s o f p e r c o l a t i o n 
i s no t l i k e l y t o change enough by t h e s p e c i a l programmes 
st r?t -egy to cover t h e noor in t h e p u r v i e w o f t h e s p e c i a l 
proqrpmmes. The se proorammes w i l l b e n e f i t e i t h e r the 
non -poo r who can cove r t hemse l v e s under t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f the 
poor o r the ' p o o r * ( a c c o r d i n g t o t h e government d e f i n i t i o n ) 
who a r e p o t e n t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l c a s e s and who have a c c e s s i b i -
l i t y t o 9 r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e suppo r t ( o r a t l e a s t not 
o p p o s i t i o n ) o f t h e r u r a l r i c h . 
/! 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n o r l a c k o f i t i s the o the r s i d e o f t h e 
d e p r i v a t i o n o f t h e p o o r . 
I t is a c c e p t e d tha t a major cause o f mass rural p o v e r t y 
is t h e n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y t h e p o o r , i . e . i s o l a t i o n o f t h e 
poo r f rom t h e main s t r e a m o f t h e economy. P a r t i c i p a t i o n by t h e 
poo r i s t h e r e f o r e a p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r dovolopmont and f o r e r a d i -
c a t i o n o f mass p o v e r t y . I t a s s u r e s t h e poor t h e i r s h a r e i n t h e 
t o t a l q a i n s and g i v e s them t h e s t r e n g t h t o e x i s t as a h e a l t h y 
! 
s e c t i o n . o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . L e t us f i r s t be c l e a r as t o what 
we mean by p a r t i c i p a t i o n and what t y p e o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s 
needed f o r e r a d i c a t i o n o f p o v e r t y , 
I 
WHAT IS PARTTCIPATION ? : 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n e s s e n t i a l l y mbans t o g e t i n v o l v e d o r t o 
s h a r e . However , t h i s invo lvement or s h a r i n g can be o f d i f f e r e n t 
t y p e s and a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . P a r t i c i p a t i o n c o u l d be i n d i v i -
dua l or c o l l e c t i v e , i t c o u l d b e con t inuous o r s p o r a d i c , or i t 
c o u l d b e a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s . I t c o u l d be a t the b e n e f i c i a r y 
l e v e l or i t c o u l d b e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , i t c ou l d b e a t the l e v e l 
o f D O l i c y making o r a t t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l o f c o n t r o l l i n g t h e 
h i g h e s t p o l i c y making b o d y . O b v i o u s l y , t h e r e i s a w i d e gap 
be tween t h i s i d e a l and the r e a l i t y o f t h e d e v e l o p i n g economi s 
v/here t h e r e i s a mass n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n even a t t h e b e n e f i c i a r y 
l e v e l . The q u e s t i o n t h a t a r i s e s i s what a r e the f a c t o r s r e s p o -
n s i b l e f o r t h i s n o n - p a r t i c i n a t i o n and how can one reach t h e 
d e s i r e d p a t t e r n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n f rom t h i s l e v e l o f non -
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 

as w e l l as a h i g h power status^. The two c h a r n c t e r i s t i c s o f 
"the s t r ? » t i f I c a t i o n s have two important r e s u l t s . On t h e one 
hand, t h e y have c r e a t e d an e l i t e g roup t h a t h o l d s h i g h economic, 
p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l s t a t u s , w h i l e on t h e o t h e r hand, a l a r g e 
number o f househo l d s a r e d e p r i v e d o f a l l t h e t h r e e t y p e s o f 
s t a t u s . 
The e l i t e g roup or t h e r u r a l r i c h a r e in a p o s i t i o n t o 
use t h e i r s t a t u s in s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r own p o s i t i o n f u r t h e r . 
The r u r a l r i c h o r e a l s o l i k e l y t o have a c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e 
on t h e s t a f f o f t h e government deve lopment a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and f 
on the c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d i n g t h e banks and v a r i o u s 
t y p e s o f o t h e r b o d i e s . T h i s i s b e c a u s e o f a number o f 
r e a s o n s . The r u r a l , r i c h h e l p them in t h e i r f u n c t i o n i n g 
i n many ways . S e c o n d l y , t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e r i c h i s b e n e f i c i a l 
t o them a l s o . And t h i r d l y , n e i t h e r the s t a f f o f t h e d e v e l o p -
ment a d m i n i s t r a t i o n nor t h e c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n s can a f f o r d t o 
go a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e r u r a l r i c h as the consequences 
c o u l d be h a r m f u l . 
As they own major p r o d u c t i o n r e s o u r c e s o f t h e economy, 
they p r o v i d e emoloyment ( f o r wages ) t o t h e masses and a l s o 
p r o v i d e l oans f o r s e e d s , f o r consumption, f o r s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s , 
e t c , e t c . T h i s has r e s u l t e d in t h e h e l p l e s s o r u n i l a t e r a l 
economic f?ependence o f t h e masses on t h e r u r a l r i c h v i z . t h e 
t rader ;^ , the ta1q f a rmer s nnd on thr « money len '^ lcrs ( R e f e r t o 
f i g u r e 9,1) . 
The roots of the non-participation are in the strati-
fication of our rural society and in the inability of our 
planners to perceive 'the problem of rural poverty correctly. 
The three types of stratifications of our rural society have 
created, on the one hjand, a group of rural rich who hold 
considerable socio-economic and political power in their 
hands, and on the other hand, it has left the masses without 
this power. This has resulted in a helpless dependence of 
the masses on the rural rich not only for enqployment and 
wages, but also for information about new prograirmes/ 
technology, for accessibility to the administration, for 
accessibility to the credit market, for water, seeds and 
implements, for credit for consumption, social functions 
and for other emergencies. Such a situation has enabled 
the elite to use their power to protect and strengthen their 
own favour^le situation, 
This has resulted in the non-participation of the poor 
masses, (a) The poor are either not interested in partic-
ipating out of frustration or out of helplessness or (b) have 
no confi^nce and courage to come forward to participate, 
(c) or are not in a position to participate as they have 
no proper knowledge about the procedures and no proper help 
to participate. 
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o r ( d ) a r e p r e v e n t e d f rom p a r t i c i p a t i n g b y t h e r u r a l r i c h . 
The f i r s t ' t y p e o f s i t u a t i o n can be d e s c r i b e d as t h e "accommo-
flation* by t h e p o o r , t h e second t y p e o f s i t u a t i o n can b e 
d e s c r i b e d as t h e s ense o f inadequacy f e l t by t h e poor ( t h e 
s t a t u s , Rystems and c u l t u r a l b a r r i e r s ) , the t h i r d s i t u a t i o n 
i n d i c a t e s the poor a c c e s s i b i l i t y o f t h e poor t o i n f o r m a t i o n / 
f a c i l i t i e s , and t h e f o u r t h s i t u a t i o n r e f l e c t s t h e ve k b a r g a i n -
i n g power o f t h e p o o r . Thus a l l t h e s i t u a t i o n s o f n o n - p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n seem t o b e o r i g i n a t i n g f rom t h e s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c -
t e r i s t i c s o f t h e r u r a l s o c i e t y . 
i m p l i e s t h a t any s t r a t e g y t h a t aims a t l a r g e s c a l e 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e poor in deve l opmenta l a c t i v i t i e s , s h o u l d 
attac"k on t h i s h o p e l e s s dependence o f t h e poor as once i t i s 
removed or even r educed c o n s i d e r a b l y , the poor w i l l b e in a 
p o s i t i o n to p a r t i c i p a t e . The needs o f t h e poo r t h e r e f o r e s h o u l d 
be a s s e s s e d f rom t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w . However , t h e p l a n n e r s 
a s sessment o f t h e needs seem to b e d i f f e r e n t . They have emph-
a s i z e d a s s e t b a s e d income g e n e r a t r n n programnes f o r t h e poo r 
w i t h o u t unde r s t and ing the r e a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f t h e p o o r . As 
ou r e m o i r i c a l s t u d y has shown t h e r e i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e gap 
b e tween the p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e p l a n n e r s and o f t h e poor r e g a r d i n g 
d i n g p o v e r t y . And t h i s i s a l s o an important f a c t o r r e s p o n -
s i b l e f o r t h e n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y t h e p o o r . 
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THE /.Jl.b. PROG'^AMMES STRATEGY AND NON-PARTICIPATION : 
The IRDP s t r a t e g y alms a t b r i n g i n g t h e poor in t h e main 
s t r eam o f t h e economy by e n c o u r a g i n g t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
Howeve r ; i t does not remove t h e r e a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f the p o o r . 
T h a t i s , i t does not a t t a c k the s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
o f t h e r u r a l economy; i t does no t attemnt to r educe t h e 
depenrlence o f t h e poo r pn t h e r u r a l r i c h . I t t r i e s to g i v e 
a s s e t b a s ed income g e n e r a t i n g schfmor. t o the poor which a r e 
no t r e a l l y l i k e l y t o reach t h e r e a l poo r on one hand and t h e 
poo r a r e not l i k e l y t o be a b l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e in them on the 
o t h e r , c o n s e q u e n t l y , not many poor a r e l i k e l y t o t a k e 
advan tage o f t h e schemes. And even t h o s e who t a k e advantage 
may not o b s e r v e t h e f i n a n c i a l d i s c i p l i n e needed and t h e r e f o r e 
may not g e t t h e e x p e c t e d b e n e f i t s f rom t h e schemes. The net 
g a i n s o f such a s t r a t e g y a r e l i k e l y t o be v e r y l i m i t e d in 
terms o f b r i n g i n g t h e DOor in t h e main s t ream o f t h e economy. 
THE PROCESS OF PERCOLATION 
The v a r i o u s i n p u t s needed f o r g rowth can be l i s t e d es 
i n f o r m a t i o n about new t e c h n o l o g y , s u p p l i e s o f new i n p u t s 
c r e d i t and i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s ; and o t h e r i n s t i t u t -
i o n a l h e l p f o r g e t t i n g s u p p l i e s o f implements e t c , and 
m a r k e t i n g p r o d u c t s . The o r g a n i s a t i o n s t h a t p r o v i d e t h e s e 
i n p u t s and t h e r e b y br ' ing new deve lopment programmes i n a 
r u r a l a r e a a r e , the deve lopment a d m i n i s t r a t i o n (VIW, P a t w a r i 
e x t e n s i o n o f f i c e r s e t c , ) , the f a r m e r s s e r v i c e s o c i e t y (F3S) , 
c r e d i t i n s t i t u t i o n ( i . e . c o o p e r a t i v e c r e d i t s o c i e t i e s , banks 
e t c . ) Some t imes b i g f a r m e r s , shopkeepers o r money l e n d e r s 
e t c . , who a r e i n touch w i t h the o u t s i d e w o r l d may a l s o b r i n g 
t h e new programmes t o the v i l l a g e . 
As a l l t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s are under the c o n t r o l o f the 
r u r a l r i c h , the e n t r y o f new prograrrxnes, i n a r u r a l a r e a i s 
a l w a y s d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , through t h i s g r o u p . In f a c t , 
i f a p rogramme/techno logy e t c , i s not advantaqoous to them, 
t h e y t r y to p r e v e n t i t ' s e n t r y i n t o the v i l l a g e . 
Thus the p r o c e s s o f p e r c o l a t i o n o f a nev; prograrrjne/ 
t e c h n o l o g y e t c , s t a r t s from thi )^ g r o u p . The f a c t o r s t h a t 
f j ove rn the d i r e c t i o n o f the p roccsr^ LhuroaL t t r a r e , ( a ) c la : : ; s 
i n t e r e s t , ( b ) c a s t e s o l i d a r i t y and ( c ) power p o l i t i c s . 
The economic c l a s s t h a t recr i v c s the b e n e f i t s f i r s t 
i s the c l a s s o f the r u r a l r i c h who a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n 
k e e p i n g the b e n e f i t s t o themse l ve s as the s t r e n g t h o f 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n depends on t h e i r ' e ^ t e l u k i v e ' - g a l n e . C o n s e q -
u e n t l y , the c l a s s o f the b i g l a n d h o l d e r s v j i l l be the 
f i r s t c l a s s t o g a i n the b e n e f i t s . The p e r c o l a t i o n t o o t h e r 
c l a s s e s w i l l t a k e p l a c e as l o n g they have conmon c l a s s i n t -
e r e s t s an^ have a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o the c r e d i t marke t . The 
u p p e r c l a s s e s , t h e r e f o r e , w i l l be main b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f the 
b e n e f i t s , the uppe r -n f b s t c l a s s e s b e i n g maximum g a i n e r s . The 
p e r c o l a t i o n t o the l o w e r c l a s s e s v/ i l l be a lmos t n i l . 
C a s t e s o l i d a r i t y i s ano the r f a c t o r t h a t gove rns the 
p r o c e s s c f p e r c o l a t i o n . The k i n s h i p r e l a t i o n and the p o l l -
u t i o n - p u r i t y r u l e s a re the m a j o r b a s e s o f c a s t e s o l i d a r i t y . 
C a s t e - w i s e h o u s i n g p a t t e r n i n r u r a l a r e a s s t r e n g t h e n s the 
c a s t e s o l i d a r i t y . There i s t h e r e f o r e a tendency on the p a r t 
o f the e l i t e g roup to i n c l u d e t h e i r c a s t e - f e l l o w s i n s h a r i n g 
the b e n e f i t s . The p e r c o l a t i o n p r o c e s s v ; i l l d i r e c t the b e n e -
f i t s t o h i g h c a s t e - h o u s e h o l d s . The a c c e s s i b i l i t y o f 
o t h e r c a s t e s t o the g a i n s v/ i l l depend on the d i s t a n c e between 
t h e i r s o c i a l s t a t u s ahd the s o c i a l s t a t u s o f i-he e l i t e g r o u p . 
The l e s s e r the d i s t a n c e , the g r e a t e r w i l l be t h e i r chance o f 
g a i n i n g the b e n e f i t s . S 
Power p o l i t i c s i s e s s e n t i a l l y the game o f those i n po'.s'er 
t o reiii.-iin i n pov/er. ConGcquc n t 1 y il-if.nc \jiio cu _ o r t , the r u r a l 
e l i t e t o remain i n power vz i l l be t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f new 
economic programmes. T h e s e b e n e f i c i a r i e s w i l l be the members 
o f F3S, . I-CS, the v i l l a g e panchava t e t c , e t c . 
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I n the same way as shown i n f i g u r e ] , i f the nuirtoer o f 
strata t h a t e n j o y h i * ^ s t a t u s i n any p a t t e r n o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n 
i s one o r v e r y s m a l l , the e x t e n t o f p e r c o l a t i o n o f b e n e f i t s 
w i l l be l e s s as t h e r e w i l l b e on l y a f ew s t r a t a t o ; h a r e the 
b e n e f i t s . I f , on the o t h e r hand, the number o f s t r a t a i s h i g h , 
t h e p r o c e s s o f p e r c o l a t i o n w i l l c o v e r 6 l a r g e number o f h o u s e -
h o l d s . 
To sum up t h e r e f o r e , (1 ) The maximum b e n e f i t s o f new 
economic p rog rammes/techno logy e t c , w i l l go t o the r u r a l e l i t e , 
( 2 ) the p r o c e s s o f p o r c o l a t i o n w i l l f o l l o w t h r e e h o r i z o n t a l 
d i r e c t i o n s b a s e d on c l a s s i n t e r e s t , c a s t e , s o l i d a r i t y and 
powe r g r o u p s . The h o u s e h o l d s t o be b e n e f i t t e d by any new 
t e c h n o l o g y / p r o g r a m m e « w i l l be those who b e l o n g to u p p e r s t r a t c 
o f t h r e e t y p e s o f s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s . 
The r e s t o f the p o p u l a t i o j i w i l l remain a lmos t o u t s i d e 
the p u r v i e w o f p e r c o l a t i o n i n a normal s i t u a t i o n . 
I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , the p r o c e s s o f p e r c o l a t i o n w i l l 
t end t o s t r e n g t h e n the p o s i t i o n o f the s t r o n g and weaken t h e 
p o s i t i o n o f the weak . 
The c a s e o f B e r t h a l ( k ) v i l l a g e r e v e a l s t h i s c l e a r l y . 
The v i l l a g e has o n l y one dominant c a s t e , namely, the 
J a t s . As the J a t s own o v e r more than 85% o f the l a n d 
and a r e heading* a l l t h e i n ^ o r t a n t v i l l a g e o r g a n i s a t i o n s , 
they have huge powers i n t h e i r hands^ the h i g h % o f n o n -
p a r t i c i p a n t s (64%) and h i g h l e v e l s o f f r u s t r a t i o n o f t h e 
p o o r a r e due t o t h i s one c a s t e dominance . 
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The g a i n s a r e n o t l i k e l y to b e p o r c o l e t e d t o the masses who 
have no povjer as the masses a r e o f no consequence i n the povjer 
p o l i t i c s . On the c o n t r a r y ^ the m r a l e l i t e v ; i l l be i n a s t r o -
n g e r p o s i t i o n i f the masses do not g a i n a n y t h i n g . 
The f l o w c h a r t on the o p p o s i t e p a g e d e p i c t s the f l ov ; o f 
b e n e f i t s t o d i f f e r e n t s e c t i o n s o f i rural p o p u l a t i o n . I t shows 
t h a t t h e p e r c o l a t i o n o f g a i n s i s l i m i t e d - o n l y t o . t h o s e 
( a ) who have some minimum l e v e l o f a s s e t s , 
( b ) who b e l o n g t o h i g h c a s t e s o r dominant c a s t e s and 
( c ) who have d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e on d e c i s i o n ra ik ing . 
I t seems t h a t the h o u s e h o l d s which b e l o n g to lov/er c a s t e s 
and lov/er c l a s s e s and ^/ho h o l d no power on any d e c i s i o n rr.sking 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a r e l i k e l y to be l e f t o u t o f t h e p r o c e s s o f p e r c -
o l c3t ion . I n o t h e r v/ords, l a r g e rnosrjos o f the l owe r s t r a t a o f 
the r u r a l s o c i e t y a re hot l i k e l y to be b e n e f i t e d by v a r i o u s 
economic programmes t h a t e n t e r the r u r a l economy. 
The e x t e n t o f p e r c o l a t i o n d f b e n e f i t s i n a v i l l a g e v/ i l l 
l a r g l y depend on the n a t u r e o f the s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s . One can 
f o r m u l a t e two r u l e s i n t h i s r e s p e c t , ( a ) The h i g h e r i s the 
e x t e n t o f o v e r l a p p i n g o f the h i g h e r s t r a t a o f d i f f e r e n t t y p e s , 
the lov;er w i l l be the e x t e n t o f »:»ert?olation and v i c e v e r s a , and 
( b ) the g r e a t e r i s t h e number o f s t r a t a a t the h i g h e r l e v e l , the 
g r e t e r w i l l b e the p e r c o l a t i o n . F i g u r e s 2 and 3 e x p l a i n the 
r u l e s c l e a r l y . As shown i n f i g u r e 2, i f the h i g h e s t economic 
c l a s s e s and h i g h e s t c a s t e s c o i n c i d e t o a g r e a t e x t e n t , the 
p r o c e s s o f p e r c o l a t i o n f rom b o t h the d i r e c t i o n s - c l a s s i n t e r e s t 
and c a s t e s o l i d a r i t y - w i l l c o v e r the same househo ld s t o a 
l a r g e e x t e n t . ' . ^ In o t h e r wor f l s , i f the c o n c e n t r a -
t i o n o f s o c i o - e c o n o m i c - p o l i t i c a l power i s more, the b e n e f i t s o f 
economic growth are l i k e l y t o reach a l i m i t e d nurrJ^ er o f h o u s e -
FIGURE I 
RURAL SOCIAL STRATIFICATIONS 
H i g h e s t C a s t e s 
H igh C a s t e s 
Lower C a s t e s 
Lowes t C a s t e s 
NOTE: ABCD = T o t a l p o p u l a t i o n 
H o r i z o n t a l d i v i s i o n s o f the p o p u l a t i o n i n d i c a t e 
c a s t e s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , 
« 
Each c a s t e g roup i s d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e c l a s s e s 
H i g h C l a s s 
Low C l a s s 
Lowes t C l a s s 
I n d i c a t e s the h o u s e h o l d s who h o l d power i . e . who 
i n f l u e n c e the d e c i s i o n making o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 
-J 
B 
InAicatea oftxlapping of the hle^est stretd 
class, oasto andl power groaps. Ihe benefits 
therebre axe likely to reach aaliay the house-
holds beloDglfle to the hi^est strata. 
B InOleates lesser degree of ovezlapping of the 
bluest strata of different types of stratifi-
cations. Ihe benefits therefore axe likely to 
reach a large niober of households belonging to 
h l ^ castes) classes and poi«r groups. 
FIQUHK 3 
'I 
B 
i i m m 
I h e n u a b t r o f H l f ^ C a s t e s t h a t e n j o y b i f l h e s t 
e c o n o B l o s t a t u s and b e l o n g t o the power ; r o u p 
i s o i a y t w o . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the number o f 
b o u s e b o l d s t o b e b e n s f i t t e d new e c o n o a l c 
p r o g r a a n e s i s r e l a t l T e i l / s o a O l . 
B S i e n a i b e r o f b l ^ c a s t e s t b a t e n j o y b l g b e s t 
e e o n o m c s t a t u s and b e l o n g t o t b e M n e r g r p u M 
XB f o u r . She n a e b e r o f bousetaeads t h a t w i l l b e 
c o n e e m t d by ttae p r o c e s s o f p e r c o l a t i o n I s 
t h e r e f o r e b i g ) ) * 
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BRONi CONCLUSIONS 
1, The rural society is stratified on the basis 
of Caste, Class and Power, 
2, The Intensity of poverty and inequality is more 
in villages vAiere economic power is concentrated 
in tiie hands of a small group. 
3» There is convergence of Class, Caste and Power 
groups, 
4. Class has the most significant influence on the 
percolation of development benefits, 
5. Organisational-institutional structural factors 
go against the interests of target groups and 
Impede the percolation of benefits to them. 
6. Economic policy under IRDP has failed to raise 
the target groups above the poverty line. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR A3RARIAN ECONOMIC POLICY 
The f o l l o w i n g shou ld b e the o b j e c t i v e s o f an e q u i t y -
o r i e n t e d s t r u c t u r a l p o l i c y f o r p o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n in r u r a l 
India. 
(a) ttexiirum prp^vctAon g£ wealth.^or eradAcn^ipn of poverty. 
With t h a t end i n v i e w ( a l o n g w i t h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in o u r 
s o c i a l and economic a t t i t u d e s ) , I n d i a r e q u i r e s a system o f 
a g r i c u l t u r e which w i l l p r oduce o r h e l p p roduce more and more 
f o o d and raw m a t e r i a l s as time p a s s e s , 
( b ) P r o v i s i o n o f f u l l emp lovnent . A l though the u l t i m a t e aim 
i s t o have f e w e r and s t i l l f e w e r men w o r k i n g on the s o i l so 
t h a t more and more wo rke r s a r e r e l e a s e d f rom a g r i c u l t u r e f o r 
a b s o r p t i o n i n p r o d u c t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l goods and s e r v i c e s t h a t 
a c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t y need s , as l o n g as t h e r e axre m i l l i o n s upon 
i b i l l i o n s o f unemployed and underemployed p e r s o n s i n the c o u n t r y 
w a i t i n g f o r employment o r f u l l employment, we need t o have an 
a g r a r i a n system w h i c h , compared to a l l o t h e r s , p r o v i d e s * the 
l a r g e s t employment p o s s i b l e p e r a c r e . 
( c ) E q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w e a l t h o r a vo i dance o f unde r 
d i s p a r i t i e s i n income. W i th t h a t end i n v i e w , c e i l i n g s 
w i l l have t o b e imposed on p r e s e n t p o s s e s s i o n s and f u t u r e 
a c q u i s i t i o n s o f l a n d - i f p o s s i b l e a f l o o r w i l l a l s o have to be 
l a i d down. 
I t i s contended t h a t a system o f i ndependen t p e a s a n t r y 
own ing the sma l l p a t c h e s o f l a n d i t h o l d s , l i n k e d t o g e t h e r by 
s e r v i c e c o o p e r a t i v e s , w i l l f u l f i l the above th r ee o b j e c t i v e s . 
li 7 
This will require that every cultivator is given a 
stake In the land he holds which means that he will be made 
its proprietor and no threat of ejectment will keep hanging 
over his head any longer. 
"Unless those who work own the land, or are at least 
secure on the land as tenants/'? says w.A.LadeJlnsky, "all 
the rest is likely to be writ in water. And this is the 
most difficult step to achieve. It is relatively easy to 
use science to increase production, but only if the culti-
vator's relationship to the land and the state's treatment 
of him and of agriculture create incentives to invest, to 
improve the land and to raise productivity," 
Farm tenancy, therefore, needs to be replaced by peasant 
proprietorship %<hich means that landlordism has to be ddolishe* 
lock, stock and barrel* Every cultivator of the soil, irres-
pective of his status under the existing law, has to be given 
permanent rights and brought into direct relationship with 
the state. No intermediary of landlord shall be permitted 
t • 
to resume land from tenants for self-cultivation, and no 
farmer to lease out his land. 
Our agrarian organization has, therefore, to be such as 
i' 
%fOuld lend itself to the maximum exploitation of land, that 
Is, as will give us maximum yield per acre even though it 
may not be consistent with the maximum exploitation of labour 
and capital. In other words, that economy alone will suit us 
where we have to apply to land more, or increasing number of 
43S 
units of labour or capital, or of both in order that the 
fullest use may be made of the former, bigger yields 
realized per acre, r 
C^r aim must be obviously not the highest possible 
production per man or agricultural worker, but the highest 
possible production per acre. That is vhat will give us 
the largest total for India as a whole and thus eradicate 
poverty or Want of wealth in the absolute. 
On the otiier hand, in countries like the USA, Canada, 
Australia or New Zealand were land is not a limiting factor 
and laibour is relatively scarce, it may be in the national 
interest to obtain the maximum out^t per worker rather than 
maximum yield per acre. 
Farm Management Studies prove that yields per acre 
accruing to a farmer decline as the size of his farm incre-
ases. The reason lies in the fact that agricultural produ-
ction is a life process and, like living beings, is greatly 
affected by the care and devotion it receives, and that 
application of human labour and supervision per acre decr-
eases as the area of the farm increases, 
F 
Output per acre is higher on small farms than on large 
farms. Thus, if a crowded countiry like India has a choice 
between a single lOO-acre farm and 40 2.5 acre farms, the 
coital cost to the national econcmy will be less if the 
country chooses the 40 small farms. There is a second reasoi 
also in favour of the small farm. India is faced with the 
problem of unemployment. National interest, therefore, 
demands an agrarian economy Which, while serving to extract 
L? q 
the maximum out of the land that constitutes the limiting 
factor In our circumstances* will provide the optimum of 
employment for the rural folk. 
Largely because of diseconomies of management and 
difficulty in supervision of a large number of hired workers, 
large holdings attract the use of large machines* thus emply-
Ing more human labour* The number of workers employed per 
100 acres In regions or countries Where small holdings 1 
predOTtinate is greater than that employed in countries where 
large holdings form a large percentage. For example* Japan 
Taiwan* and South Korea* with ^ an average holding of 2.92* 
3,14 and 5,12 acres* carry a population per 100 acres ( of 
arable land and land xmder permanent crops ) of 87*79* and 
89 workers respectively. Whereas the corresponding figures 
for the USA* Mexico* and Brazil stand at 302.65* 305.93* and 
178.95 acres and 1* 12* and 17 workers respectively. 
Thirdly* in as much as a system of agriculture where 
the worker himself is the owner of the land under his plou^* 
peasant proprietorship serves so faster an egalitarian society 
under which there can be no concentration of property and, 
therefore* disparities in wealth and incomes are not wide. 
Lastly* in as much as a peasant's vocation* season in 
and season out* can be carried on with a ]p>air of bullocks 
or a small machine in the solitude of nature without the 
necessity of having to give orders to* or take orders from 
anybody* the system creates a population of independent 
outlook and action in the social and political fields. Thus* 
{ 
peasant proprietorship emerges as the greatest bulwark of 
democracy. 
So that to sum up; a system of peasant proprietorship 
f' 
not only produces more wealth* provides more employment, and 
removes glaring dl^aritles from land but will also prove 
the most secure base of democracy. 
ki. a 
COMPARATIVE LEVELS OP AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AND 
pi^qpypyyvinr ^ 
Country O i O M v a l u t 
added In 
•grleoltun 
0iO8t value 
added per 
pereon 
engaged In 
agriculture 
Oross value 
added per 
mala person 
engaged in 
agriculture 
Gross 
value 
•aded in 
per 
hectare tf 
arable 
land 
1 2 3 4 S 
$ Million 
at US 
prices 
$ at US 
prices 
Vrance 5,000 l;573 2,334 154 
Germany (TR) 2»482 837 1,321 160 
Italy 4,297 867 1«268 203 
Japan 5,468 451 948 523 
TJK 2*849 3,223 3,686 132 
USX 23,587 5,429 6,678 50 
SOURCES Angus Maddison« Economic Progress in Japan and 
USSR, 
George Allen and Umrin London, 1969, p* 65 
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Had larg« naChlnery by itsel f contribated to agricultaral 
production* the yield per unit of land in the USA and the USSR» 
Where the chief means enplo^^d in working a farn i s the use of 
large nachinery« vould have been greater than in western Europe 
and Japan Where nueh less machinery i s used« But tie find that 
the reverse i s the case* Although an average landholding per 
cultivating family in Japan i s the ffnallest of these countries, 
r i z , three acres or i t wi l l be seen that i ts output per 
unit of land i s fowe times higher than in the UK« ten times 
higher than in the USA« and 16 times higher than in the USSR* 
That the production per unit of laisour in France* the UK, the 
United States i s several times higher than in Japan is i r re le -
vant* Mechanisation of farming Operations does improve consi-
derebly the yield per unit of labour, but i t does not inerease 
the fiMld per unit of land, and i t i s this that matters in India 
more than.anything else* 
Agricultural production being a biological process, there 
are no economies of time and scele in agriculture farm Modem 
farm technology i s scale-neutral. Enlargement of the sise of 
an undertaking, therefore, does not lead to increased productico 
in agriculture* 
IDEAL SIZE OF A PARMt 
The upper limit of the farm shall be governed by the 
working capecity of one worker or one unit of mai^ power and 
the lo%#er limit, by the productive capacity of one unit of laod^ 
.S A 1.' 
In our country* thersfoire, (a) where I t is land that Is 
the limiting factor, not l ak^ r ; (b) t ^ r e the area of l « id a 
cultivating familj^ ,(usually consisting of t>fo iioifters) holds 
on average today amounts to a bare 6.25 acres or so; (c) %^ere 
the rate of population grotrth i s very high* viz** nearly 2*5 
per cent per annum* and (d) nhere industrialisation or develop-
ment of non-agriculture is proceeding at such a slow pace that 
the landsman ratio of this farming population i s going down 
instead of going up* i t is in the interest of the people thatt 
(a) a ceiling on present possessions of land is imposed 
at a level not more than 27.5 acres per adult worker (including^ 
of course, his wife and minor children* i f any) and the area 
that thus becomes availddle is distributed to those Mio possess 
no land at a l l or possess less than 2«S acres each; 
(b) a f loor is laid at 2,5 acres* that is* the Imt relating 
to transfer and partition of land in reduced below 2*5 acres; 
and 
(c) futuce aoquisitions of land are so regulated that* 
along with %^at he may be already possessing* the total area « 
man comes to hold does not exceed a particular limit which m^ 
be fixed somewhere between the ceiling and the f loor. 
Both the actual ceiling and floor may di f fer with the 
circumstances of a region concerned^ such as the land-man: ratio 
of its farming po;ulation and quality or productivity of the 
soi l . For exanple* in sandy areas the two figures may stand ait 
25 and 5 acres respectively whereas in irrigated areas* having 
good soil* these may be brought down to 12.5 and 2.5 acres* 
U 3 
LitfO RBDISTRISPTIOWt 
Znexhaustibility of land gives those directly engaged 
in working i t % feeling of security^ ubioh no other means of 
occupation can offer* Land never disil lusions a man completely 
the hope of plenty.in the future always remains* and i s not 
infrequently realised, understandably enoug^h, therefore, there 
has been much clwiour, rather scramble for ownership of land 
in the county. 
Of the 67,4 per Mnt male %ioikers engaged in direetly 
working the land, only 46.35 per cent are cultivators, that 
i s , enjoy rigfhts of ownership or possession over the land; the 
rest, 21*05 per cent, are agrj.cultural labourers with no r i ^ t s 
in land, proprietary or possessory* As regards diqiarities in 
the area of land held by the cultivators inter se, we wi l l 
s 
refer the reader to the Report on Agricultural Census (Oovem* 
ment of India, 1970.71) * He wi l l find that while as many as 
50*6 per cent of the cultivators together held only . 3*9 per 
cent of the cultivators held es much es 30*9 per cent* 
Emphasising two of the aij^ guments in favour of the small 
sise of the farm, P*S* J^ ppu, Joint Secretary, Agriculture and 
Land Reforms Coimnissioner, in his report of Ceiling on Large 
Holdings, submitted to the Oovemment of India in J^^ril 1971, 
•aidi 
There i s a point 9f view that the fixing of a ceiling 
on agricultural holdings at low Itval i and tht radistribution 
of surplus land in countries os heavy population pressure and 
inadequate avenues of productive enploymant IDce India, ia 
X _ 
l ikely to lead to .m inoreaae in overall agricultural production 
and fu l ler utilization of the anrailable inan»po«er. The esqplanattion 
for both these reaulta is that the o%fners of high holdings generally 
depend on wage labour and, therefoze, they %#ill employ labour only« 
up to the point lAiere the increase in out^t resulting from the 
Mqploynent of the last unit of labour is at least slightly above the 
vaga level. No such consideration exists in the case of smaller 
holdings Which are generelly operated by family labour* There being 
no alternative sources of e^ploymant, family labour %d.ll continue to 
be eaqployed* far beyond the point %Aien output per unit of labour is 
equal to the wage level* • In feet, as long as there is any hope of 
increased production, additional holdings wil l be cultivated more 
intensively leading to eidianced overall production. Simultaneously 
t 
there is also ful ler utilisation of the anrailable man-power* 
The assumption frequently made that there is a confliet between 
the two goals of economic growth and social Justice or greater econo-
mic equality has no basis, « t least, in the sphere of agricultural 
production; rather es we have elready seen, they are in harmony* 
Greater equality in distribution of land would also lead to greater 
economic growth in the countryside* 
Whatever uti l ity or potentiality the land redistribution 
prograratne had was compunded f i r s t by the power structure of ^ e ruling 
party and, second, by its inefficiency* Kolf Ladejindcy in a report 
to th« Planning Commission saysi 
'i 
Not th« Isast in ttM eontcoversy about land ceilings, is 
tha fact that the rich and well-to-do faxm groups in India count 
very imich in the inner counsels of the Congress Party both in 
t 
the centre and the states* qpecially on election day«**.Thou^ 
the nuniber of those subject to the ceiling is small, their 
influence is widespread throu^ the control of local seats of 
power and much e l se . . . Tho so-called "vote banks'* are s t i l l 
controlled by them as illustrated by the fact that in the Punjab 
Assembly 45 out of 64 menbers are rated as big owners, in Haryana 
the r e q ^ t i v e numbers are 30 and 52, and in Madhya Pradesh 96 
out of 220 Congress legislators are reported to hacve landholdings 
in excess of the declared limit. Many an other state would ^low 
rou^ly the same relationship. 
A task force set up by the 'Planning Commission in 1972 
under the ^airmanship of the Land Reforms Comnissioner, P.S. 
t^jflx, to make a critical assessment of the esqperience in land 
reform during the previous plan periods, arrived at the same 
conclusion when i t warned the government that "there could be 
no progress in land reforms in the absence of the requisite 
political w i l l " 
(Report, March 1973) 
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UNIMODAL STRATEGY 
« 
The most f undamenta l i s s u e o f a g r i c u l t u r a l s t r a t e g y 
f a c e d by the l a t e d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s i s t o choose b e t -
ween a b imoda l s t r a t e g y wherel::^y r e s o u r c e s a r e c o n c e n t r a t e d 
w i t h i n a s u b s e c t o r o f l a r g e , c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e u n i t s o r 
a un imoda l s t r a t e g y which s e e k s to e n c o u r a g e a more p r o g r -
e s s i v e and w i d e r d i f f u s i o n o f t e c h n i c a l i n n o v a t i o n s adap ted 
t o ' t h e f a c t o r p r o p o r t i o n s o f the s e c t o r as a w h o l e . The 
e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n be tween the two approaches i s t h a t 
the un imoda l s t r a t e g y emphas i ze s sequences o f i n n o v a t i o n s 
t h a t a r e h i g h l y d i v i s i b l e and larqe lTr s c a l e - n e u t r a l . T h e r e -
f o r e , the se i n n o v a t i o n s can be used e f f i c i e n t l y by sma l l -
s c a l e f a r m e r s and edopted p r o g r e s s i v e l y . 
The h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e o f Japan and Ta iwan demons-
t r a t e s t h a t a b imoda l p a t t e r n i s no t an i n e v i t a b l e outcome, 
A unimodal s t r a t e g y a o p e a r s t o have s i g n i f i c a n t a d v a n t a g e s 
w i t h 'rcr.pect t o " t o t a l e f f i c i e n c y " as w e l l f>5 in i t s e f f e c t s 
on income d i s t r i b u t i o n and e q u i t y . 
Under a b imoda l f r o n t i e r f i r m s w i t h t h e i r h i g h c a p i t a l 
t o l a b o u r r a t i o wouW account f o r the bul3< o f commercia l 
p r o d u c t i o n and would have t h e cash income r e q u i r e d t o make 
e x t e n s i v e u se o f pu r chased i n p u t s . Inasmuch as the a g g r e g a t e 
demand cu rve f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s i s i n e l a s t i c and i t s 
r iahtv ;ar ( ] c h i L t o v e r time i s cr-.s' n t i a l l y a f u n c t i o n o f "Lhe 
r a t e o f s t r u c t u r a l t rHnsCormat ion , t o c o n c e n t r a t e r e s o u r c e s 
v/ithin a s u b s e c t o r o f a g r i c u l t u r e i n e v i t a b l y i m p l i e s a r e d u c -
t i o n i n the a b i l i t y o f form hou- .eholds o u t s i d e t h a t s u b s e c t o r 
t o adopt new purchase^! i n p u t s nnd t e c h n o l o g i c G , 
L u a 
Unde r the b imoda l approach the d i v e r g e n c e between 
the f a c t o r i n t e n s i t i e s and the t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y o f 
f b e s t " and a v e r a g e f i r m s i s l i k e l y t o become p r o g r e s s i v e l y 
g r e a t e r as a g r i c u l t u r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e . M o r e -
o v e r , b o th the i n i t i a l and sub sequen t d i v e r g e n c e be tween 
F 
the t e c h n o l o g i e s u sed i n the two s e c t o r s i s l i k e l y t o be 
a c c e n t u a t e d b ecause the f a c t o r p r i c e s , f a c e d by the modem 
s e c t o r d i v e r g e f rom s o c i a l o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t . 
Unde r the un imoda l s t r a t e g y w i t h i t s emphas is on 
h i g h l y d i v i s i b l e and s c a l e - n e u t r a l i n n o v a t i o n s , the b e s t 
f i r m s i n the a g r a r i a n s e c t o r d i s p l a y e s s e n t i a l l y the same 
f a c t o r i n t e n s i t i e s as a v e r a g e f i r m s . More f i r m s w i t h i n 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r a r e a b l e t o expand t h e i r u s e o f 
f e r t i l i z e r and the o t h e r d i v i s i b l e i n p u t s . Thus, the 
d i f f u s i o n o f i n n o v a t i o n s and a s s o c i a t e d i n p u t s , w i l l b e 
more b r o a d l y b a s e d , and t h e d i v e r g e n c e i n f a c t o r i n t e n s i t i e s 
I 
between f r o n t i e r f i r m s and a v e r a g e f i r m s w i l l be m o d e r a t e . 
I t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t the two s t r a t e g i e s w i l l have 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t impact s on many d imens i ons o f 
economic and s o c i a l c h a n g e . Most o b v i o u s a r e the d i f f e r -
e n c e s i n the n a t u r e o f deman<^ fo r f a rm i n p u t s , b u t the 
s t r u c t u r e o f r u r a l demand f o r consumer goods w i l l a l s o be 
v e r y d i f f e r e n t under a unimor].il as compared to a b imboda l 
s t r a t e g y , 
A m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e i n income d i s t r i b u t i o n i s t o be 
e x p e c t e d b e c a u s e o f the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t u n d e r a b imoda l 
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Strategy the d i f f i cu l t problem of absorbing a rapidly gro^Hn^ 
labour force into productive empolyment would be esqpacerbated 
vhereas under a unimodal strategy there is a good prospect 
that the rate of increase in demand for labour would be more 
rapid than the growth of the labour force, THis would mean 
that under-enqployment and unemployment could be reduced as a 
result of wider participation of the rural population in 
improved income earning opportunities. 
The unimodal strategy^ appears to o f fe r greater promise 
for the development of local manufacturing %Aiich is less 
demanding in i ts technical requirements and which is characerized 
by lower eapital/ldbour patios and lower foreign exchange content. 
On the basis of ejqperience in Japan and Taiwan, i t seems clear 
that a unimodal strategy wi l l have a much more favourable impact 
on the gro%rth of output and especially on the growth of employment 
in local manufacturing and supporting service industries* 
The thrust of a unimodal strategy is to encourage general 
diffusion of yiald - incMuing innovations and such machanicd. 
innovations as are conplementary with the new seed fe r t i l i zer 
technology* The bimodal strategy emphasizes simultaneous 
adoption of innovations that increase substantially the anount 
of land which individual cultivators can ef f ic ient ly work in 
addition of the yield - increasing innovations emphasized in 
the unimodal approach. 
t 
Redistributive land.reform is a necessary condition for a 
unimodal strategy. I t can be emphasized that a an effectively 
implemented land reform prograrnme Vhat brings about a more eqpial 
distribution of landed wealth awill not only contribute to the 
goal of equity but %fill also tend to faci l i tate low-cost expansion 
of farm output based primarily on yield-increasing innovations 
and erode the existing highly eaqploitative rural po%<er structure. 
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SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 
AND 
APPENDIX ' B ' 
, DISTRIBUnON OF DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS 
C lass P o s i t i o n 
1 
1.1 a JSRSTy®*^* f a m i l y poBSss ^ Yoa/No 
1.2 b I f y s s , g i v e d e s c r i p t i o n of such land? 
1.3 Land owned. 
Held on mortgage. 
a c r e s ) Taken on rent ( a c r e s ) 
( a c r e s ) Taken on share ( a c r e s ) 
How does your f ami l y c o n t r o l and use the land under i t s 
po s se s s i on 7 
C u l t i v a t e d by faraily_ , ( a c r e s ) Given on mortgage. ( a c r e s ) 
C u l t i v a t e d by l ebour . ( a c r e s ) Given on r ent/sha re ( a c r e s ) 
How much income your f a m i l y earns in a year from d i f f e r e n t sources 
Sources Income 
1. 
2 . 
3. 
4 . 
Power P o s i t i o n j 
3.1 a . Do you ho ld any o f f i c e in v i l l a g e , b l ock , d i s t r i c t or 
r e g i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s auch as Panchayat . Panchayat 
S a m i t i , Z i l e P e r i a h a d , c o o p e r a t i v e s o t c , 
Yes/No 
I f yes , p l e a s e g ive the d e t a i l s : 
1, Panchayat 
2, Panchnyat Sami t i 
3 , Panchoyat Sami t i 
s tanding committees 
4 , Z i l o Pa r i ahad 
5, Coopera t i ve s o c i e t y 
6 , P o l i t i c a l pa r ty 
7 , Z l l e Pa r i ahad s tand ing 
committee 
6 . Do your r e l a t i v e a other than the f ami ly members hold any o f f i c e 
in the v i l l a g e , b l o c k , d i s t r i c t or r e g i o n a l o r g a n i a a t i o n s ? 
Yea/No 
9, I f y e s , p l e a s e g i ve d e t a i l a 
Name with r e l a t i o n Residence P o s i t i o n he ld with 
o r g a n i s a t i o n 
2. . 
3. . 
1 0 . Extension Conttv^t i 
J [ 0 ( a ) During pnet one your , how mony tiinno did yau moot tho f o l l o w i n g 
) 
extens ion pe r sonne l or v i c e v e r s a 7 
B.D.P.O* Cooperative Inspector;, 
I 
A.E.O. 
S o c i a l Ed • ^ Panchayat Oggicer 
/! (i 
V .L .W . VETERINARY DOCTOR 
1 0 ( b ) Do you have poraonaX contact® w i t h tho f a l l o w i n g oxtono ion 
p e r s o n n s l 7 
B . D . P . O . Yes/No C o o p o r o t i v e I nopoc to r Yes/No 
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11. Have you r e c e i v e d any t r a i n i n g o r g a n i s e d by tho e x t e n s i o n 
p e r s o n n e l d u r i n g 1978-79 L 1983-84 . 
Yes/No 
12. I f y e s , s p e c i f y the na tu re of such t r a i n i n g t 
2. 
13. Development B e n e f i t s : 
1 3 ( i ) P l o a s o s t a t e which of the f o l l o w i n g improved 
i 3 ( i i ) P r a c t i c e a you have hea rd , t r i e d and adopted 7 
P r a c t i c e A p p l i - Heard T r i ed Adopted 
c a b l e 
13 A A g r i c u l t u r a l P r a c t i c e a t 
1. high y i e l d ing seed 
2. Chemical f e r t i l i z e r 
(WP) 
3. Mul t ip le cropping 
4. Pli.nt protect ion 
5.Weedicide s 
6. Cul t ivator 
Animal Husbandry : 
I 
1. A 1 t i f i cicil/iinp ruv ed 
bull insemination 
2. Inocul tat ion of 
c a t t i e s 
3. Trec^tment of c a t t i e s 
by ve t e r inar ians 
13 C Health and S a n i t a t i o n ; 
1 . Birth contro l meaures_ 
2. Small pox/cholera 
vaccianation 
3. U.D.T. jipray 
14 State whether you have bo'rrowed loans from Gov e rn etn en t or 
bc-mi - Liuv cirniiion I liOurctJO fo r dnvi;! i.pincn IM I ,jurpO',i:; duimij 
1973-79 19Q3-B4. 
Yes/No 
r - I /, ; 
15. I f ytis, p l e a s e g i v e d e t a i l s of such lo^f ig ? 
D e s c r i p t i o n 
• £ 15 A A q c i c u l t u r e ; 
1. Crop Loan 
2. F e r t i l i z e r 
Taquavi 
Amount Sourc e Te rtn of Loan 
3. Implement's/ 
machinery 
4. LonU improvement 
5. N inur i r i i g u t i a n 
t 
G. Any o t h e r , s p e c i f y . 
1 5 t) Animal husbandry : 
1. L i v e s t o c k purchas,e_ 
2. Shed c o n t r u c t i o n 
3. Any other ( S p e c i f y ) , 
15 C H o r t i c u l t u r e : 
•v 
1. Panch ing/P lBnta t i on_ 
2. Any other ( s p e c i f y ) ^ 
15 D I n d u s t r i a l Loang ; 
1. M . j lu r i . i l /oqu i pmont 
bu i i id iMj conutruc t i un_ 
3. Any other ( s p e c i f y ) 
1 5 E f'li s c e l l a n e u u s 
1 . 
2 . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Tota l 
i 
15 F I f no, d id you make any attempt ^ 
to g e t l o a n s du r in g ^ 5119^7 9 a, 
15 G 
15 H 
15 1 
15 J 
Ha\/e eve r been exempted from 
pay ing tho l oyna or p a r t t ho roo f 
borrowed from the Governi^ent or 
seifl i -Governement sou rce s ? 
I f :/es, how much and in which 
year ? 
Have you receivt .d any- g r a n t s i n 
CCI&''' or kind from tha Govt, f o r 
the deve lopmenta l pu rposes dur ing 
1970-7 9 1983-04 , 
I f yesf please give de ta i l s of such 
grants : 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
YES/NO 
D e s c r i p t i o n ValiiB in R^ , 
with year 
Source 
15 J { A ) A q r i c u l t u r e 
1. Seeds 
2. F ev t i ; 
3. Lund imp rev cm (J nt 
4. Ltind ruclar.iuti on 
5. I mpluinent s/uc,uipmento 
(). 1' l.iii L pi u Luc Li.on 
1. 
1 C .' 
15 J B. A p p l i e d N u t r i t i o n Programme 
1. V e g e t a : l e s / f r u i t s seeds 
2. Kitchen g. rden implements^ , 
3. L i v e s t o c k p u r c h a s e s 
4. B u i l d i n g and equipment 
5. C h i l d f e e d i n g __ 
6. Feed ing of mothers _ 
7. Any o the r ( s p e c i f y ) __ 
15 J C. Hea l th and S a n i t a t i o n 
1, B i r t h c o n t r o l 
2. Ldod Cor compost p i t s 
U. Any other ( s p e c i f y ) 
15 J D. S o c i a l Educat ion 
1. 1 r . l in ing cuurst-s attL;nded_ 
2. H . id iu/ t rans i s t o r e 
3. Any ottiur ( s p e c i f y ) 
15 J A r t s tjnd C r a f t s 
1. Equipment 
2. M a t e r i a l 
3. Any othier ( s p e c i f y ) 
15 J F. Mas.ce l laneous 
1 . 
2. 
lur/vL 
A7> 
16 a Did any of your f a m i l y members r e c e i v e any p r i z e or reward 
in cash or kind f o r your p a r t i c i p a t i o n or puxfa rmance in 
dev e l opmtntal progri^mmes such es crop c cmp e t i t i on , development, 
baby show, l e a d e r s h i p , a r t s and c r a f t s e t c . du r ing 19 ? 
Yes/Mo 
17 I t yes , p l e a s e g i v e d e t a i l s of thu same : 
Items D e s c r i p t i o n Va lue in Rs. Source 
1. Crop por furmance 
2. Implement use 
3. Kitchen garden 
4. C a t t l e r e a r i n g 
5. P o u l t r y fa rming 
6. Baby show 
7. Games and s p o r t s 
8. House improvement 
9. A r t and C r a f t s 
10. Leade r sh ip 
11. Any other ( s p e c i f y ) 
47 ^ 
18 P l ea se s t a t e from which of, the f o l l o w i n g v i l l a g e 
amen i t i e s your f ami l y has d e r i v e d b e n e f i t s ? 
1 . Commonity/Inforroation c a n t r e 
2. Dr ink ing water w e l l 
3 . E l e c t r i c i t y 
4« Canal w a t e r / G o v t . t u b e w e l l s 
5. Lane pavement 
6 . Pucca d r a in s 
7. S t r e e t l i g h t s 
8. Rura l latr ines/common baths 
9. P .H .C ./Sub centre 
10. V e t e r i n a r y h o s p i t a l 
11. V i l l a g e schoo l 
12. Any other 
19 P l ease s p e c i f y any other k ind of b e n e f i t your f ami l y has 
secured from Government or semi-government o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
which proved you economica l l y g a i n f u l , 
20 Do you f e e l your a s s e t s have inc reased dur ing 1978-79 i 1983-84, 
I 
Yos/No , 
21 I f yoQ, p loaoe g ive d o t a i l e of your Q30oto» 
A s s e t s I n v e n t o r y P o s i t i o n in 1968 
No. V a l u e 
P o s i t i o n ot p r e sen t 
( 19 76) 
No. V^ lue 
A g r i c u l t u r a l A s s e t s 
1 . 1 . Lcm d { ncvcf j ) F oIn J 
I r r i g^ted 
21. 2. L i v e s t o c k s : 
Draught s n i m r l s 
M i l c h pnimals 
P o u l t r y U n i t s 
Others 
21. 3. Implements : 
T r f i c to r s 
T u b e w e l 1 / w e l l s 
Other implnmen t s 
21*4 N o n - A g r i c u l t u r a l a s s e t s 
21.4 1. B u i l d i n g s 
Resi den t i a l 
N o n - R e s i d e n t i e l 
21.4 2. M o t o r i s e d conveyance 
21.4 3, B u s i n e s s a s s e t s ( shops ) 
I n d u s t r y , p r t r o l ponp e t c . ) 
21.4 4. Financicj ' l a c s e t s l L I C ) 
22 hovj much of the i n c r e a s e i n . y u u r rrj^iet^, do yuu th ink , r.Lic to ' ri I 
Uuv ul U|JIIIUN L l'iu(jr,iiiiiiie ? Uu L uf h rup tu , wciuid yuu ;,<iy, 
A7 Q 
23. 
24. 
25, 
NIL 51-75 Pa i s e 
1-25 Ra i s e . 
26-50 P c i s c 
76-10n Pa i s e 
Percent ion obaut Dev el opi'ient Bf^nefits 
How much do you think the development ptogrnmrnes b e n e f i t e d 
you dur ing 1970-79 8. 1983-84. 
Very m uc h/in uc h/ l i t t l e/ not at a l l 
How much you think your f a m i l y incoiiie h ; s i nc reased dur ing 
1978-79 1983-B4 as a r e s u l t of the development progrcmmes? 
Over L rupee, would you say : 
NIL 51-75 P a i s e 6 
76-10U Pni£.o 1-25 PniHE, 
26-50 P a i s e A bov o rup ec one 
( S p e c i f y ) 
Which groups, do you th ink , have b e n e f i t e d most, some 
l e a s t from the development progrf.mmes 7 
Gr oup s B e n e f i t s 
1. Higher Castes 
2. Lower Cas tes 
3. Rice Peop le 
4. poor People 
5. Power Ho lders 
6. Peop le with l e s s or no power 
Most/Some/Le? st 
Most/Some/Least 
Most/Some/Least 
Most/Some/Least 
Most/Sume/Lea st 
Most/Some/Lea st 
r PM r-4 7 :> 
26 Why some peop l e in yoiJ^^  op in ion were ptde to get more 
development b e n e f i t s than o the r s 7 
K Grea te r i n f l u e n c e n" d appxO£jch 
2. More r e s o u r c e s to i n v e s t 
J. bruti ier r i sk -benr i tig c&pncity 
4. More a b l e to meet p o l i c y requirement 
5. More c l o g e to o f f i c i a l s 
6. O f f i c i a l s a re kept o b l i g e d 
7. Greater Knowledge of b e n e f i t s o f f e r ed 
6. More d e s i r o u s of ec°riomic g f i n s 
9. P o l i c y of t a r getiZc )tion 
10. P a r t i s a n s h i p of pnr'C l iayati r a j 
b (pdies/cocp. 
11. Any other ( S p e c i f y ) 
f.^ I 
1 . I d e n t i f i c f a t i on 
( a ) Nsme of the o f f i c i a l 
( b) Des i gnat i on 
( c ) E d u c a t i o n a l Q u a l i f i c u t i o n 
( d) Date of j o i n i n g the block 
( e ) T o t a l No .o f y e a r s of 
aRTvico in the IRDP/DRDA 
2. S^c io - economic p o s i t i o n 
S* 1 Occupat ions f o l l o w e d by 1. 
t iarning members of your 2 
f nmi ly , 
2.2 Lcind owned by your r f ami l y ( a c r 
2.3 Cr:ste name 
2.4 P l e a s e nyme i n st i t ut i on s/or gani s r; t i cn s of which :;ny 
member of your f m i l y hf^s been/ i s o member of an o f f i c e 
beare r i' 
Name of the P o s i t i o n he ld p o s i t i o n he ld 
O r g a n i s a t i o n nt p r e s e n t at p a s t with y 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
3. Equal V/s D i f f e r e n t i a l , t r ea tment 
T . I V^luit mjj jor cun ' j ideru t i on £, gL 'ncr , . l ly gu ide yctir d e c i s i o n ! 
with regr5rd to the number of v i s i t s tu any vi l lc .qt ; ? 
1 . : 3. 
2. 4. 
40' 
3 .2 In v i ew of your pa s t e x p e r i e n c e , p l e a s e s t e t e which of the 
f o l l o w i n g you o f t e n approach dur'^.ng your vi l lc . -ge v i s i t ? 
, Peoplt! with Pov ; e r / in f l uence 
2. P eop l e with l i t t l e or no power 
3. Peop l e of h igher d^^ss 
4. Peop l e o f l owe r c l a s s 
5, P eop l e o f h igher CF;ste 
6. Peop le uf lower c a s t e 
3.3 In your e x p e r i e n c e , which of the f o l l o w i n g o f t en p r o v i d e s 
o u t i s f a c t o r y f o o d nnd s tay a r rangements to the extenai^-'n 
p e r s o n n e l 7 
1. P e o p l e with p ower/in f 1 uenc s 
Pei -p lc with l i t t l e / o r no power 
3. Pei-plti of h igher c l c s s 
4. P eop l e uf l o w e r c i : ss 
5, Peop le of h i g h e r c a s t e 
6. Peop l e of lower c a s t e 
1 
3 .4 Whom of the f o l l o w i n g d id you f i n d most r e s p o n s i v e find 
h e l p f u l in f u r t h e r a n c e of the dov elopirient progrf,mmes ? 
1. Peop l e with p o w c r / i n f l u e n c e 
wit. h 1 i t U fir nu 
3. PoL'pJa of hi yhei c l . r, 
4. P eop l e of c l ^ s s 
5. Peop l e of h igher coste 
6. P cup It: of lovjcr iJriste 
3.5 In your op in i on , which of the f o l l o w i h y hove b e n e f i t e d most , 
% 
some and l e a s t from the development programmes. 
Groups of P e o p l e Buinefita r c c c i vud 
1. Peop l e with power/ in f l uence^ 
2. Peop l e with l i t t l e or no power_ 
3. P e o p l e of h igher c l a s s 
4. P eop l e of l owe r c l a s s 
5. Peop l e of h i ghe r c a s t e 
6. Peop l e of l o w e r c a s t e 
most some l e a s t 
m ost some l ea s t 
most some l e a s t 
most some l e a s t 
most some l e a s t 
m Ost s om e l e a s t 
3 .6 VJhy some peup ie in your op in ion have r e ce i v ed mure b e n e f i t s 
than o t h e r s from the proyrommes ? 
1_j 1. Greater influtMicr: i.u -'pprur^Lh 
2. More rugourcea to invest. 
' 3. G rea t e r r i s k bi; 11 r i n (J c a p ri c i t y 
M. Mure a b l e to meet p o l i c y r equ i r ement s 
5. More c l o s e to o f f i c i a l s 
6, O r f i p i a l s a re kept o b l i g e d 
7. Greater Knowledge of b e n e f i t s o f f e r e d 
8, More d e s i r o u s of economic g a i n s 
V. P o l i c y of t a r g c t i z a t i on 
1 0 . P a r t i s a n of Ponchayut i Hnj D odi e s/C cop er a t-
i v es 
J 1 . P o l i c y of b e n e f i t i n g lower c a s t e 
_1 Hi ijli L.i ' it.( ) ut I i I, t . l i ij 
4. Contact with Sampled V i l l a g e s : 
{To be admin is tered among those extens ion pe rsonne l only who ere 
conccjrfied with the development of the jsumplcd v i l l a ' , e s 
4.1 Appruxirndtely tiow nuiMy tiinua iJurintj luut unu ye^r did 
you v i s i t the f o l l o w i n y v i l l i i g c j : 
a . IMLANI (A ) 
b. A DA UN (A) 
c . B£RTHAL(K) 
(J. IjIKIll (A ) 
4 ,2 P loBsa name a t l e a s t f i v e persons from each v i l l a g e whom 
did you meet during your v i s i t s to these v i l l u g e s 7 
« 
I^LAM (A ) A DA UN' (A) BERTHrtL (K) SI KRI ( K) 
1. 1. 1. 
• 2 » I » 
3 . 3. 3. 
4 . 4 . 4 . 
5. 5. b. 
4,3 Plc'tjse noiiie those person^ who hc^ve extended ^lCJspit£lity to 
you dur ing your v i s i t to these v i l l a g e s 
IdLANI (A ) ADAUN (A ) I3ERTHAL (K) SlK^^ (K) 
1 . J . 1. 
2. 2 . - 2. 
3. 3. 3. 
4 . 4 . 
5 . 5 . 5 . 
ty-'i 
4,4 P l e a s e mentione names of a t l e a s t f i v e pe r sons from 
each v i l l a g e who have come t o see you in your o f f i c e 
du r ing l a s t one y e a r , 
r 
( M adaun (A ) ^ m i - i K i 
1. 
2., 
3., 
4. 
1 • » • 
2. 
1 • 
2. 
3. 3. 3. 
4. 4. , 4. 
5. 5. Y 5. 
4. 5 P l e a s e name f i v e pe r sons from each v i l l a g e whom you found 
most rc 's i jonsivo and h e l p f u l in fu r ther anco of the development 
programme 
I NLp M (A ) ADAUN (A ) DERTHAL (t<) SIKHI (K ) 
1 . 1 . 1. 1 . 
2. 2. 2. 
J. 3. 3. 3. 
4. 4. 4. 4. 
5. 5. 5. 5. 
4.6 P l e a s e mention niimes of ten persons from ench v i l l a g e who 
in your knowledge* have 
development programme ? 
b ene f i t ed most from c omiii un i t y 
UILANI lAL A DA UN (A ) BtRTHAL (K) SIKHI (K) 
1. 1. 1 . 1 . 
2. 2. 2. 2. 
3. 3. 3. 3. Y 
4. 4. 4. 4. 
5. 5. 5. 5. 
6. 6. 6. 6. 
7. 7. 7. 7. 
8. 8. 8. 8. 
9. 9. 9. 9. 
10. ID. ID. K!. 
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